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ABSTRACT  
 
 
The thesis investigates, from a contextual and user perspective, the implementation processes 
of microfinance interventions and the effect of the implementation processes on households 
and businesses. The thesis‘ central argument is that microfinance discourse has neglected the 
perspective of microfinance users and this can negatively affect microfinance interventions as 
development tools. The study examines two microfinance interventions, Nsoatreman Women 
Empowerment Programme and Sinapi Aba Trust, in Nsoatre, a rural community in Ghana. 
Data for the study is from secondary sources, 26 interviews and 100 questionnaires. The 
study was guided by the philosophical ideas underlying the Sustainable Livelihood Approach 
and the Interpretive Approach. Using qualitative, cross-tabulations and ordinal logistic 
regression, the analysis found that the microfinance institutions studied essentially employ 
top-down approaches and that the perception of microfinance as non-paternalistic is not 
supported by this study. The mode of group formation has significant ramifications on 
subsequent group activities and peer monitoring played a limited role in mitigating moral 
hazard. Service users exhibited noticeable lack of knowledge on intervention activities. 
Microfinance interventions contribute to household consumption more than it does to 
household asset accumulation. Poorer service users reported more household and business 
benefits. The findings suggest a reappraisal of the design of microfinance interventions, 
especially in rural areas.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
Microfinance has gained global acclaim as an important poverty reduction tool in many 
developing countries (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Gibbons and Meehan, 2002; Armendariz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Copestake, Greeley, Johnson, Kabeer and Simanowitz 2005; 
Bakhtiari, 2006). According to Morduch (2000), few recent innovations have held much hope 
for reducing poverty in developing countries as microfinance. Indeed microfinance is 
perceived as a crucial driving mechanism towards achieving the millennium development 
target of halving extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 (Simanowitz, 2002; Fernando, 2004; 
Arun, Imai and Sinha, 2006). Mohammed Yunus
1
 even described microfinance as a human 
right. According to leading advocates in the field, microfinance has the capacity to efficiently 
and effectively provide sustainable financial services to poor households who are otherwise 
excluded from the conventional financial systems for lack of collateral. Casting aside the 
euphoria on microfinance, a sober question can be asked ‗does microfinance really reduce 
poverty?‘  
  
The above question has generated scores of studies that have endeavoured to ascertain 
whether microfinance does indeed reduce poverty. Impact assessments have been the 
preferred method of assessing microfinance institutions‘ effect on poverty. A study by Pitt 
and Khandker (1998), which was reputed to be one of the most rigorous studies at its time, 
found positive effects of microfinance. However doubts have been cast on this study by 
                                                 
1
 Mohammed Yunus, a Nobel laureate, is acclaimed to be the ‗father‘ of microcredit and is the founder of the 
Grameen Bank.  
2 
 
Roodman and Morduch (2009) after a review of the data employed in the study. In the last 
three years studies using randomised control trials have emerged as more credible means of 
investigating microfinance (see Giné, Harigaya, Karlan, and Nguyen, 2006; Karlan and 
Zinman, 2008a; Karlan and Zinman, 2008b; Karlan and Zinman, 2009). Almost all the 
studies share similar weakness: characteristics of service users, the context in which 
interventions operate and implementation processes of microfinance interventions have not 
been well articulated and understood. This had led to the impression of microfinance 
institutions and service users as being homogenous. Additionally impact assessments 
endeavour to assess the quantum of impact on service users but seldom investigate why such 
observed impacts occur.    
 
Other studies have examined components of microfinance institutions but most of these have 
concentrated on individual components such as on loans, groups, interest rates and savings. 
Studies that assess the entire implementation process from the perspective of service users are 
lacking in microfinance literature. This has resulted in disjointed understanding how 
microfinance institutions work and affect poverty. Again like impact assessments, studies on 
the various components have observed microfinance interventions from the perspective of 
microfinance institutions rather than from users of microfinance services.  
 
Finally, microfinance research has mainly depended on institutional designs
2
 in 
understanding how microfinance interventions are implemented rather than how they are 
actually implemented. Thus these studies fail to capture the implementation gap- the 
difference between what was supposed to be implemented and what is actually implemented.  
 
                                                 
2
 Institutional designs refer to stated formal implementation plans of the intervention which are supposed to be 
put into action.    
3 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study   
Given the problems identified in the microfinance literature, the main aim of this study is to 
assess the implementation processes of microfinance interventions and their effect on poverty 
outcomes from the perspective of service users. The specific objectives are: 
1. To assess the implementation processes of microfinance interventions and their 
effects from the perspective of service users. 
2. To assess the effect of the various microfinance components on poverty outcomes and 
taking context into consideration.  
3. To identify the implementation gaps in the microfinance interventions studied. 
 
1.3 Main Research Questions and Sub-Questions  
This study seeks to understand how microfinance interventions are implemented and how the 
various components of the intervention affect households and businesses of service users. In 
this context the overall research question of this thesis is: how do implementation processes 
affect poverty reduction by microfinance in rural Ghana? To answer the research 
question two main questions and sub-questions were formulated.  
 
I. How are microfinance interventions implemented and how do they affect activities 
within the intervention? 
1. To what extent are contextual factors and perceptions of service users taken into 
account in the design of microfinance interventions and what are the implications? 
2. Are there any differences between microfinance institutions‘ intended and actual 
implementation practices and what are its ramifications? 
3. What are the role and implications of microfinance interventions in group formation 
and dynamics?  
4. How do microfinance institutions‘ loan activities affect service users‘ loan 
management? 
5. To what extent are non-financial services relevant to service users? 
6. How do service users perceive costs of microfinance and why? 
 
4 
 
II. How do microfinance implementation processes affect poverty reduction?   
1. Do characteristics of service users and their businesses influence poverty reduction 
and why? 
2. What are the effects of microfinance interventions on businesses and households?  
3. Do group formation and subsequent activities influence poverty reduction? 
4. How do loan matters affect poverty reduction?  
5. Do savings facilities of microfinance institutions enable service users to reduce 
poverty?  
6. What is the relationship between costs of microfinance and poverty reduction?    
  
The above main- and sub-questions were formulated in section 3.3 after the review of the 
literature and identification of the approach that guide the research process. They are 
reproduced here to show the sequential flow of the research logic. The research question 
stated above is answered in chapters 6 and 7. Specifically, the first main research question 
including its six sub-questions investigates the implementation processes of microfinance 
interventions in chapter 6.  The second main question and its accompanying six sub-questions 
examine the effect of the implementation process on poverty reduction in chapter 7.  
 
1.4 Scope and Delimitations of the Study 
This study is concerned with how the components of microfinance interventions are 
implemented and how these processes affect poverty. The study focuses on microfinance 
interventions in a rural area in Ghana. It involves service users‘ perceptions of microfinance 
interventions‘ implementation processes and their effect on businesses and households of 
service users for the period they had been in the intervention. If data is obtained from staff 
and documents of the microfinance institution then it is to serve as a basis for comparison 
with information collected from service users or to understand certain aspects of the 
5 
 
intervention process. The study also concentrates on microfinance interventions which have a 
poverty reduction focus.  
   
The emphasis on contextuality constitutes the strength of this study but this can be a 
limitation with respect to generalisability of the results. The results of this study can only be 
strictly generalisable to the geographical area studied. To overcome this limitation, efforts 
will be expended at selecting a community that is typical in the region of study. Additionally, 
some inferences can be made to neighbouring areas that share a context similar to that of the 
study area because most of the microfinance interventions in Ghana have adopted versions of 
the Grameen model and therefore have similar modes of operation
3
.  
  
1.5 Justification of the Study 
The microfinance industry and research is increasingly focussing on institutional 
sustainability (Hulme and Arun, 2009). Strategies at ensuring the sustainability of 
microfinance institutions and ending their dependence on subsidies and external finance have 
preoccupied microfinance discourse. In ensuring the sustainability of microfinance 
institutions, financial sustainability
4
 has assumed increasing importance in the microfinance 
industry and literature. The idea of striving for financial sustainability is that it is institutions 
which do not depend on external support or subsidies that can grow and achieve wide 
outreach and have the maximum impact on service users (Robinson, 2003). Bateman and 
Chang (2009) reject the implicit assumption in Robinson‘s argument that providing the poor 
with microfinance services will automatically result in the poverty reduction. Emphasis on 
                                                 
3
 Most microfinance institutions have adopted versions of the Grameen methodology: joint liability, regimented 
and short repayment periods, dynamic incentives among others.  
4
 Rosengard (2001) defines financial sustainability as the development of products and delivery systems that 
meet client needs, at prices that cover all costs of providing these financial services.  
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financial and institutional sustainability has compromised opportunities for ensuring that 
microfinance interventions have the maximum effect on poverty (Simanowitz, 2002). When 
poverty reduction has been considered at all in microfinance research, loan repayment rates 
have been primarily employed as proxy for poverty reduction. Empirical evidence suggests 
that repayment rates may not be good indicators of poverty reduction (see Marr, 2003; 
Copeland, 2009). In addition to the above microfinance research rarely emphasises the 
perspective of the users the financial services. Impact assessments have tried to assess 
microfinance using objective indicators such as income which can be quite problematic, 
especially in the rural context in developing countries
5
. 
 
Given the above situation in the state of research in microfinance, this study is deemed 
important because it intends to put the understanding of microfinance implementation and its 
effects on households and businesses in the spotlight. The implementation process will be 
observed through the viewpoint of the users of the intervention and the effects of 
microfinance components assessed on indicators that service users deem relevant to them. In 
addition, this thesis will interpret its findings in the context in which the microfinance 
interventions are implemented. This should enable a better understanding of the microfinance 
processes and effects.  
 
The study of the implementation processes and their effects on poverty reduction is essential 
because microfinance institutions in Ghana have mostly replicated versions of the Grameen 
model with very little documented knowledge of its applicability and relevance to the 
Ghanaian context, especially in rural areas. Mknelly and Kevane (2002) argue that lessons 
                                                 
5
 Assessing incomes in rural communities are problematic due to difficulties associated with trying to quantify 
in monetary terms the substantial subsistence and non-monetised economy prevalent in most rural economies. In 
addition the complex nature of rural livelihood (including seasonal fluctuations) makes the assessment of 
incomes from these myriad of sources difficult and prone to under- or over-reporting.   
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learned from Asian and Latin American experiences may not be applicable to West Africa. It 
is hoped that this study will illuminate the relatively unknown service users‘ perception of the 
Grameen model of microfinance, especially in rural areas.   
  
Very few studies explicitly study microfinance interventions through the eyes of the 
beneficiaries (Marr, 2002, 2003; Johnson and Copestake, 2002). The ‗view of microfinance 
from below‘, that is service users‘ perception of microfinance not only helps to fill a gap in 
the microfinance literature but also constitutes an ingredient for making microfinance 
effective as a development intervention in developing countries. It is argued that service 
users‘ demand, motivations, and the degree of their participation in the activities of 
interventions depend on their perception of the interventions. Microfinance interventions will 
become more relevant for development if perceptions of service users are taken into account 
in the design and implementation of microfinance interventions.  
 
A perusal of the literature indicates that few studies, for example Marr, 2002, have examined 
the effect of the various the components of microfinance interventions on households and 
businesses of service users. Furthermore, studies that try to systematically link the 
components of microfinance interventions to poverty outcomes (household and business 
effects) from the perspective of service users and taking contextual information into 
consideration are fewer in the microfinance literature. Contributing to the research gap just 
mentioned is perhaps the most important justification for this study and an innovation in 
microfinance studies. The findings of this study should not only add to the literature on 
microfinance but have practical relevance in the microfinance industry. In other words, the 
findings of this thesis are expected to enhance microfinance‘s relevance to poverty reduction. 
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1.6 Structure of the Study 
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. Each chapter addresses certain aspects of the 
study and it is designed in logical sequence towards answering the research question.  As an 
introductory chapter, this chapter provides a brief background on microfinance and identifies 
the research problem. Chapter I explains the aims and objectives; research questions; scope 
and limitations of the study; and significance and justification of the study. Chapter II 
reviews the state of knowledge on microfinance with the research problem in mind. It aims at 
ascertaining the extent of the problem identified in chapter one including identifying and 
narrowing research questions. The chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of methods 
which have been employed in addressing similar problems. The review also aims at 
disaggregating and understanding the concept of microfinance. The review of the state of 
knowledge on microfinance is expected to provide some methodological and theoretical 
pointers for this study and also clarify the identified research problem.  
 
Chapter III presents the analytic framework of the study. Based on the research problem 
theoretical and methodological constructs are devised to address the research problem. The 
study identifies the philosophical ideas underlying Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) 
as a guide to the formulation of research questions and analysis. The interpretive approach 
was introduced mainly to guide the fieldwork activities and analysis of data. The research 
questions were formulated at this stage and they were largely informed by the SLA. The 
methodological strategy employed in the study is then introduced and justified. The mixed 
method approach was deemed to be the most appropriate and how it will be applied in the 
various stages of the research process explained. Finally a model of the analytic framework is 
presented and explained.  
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Chapter IV sets out to identify the rural community and the microfinance interventions to be 
studied. A brief economic and political background of Ghana is presented. The chapter 
focuses on the financial regulatory framework of the country emphasising aspects which are 
relevant to microfinance. The financial regulatory framework of Ghana recognises three 
levels of financial/microfinance institutions (formal, semi-formal and informal).  The 
distinction between informal and semi-formal is quite blurred and leaves a gap for the 
exploitation of the poor. The background of the area of study, Nsoatre, is presented next. The 
financial, economic and pertinent cultural characteristics are discussed. The backgrounds of 
the two financial institutions are then presented. While Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) is a financial 
NGO purposely established to provide microfinance services, Nsoatreman Rural Bank 
(NRB), which operates the Nsoatreman Womens‘ Empowerment Programme (NWEP), is a 
formal banking institution.   
 
After the identification of the microfinance institutions to be studied, the next stage was the 
collection and analysis of data, which is captured in Chapter V. The chapter recounts the 
activities and strategies employed in gaining access to respondents. The processes of data 
collection and their administration are also presented in this chapter. Both qualitative and 
quantitative data were collected. The data collection was sequential with the qualitative data 
collected first using semi-structured interviews. Preliminary analyses from the interviews 
were incorporated into the construction of the questionnaire. A lot of effort was expended to 
ensure that data collected were valid and reliable. Finally the chapter presents the techniques 
for analysing the data collected. The qualitative and quantitative data were analysed 
separately but were combined to answer the questions raised in the next two chapters.  
 
10 
 
Chapter VI is concerned with understanding the implementation process of the two 
microfinance interventions. Service users‘ perception of the components and implementation 
process forms the basis of the analysis in chapter six. The findings are interpreted in the 
cultural, social and economic context of the study area. The findings of the chapter reveal 
new insights which hitherto have not been uncovered in the microfinance literature. Chapter 
VII examines the effect of the components and the implementation process on poverty 
outcomes. Poverty outcomes refer to the effect of the intervention on households and 
businesses. Indicators for households and businesses were constructed from groups of 
variables.  
 
Finally, Chapter VIII summarises the thesis. Significant findings under each research 
question are identified and discussed. In the process contribution of the thesis to the state of 
knowledge in microfinance is explicated. The chapter ends with limitations and suggestions 
for further studies.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF MICROFINANCE INTERVENTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
2.1 Introduction  
How have microfinance interventions been assessed? What does the extant literature 
contribute to the microfinance assessment debate? What methodological approaches have 
been used and how have these approaches impacted on findings? Chapter I presented the 
research problem and provided justification for answering the question. This chapter intends 
to answer the above questions by analysing the existing state of knowledge on microfinance 
with the view of clearly identifying the gap in previous research in the area for which this 
study will make a contribution. The review of the relevant knowledge in microfinance is 
expected to help develop sharp and insightful research questions. The review of the relevant 
literature on microfinance is important for determining what is known and unknown about 
the chosen research topic and also keep abreast with current research approaches and trends 
and debates. The assessment of the state of knowledge relevant to the research topic is 
expected to inform the analytical framework, methods of collecting data and analysis.   
 
This chapter begins with a disaggregation and analysis of the term ‗microfinance‘ and finally 
postulates a working definition for this thesis. Next, this chapter examines the parallel 
between changes in development ideology and microfinance to enable the understanding of 
the changing perceptions of microfinance and why it has gained so much popularity as a 
development tool. As part of identifying the gap in the literature, the chapter presents and 
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reviews some classic impact assessment studies. The rest of the chapter presents and 
discusses studies on the various components of microfinance interventions and how they 
impact on poverty. The chapter concludes with implications of the relevant literature on 
microfinance for this thesis.  
 
2.2 What is Microfinance? Disaggregating the Concept 
Microfinance has become a popular and fashionable word in financial and development 
circles. What then is microfinance? This is what CGAP (2010:1) has to say about 
microfinance:  
―Microfinance‖ is often defined as financial services for poor and low-income clients. 
In practice, the term is often used more narrowly to refer to loans and other services 
from providers that identify themselves as ―microfinance institutions‖ (MFIs). These 
institutions commonly tend to use new methods developed over the last 30 years to 
deliver very small loans to unsalaried borrowers, taking little or no collateral. These 
methods include group lending and liability, pre-loan savings requirements, gradually 
increasing loan sizes, and an implicit guarantee of ready access to future loans if 
present loans are repaid fully and promptly. 
 
In addition to the definition above, Azevedo‘s (2007) adds another dimension: the rationale 
for the provision of microfinance services.  ‗The term microfinance refers to the provision of 
financial services for low-income households and micro entrepreneurs (both urban and rural) 
for productive purposes‘ (ibid: 301). However whether microfinance is always provided for 
productive purposes is debatable. This issue is further discussed in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
 
To say microfinance is provided by microfinance institutions is not always correct. In recent 
times it is common to find many essentially non-financial NGOs and commercial banks 
involved in microfinance. These institutions cannot be called microfinance institutions. The 
difference between microfinance interventions and microfinance institutions is discussed in 
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Appendix 4. Continuing, the two definitions above represent the common conception of 
microfinance. They portray the common conception of microfinance: financial services that 
formal institutions provide for the poor. Seibel (1999) and Wright and Rippey, (1999) 
challenge these definitions and argue for a more inclusive view of microfinance. They 
contend that microfinance should be more inclusive and should take into consideration 
informal financial arrangements such as moneylenders and financial support from relatives 
which constitute an important source of financial assistance for the poor. Although informal 
financial services are technically part of microfinance, the term is generally known and used 
to refer to the provision of financial services to the poor by formal institutions such as the 
Grameen Bank, BRAC and FINCA. Some scholars prefer to use the term ‗institutional 
microfinance‘ to refer to microfinance excluding informal financial services. For instance, 
when Robinson (1995) advocates the movement of microfinance away from subsidised credit 
to financial intermediation on commercial basis, it is with reference to financial services 
provided by formal institutions.  
 
What is microfinance from the perspective of its service users? Copestake defines 
microfinance in relation to its users employing another of CGAP‘s definition:  
 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (the apex association of international 
donors who support microfinance) regards microfinance as ―a powerful tool to fight 
poverty‖ that can help poor people to ―raise income, build their assets and cushion 
themselves against external shocks.‖ (CGAP, 2004a:1). Microfinance is defined here in 
relation to its users - rather than in relation to other forms of finance - as the supply of 
savings, credit, insurance and payment services to relatively poor people. Copestake 
(2007:1). 
 
Rutherford (1999), on the other hand, perceives microfinance as the means by which poor 
people convert sums of money into large lump sums. Although Copestake and Rutherford‘s 
definitions add important dimensions to the definition of microfinance, they do not mention 
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the various services that the poor access through microfinance. In addition, Rutherford‘s 
conception of microfinance does not indicate how microfinance enables poor people to 
convert sums of money into lump sums.  
 
Ledgerwood (1999:1) provides a more comprehensive definition of institutional 
microfinance: 
 
The term [microfinance] refers to the provision of financial services to low-income 
clients, including the self-employed. Financial services generally include savings and 
credit; however some microfinance organisations provide insurance and payment 
services. In addition to financial intermediation, many MFIs provide social 
intermediation services such as group formation, development of self-confidence and 
training in financial literacy and management capabilities among members of a group. 
Thus the definition of microfinance often includes both financial intermediation and 
social intermediation. Microfinance is not simply banking, it is a developmental tool. 
Microfinance activities usually involve: 
 Small loans typically for working capital 
 Informal appraisal of borrowers and investments  
 Collateral substitutes, such as group guarantees and compulsory savings 
 Access to repeat and larger loans, based on repayment performance  
 Streamlined loan disbursement and monitoring  
 Secure savings products 
 
Ledgerwood‘s definition encapsulates non-financial services, an essential but 
neglected component in definitions, which enables the poor to make efficient use 
of microfinance.  
 
Gallardo (2002) investigates how microfinance is defined in the Ghanaian context from the 
perspective of the central bank, the Bank of Ghana (BoG). The Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI) of Bank of Ghana classify microfinance as lending to borrowers with the 
capacity to support loans of less than GH¢100 and in the case of group lending—with joint 
and several guarantees of members of the group—for an amount not exceeding GH¢500. 
With the high level of inflation in Ghana definitions that give precise figures become out of 
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date after a short while
6
. Buyske (2004) estimates the average global microfinance loan to be 
around $400 (about GH¢ 600). It is argued that it is poor people‘s inability to access formal 
financial services that triggered the use of innovative methods of making financial services 
available to them. Microfinance loans must therefore be small amounts which the poor can 
effectively manage.  
 
Is microfinance aimed at poverty reduction? The general consensus demonstrates that 
microfinance is inextricably linked to poverty reduction particularly with regard to 
developing countries (Haynes, Seawright, Giauque, 2000). Ledgerwood (1999) argues that 
microfinance does not aim at just providing services, it is a development tool. Littlefield, 
Murdoch and Hashemi (2003), Simanowitz and Brody (2004) and UNCDF (2005a) perceive 
an important role for microfinance in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). UNCDF (2005b) argues that microfinance underpins the achievement of many 
Millennium Development Goals and plays a key role in many of its strategies. Although 
many studies postulate two or three other objectives of microfinance, there is overwhelming 
evidence that at least in developing countries microfinance is regarded as an important 
poverty reduction tool.  
 
In summarising the above definitions and discussions of microfinance, the following salient 
factors emerge: microfinance is an activity that employs certain innovative techniques (joint 
liability, savings collateral etc) to provide some services (financial and non-financial) to a 
certain category of people (the poor who do not have access to formal sources of financial 
services) for a certain purpose (principally for investment in business) and aimed at achieving 
a certain objective (poverty reduction-at least in developing countries).  It is important to note 
                                                 
6
 Individuals routinely borrow GH¢500 and above in microfinance interventions (see Table 2.1A and 2.2A in 
Appendix 2). 
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that microfinance as a concept is dynamic. Where, why and how microfinance has been 
implemented has undergone a many changes and this is discussed in the section that follows.  
 
2.3 Changing Perceptions and Theories of Microfinance 
Why does microfinance take the form that it does today and what accounts for the changes in 
conceptualisation of microfinance over time? To answer this question the study reviews and 
analyses how prevailing development ideologies and perceptions of poverty have influenced 
the conception and direction of microfinance over time. It briefly discusses factors that 
precipitated the need for microfinance interventions and some theories concerning the 
relationship between microfinance and poverty reduction.  
 
2.3.1 Changes in Development Thinking and Microfinance: The 
Parallelisms 
Changes in development thinking and ideological climate from the 1950s posed major 
challenges to how anti-poverty strategies, especially microfinance, were conceptualised and 
implemented. Tracing and analysing these developments through time helps explain how and 
why microfinance took the forms and features that it did and also account for the state of the 
present microfinance industry. Modes and rationale for the delivery of microfinance services 
have undergone changes over the years with the major drivers being changing development 
ideas and society‘s perceptions of poverty. Shifting development paradigms and perceptions 
of poverty have proved to be crucial determinants in the management, nature and scope of 
poverty reduction interventions like microfinance. 
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Three major waves are identified concerning the provision of financial services to the poor. 
The first was the provision of heavily subsidised credit to poor farmers with almost exclusive 
emphasis on poverty reduction during the 1950s to the 1970s. The second wave which began 
in the 1980s involved the provision of microcredit to mainly non-farm micro-enterprises by 
mostly NGOs. The third and the most recent involved the realisation of the multiple and 
complex financial needs of the poor and hence the introduction of microfinance which 
involves financial intermediation and an orientation towards profit-making. It is important to 
note that categorisation of microfinance institutions into waves should not be considered as 
distinct periods without overlaps. For instance the Unit Desas or Village Banks, the rural 
financial institution of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), operated as a financial intermediary 
and adopted market-oriented interest rates as far back as 1983 when subsidised microcredit 
was in vogue (Hulme and Mosley, 1996).      
 
With regard to the first wave, the creation of formal agricultural credit systems, also known 
as Agricultural Development Banks (ADBs) by donors and governments between the 1950s 
and the 1970s was inspired by the idea that widespread shortage of credit constituted a major 
constraint to development of agriculture which happened to be the backbone of most 
developing countries (Yaron, 1992). The dearth of credit they envisaged, resulted in low rates 
of agricultural productivity, lack of employment opportunities, inadequate incomes and low 
savings rates. This period was dominated by the meritocratic explanations of poverty. 
According to Morduch (1999) received wisdom and the general perception of the poor during 
this period was that they were ignorant of the means of lifting themselves out of poverty and 
did not work hard enough. It was assumed that the poor could not save enough to accumulate 
assets and could not afford credit on commercial interest rates.  
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In conformity with the then prevailing state-led development paradigm, as exemplified by the 
Keynesian economic doctrine which provided a justification for greater economic role for 
governments, the ADBs, which were usually state-sponsored financial institutions, were 
tasked with the responsibility of offering subsidised microloans to small-scale farmers. They 
encouraged the adoption of new technology through training and education in agricultural 
production techniques and entrepreneurship and thus ensuring the growth of the agricultural 
sector in general (Yaron, 1992; Morduch, 1999a). Microfinance reflected the top-down and 
supply-driven ideas prevalent at that period.  
  
In spite of the good intentions and the advantage of operating on national scale, ADBs nearly 
failed universally and their disaster stories are well-documented (Gonzalez-Vega and 
Graham, 1995; Robinson, 1995; Morduch, 2000). As already mentioned, ADBs mostly 
adopted supply-driven strategies that neglected savings-mobilisation and other financial 
services in favour of external funding and emphasised top-down controls. These banks also 
had weak and dysfunctional governance structures and internal control mechanisms which 
were unable to prevent political intrusion and the disciplining of delinquent borrowers 
(Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995).   
 
The second wave begun in the 1980s with the realisation that the poor were not ignorant after 
all and that they were entrepreneurs who needed an institutional environment that would 
permit them to play their part in the development process (Chamlee-Wright, 2005). The 
structural explanation of poverty was in vogue: poverty was mainly a result of the market 
game and the unfair distribution of resources in the society (Khandakar, 2004). General 
development ideas shifted from supply- to demand-driven approaches. This new thinking led 
to the increased realisation of the multiple and complex financial requirements of the poor.  
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As a result household and livelihood sustainability dynamics became important in 
microfinance so that the issue of fungibility, which hitherto was perceived as a hindrance in 
targeted financial interventions, became an important strategy for the microfinance users 
(Hulme, 1997).  
 
With the new development thinking in mind frontline development organisations started to 
offer microfinance services to poor households (usually women
7
). This mainly Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) approach to poverty reduction involved the provision of 
loans to create income-generating activities in mostly the non-farm sectors of rural 
economies.  Microfinance organisations during this period mainly provided subsidised 
microcredit, while a few, like the Grameen Bank, demanded regular compulsory savings as a 
precondition for accessing credit (Khandakar, 2004). 
 
The third wave started with the permeation of the ideology of neo-liberalism into most 
developing countries which resulted in the removal of controls in financial sectors through 
programmes such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) in Ghana. These developments together with the Microcredit 
Summit of 1997 spawned the idea of a new concept for microfinance (Khandakar, 2004). 
Hitherto microfinance consisted almost entirely of allocating only loans or microcredit
8
 to 
service users. Although the ideas of microcredit and microfinance are similar, they differ 
significantly in motives and modes of operations (Robinson, 1995). Unlike microcredit which 
provides mainly credit, microfinance is involved in financial intermediation. Again unlike 
microcredit institutions which are mostly altruistic and welfarist inclined, microfinance 
organisations are usually inspired by the profit motive (ibid). Contemporary microfinance 
                                                 
7
 For reasons why microfinance institutions cater to mostly women see section 2.6. 
8
 Some researchers such as Malcolm Harper argue that microfinance is still essentially about microcredit. 
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institutions usually intend to become self-sustaining and end their dependence on external 
finance. This objective, which is to ensure institutional sustainability and growth (outreach), 
has now become the central issue in the microfinance industry.  
 
Burkett (2007) says microfinance enjoys ever-growing funding and enthusiasm in recent 
times because the concept of microfinance is in consonance with the neoliberal and 
neoconservative economic agenda which emphasise market-oriented solutions to 
development. The idea of poor people working their way out of poverty is attractive to an 
ideological position that approaches poverty reduction through the engagement in notions of 
‗active individualism‘ that evoke empowerment and entrepreneurial activities and economic 
citizenship. Microfinance is attractive because it promotes the means of building people‘s 
capacity to participate in economic activities and create social capital but de-emphasises 
structural analysis and collective responses.  
 
In sum microfinance programmes have reflected the development ideology prevalent during 
the different epochs. The recent models of microfinance have been shaped by contemporary 
discourse in development. Thus it is important to understand that as much as it is argued that 
microfinance is driven by research and innovations, the underlying drivers of change in 
microfinance have been development ideologies.    
 
2.3.2 Theories of Microfinance 
According to Hulme and Mosley (1996), the proposition that capital investment and other 
financial services constitute key determinants of economic growth and income improvement 
continues to drive most development efforts including microfinance. Hulme and Mosley 
(1996) cite a large number of research results that indicate a strong and positive correlation 
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between growth and the share of investments in GDP. It is precisely this idea that drives 
microfinance. It is assumed that like the positive relationship between financial investment 
and economic growth, financial investment in the poor through microfinance services will 
lead to increased incomes of the poor and ultimately result in poverty reduction (Hulme, 
1997). El-Solh (1999) argues that microfinance cannot by itself generate income but should 
be perceived as an important input in the process of developing micro-enterprises. 
Microfinance institutions are perceived as important because they fund micro- and small-
scale enterprises which are integral to the private sector which in turn are perceived as an 
engine of growth for economies of developing countries that have moved from state-directed 
to market-oriented economies.  
 
El-Solh (1999) postulates two theoretical propositions on the macro-level for supporting 
microfinance interventions: economic and human resources. By enabling the establishment of 
new micro-enterprises, microfinance supports the efficient use of labour and capital as factors 
of production and therefore contributing to economic growth and ultimately to sustainable 
development. The human resources theory is quite similar to the economic one. Since it is 
generally accepted that microfinance is labour-intensive, facilitating access to microfinance is 
likely to result in the acquisition of new skills and  the upgrading of existing ones and thus 
improve on the capacity of the poor to generate income and improve their livelihood.  
 
In addition to the discussed theories underlying microfinance, another spinoff theory is that of 
empowerment: the poor become empowered when they participate in microfinance activities 
(Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 1996; Chester and Kuhn, 2002). By self-selecting themselves 
into groups and self-managing their groups, and gaining control over the means of making a 
living, poor people become empowered and independent. Empowerment has been 
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particularly relevant for women who are perceived as being marginalised in most developing 
countries. 
 
In sum, among the theories that underlie the concept of microfinance it is the economic 
dimension that stands out as most significant. Poor people are provided with capital which 
they invest in income-generating activities and make profit. This should result in a virtuous 
cycle: credit leads to increased production and incomes, and allow for greater consumption 
and savings, and result in further investment (Meyer, 2002). These theories have not been 
without criticisms. There are many concerns about how the theories play out in practice. This 
constitutes an area of investigation of this thesis.  
 
2.4 The Role of Impact Assessment in Understanding 
Implementation Process and Perspectives of Service Users    
Much of the research in microfinance has involved assessing its impacts on individual service 
users, businesses, households and communities. However the extent to which impact 
assessments incorporate implementation processes of microfinance interventions and 
perceptions of users in their studies has not been highlighted in the literature. This section 
begins with a postulation regarding the importance of incorporating implementation 
processes and perspectives of service users in impact assessments. This section assesses a few 
well-known impact assessment studies to ascertain the extent to which they investigate and 
analyse implementation processes of the various components of microfinance interventions 
and give representation to perceptions of service users.   
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Microfinance interventions have primarily been assessed through impact assessments. The 
interest in impact assessment is due to concerns about the effect of microfinance on poverty 
reduction, enterprise development and economic growth since the claims of the benefits seem 
to have outstripped the evidence that is currently available (Hulme 1997). Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005) and Hulme (1997) have argued that the impact assessments 
primarily attempt to answer the question: What would have happened to the service user had 
the intervention not existed? It can be argued that to understand how and why microfinance 
affects poverty, impact assessments need to understand how microfinance interventions work 
within the context in which they are implemented (Verhagen, 2001; Simanowitz and Brody, 
2004).   
 
If impact assessments fail to investigate how microfinance interventions are implemented and 
how they work, then such an assessment will amount to a black box assessment. It is not 
enough to conclude that an intervention works or does not work if one is not privy to the 
knowledge of why and how the observed finding occurred.  For example, using randomised 
control trials (RCTs) microfinance critics have concluded that microfinance interventions do 
not reduce poverty (see Karlan and Zinman, 2010). However, without investigating how the 
said intervention was implemented, concluding that microfinance interventions do not work 
might be flawed. This is tantamount to claiming microfinance interventions are homogenous. 
Microfinance interventions differ in orientation, the types of services they provide and how 
they are provided. Microfinance would therefore influence service users in diverse ways 
(Barnes, Morris and Gaile, 1998; Barnes, Gaile and Kibombo, 2001; Holvoet, 2004).  
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2.4.1 Conventional Impact Assessments   
The study examines some well-known conventional impact assessments to ascertain the 
extent to which implementation processes are incorporated in their work. It begins with an 
often cited study by Pitt and Khandker (1998) which examined the impacts of participation 
by gender in the Grameen Bank and two other group-based microcredit programmes
9
 in 
Bangladesh on labour supply, schooling, household expenditure and asset accumulation. In 
this study, a quasi-experimental household survey was conducted on 87 villages in 
Bangladesh. This was one of the first studies to employ econometric analytical techniques 
that enabled it to account for issues of endogeneity and self-selection in microfinance impact 
assessment. Indeed the robustness of the methodology makes it a classic
10
 in studies in 
microfinance impact assessment. The primary finding of the study was that poor households 
experienced greater benefits when programme participants were women. For example, the 
study found that for every additional 100 taka lent to women household consumption 
expenditure increased by 18 taka compared to 11 taka for men. 
 
Although the above study provides some contextual information on the study area, it is silent 
on how the three programmes were implemented. Pitt and Khandker only describe part of the 
intervention designs but not the implementation process. For instance, did the observed 
findings occur because the programmes were particularly suitable to women and not men? 
Were some services such as non-financial services patronised by men? What were the roles 
of the various components of the interventions in the achieving the observed findings? 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) concede it cannot be ascertained from the 
estimates in the analysis why the women have a higher marginal impact than men. The study 
                                                 
9
 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) 
10
 Findings of this study have been disputed by Roodman and Morduch, (2009) by re-examining the data.  
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is so engrossed in econometric methods of accurately assessing impacts that ignores the 
question of why and how the observed impacts occurred.    
 
Next, a study by Johnson and Copestake (2002) is examined as a case of one of the few 
impact assessments studies that proves impact and demonstrates how and why these impacts 
occurred. This multi-component and multi-team research studied the operations of FINCA, 
an international microfinance NGO, in Malawi. In a series of component studies, the team of 
researchers employed qualitative and quantitative (cross-sectional and longitudinal) analysis. 
The study assessed the economic, social and geographical impacts of the intervention; 
contextual influences; differences in impact between households; and impact improvement. 
The study compared three groups: continuing clients, departed clients and a control group. 
The significant findings of the study are presented below. Johnson and Copestake‘s study is 
exhaustively reviewed not just as an example of a comprehensive impact assessment, but also 
for the wealth of information it reveals and its potential relevance to the thesis. 
 
The microfinance intervention Johnson and Copestake studied, FINCA, operates a village 
banking model, lending money and accepting savings from low-income women entrepreneurs 
who are organised into groups. At the time of the baseline survey 48% of service users were 
below the poverty line. This is typical of people that most microfinance reaches: people 
clustered around the poverty line (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Women were found to be in 
control of their loans and incomes. The purpose of the income earned as a result of 
microfinance was to supplement household food expenditure, to make provisions of small 
items of expenditure such as contributions to educational needs of children. A year after the 
baseline survey, 59% of respondents in the repeat survey had left the programme. For 
microfinance interventions in general, Hulme (1999) observed that exit rates are high in the 
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first two or three cycles: an understandable occurrence during which groups are whittled 
down to members who are comfortable with one another. The study found that the most 
common reason for leaving was the obligation to pay weekly (40%).  
 
The study found a highly significant relationship between the spouse‘s occupation of those 
who stayed and those who left the programme. Those married to farmers and unskilled 
workers being more likely to drop out than those with husbands who were businessmen or 
employed professionals. An explanation that can be adduced for this finding could be that 
service users with spouses who were businessmen or employed professionals were relatively 
well-off and therefore enabled loans to be invested in business which yielded profit rather 
than for just household consumption. It is also probable that spouses with well-off spouses 
were located in the urban areas which were found to be more conducive for microfinance 
activities. For example, this study found that in the rural area (Central Region) 27% 
compared to 75% of clients in the urban area (Southern Region) claimed FINCA had enabled 
them increase their incomes.  
 
Continuing service users had increased their business revenue by 74%, while 9% and 62% of 
the dropouts and comparison groups respectively had increased their business revenue. 
However the ratio of gross profit to turnover was higher in the dropout group and the 
comparison group than the continuing service users. The researchers claimed that this could 
be a result of the pressure involved in doing business with FINCA loans rather than with own 
capital, as cash flow is critical to making weekly payments. Food expenditure had increased 
for continuing service users, with a few continuing clients in the Central region saying they 
had to reduce meals in order to have money for repayment.   
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The proportion of continuing service users owning a range of high value items such as TVs, 
radios, chairs was higher than dropouts. A much higher proportion of the comparison group 
than continuing clients owned assets despite overall greater incidence of being below the 
poverty line. The inflexibility in loan repayment in an environment characterised by 
fluctuating cash flows precluded continuing clients from acquiring household items unlike 
the comparison group who could afford to buy what they wanted and survive on what was 
left without the pressure of loan repayment. Investment in business assets was minimal. The 
majority spent nothing on upgrading business premises since most operated their businesses 
from the market.  
 
Loan repayments and heavy savings requirement of the programme meant little money was 
left over for household use. The savings facilities were however lauded by the clients. Major 
benefits included learning the discipline of savings, with service users saying it was easier to 
save while with the intervention than independently. Having the opportunity to save was 
missed by those who left FINCA. Among Malawi‘s matrilineal societies children were the 
responsibility of the women‘s family and therefore many women were concerned about their 
future. The study observed that group members encouraged each other, visited, chatted and 
learnt to relate with one another. The issue of joint liability (having to pay for others) caused 
much tension among members. Some groups experienced problems including high member 
turnover. Some of the reasons for this state of affairs were that new clients who joined 
already-formed groups were not provided with training like those who started the groups and 
in some cases power struggles emerged between old and new members. 
 
Borrowers in the rural area were more likely to withdraw from the scheme. The study 
attributed this to the poor markets and limited economic opportunities in the rural areas. The 
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study emphasises the dependence of the non-farm enterprises on agriculture in the Central 
region compared to that of the south. The profound influence of seasonal agriculture on 
business opportunities produced much uncertainty. Traders were required to shift stock 
quickly in response to opportunities that arose. The rigid methodology of a16-week cycle was 
challenging for service users who usually encountered a mismatch between the loan cycle 
and business opportunities. It is noteworthy that the most cohesive and best performing 
intervention was in a town close to the airport that gave the town more diversified economic 
opportunities.  
 
The study found that the scale of business of women‘s income-generating activities in the 
Central region (rural area) was small and could be classified as subsistence micro-
enterprises‘. Most of these service users had no working capital other than the loan itself 
therefore business ceased between cycles. In addition the length of time a service user had 
been in business was related the outcome of dropping out. More established businesses were 
less likely to leave the intervention.   
 
In sum continuing service users fared better than dropouts but there was there was not much 
difference between the continuing group and the comparison group. Indeed profits of a 
comparison group experienced faster growth than the continuing clients. The study‘s finding 
suggests that while enterprise profitability can be adequate without FINCA loans, the 
presence of FINCA loans tended to reduce profitability.  Rigidity of loans was 
counterproductive in a highly seasonal environment and caused a high level exit and poor 
impact performance.   
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The above study compares three groups: continuing service users, comparison group and 
dropouts. The comparison between continuing groups and dropouts was flawed because it is 
obvious that the two groups were dissimilar at the outset. However the comparison reveals 
some poignant issues. Poorer service users and those from the rural area are more likely to 
drop out. Businesses in the rural areas were more likely to be influenced by seasonal 
fluctuations. Johnson and Copestake (2002) have clearly demonstrated that microfinance 
works better in urban areas than rural areas.    
 
Johnson and Copestake‘s (2002) study is comprehensive and focuses on contextual factors. 
The rural/urban comparison was very insightful. However, the study does not systematically 
examine the implementation processes of the microfinance interventions. This is important 
for answering questions of why and how the observed impacts occurred. For example it does 
not examine how groups were actually formed or the process of loan repayment. What is left 
unsaid can sometimes be very important given that in a conversation with Ms. Kalebe-
Nyamongo
11
 she claimed she witnessed the seizure of properties of defaulting service users 
by officials of FINCA in Salima Township in the Central Region. The study is silent on such 
incidents which have a potential to affect the outcomes of microfinance interventions. For 
example it would have been interesting to know whether the implementation of the 
intervention involved bribery and any other corrupt practices and the effect of these on 
incomes.  
 
                                                 
11
 Ms. C. Kalebe-Nyamongo is a PhD student in the University of Birmingham. She witnessed the activities of 
FINCA during a study of the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) in 2001.   
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2.4.2 Randomised Control Trials- Nouveau Impact Assessment Studies 
In the last three years some researchers have moved away from conventional impact 
assessments and have begun using randomised control trials (RCTs) to assess the impact of 
microfinance. While in conventional impact assessments the researcher has no control over 
who gets into the intervention or the control group, RCTs enable the researcher to randomly 
assign people into either the control or the intervention group. RCTs are therefore able to 
overcome the perennial problem of identifying a suitable control group for comparison. 
Findings of RCTs are considered more credible because the researcher is able to control the 
research process and avoid the pitfalls associated with conventional impact assessments. 
What do RCTs tell us about the implementation processes and the impacts of microfinance 
interventions? Dupas and Robinson (2008) conducted a randomised field study in Kenya to 
test whether savings constraints prevented poor micro-entrepreneurs from increasing the size 
of their businesses. The researchers gave interest-free savings accounts to randomly selected 
daily income earners and collected self-reported log-books that respondents updated daily. 
The study found that owning a savings account was associated with substantial and positive 
impact on productive investment levels and expenditures for women but no measurable 
impact on men. The findings suggested that savings accounts enabled women to cope with 
household shocks without having to draw down their working capital. 
 
Most impact assessments usually assess the entire microfinance intervention on poverty. 
Dupas and Robinson‘s study is one of the few that have focused on one component (savings) 
of the intervention. The use of self-reported data is a plus because it likely to provide useful 
insights from respondents which could not have been accessed in any other way. Like the 
other impact assessments examined in this thesis, the study by Dupas and Robinson (2008) 
does not investigate how the savings facilities are implemented by the village bank or provide 
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much contextual information which may have been insightful in understanding the findings 
of the study. For example why did a substantial proportion of entrepreneurs (40%) not use the 
savings account? What was entrepreneurs‘ perception of the savings facilities?  
 
Two studies employing randomised control trials are examined next. Karlan and Zinman 
(2008a) used RCT to examine the impact of consumer loans in South Africa. The same 
authors Karlan and Zinman (2009) measured the impact of expanded access to credit on 
business growth and well-being in Manila. In South Africa respondents who had access to 
consumer loans were more likely to have kept their jobs, have significantly higher incomes 
and have a more positive attitude of the future. In the study in Manila it was found that 
increased access to microloans resulted in less investment in the targeted business 
(fungibility?). The authors contend businesses shrunk as a result of clients shedding 
unproductive workers. Treatment effects were found to be stronger for male and higher 
income earners, groups which were not normally targeted by micro-lenders. Microfinance 
was found to mainly work through risk management and investment at the household level 
rather than directly through targeted businesses.  
 
As stated previously, the main difference between findings obtained through normal impact 
assessments and randomised control trials is that findings of randomised control trials are 
more credible. However, like other impact assessments, the studies by Karlan and Zinman 
fail to incorporate the intervention processes and the context in which the interventions 
occurred in order to interpret and understand the findings of the studies. For instance, 
contextual data would have explained why people who took loans in the South African study 
were more likely to have kept their jobs. It is possible that people who took loans in South 
Africa kept their jobs because if they had taken the risk of changing jobs and had been 
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rendered unemployed even just for a few months, it would have increased their chances of 
loan default. The clients of the two interventions are much wealthier than those found in 
typical microfinance settings. For example clients in the South African study were employees 
who earned average salaries of $3600 per year and could access loans from other banking 
institutions. The consumer loan scheme in South Africa cannot be strictly classified as a 
microfinance scheme as per the operational definition of microfinance for this thesis (see 
section 2.2). In addition the two studies were conducted in urban communities and do very 
little to enlighten us about how the interventions have fared in rural areas.   
 
To conclude, it is evident that models of impact assessment reviewed focus on ensuring that 
their findings are relatively credible and valid. Except for the study by Johnson and 
Copestake (2002) none of the other studies reviewed had significantly considered the issue of 
context as an explanatory factor in their analysis. In addition if these studies are somehow 
representative of impact assessments, then it can be concluded that impact assessments pay 
little attention to how microfinance interventions are implemented. It is argued that 
intervention designs (which impact studies focus on) can significantly vary from how they 
are implemented (Matin and Hulme, 2003). This implementation gap can be very wide in 
developing countries.    
 
2.5 Group Lending  
What is known about the implementation processes and dynamics of group lending and what 
are its implications for poverty and why? Group lending refers to the strategy where poor 
people usually without collateral come together to form groups for the purpose of obtaining 
loans and other financial services from microfinance institutions (Ghatak, 1999; Armendariz 
de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Group lending usually uses joint liability as a form of social 
33 
 
collateral that replaces physical collateral, a resource which the poor are usually unable to 
provide. Joint liability implies that if one member cannot repay a loan then the other members 
of the joint liability group will have to do so (Ahlin and Townsend, 2007). Some attributes of 
group lending is its ability to mitigate asymmetric information and enforcement difficulties in 
the finance market. Group lending implies that risks are essentially transferred from the 
microfinance institution to the borrowers themselves and additionally mitigates problems of 
adverse selection, moral hazard, lack of insurance and lack of enforcement (Simtowe and 
Zeller, 2006). Marr (2001) cautions that it is important not to assume group lending dynamics 
as existing in a vacuum but to perceive the process as embedded in social, economic and 
cultural factors. Group behaviour is influenced by power structures, evolving risks, 
constraints and opportunities that emerge during the process (ibid). 
 
Achieving economies of scale was the motivating factor for first use of groups by the 
Grameen Bank, which is widely reputed to be the first microfinance institution to sustainably 
lend to groups. However, the Grameen Bank realised that asking people to form groups for 
credit not only reduced the cost of screening and monitoring loans but also drastically 
minimised costs of enforcing debt repayment (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005).  
 
The review of the literature on group lending employs a joint liability model presented by 
Simtowe and Zeller (2006) to explain and understand the strategy of group lending in 
microfinance. Figure 2.2 below shows loan transactions and various stages in the group 
lending approach starting from group formation through to repayment. Each stage is 
associated with a problem that group lending is supposed to address. The stages identified in 
Figure 2.2 will form the basis of the organisation and discussion for the rest of the section. 
Marr (2002) adds another stage (auditing) to the Simtowe and Zeller model. Marr defines 
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auditing as the process of investigating the causes of loan non-repayment to ascertain whether 
the default was wilful or otherwise. Auditing can however be subsumed under the fourth 
stage in Figure 2.2: members audit their peers in case of loan default before deciding to 
enforce repayment. In Figure 2.2, it can be argued that stage four should come before three 
because the final stage of the process is when the loan cannot be repaid and other group 
members are bound by joint liability principle to repay irrespective of whether the default 
was wilful or otherwise. Simtowe and Zeller‘s dynamic presentation of group lending (Figure 
2.2) should not be seen as simple problem and solution stages: some solutions address 
problems in other stages. For instance, peer selection can mitigate the problem of ex-ante 
moral hazard: members select peers who they know are likely to engage in non-risky 
projects. What are shown in Figure 2.2 are the dominant solutions to potential problems in 
each stage of the intervention.  
 
Figure 2.2: Dynamic Group Lending Model 
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2.5.1 Group Formation  
This is the first stage in Figure 2.2. Allowing groups to form on their own is crucial and 
ensures that potential borrowers can utilise local information they have about each other‘s 
project or attributes in order to look for the best partners (Ghatak, 1999, 2000; Armendariz de 
Aghion & Morduch, 2005; Al-Azzam and Sarangi, 2007). The idea that potential members 
are jointly liable for loans means that self-selection is crucial to ensure assortative matching, 
where safe or risky people form groups with their kind. Enabling the self-selection of groups 
reduces the incidence of adverse selection (Ghatak, 1999). Rogaly and Johnson (1997) 
propose that members‘ control of groups devoid of manipulation by microfinance officials is 
vital for the success of the group lending scheme.  
 
Some empirical observations reveal that not all groups in microfinance interventions are 
formed using peer selection. Karlan (2003), for instance, describes how FINCA affiliates in 
Peru invited interested borrowers to add their names to a list which later becomes a group. 
Marr‘s (2002) research in shanty towns and rural Peru revealed that groups started off as 
fragmented and heterogeneous. This implied that groups had limited information about their 
peers‘ level of risks. Marr found initial information levels among group members to be 
generally superficial. Marr attributes this state of affairs to four factors: the lack of interest of 
loan officers in the screening process; members selected for their readiness to hand over loans 
to another relative; persons in position of power ignoring the selection criteria for political 
favours and money; and the pressure to find enough people to attain the minimum number to 
start a group. Groups therefore exhibited traits of heterogeneity due to what she calls ‗hidden 
agenda‘ of group members and officials.  
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The above discussion emphasise the difference between how groups are supposed to be 
formed and how they are really formed in practice. Self-selection based on risk type is 
supposed to mitigate the problem of adverse selection as identified in Figure 2.2. Groups self-
select people of the same risk type thereby forming a homogeneous group. Homogeneity of 
risk type seems not to be the only factor in ensuring a successful group lending. Mknelly and 
Kevane‘s (2002) study of a microfinance intervention in Burkina Faso underscores the 
importance of achieving homogeneity in socio-economic status.  Their study found that loan 
sizes were positively correlated with socio-economic class.  Unequal sizes of loans affected 
repayment performance. Members who had taken smaller loans were reluctant to be jointly 
liable for much larger loans taken by their peers.  Socio-economic homogeneity among 
groups is expected to enhance intimacy, cooperation and consensual decision-making. 
However it has been argued that heterogeneous groups are not without merit. They mitigate 
covariant risks and also improve group performance when better-off service users assist 
poorer service users with loan repayment. 
 
To conclude it is evident that most microfinance institutions want groups formed through 
self-selection to ensure homogeneity in terms of risk and socio-economic status. In practice 
such goals may not be realised because of implementation problems and other interests.  For 
example, intrinsic contextual factors in a community such as ethnic and caste affiliations can 
influence group formation activities. 
 
2.5.2 Peer Monitoring  
The second stage in Simtowe and Zeller‘s model is group monitoring. Peer monitoring means 
service users scrutinising or checking their group members to ensure that they do not engage 
in activities that will jeopardise loan repayment. Stiglitz (1990) says that microfinance 
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institutions need to ensure that service users use loans prudentially so that the likelihood of 
repayment is enhanced. For service users the incentive to monitor the use of loans stem from 
the issue of joint liability and the potential loss of access to future loans for all members in a 
group (Sharma and Zeller, 1997). Stiglitz (1990) adds that the success of the Grameen Bank 
and other similar group lending programs have enjoyed success as a result of the peer 
monitoring strategy. Aghion (1999) argues that peer monitoring can also prevent strategic 
defaults in group lending by verifying peers project returns (ex-post moral hazard). 
Fuglesang, Chandler and Akuretiyagama (1993) also found that monitoring by the officials of 
microfinance interventions played an important role in improving repayment rates. For 
instance, the Grameen Bank primarily relied on staff for monitoring the use of loan funds.  
 
How did peer monitoring work out in practice? Simtowe and Zeller‘s (2006) study, based on 
data collected by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 1999 from 99 
Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) credit groups, showed that members were not 
actively involved in monitoring. Members generally lacked knowledge about the 
characteristics of other members in the group. Field assistants were found to play a more 
important role in monitoring activities of service users. In this instance, field assistants were 
effective because the MRFC invested in agricultural projects which were visible for all to see 
and could be easily monitored. Marr (2002) also found a very low level of monitoring in 
groups in La Chanchita microfinance programme in Peru. More than half of service users had 
undertaken no peer monitoring whatsoever and those who claimed to have monitored their 
peers did so on an inconsistent basis. Peer monitoring was found to be expensive and the cost 
of monitoring appeared to be the most important hurdle in the peer monitoring process. Marr 
also discovered that monitoring was discouraged when sub-groups were composed of close 
relatives with strong interest in avoiding monitoring and penalties. Another important finding 
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of her study was that information obtained through peer monitoring was distorted, hidden or 
not divulged to group members or intervention officers. People who volunteer such 
information could be labelled as informers and suffer some consequences. Marr, however, 
was of the opinion that peer monitoring was essential for loan repayment.  
 
In sum the evidence on peer monitoring is mixed: while many theoretical studies point to the 
importance of peer monitoring in group lending, empirical enquiries such as that of Marr 
(2002) found that monitoring was only partially practiced. Like self-selection in group 
formation, peer monitoring required that members have good knowledge of how their peers 
used their loans. Empirical studies point to the difficulty in achieving perfect knowledge 
amongst service users. Marr (2002) and Stiglitz (1990) have demonstrated that peer 
monitoring is not costless. Service users would therefore assess the cost and the benefits to be 
derived from monitoring before taking a decision to undertake peer monitoring. If service 
users have not used peer monitoring, then have they ensured that loans will be employed in 
projects that will not jeopardise chances of repayment? In other words how will groups 
mitigate the problem of ex-ante moral hazard? Evidence from Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak 
(1999) indicate that peer selection plays an important role in mitigating moral hazard as 
previously mentioned. For example, Stiglitz (1990) shows that group lending can increase the 
choice of safer projects when service users select peers willing to engage in safer projects.    
 
2.5.3 Enforcing Loan Repayment  
Enforcement refers to the use of peer pressure and/or sanctions to induce service users to 
repay loans. Enforcement is to mitigate the problem of ex-post moral hazard. Enforcement is 
shown as the third stage in this section instead of joint liability as depicted in Figure 2.2. It is 
argued that the fourth stage should precede the third in Figure 2.2. This is because the burden 
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of repayment falls on the entire group (joint liability) after the application of pressure and 
sanctions fail to induce defaulting service users to repay loans.  It is at the enforcement stage 
(stage 3 in this thesis) that Marr‘s (2002) audit stage mentioned earlier becomes relevant. 
When repayment is not forthcoming then members of the group have to ascertain whether the 
default is wilful or due to investment failure.  
 
Beasley and Coate (1995) demonstrate that if social penalties (enforcement) are strong 
enough group lending can improve repayment rates. Marr (2002) argues that when the level 
of monitoring is low, groups tend to rely more on the use of peer pressure and sanctions to 
achieve high repayment. Paxton (1996) found in Burkina Faso that groups were more willing 
to exert pressure to encourage repayment before the loans were due rather than after default 
had occurred. In the study area in Burkina Faso, if reasons for default were considered 
uncontrollable members did not put much pressure on the defaulting service user. Village 
harmony was so valued that even when default was wilful there was not much pressure 
applied. In contrast Marr (2001) described the type of social sanction taken against defaulters 
in Peru. Defaulters could be ostracised from community-based relationships and harassed till 
payment was received. Violent sanctions such as aggressive public humiliation, seizure of 
private property and even burning of houses are not uncommon.  Montgomery (1996) reports 
that sanctions applied against defaulters could range from negative comments, social 
exclusion to the seizure and sale of household assets.     
 
2.5.4 Peer Support/Joint Liability 
When peer pressure and sanctions have been applied and have failed to result in repayment, 
other members in the group have to make good the default. This should logically have been 
the last or fourth stage of the model. Simtowe and Zeller (2006) call this the problem of 
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limited liability. It can however be argued that joint liability is not just a stage in the group 
lending scheme, but underlies the entire process of group lending (Ghatak and Guinanne, 
1999). Service users have joint liability in mind when they organise themselves in to groups. 
It is the idea that all members of a group are jointly liable for any loan default that compels 
peers to monitor and apply pressure and sanctions to ensure repayment.  
 
Although joint liability is perceived as the basis of group lending it is not enforced in some 
microfinance interventions. Jain (1996) observed in the Grameen Bank that even though there 
was much discussion and emphasis on the concept of joint liability, it was the individual 
defaulter who was pursued. Other members of the group did not have to suffer jointly for the 
non-payment of the loan by the individual. The Grameen Bank as whole has evolved: 
Grameen Classic System has evolved into the Grameen Generalised Scheme or Grameen 
Bank II, which has essentially abolished joint liability (Reggiani, 2005). Even though the new 
Grameen claims to have abolished the joint liability scheme, it has instituted the system of 
rewards for branches that achieve 100% repayment rates among others. This reward scheme 
is likely to compel Grameen staff and/or groups to surreptitiously force recalcitrant service 
users to pay up or help them to repay.    
  
Joint liability is not without risk to service users. For example, when microfinance 
institutions decide to form groups without recourse to self-selection and in addition insist on 
joint liability, it is likely to create a problem for service users. For instance, what will happen 
to the issue of joint liability when the level of heterogeneity with regard to risk and socio-
economic status is high? Few studies have been found that have comprehensively examined 
the effects of group formation and joint liability on service users.  Another matter that 
warrants examination is how contextual factors influence peer support or joint liability. 
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2.5.5 What is the Relationship between Group Lending and Poverty 
Reduction? 
Most studies that have examined the impacts of group lending on poverty have employed 
loan repayment as a proxy for poverty reduction and they show mixed results. For instance, 
Gomez and Santor (2003), using data from two Canadian microfinance institutions found 
evidence that group lending lowered borrower default compared to individual lending and 
that group lending effects operated through self-selection into lending groups and once inside 
the group, greater group borrower effort. Karlan (2003) used data from FINCA-Peru and 
discovered that group lending engendered higher loan repayment and higher savings. Data 
collected from another group credit programme, FINCA- Costa Rica, showed that groups that 
screened their members and relied on local information had higher repayments rates than 
those who did not (Wenner, 1995). Mckernan (2002) also found that being a member of 
Grameen increased self-employment profits by about 126% after controlling for the direct 
benefits of access to loans. This increment was attributed to the increased social and human 
capital derived from group meetings. Finally, it is envisaged that group lending increases the 
efficiency of delivery of financial services to the poor and reduce transaction costs of 
microfinance institutions which, hopefully, might translate into lower cost of borrowing for 
service users. 
  
Other studies such as Ahlin and Townsend (2007) and Wydick (1999) have examined how 
social ties affect group lending and the effect of group lending on repayment rates.  Ahlin and 
Townsend (2007), employed survey data from joint liability groups of the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand and found the issue of 
screening during group formation as the most important and had a positive impact on 
repayments among the wealthier clients. Stronger social ties among the poorer clients 
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reduced repayments. However, in a limited contract enforcement environment, such as in a 
village, sanctions tended to increase repayment. Wydick‘s (1999) study in Guatemala 
indicated no significant effect of social ties on group behaviour. Group members tended to 
function best as peer monitors. The author stated that social ties were likely to create a 
conflict of interest for groups, making threats of ejection from the group more difficult. 
Interestingly, the rural/urban divide appeared to enforce in groups through different means: 
urban groups mainly through intensive peer monitoring and for groups in rural communities 
social pressure, that is, threats of expulsion from the group.  
 
2.5.6 Are There any Costs to Group Lending?  
Although group lending is an innovation that enabled the poor to access credit, it is not 
without costs to borrowers. The essence of the group lending approach is to transfer 
responsibilities and liabilities from microfinance institutions to the service users (Armendariz 
de Aghion & Morduch 2005). Monitoring and the application of sanctions on recalcitrant 
group members could fray social relationships and ties. A group member might ask ‗why 
should I be responsible for other defaulters in my group?‘ There is no easy answer to this 
question except that banks find this strategy a good and cost-effective means of doing 
business with the poor. A study in Bangladesh and Uganda revealed that between 76% and 
87% of current borrowers and dropouts preferred to be independent borrowers (WWB, 2003). 
Some microfinance institutions such as ASA and Grameen have begun to modify their use of 
group liability, acknowledging that it does not work well in the later loan cycles (ibid). Group 
lending can discourage entrepreneurship especially in situations where some group members 
find themselves financially progressing faster than their peers. Progressive peers might find 
that they cannot obtain the amount of loan they require within the group. Huge loan 
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differentials in groups create problems: members are reluctant to be jointly liable for much 
larger loans taken by their peers. 
 
Perhaps the most important concern of the group lending approach on poverty is the danger 
that the very poor might be left out during the process of self selection (Johnson and Rogaly, 
1997). Because the poorest are usually more vulnerable and are perceived as high risk, they 
may be excluded in the process of group formation. Contributing to this argument, Marr 
(2002) says that joint liability groups are often unable to harness local information for the 
purpose of peer monitoring, and hence have to resort to inflicting severe sanctions to achieve 
high repayment rates. These practices often appear to damage group cohesiveness and hit the 
poorest and the most vulnerable the hardest, creating poverty and undermining the very 
foundations of these microfinance schemes. Huppi and Feder (1990) are however of the 
opinion that negative experiences with group lending in developing countries emanate from 
problems of implementation rather than defects in the concepts.  
 
In summary, the above discussion on group lending emphasises the importance of group 
members obtaining as much knowledge of their peer as possible for the purposes of group 
formation and peer monitoring. The basic motivation for groups to carry out the activities 
discussed above in Simtowe and Zeller‘s model is that each member‘s action or inaction has 
repercussions for the group as a result of the issue of joint liability. However, how groups are 
constituted and subsequent dynamics within the group depends on the implementation 
process and the environment within which the intervention occurs among others.  
    
Does the microfinance literature enable the understanding of group activities and dynamics 
within context? Of the studies so far reviewed only Marr (2002) employs contextual analysis 
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to explain her observed findings. The lack of insight into the context of the studies reviewed 
seems to inhibit the understanding of findings of the studies. For instance, although Wydick 
(1999) and Ahlin and Townsend (2007) find that very strong social ties amongst group 
members like friendship and family ties can inhibit loan repayment, they offer very little 
contextual information to explain this finding. This finding is explained by Marr (2002) to the 
effect that groups formed among people with strong social ties were done for reasons other 
than ensuring assortative matching.  Although Marr (2001, 2002) presents good background 
information (context) in her studies, she fails to distinguish between group lending dynamics 
in urban and rural areas. Regarding the effect of group lending on poverty reduction, it is 
evident from the fordoing discussion that group lending is essentially an important vehicle for 
enabling financial institutions to provide financial service to the poor rather than for directly 
reducing poverty. If it has any effect on poverty at all it is rather an indirect one. However, it 
should be noted that group lending is not the only mechanism through which financial 
services are provided to the poor.   
 
2.6 Why do most Microfinance Institutions Target Women and what 
are the Implications for Poverty Reduction?  
The general perception of microfinance is about banking for women. Pioneer microfinance 
institutions such as BancoSol and the Grameen Bank have made women the core users 
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Mayoux (2002: 76) traces the increasing 
emphasis of targeting women: 
 
In the 1990s microfinance targeting women became a major focus of gender policy in 
many donor agencies. Literature prepared for the 1997 Microcredit Summit, donor 
policy documents and NGO funding proposals all present an extremely attractive 
vision of increasing numbers of expanding, financially self-sustainable microfinance 
programmes reaching large numbers of women borrowers‘ Mayoux (2002: 76). 
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2.6.1 Why Do Most Microfinance Institutions Target Women?  
Emphasis on women in microfinance was initially based on practical considerations of 
ensuring that loans were paid back rather than any for any other reason. The Grameen Bank 
of Bangladesh was one the first microfinance institutions to experiment with women. 
Recounting their experience with women, Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, (2005) say 
Grameen initially did not have such a strong emphasis on women when it begun business in 
the 1970s. Grameen shifted their focus onto women in the early 1980s when they showed 
better loan repayment records than men. The initial idea was to have an equal number of men 
and women but women‘s record showed so remarkable a repayment rate that by the end of 
2002, 95% of Grameen clients were women (ibid). The practice of targeting women has since 
been emulated by most microfinance institutions.  
 
Cheston and Kuhn (2002:9) summarise the rationale for targeting women as ensuring 
efficiency and sustainability of microfinance institutions: microfinance schemes run 
efficiently due to women‘s cooperation and good repayment records. Their ‗lower arrears and 
loan loss rates have an important effect on the efficiency and sustainability of the institution.‘ 
Women are more likely than men to self-select into microfinance institutions with some 
conditions attached: namely training sessions, small loans, weekly meetings and joint 
responsibility (Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). Johnson and Rogaly (1997) also 
confirm the forgoing argument that women are usually targeted to ensure better loan 
repayment rates and efficiency in implementation of microfinance services rather than for any 
other concerns.  
 
Empirical evidence support the above augments for targeting women. For example, 
Rahman‘s (1999) village-level observations in Bangladesh revealed that Grameen Bank 
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preferred to target women for strategic reasons of investment and recovery of loans than for 
the benefit of the women themselves. Women were found to be more compliant and easier to 
discipline than the men. Hulme (1991) found in Malawi that timely repayments rates for 
women clients were 92% against that of 83% for men in the Malawi Mundzi Fund (MMF). 
Rhyne and Holt‘s (1994) review of World Bank projects revealed that repayment data of the 
majority of projects reported a higher rate of repayment by interventions that concentrated on 
women than in mixed gender projects. Thus targeting women to ensure efficiency, 
sustainability and improvement in financial performance more than any other concerns about 
gender has gained almost universal acceptance  
 
Apart from good repayment performance and ensuring the sustainability of microfinance 
interventions, women have later come to be targeted for other reasons. Two major factors 
have driven the increasing involvement of women in microfinance activities. The first has to 
do with promoting gender equity. Khandker (2001), and Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright 
(2006) argue that many microfinance interventions specifically target the women based on 
the perception that they are poorer than men, they participate less in the labour market and 
have an inequitable share of power in household and community decision-making. The 
second reason for targeting women relates to the benefits that accrue to households compared 
to targeting men.  
 
Using microfinance as a tool to foster gender equity is justified by studies conducted by the 
UNDP, UNIFEM and World Bank which indicate that gender disparity in developing 
countries result in stagnation in economic growth and development. Indeed a strong and 
positive relationship has been found between gender-related development indicators and the 
human development index (Chester and Kuhn, 2002).    
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First, women are targeted because they are more likely to be marginalised with regard to 
access to conventional forms of financial services. Women, more than men, are faced with 
difficulties in accessing credit for productive activities, especially in rural areas. Legerwood 
(1999:37) says ‗women face cultural barriers that often restrict them to the home (for 
example Islamic purdah), making it difficult for them to access financial services.‘ Women 
suffer inequities with regard to access and ownership of productive inputs like credit and 
land. As a result women are likely to be poorer than men and this constitutes a justification 
for microfinance institutions to reach out to them. Cheston and Kuhn (2002) contend that 
women are targeted because they are overrepresented amongst the world‘s poorest people. 
According to Ledgerwood (1999), women entrepreneurs have been targeted by microfinance 
institutions because they almost always constitute the poorest segment of society.  In the 
1995 Human Development Report of the UNDP
12
, it was reported that 70% of the 1.3 billion 
people living on less than $1 per day were women (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). 
  
Second, providing women with microfinance is said to facilitate the process of empowering 
women because they are usually in a subordinate position relative to men. Kabeer (1999) has 
defined empowerment as the process of women taking control and ownership of their lives 
through expansion of their choices. In a survey carried out in rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999, 
Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2003) discovered that women‘s involvement in microfinance 
led to a greater role in household decision-making; gaining more access to financial and 
economic resources; having improved social networks; having more freedom of movement; 
and increasing their bargaining power in the household. A study in Nepal to assess the 
empowerment effect of microfinance interventions by Ashe and Parrot (2001) found that 68% 
of women had experienced an increase in most areas of decision-making traditionally 
                                                 
12
 UNDP, (1996) the UNDP 1995 Human Development Report.  New York: UNDP. 
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dominated by men. In the Philippines, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2009) used randomised 
controlled trials in a study that examined whether access to individually held commitment 
savings empowered women. The study found that access to goal-setting and savings resulted 
in a significant increase in empowerment for women. It is noteworthy that employing 
microfinance for ensuring gender equity has not been hugely successful mainly due to the 
fact that microfinance rarely challenges the socially embedded and seemingly intractable 
structures that perpetuate gender inequity. This is discussed in the next section.  
 
Regarding the second justification for targeting women, many studies have found that 
households tend to benefit if income accrues to women instead of men. Ledgerwood (1999) 
argues that an increase in women‘s income benefits the household to a greater extent than a 
commensurate increase in the income of men.  For instance, in a study of the Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh, Khandker (2003) estimated that microfinance contributes to household 
consumption at the rate of 18% for lending to females and 11% in the case of male 
borrowing. Women have been observed to spend more of their income on their households: 
women were more likely than men to spend their profits on household and family needs 
(Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). Thomas (1994) found that enabling women to access credit 
resulted in an increasing share of the household budget spent education, housing, and on 
health. Chester and Kuhn (2002: 8) conclude that several studies had confirmed the well-
documented observation that women were more likely to spend their incomes on the 
household. They cite a Women‘s Entrepreneurship Development Trust Fund (WEDTF) 
report which revealed that increased income that accrued to women benefited their children, 
especially in diet, education, health care and clothing. Further evidence of benefits of 
microfinance on women is provided by Khandker (2005) who found evidence of positive 
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impact of loans on women with the impact being more pronounced for those in extreme 
poverty.   
 
2.6.2 Are There any Downsides to Targeting Women? 
As with any social intervention, there are bound to be drawbacks with targeting women. 
According to Mayoux (2002), as the findings of the relationship between women and 
microfinance accumulated, the initial enthusiasm regarding the positive impact of 
microfinance on women and their households gave way to scepticism. The benefits of 
microfinance interventions that were expected to accrue to women failed to materialise as 
anticipated, especially regarding empowerment. The core of the issue is that power, and in 
this instance patriarchy, is deeply embedded in social systems, values and traditions which 
microfinance barely challenges. As result Mayoux (2002:76) suggests reasons why 
microfinance might have limited effect on women‘s empowerment:  
 
• Many women have limited control over income and/or what little income they earn 
may substitute for former male household contributions, as men retain more of 
their earnings for their own use.  
• Women often have greater workloads combining both production and reproductive 
tasks.  
• Women‘s expenditure decisions may continue to prioritise men and male children, 
while daughters or daughters-in-law bear the brunt of unpaid domestic work.  
• Where women actively press for change, this may increase tensions in the 
household and the incidence of domestic violence.  
• Women remain marginalised in local and national level political processes.  
 
Empirical evidence gives credence to Mayoux‘s (2002) reasons for the limited empowerment 
effect of microfinance interventions on women. In a study of two interventions in 
Bangladesh, Goetz and Gupta (1996) found that only 37% women, on the average, had 
considerable influence over loan use, while 63% had partial, limited and or no control over 
loan use. About 22% of respondents had no idea of how loans they had contracted were used. 
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Women had greater control when loan amounts were small and when the purpose of the loan 
did not challenge the prevailing gender division of labour. Goetz and Gupta noted that by 
targeting women microfinance institutions may be merely using women as unpaid debt 
collectors mediating between the microfinance institution and male members of the 
household, and thereby making them more dependent on the men. Given the very patriarchal 
nature of the Bangladeshi society this should not be very surprising. Hulme and Mosley 
(1996; 129) urge microfinance institutions to place greater attention on ‗developing new and 
more productive roles for women‘. Simply emphasising only disbursement to women is 
likely to promote tokenism and reinforce the existing gender roles.     
 
Cheston and Kuhn (2002) argue that microfinance, rather than facilitating women‘s 
empowerment, reinforces gender inequalities. In Ghana, for example, Cheston and Kuhn 
discovered that women were taking an increasing share of household expenses once they 
begun earning incomes while their husbands reduced their contribution towards the upkeep of 
the household. These women became progressively more overburdened thus dampening their 
advancement towards empowerment. In Bangladesh  Rahman (1999) found that the honour 
of husbands were at stake if their wives experienced repayment problems so husbands put 
much pressure on their wives when it came to loan repayment. Thus women service users 
faced pressure from the microfinance institutions and the family, a situation some described 
as intolerable. In sum, while microfinance can be a means of decreasing gender inequity, it 
can become a medium for the exploitation of women. Microfinance has been criticised for 
reinforcing gender roles and inequity and not doing much with regard to confronting social 
structures that perpetuate gender inequity.     
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2.6.3 Characteristics of Women’s Business 
Although there is a general tendency for microfinance interventions to focus on women, not 
much attention is given to the characteristics of women‘s income-generating activities in 
order to ascertain how they can potentially be affected by microfinance interventions. 
Ledgerwood (1999) investigated women‘s income-generating activities, taking into 
consideration women‘s traditional role in the household. The rest of this section is based on 
Ledgerwood‘s analysis of women‘s income-generating activities. Women tend to emphasise 
household maintenance and risk reduction in their business strategies. Women place less 
weight on the growth of their income-generating activities, preferring to invest profits in their 
households. Ledgerwood says women focus on trade, services and light traditional 
manufacturing. Their businesses tend to be located in the household with the frequent use of 
household labour. Businesses tend to start small and remain small through their lifespan. 
Women usually engage in businesses that offer easy entry and exit and do not need large 
amount of capital, fixed assets or special skill. Such businesses enable women to balance 
their work and household obligations. Such activities are likely to be seasonal, geographically 
transferable and amenable to household conditions. Ledgerwood concludes that the 
characteristics discussed limit women‘s choice of business activity, which represents an 
important consideration when microfinance interventions provide financial services for 
women.      
  
To conclude, microfinance initially targeted women to boost loan repayment and ensure 
compliance with intervention regulations. Microfinance was later used as a tool to foster 
gender equity and empower women. Microfinance institutions also focused on women 
because they were more likely to fulfil the poverty reduction objective: households 
experienced more benefits if women were users of microfinance interventions. Although 
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empirical evidence of greater benefits were largely realised, empowerment of women 
indicates mixed results because microfinance does not challenge the social structures that 
perpetuate patriarchy in most societies of developing countries. The nature of women‘s 
income-generating activities was reviewed. Women, in trying to juggle household duties and 
businesses, place less emphasis on business expansion and prefer businesses close to home.   
 
2.7 The Microloan Trajectory: Does it Reduce Poverty? 
Microloans constitute the foundation of microfinance interventions. The importance of loans 
is demonstrated in the manner in which the terms ‗microfinance‘ and ‗microcredit‘ continue 
to be used interchangeably even though microfinance refers to the provision of a number of 
financial services including microcredit (loans). In fact the microfinance industry begun with 
the provision of loans and in addition most of the literature on microfinance is actually about 
the provision of credit or loans.  
 
This section begins with a brief discussion of how the issue of fungibility has influenced the 
provision of loans. Issues of loan disbursement, size, use, and repayment which continue to 
provoke lively debates in the microfinance industry are discussed in this section. This section 
also reviews the state of knowledge on the effect of loan issues on poverty reduction. 
 
2.7.1 Fungibility of Microloans 
In developing countries in the 1970s, poverty was conceptualised as a result of low 
productivity in the agricultural sector. Loans were therefore targeted towards farming to 
boost agricultural production. Credit was usually offered in the form of agricultural inputs, 
such as seeds, tools, fertilisers, for land preparation and sometimes technical services 
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(Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). The idea that cash loans were fungible—they could be diverted 
for purposes other than which they were intended—was perceived as a problem that had to be 
addressed. Farmers were rarely offered cash because it was believed it would be diverted 
from agricultural production.  
 
In recent times microfinance interventions have mostly targeted poor people engaged in 
income-generating activities or the entrepreneurial poor as a means of tackling fungibility. It 
was envisaged that the entrepreneurial poor will invest loans in income-generating activities 
in order to achieve reduction in poverty. In spite of this many empirical studies have found 
that loans are routinely used for purposes other than for income-generation. Despite this 
awareness most microfinance institutions insist on providing loans only for business 
investment purposes. Microfinance interventions try to track loan use through staff and peer 
monitoring. It is evident that microfinance institutions are unable to prevent loans being used 
for non-business purposes even though some microfinance interventions profess they can. 
Hulme (1998) however argues that fungibility should be seen as a strategy used by the poor 
to achieve the greatest level of satisfaction from loans.  
 
2.7.2 Loan Disbursement Process 
The loan disbursement process usually begins with verification of documentation. Loan 
officers collect pictures and other personal details to commence the loan application process. 
In group lending when members in the group have been verified everyone usually received a 
loan.  In some cases access to loans depended on the type of enterprise. For instance, Kah, 
Olds and Kah (2005) assessed ten microfinance institutions in Gossas, a small town in 
Senegal. During the application process, women were requested to indicate how they planned 
using loans and also their repayment strategies. On the basis of the information provided the 
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best projects were selected to receive loans. Loan application process could take a few days 
to some months. Loan applications in joint liability lending schemes in general are usually 
considered as a single loan application. There can be delays in disbursement if there were 
problems with individual applications. For instance, in the Sita Devi Foundation (SDF)
13
 a 
microfinance institution in India and the Association of Forest Communities in Petén 
(ACOFOP)
14
 which administers a microcredit fund in Guatemala, loan application had to be 
presented as a package and if there were problems with a member‘s documentation the group 
application process was put on hold. Westley (2005) studied four microfinance institutions in 
the Caribbean and found that loan processing times could take between 1.5 to 5 weeks for 
first-time borrowers. It is worthy to note that among the four microfinance institutions, those 
with shorter processing times coincidentally employed group lending strategy and/or loan 
officers spent 80% or more of their time in the field. Churchill (2000) says it is not unusual 
for the entire process to take three to four months. According to Westley (2005: 18) reducing 
the time taken from loan enquiry to disbursement increased the value of credit services to 
service users and encouraged client loyalty and repayment. The author also observed that two 
microfinance interventions that imposed greater transaction costs on first time applicants and 
took longer time to process and disburse loans coincidentally experienced high delinquency 
rates. However, it is likely that microfinance interventions which processed applications more 
quickly were also more efficient in the entire microfinance process.    
  
When loans were finally ready, they were usually brought to service users in their 
community. Service users usually did not need to travel to collect loans. However, in the 
Small Enterprises Foundation (SEF), a microfinance institution in South Africa, some service 
                                                 
13
 For more on the SDF see website http://66.102.9.132/search?q=cache:-  
plbwqsMREkJ:sitadevifoundation.in/yahoo_site_admin1/assets/docs/SDF_Microfinance_Methodology-
Website.265195032.doc+microfinance+loan+disbursement+process&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk 
14
 See http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/008/a0226e/a0226e09.htm for more information on ACOFOP 
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users claimed they dropped out because they had to endure high transportation costs to collect 
their loans.  Transport costs sometimes exceeded interest payments in the case of small loans 
(Simanowitz, 2000). Loans may be staggered
15
 as in the case of the Grameen Bank or all 
members of a group take loans at the same time.  
 
Subsequent loans required shorter times to process because loan officers did not have to 
conduct stringent on-site business evaluations. Subsequent loans were disbursed after the 
previous one had been repaid (Churchill, 2000). Due to the rigid pattern of loan 
disbursement, microfinance institutions have been criticised for operating without regard to 
the contexts within which they operate. Johnson and Rogaly (1997) claim while this system 
can be helpful in terms of being uncomplicated and mechanical, service users take loans 
when they become available rather than when they require them. In rural areas where there 
are considerable fluctuations in demand for goods and services, the period when loans are 
received can be an important determinant of the profitability of loans.  
 
2.7.3 Size of Loan 
What is the size of a microfinance loan and what determines the size of loans? Various 
studies have tried to estimate the size of microfinance loans. For instance, Buyske (2004) 
says microloans range between $300 and $1000. Christen, Lyman and Rosenberg (2003) 
recommend that only an upper limit should be set for a microloan and that loan size decisions 
should be based on borrower‘s character and cash flow. Ledgerwood (1999) also urges 
microfinance institutions to consider cash flows as well as service users‘ ability to repay 
                                                 
15
 In the staggered method group members receive loans in stages. Some members of a group receive their loans 
and if they repay then other members are eligible to take their loans.  
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loans in determining loan size. Debt capacity
16
 rather than credit need
17
 is deemed as an 
important criterion for loan assessment for service users. The socio-economic status of 
service users and the environment in which the intervention operates (rural/urban) have been 
found to be important determinants of size of loans. Parsini and Yoskowitz, (2005) and 
Painter and MkNelly (1999) all found that loan size was positively associated with urban 
location. Seasonality and market constraints were also found to be important determinants of 
loan size especially in rural communities. Godquin (2002), in a study in Bangladesh found 
that wealthy borrowers received bigger loans. Gaiha (2001) also found in study in rural India 
that wealthier beneficiaries received about twice of what went to the poorer beneficiaries. 
Level of education and age also showed a positive effect on loan size. WWB (2003) assessed 
service users‘ satisfaction with loan size in Bangladesh and Uganda. They found 34% and 
27% of service users in Bangladesh and Uganda respectively were dissatisfied with the 
smallness of loan sizes.      
 
The size of microfinance loans is also determined by the orientation and ideas of 
microfinance interventions. First, some microfinance institutions provide small loans based 
on the assumption that it will be demanded by only poorer service users.  In other words loan 
size serves as a proxy indicator for the level of poverty of microfinance service users 
(Schreiner, 2001). However, Dunford (2002) argues that while it is evident that the poor 
cannot take large loans, there is no corresponding evidence that only the poor apply for small 
loans. Better-off service users can and do borrow small loans to ease cash flow problems and 
to begin additional income-generating activities. In spite of Dunford‘s finding it is argued that 
smallness of loan sizes in addition to other mechanisms have been used to prevent the 
relatively well-off people from hijacking smaller loans destined for poorer people. Hulme and 
                                                 
16
 Debt capacity is the amount of additional debt a service user can bear without running the risk of default.  
17
 Ledgerwood says credit need assessment is quite unreliable because it involves self-reported information 
which contains ‗want‘ that does not take debt capacity into consideration.  
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Mosley (1996) have noted that other factors such as the very public nature of financial 
transactions and group meetings significantly contribute to deterring the non-poor from 
accessing small-sized loans.   
  
Second, many microfinance institutions usually begin with smaller loans and, depending on 
repayment performance, steadily increase the size of loans. This is called the dynamic 
incentive strategy (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Godquin, 2002).  
SafeSave discovered that an important contributory factor to bad debt was the offering of 
overly large first loans (Staehle, 2005). In addition to preventing loan default, microfinance 
institutions make initial small loans and demand the prompt repayment as a means of 
stimulating productive use of microcredit. This technique is important if bad debt reflects the 
inability of poor households to make productive use of credit (ibid).  
 
Third, changes in loan size have also been used to measure of changes in level of poverty of 
service users. For example, Painter and MkNelly (1999) used the ability of service users to 
work and repay progressively larger loans as a proxy indicator for viability of service users‘ 
income-generating activities and reduction in poverty. This method of assessing impact of 
microfinance intervention has been much criticised. The use of dynamic incentive strategy by 
most microfinance interventions makes it difficult to ascertain whether increased size of loans 
was due to routine increment (dynamic incentive) or as a result of viability of service users‘ 
income-generating activities or reduction in poverty. Loans, on the other hand, are known to 
be used for other purposes other than income-generating activities and therefore increased 
demand for loans might not be linked to business viability or reduction in poverty.      
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In sum, there seems to be no consensus on what constitutes the optimum size of a 
microfinance loan. The size of a loan should depend on the context. Since microfinance 
services are offered to poor people who have no access to orthodox financial services, loans 
are likely to be relatively small. Wealthier service users are more likely to demand bigger 
loans and so are urban dwellers. Small-sized loans have been used as instruments to prevent 
default, target the poor, and controversially measure changes in level of poverty.  
    
2.7.4 Loan Use 
Concerning loan use, most microfinance interventions provide loans primarily for investment 
and generation of wealth. This is the promoted purpose of microfinance loans. Empirically, 
microfinance loans are used for income-generation and a host of other purposes, the most 
notable being for consumption. Case studies reviewed by Johnson and Rogaly (1997) 
revealed that loans were routinely used to pay school fees, to repay other loans and for 
consumption. The poor have been found to use loans to smoothen consumption in many 
developing countries (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). According to Buss (1999), because money 
is fungible service users divert money away from income-generating activities. The most 
common of these is what he calls loan substitution where loans replaces existing business 
capital and releases this for other expenditure including loan recycling. While it is generally 
agreed that service users routinely use their loans for non-business purposes, few studies have 
looked at the effect of loan diversion on loan repayment or on poverty reduction. Using 
econometric and qualitative analysis in a case study in Ethiopia
18
, Abafita (2003) found that 
loan diversion was an important and significant factor that negatively influenced loans 
repayment in rural communities.   
  
                                                 
18
 Jemal Abafita studied the Oromia Credit and Savings Share Company in Kuyu town in Ethiopia 
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Especially in rural areas, how service users have employed their loans has depended on 
seasonal fluctuations and subsequent changes in demand for goods and services. Service 
users have also been found to use loans quite flexibly: for occasional income-generating 
activities; for social investments; children‘s education; and consumption. It could happen that 
the person dealing with the microfinance intervention will not be the person using the loan 
(Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Balkenhol, 2007). Wright (1999a:4), on the other hand, argues 
that service users endeavour to spread their risks: 
 
The poor are too smart and too risk-averse to put ―all their eggs in one basket‖ and invest 
exclusively and heavily in one enterprise. They are managing their portfolio of income 
generation activities and looking to minimise risk, so that if activity or ―enterprise‖ fails, 
it only has a limited, manageable impact on total household income. 
 
2.7.5 Loan Repayment  
Service users generally repay loans from profits that accrue from investment of microloans in 
income-generating activities. Other studies have found that service users repay loans not only 
from their productive ventures but also rely on relatives, friends and on their peers. 
Rutherford (2000) argues that surplus and savings generated from household‘s overall 
productive strategies tend to be the main source of loan repayment.  
 
Loan repayment patterns, like disbursement, follow a strict regimen. Loans are usually repaid 
in weekly, fortnightly and monthly instalments. The reason for this strict repayment regime, 
according MkNelly and Kevane (2002), is to inculcate fiscal discipline into borrowers. In 
reality such repayment schedules are more important for ensuring high repayment rates than 
for any other reason. Do repayment patterns affect repayment rates? Field and Pande (2008) 
conducted a randomised experiment in urban India to assess whether repayment schedules 
affected repayment rates. Service uses were randomly assigned to weekly and monthly 
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repayment schedules. It was found that there was no statistically significant difference 
between weekly to monthly repayment rates. In view of the findings the authors argued that 
increasing the period of repayment (i.e. from weekly to monthly) will reduce transaction 
costs for the microfinance institution. It can also be argued that it will also reduce the 
transaction costs for service users as well. Service users have complained about loss of 
productive time when they had to attend compulsory weekly meetings to repay loans 
(Johnson and Rogaly, 1997).  
 
Jain and Mansuri (2003) suggest that the use of tightly structured instalments starting soon 
after loan disbursement puts service users at a disadvantage. Such repayment schedules are 
not suitable for the rural poor who usually make the bulk of their incomes seasonally. Service 
users desire flexible repayments arrangements which coincide with fluctuations in their 
incomes. For instance, informal lenders usually allow flexible repayment schedules often 
permitting repayment at periods to coincide with periods when borrowers come into money 
such as during harvest periods. It is this flexibility, perhaps, that enables moneylenders to 
survive even in areas where microfinance institutions abound. Buchenau (2003) described 
two regulated microfinance institutions, Caja Los Andes in Bolivia and Financiera Calpia in 
El-Salvador, which operated credit products for rural households and allowed for flexible 
repayment tailored to the expected cash flows of individual households. In assessing 
borrowers‘ repayment capacity, the two interventions considered the future cash income and 
expenditures of households‘ basket of different economic activities to determine payment 
capacity and a payment schedule. In addition Hickson (1997) commented on the popularity of 
a flexible loan product in the Qinghai Community Development Project (microfinance 
scheme) in China. Nearly all service users opted for this loan product whose principal did not 
have to be paid until the end of the loan term. Interestingly most service users paid off loans 
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before they fell due. Grameen Bank has realised the importance of permitting flexibility in 
loan repayment and had introduced variable repayment schedules under the new Grameen II. 
However, Rutherford (2006) observed that this strategy was hardly being implemented 
because staff perceived this new scheme as being too cumbersome and complicated to 
implement and therefore discouraged the use of the facility.  
 
In a contrasting picture, Mknelly and Kevane (2002) provide a stark instance of mismatch 
between standardised repayment terms and economic opportunity in Nagereongo, a village in 
Burkina Faso. Although it was evident that onion farming was very profitable, the monthly 
repayments required by the microfinance institution were not conducive to the activity. Onion 
farming was profitable if onions were stored for between four and five months after 
harvesting (when prices were higher). The loan repayment schedules were such that the 
women had to sell onions just after harvest when prices were low in order to repay loans.  
 
2.7.6 Loans and Poverty Reduction  
The idea of enabling the poor to have access to loans is based on the virtuous cycle principle: 
‗low income, investment, more income, more credit, more investment, more income‘ (Hulme 
and Mosley, 1996:122). It is assumed that credit will be used for productive purposes and 
would generate additional income for borrowers. Thus, the provision of credit came to be 
perceived as an important mechanism for reducing poverty and has even been described as a 
crucial element in the achievement of the millennium development goals (MDGs). Loans 
invested in income-generating activities should reduce income poverty if businesses are 
profitable. Loans used for consumption prevent the poor from falling further into poverty and 
thus make them less vulnerable (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Being less vulnerable implies 
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that the poor people have increased capability to invest in more risky but potentially 
profitable investments.   
 
Does successful loan repayment imply poverty reduction? The fact that borrowers have been 
able to successfully repay their loans does not automatically imply a reduction in their level 
of poverty. Evidence from Peru indicates that some group-based microfinance interventions 
resort to severe sanctions to achieve high repayment rates (Marr, 2003). It is not uncommon 
to find service users selling off assets or borrowing from multiple financial sources 
(moneylenders and/or other microfinance institutions) to pay off microloans (Copeland, 
2009). This practice leads to the danger of a debt spiral where borrowers get deeper and 
deeper into debt. According to Marr (2003), these practices hit the poorest and the vulnerable 
the hardest, increasing poverty and undermining the foundations of the microfinance 
interventions. For this reason, extreme caution needs to be exercised in the use of repayment 
rates as a proxy for poverty reduction or increase in incomes.  
 
Is there any empirical evidence of access to loans resulting in poverty reduction? Very few 
studies have assessed the effect of loans on poverty because it is difficult to isolate the impact 
of loans out of the many factors in a microfinance intervention that can potentially affect 
poverty. In other words microfinance encompasses more than loans, even the minimalist 
institutions. Osmani (1998) observed that access to credit brought only partial improvement 
in women‘s well-being because of the low absorptive capacity in poor communities. Zaman 
(2000) has argued that the impact of income poverty depends on borrowing beyond a certain 
threshold.  For example, consumption information from 1072 households in the BRAC 
showed that the largest effect on poverty was evident when moderate poor BRAC service 
users borrowed more than 10000 taka ($200) in cumulative loans.  
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Have loans helped to create jobs given that employment is key to attain the millennium goal 
of halving poverty by 2015. Balkenhol (2007) concedes that direct employment generation is 
not an explicit goal of microfinance but microfinance institutions invariably include it as one 
of their objectives. Evidence suggests that microfinance mainly affects self employment and 
unpaid household labour and has very little effect on wage employment outside of the service 
user‘s household (ibid). Hulme and Mosley (1996) also reached the same conclusion; they 
observed that loans had very limited impact on employment outside the household. Higher 
employment impacts were only found in rapidly growing formal economies (such as 
Indonesia).  
 
The general consensus is that well-off borrowers are more likely to benefit from microfinance 
than the poor. For instance, after an exhaustive study of 13 microfinance institutions 
(including BRI, Grameen Bank, BRAC, TRDEP, BKK, K-REP, BancoSol, and SANASA), 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) concluded that the impact of loans on service users‘ income was 
positively related to the service user‘s income. Hulme and Mosley (1997:102) explain that 
‗those with higher incomes have a greater range of investment opportunities, more 
information about market conditions and can take more risk without threatening their 
minimum needs for survival.‘  
 
The empirical evidence of loans on poverty has not always been positive. Hulme and Mosley 
(1996) argue that loans can induce economic activity to the extent that the rate of return falls 
below the cost of borrowing. The authors also believe there is considerable underreporting of 
credit-induced crisis in most studies of finance for the poor. On the extreme end, Shiva 
(2004) and Sharma (2006) reported that commercial microfinance loans had ensnared several 
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thousands of very small farms into a downward spiral of dependency and growing debt with 
an estimated 160,000 farmer suicides since 1997 in India.   
 
In conclusion, it is evident that loans constitute the backbone of microfinance. How loans 
have been provided has been influenced by the issue of fungibility of credit. Although 
empirical findings indicate loans are used for a myriad of purposes, most microfinance 
institutions endeavour to find ways of ensuring loans are used for productive purposes. Loan 
disbursal and repayment patterns were found to be regimented. Such ritualised patterns do not 
usually match with business cycles and cash flows patterns of especially rural service users. 
The size of microfinance loans have been used in conjunction with other techniques to target 
the poor, ensure the high repayment rates and controversially measure changes in poverty of 
service users. Not much empirical work is available on the effect of loans on poverty because 
of the problem associated with isolating the effect of loans in an intervention. However, many 
theoretical propositions posit a positive relationship between income levels of service users 
and poverty reduction.  
 
2.8 How useful are Emergency Loans? 
Users of microfinance interventions are generally poor and vulnerable. The poor are 
vulnerable because they face a wider variety of risks and shocks and they have fewer 
resources to rely on (Kabeer, 2005). In the context of this insecure livelihoods and limited 
options, poor service users require financial assistance that enables them to mitigate their 
vulnerability (ibid).  Why not use regular loans to reduce risks of service users? According to 
Churchill (2003b) while microfinance loans can reduce service users‘ vulnerability by 
increasing incomes and assets, it is not an effective means of managing risks. Loans are 
unsuitable to address households‘ short-term cash requirements. Churchill argues that 
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emergency loans are important complements to microfinance loans, ‗providing safety nets to 
low-income households to resist the downward pressures of economic stresses....‘ (ibid: 2). 
Emergency loans assume a more important role during periods when disasters or crises affect 
the entire community so that other potential sources of assistance are also affected. As well as 
using emergency loans for reducing vulnerability, access to emergency loans can enable 
service users to seize market opportunities.  
 
Emergency loans are in effect financial instruments that improve service users‘ ability to 
mitigate shocks and risks. This study considers emergency loans as any small amount of 
money that is immediately available to mitigate risks and shocks and repaid in a relatively 
short period (Churchill, 2003b). In addition to loans specially designated for crises, 
emergency funds also include service users‘ savings that microfinance interventions permit 
them to borrow for short periods. Hulme and Mosley (1996) refer to emergency loans as 
rapid-access consumption loans. 
 
2.8.1 Factors Warranting Emergency Loans 
What risks and shocks warrant the need for emergency loans? Churchill (2003b) classifies the 
risks and shocks that perpetuate the poverty cycle into three categories:  
 
 Economic stress— an expected short-term increase in household expenses that cannot 
be handled by regular cash flows (such as weddings, child births, education and rent).  
 Idiosyncratic risk— an unexpected occurrence that increases expenses of a household, 
or decrease income or both (death, illness, loss of assets and business failure).  
 Covariant risk—an unexpected event that results in many households experiencing 
losses (example, floods, drought and fire).  
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These three factors above are nevertheless interrelated. For instance, it is known that rural 
folks in developing countries are mostly in agrarian economies and are likely to eke their 
livelihood from rain-fed agriculture and allied occupations. These people in recent periods 
have experienced erratic rainfall patterns which have made them susceptible to covariant 
risks like drought and floods and thus an increased likelihood of idiosyncratic risks and 
economic stresses. Experiencing economic stress or idiosyncratic risks reduces poor 
households‘ ability to cope with covariant risks.  
 
It is not only service users who benefit from emergency loans; microfinance institutions 
themselves derive some benefits as well. Microfinance interventions reduce default rates 
when emergency loans they provide enable service users to recover from shocks sand 
continue with loan repayments (Cohen, 1999). Contributing to the argument, Churchill 
(2003b) says that the need for emergency loans is couched in logical simplicity: targets of 
microfinance interventions, the poor, are usually vulnerable and less able to cope with risks. 
Taking a loan in itself is a risk and if borrowers are vulnerable then the lender is vulnerable 
too. When the poor have access to emergency loans they are protected from risks which 
renders them less vulnerable. This implies that emergency loans reduce risks to the lender 
and helps maintain a positive credit relationship with borrowers.  
 
2.8.2 To What Extent do Service Users Value Emergency Loans? 
Emergency loans are highly valued by rural service users because access to credit during 
times of emergencies is an important means of overcoming hardship and stabilising the 
household economy of poor families (Buchenau, 2003). Emergency loans are in high demand 
by poorer and more vulnerable households and are deemed to be a significant addition to the 
survival strategies of such households (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). For instance, members of 
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SANASA reported that emergency loans helped them to cope with contingencies (such as 
paying up costs of essential social obligations, medical expenses) at a lower cost than 
alternative coping mechanisms like mortgaging crops land or labour, sale of assets or 
borrowing from a moneylender (ibid).  
 
The important role of emergency loans in managing risk is made evident in an empirical 
study in Zambia. A study by Manje and Churchill (2002) to assess the demand for risk-
managing financial services in Zambia revealed that micro-entrepreneurs exhibited a strong 
preference for accessible savings facilities and emergency loans to enable them cope with 
risk rather than insurance.  The study showed that the most respondents were not comfortable 
with insurance or did not understand it.  
 
2.8.3 Why Microfinance Institutions are reluctant to offer Emergency 
Loans 
It is pertinent to note that while many microfinance institutions acknowledge the importance 
of providing emergency loans, only few institutions have put into place specific products to 
deal with economic stress and idiosyncratic risks that poor households encounter (Buchenau, 
2003). Churchill (2003b) gives two reasons why microfinance institutions have ignored 
emergency loans. First, the most common concern has to do with the perceived risk of giving 
out loans not meant for income generation. Most microfinance institutions are apprehensive 
that service users cannot repay emergency loans because they are not typically used to 
generate additional revenue. Such loans are perceived as unsuitable and thought to contribute 
to over-indebtedness by enticing service users to spend beyond their means. Second, 
microfinance institutions are reluctant to offer emergency loans because they do not usually 
fall under the joint liability methodology and therefore means of enforcing repayment are not 
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usually clear.  The case of the Grameen Bank illustrates the reluctance of microfinance 
institutions to provide emergency loans. Although, Grameen I had included an emergency 
loans scheme under their group fund which was funded by a 5% charge in loans over 
Tk1000, Hulme and Mosley (1996) observed that Grameen service users were unhappy about 
the minimal disbursements from this account. However, under Grameen II, the revised 
Grameen model introduced in 2001, the group fund, including the emergency loan scheme 
was scrapped.   
 
If emergency loans have been provided at all interest rates on them have been relatively high 
or the amounts have been insignificant. For example, SANASA in Sri Lanka charges about 
three times the normal interest rates because of the high demand for that type of loan (Hulme 
and Mosley, 1996). The Shakti Foundation
19
, a microfinance institution in Bangladesh, 
claims to give interest-free emergency loans to all members affected by crisis. However the 
maximum amount of loan service users were eligible for is a paltry 1000 taka (£10).  
  
2.8.4 Emergency Loans and Poverty Reduction? 
From the forgoing discussion it can be deduced that the major role played by emergency 
loans is what Hulme and Mosley (1996) call ‗protectional.‘ Emergency loans prevent service 
users from retrogressing into poverty by reducing the vulnerability of service users. By 
reducing their vulnerability service users will be in a position to invest microloans in risky 
but more profitable income-generating activities.  
 
                                                 
19
 More information on the Shakti Foundation can be found at  http://www.bwtp.org/shakti.html 
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2.9 Savings 
The introduction of savings facilities into microfinance interventions has generated a lot of 
interest and debate in recent years (Robinson, 1997; Elser, Hannig and Wisniwski, 1999; 
Richardson, 2003; Harper and Vogel, 2005). From a historical perspective, the perception of 
the poor as being too poor to save resulted in the neglect of savings as a financial instrument 
for poverty alleviation (Wisniwski, 1998). The importance of savings to the poor began to 
emerge during the early 1980s when empirical evidence exploded the idea that the poor could 
not save and could not take advantage of saving facilities (Adams and Graham, 1981). It is 
now known that the poor have to, can and do save and even pay others to take their money 
for safe-keeping in schemes such as the susu (Rutherford, 2000). The capability of the poor to 
save is buttressed by overwhelming empirical evidence that the poor all over the world save 
in different forms and for a variety of reasons. Wenner et al. (2003) makes a cogent argument 
for the provision of savings facilities to the poor in developing countries especially those in 
rural areas. He contends that in most developing countries commercial banks, which usually 
have the mandate to mobilise savings, have not entered rural credit markets on a substantial 
scale and after financial liberalisation most of the commercial banks have actually closed 
most of their rural branches. Zeller (2003) believes there is much hope for microfinance 
institutions stepping in and expanding rural savings as a result of more favourable 
macroeconomic and political conditions in many developing countries that undertook 
structural and financial sector reforms.  
 
The rest of this section examines the reasons and mechanisms through which poor people 
save. Next it reviews the state of knowledge on what the poor demand with regard to 
institutional saving facilities. Finally, it strives to unravel the effect of savings on poverty 
reduction.   
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2.9.1 Why do the Poor Save? 
Why do the poor who barely have enough to subsist on have to save? Although being poor 
implies the lack of money, the poor have to save for a myriad of reasons. The poor save 
because they require small amounts of money to finance daily livelihood activities and to 
smoothen consumption due to seasonality and unemployment (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). 
The habit of saving tends to be more important for the financing of subsistence agriculture 
where investment requirements and the bulk of incomes are generally seasonal (CGAP, 
2001). The poor save to accumulate large lump sums for what Rutherford (2000) categorises 
into lifecycle events, emergency needs and investment opportunities. First, regarding 
lifecycle events, the poor require lump sums of money for events such as childbirth, 
marriage, education and festival celebration which can be very costly. Second, the poor save 
for emergencies (personal and impersonal) which could result in the unanticipated need for 
large sums of money. Personal emergencies include sickness, death and unemployment while 
the impersonal consist of events such as war, famine, famine and floods. Third and finally, 
poor households save to accumulate large sums of money for investment opportunities such 
as purchase of agricultural implements, buy land, housing material and other productive 
assets. A study in rural Bangladesh by Maloney and Ahmed (1998) revealed that the most 
important reason for saving was to buy land followed by the objective of providing family 
security against unforeseen contingencies. Savings facilities are evidently very important for 
the poor and this is reflected in a study in Uganda where 57% of respondents claimed that the 
secure and convenient place to save was more important than ability to acquire loans 
(Deshpande, Pickens, and Messan, 2006).  
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2.9.2 How Do the Poor Save? 
It is now known why the poor save but how do they do save? Savings facilities for the poor 
can be broadly categorised into two: formal and informal. Informal savings include 
arrangement such as savings in kind, door-to-door deposit collections (susu), ROSCAs, 
ASCAs, trade savings among others. They are called informal because they are usually 
relationship-based and involve very minimal or no record keeping. Formal savings also 
known as institutional savings generally refer to regulated and non-regulated financial 
institutions such as commercial banks and financial NGOs.  
 
2.9.2.1 Informal Savings Arrangements 
It is known that traditionally poor households save in kind as well as in cash. They hold their 
savings in assets including livestock, grain, jewellery or land. These assets constitute a form 
of insurance against crisis such as drought and can be sold or pawned in times of emergency 
or crisis (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). People save to buy assets such as land which are 
sometimes used as collateral for loans. However, given the opportunity, the poor prefer to 
save in cash due to the susceptibility of in-kind savings to problems of divisibility, security 
and convenience (ibid). In Uganda for example, informal savings arrangements consisted of 
savings in kind, usually in land and livestock; participation in ROSCAs, ASCAs and similar 
groups; using a money guard (a trusted family member or individual); and saving cash in the 
home (Deshpande et al., 2006). Two other studies (Wright, 1999a; and Vonderlack and 
Schreiner, 2002) have examined the savings habits of poor people. The poor were found to 
sometimes keep cash hidden in the home for emergency use, or lend to others with the view 
of receiving a reciprocal gesture in times of need. In an in-depth study of 42 households in 
rural and urban Bangladesh, Rutherford (2002) found that savings at home was the most 
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frequently-used savings mechanism. The poor would give money to trusted people like 
shopkeepers and other traders for safekeeping without expecting any interest payment.  
 
What do the poor like about informal savings arrangements? Informal savings have the 
advantage of being adaptable to the circumstances of the savers. For instance, the savings 
collector (susu collector) maintains a personalised relationship with the saver and acquiesces 
to some flexibility in payment of deposits. Again, for instance, moneylenders are quite 
flexible when it comes to loan repayment (loans may not accrue further interests after the 
loan is overdue). Informal savings involves low transaction costs and instills discipline (for 
example RoSCAs). In spite of these advantages, informal savings suffers from insecurity, 
impermanence, and the inability to serve large numbers of the poor. Woolcock (1999) argues 
that informal savings such as RoSCAs and susu may provide some measure of short-term 
assistance but do not sufficiently diversify risk and are not appropriate for larger-scale 
projects. Wright (1999a) has described most informal savings schemes as self-liquidating. 
For example, a RoSCAs may end when people who have already received their RoSCA pool 
fail to pay their contributions. Savings collectors (susu collectors) are known to abscond with 
savings of their clients. For example, Aryeetey and Gockel (1991), in a study in Ghana, noted 
that about 40% of savers had lost their money to a defaulting susu collector and almost 80% 
knew of someone who had lost money the same way in Ghana. Informal savings institutions 
lack the resources to cater for the immense demand for savings facilities by the poor. It limits 
the poor people‘s response to unpredicted crisis requirements, flexibility in payments 
(inability to pay due to problems and increased ability as a result of windfall) and to build up 
larger sums of money. Institutional savings schemes have the ability to overcome most of the 
problems encountered by informal savings arrangements.        
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2.9.2.2 Institutional Savings Facilities: What the Poor Want 
Institutional savings facilities offer important tools for efficient liquidity management. The 
advantage that institutional deposit facilities show over informal savings is a good mix of 
accessibility to cash, security, rate of return and divisibility of savings (Wisniwski 1998). 
Empirical evidence indicates that institutional savings facilities are in high demand. For 
instance, at BRI savings accounts outnumber loans by 6 to 1 and while at Bank Dagang Bali 
the ratio of savings to loan accounts was 30 to 1 (Mukherjee, 1997). It can be argued that 
savings accounts outnumber loan accounts because loans unlike savings are rationed. In spite 
of this there is evidently a high demand for savings facilities among the poor. What features 
do the poor look for in institutional savings schemes? Studies such as Wright, (1999a); 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, (2005); and Deshpande et al., (2006) agree that service 
users want accessible, convenient and secure savings facilities. The role of interest rate as a 
determinant of demand for savings is however contested 
 
Accessibility of Savings  
Easy accessibility to savings for liquidity management is an important determinant of savings 
for poor households. Especially for emergency purposes, depositors need highly liquid 
schemes and the reassurance that they will have access to their money when it is required. 
Wright (1999a) has observed that although the majority of the poor require liquid savings 
schemes, they make do not make frequent withdrawals. What they appreciate is the option to 
withdraw whenever they want. While there is a general consensus that liquidity is key to local 
savings mobilisation, it is important to note that in many circumstances the poor have a 
strong illiquidity preference. Because it takes the poor considerable effort to save due to the 
myriad of demands on their incomes, they welcome some form of measures to prevent them 
from frequently accessing their deposits. Wright (1999a) observed that women in particular 
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require savings mechanisms that prohibit them from withdrawing in response to trivial needs 
or frivolous spending and to fend off demands from relatives and friends requesting for loans.   
 
Security 
Poor households require safe and secure microfinance institutions to entrust their savings and 
it is the most important feature service users require in savings schemes (Elser et al., 1999; 
Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002). Poor households‘ demand for saving facilities is contingent 
on their confidence in the microfinance institution‘s ability to protect their deposits. 
Institutions that have been in business for a long period are more likely to attract savings. In 
member-owned microfinance institutions in Uganda, perception of security of savings was 
highly dependent on the honesty of managers. Service users also equated modern, strong-
looking physical structures with stability (Deshpande et al., 2006). According to Wright 
(1999a) secure savings, in theory, is a key criterion of demand for savings but in reality the 
poor do not often have secure options: they often have to transact business with banks they 
often perceived as risky and unreliable. Evidence is replete in developing countries 
(especially in Africa) of failure of banks. However, compared to informal savings 
arrangements, institutional savings facilities are safer. For instance, in a survey of 1500 
people in Uganda, 99% of respondents who saved using informal arrangements had lost some 
money compared to 26% in institutional savings facilities (Deshpande et al. 2006).  
 
Convenience  
Service users require convenient institutions in which to save. The poor prefer institutional 
savings facilities that allow them to save and withdraw variable sums of money as frequently 
as possible, not be burdened by paperwork and other transaction costs, and transparent in a 
manner in which they are able to understand (Wright, 1999a; Rutherford, 2000). Service 
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users prefer saving facilities to be close to them and also short transaction times. Aryeetey 
and Gockel (1991) suggest that the reason why susu collectors are so popular in Ghana is 
because they go their clients‘ place of business and transaction time takes approximately 30 
seconds compared with 15 minutes or more in a bank for a similar transaction.  
 
Interest Rates 
The general perception in microfinance studies is that the level of interest rate is not an 
important determinant of the propensity of the poor to save with microfinance institutions. 
Dupas and Robinson conducted a randomised field experiment in rural Kenya. They found 
even though the savings scheme did not pay any interest but rather included a substantial 
amount of withdrawal fees, usage of the savings facility was high among women. A similar 
situation occurred in Indonesia when the BRI introduced the ‗village savings‘ in 1986. 
Although BRI paid no interest on small deposits and relatively less interest rates on larger 
deposits the scheme quickly became very popular (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005). Zeller et al.‘s (1997) review of empirical evidence support this perception. The studies 
reviewed are silent on the extent of competition for savings of service users. Wright (1999a) 
has observed that where credible options exist, the poor are sensitive to interest rates in 
savings.  
 
2.9.2.3 Institutional Savings Facilities: What Microfinance Institutions Provide 
From the previous section, it is now known what service users require in savings facilities. 
What savings services do microfinance institutions offer? In providing savings facilities, 
microfinance institutions have to play a role quite the opposite of that of providing 
microloans. This time, unless with compulsory savings schemes, microfinance institutions 
have to exhibit confidence, permanence, flexibility to compel the poor to entrust them with 
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their savings (Wright, 1999a). In other words they have to prove they are capable of meeting 
the savings requirements of the poor discussed above. In practice, however, due to the 
inability of savings facilities to meet demand, and some savings schemes being compulsory, 
microfinance institutions enjoy huge patronage irrespective of their status. Savings facilities 
provided by microfinance institutions can be classified under compulsory, voluntary and 
mixed.  
 
Compulsory Savings Schemes 
Compulsory savings form the largest number of savings facilities in the microfinance 
industry. The reason for the ubiquitousness of compulsory savings stems from the fact that 
most microfinance institutions are NGOs who are barred by legislation from mobilising 
savings from the public (CGAP, 2001). Microfinance institutions‘ only means of adding 
savings facilities to their interventions is making compulsory savings a condition for 
accessing loans. Compulsory savings are linked to loans and members are usually required to 
save for a certain period before receiving any credit and usually must to continue to save as 
long as they conduct business with the microfinance institution. Most microfinance 
institutions consider compulsory savings as some form of collateral and service users can 
only withdraw their accumulated savings when they decide to leave the intervention 
permanently.   
 
Compulsory savings have some benefits both for the institution and service users. First, the 
regularity of initial saving deposits can act as a screening device by providing lenders with 
free information about borrowers who are likely to repay (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Dowla 
and Alamgir, 2003). Second, compulsory savings can instil thriftiness and discipline among 
service users. Microfinance institutions implement compulsory savings, perhaps, based on the 
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assumption that the poor must be taught the discipline of saving (Rutherford, 2002). Third, 
compulsory savings serve as a reliable source of capital for microfinance institutions, 
permitting them to meet substantial demand for credit. Members‘ savings constitute about 
36%, 25%, and 16% of outstanding loans for Grameen, BRAC and BURO-Tangail 
respectively (Dowla and Alamgir, 2003). 
 
Compulsory savings schemes allow female borrowers to protect their savings in patriarchal 
societies where all household finances are likely to be controlled by husbands and other 
family members. ‗Through the vehicle of compulsory saving, women members can legitimise 
their savings instead of stashing it away secretly‘ (Dowla and Alamgir, 2003; 976). Arguing 
in favour of compulsory savings, Wright (1999a; iv) says that compulsory savings satisfies 
the demand for illiquidity preference and states; ―This ‗illiquidity preference‘ is in response 
to the poor household self-imposed need for structured and committed savings mechanisms 
that prohibit them from withdrawing in response to trivial needs or frivolous spending and 
allow them to fend off the demands of marauding relatives requesting loans or assistance.‖ 
 
The downside of compulsory savings facility is that it attracts far less deposits:  it excludes 
non-members and members usually only deposit the minimum amount required. According to 
Wright (1999a), there is evidence that compulsory savings, especially those that are deducted 
from loans issued, are simply perceived as the cost of credit and are almost universally 
unpopular among clients in Bangladesh.  
  
Voluntary Savings 
In most developing countries the introduction or the movement from compulsory to voluntary 
savings schemes is an indication of improvement and maturity. This usually implies that the 
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institution has achieved financial capacity to effectively ensure the security of deposits and 
meet legal financial requirements. By emphasising voluntary savings, the linkage between 
savings and credit, resulting in the poor considering such savings as a cost of credit is broken 
and savings can then be perceived as a service.  
  
Poor households tend to be attracted to and save more with voluntary savings facilities 
(Kabeer, 1998; Wright, 1998). Empirical evidence indicates that voluntary savings are more 
successful with regard to outreach and volume of savings than compulsory savings 
(Wisniwski, 1998). For example, according to Wright (1999a) all BRI customers save and 
only one in six is a borrower at any one time. As of December 1996, there were 16.1 million 
savers (who had saved $2.7billion) against 2.3 million borrowers (with loans of $1.7 billion 
outstanding). With the Bank Dagang Bali, the ratio of savings to loan accounts was over 30 to 
1 (Robinson, 1997). The reason for this huge demand for voluntary savings accounts, 
according to Robinson, is the notion that most microfinance service users want to save all the 
time while most are willing to borrow only some of the time. It can however be argued that 
the rather large disparity between savings and loans accounts is because loan disbursement 
represents a far greater risk to microfinance institutions compared to receiving deposits. It is 
therefore prudent for microfinance institutions to reduce risks by encouraging deposits rather 
than giving out loans.   
  
The ability of microfinance institutions to mobilise voluntary deposits and perform efficiently 
invariably depends on a stable macro-economic, regulatory, and the political commitment 
(Mukherjee & Malhotra, 1997). However, evidence from URAC
20
 in Mexico has 
demonstrated that voluntary savings can work well even in the presence of high inflation 
                                                 
20
 URAC means Union Regional de Apoyo Campesino and it is a microfinance institution based in 
Tequisquiapan in the Mexican state of Queretario. 
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(Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Voluntary savings do not work well when they are tied to loans, 
that is, when they can be used to defray debts of service users. Hulme and Mosley (1996) 
advocate a complete separation of voluntary savings from loans. In summing up the 
conditions for successful voluntary savings mobilisation, Carter et al. (2004) advocate for 
appropriate macroeconomic conditions, regulatory environment and supervisory capacity. 
They further advise donors and governments to invest in expanded regulatory capacity, 
support appropriate adjustment of laws and regulations and show the potential contribution to 
economic growth that expansion of savings can bring.  
 
Mixed Savings 
It is also common practice for microfinance institutions who routinely offer voluntary 
institutional savings to adopt informal savings strategies. Some institutions, for example the 
First Allied Savings and Loan Limited
21
 in addition to accepting savings employ the susu 
scheme to mobilise savings from the public. Rather than charge interest on daily collection as 
is done by the traditional susu collectors, the First Allied Savings and Loans Limited pays 
interest on monies collected. Many rural banks in Ghana currently operate susu schemes.  
 
It is possible to have voluntary savings facilities that incorporate some aspects of structured 
and regimented saving mechanisms akin to compulsory savings (example Buro Tangail and 
Grameen II). Depositors pay in monies at agreed periods and they are not permitted to make 
any withdrawals for a certain period of time. Fixed deposits and contractual savings 
agreements fall within the compulsory-like savings schemes. In sum, by offering mixed 
savings schemes, microfinance institutions cater to the diverse savings needs of the poor.  
                                                 
21
 First Allied Savings and Loans Limited is a regulated, non-bank financial institution in Kumasi, Ghana. 
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2.9.2.4 Implications of Institutional Savings for Poverty Reduction  
Very few studies have assessed the effect of institutional savings on poverty reduction. Chen 
and Snodgrass (1999) assessed the effect of savings on service users and found that 
borrowers-only had higher median incomes compared to savers-only. Wright and Mutesasira 
(2001) concede that savings facilities play a vital role in the management of business and the 
household. In a randomised field experiment in rural Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2009:1) 
found that savings accounts had ‗substantial positive impacts on productive investment levels 
and expenditures for women but no effect for men.‘ Further findings of from Dupas and 
Robinson‘s study also suggest that unlike the control group, the treatment group did not draw 
down their working capital to mitigate household health shocks. The study, however, does 
not indicate whether service users had access to their savings.  
 
The study argues that savings schemes are more likely to erode poverty of they meet the 
expectations and demands of service users. Mukherjee (1997) observed that some 
microfinance institutions,  Bank Dagang Bali,  BRI, and BancoSol all offer savings that meet 
specific levels of demands for security, convenience of location and choice of facilities of 
different mixes of liquidity and returns. Most of the microfinance institutions especially those 
in Asia (Grameen Bank, Buro Tangail, Save BRI and the Bank Dagang Bali) have 
transformed their savings facilities (Wright, 2010). For example after restructuring its savings 
products under the Grameen II, Grameen Bank provided a wide range of flexible services 
(public deposit services, extended member deposit services and improved loan contracts). 
Wright reports that the results of the changes have been impressive. Although Grameen took 
27 years to reach 2.5 million members, it was able to triple that number after the full 
establishment of Grameen II.  
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Even in Bangladesh‘s fiercely competitive environment Grameen in 2004-2006 
continued to grow at a remarkable rate attracting around 140,000 new members each 
month – a staggering 1.7 million new members every year. In the three years to 
December 2005, Grameen‘s deposit base tripled and its loans outstanding doubled …. 
Drop-outs returned, and even some old defaulters repaid and re-joined (Wright, 2010: 
7). 
 
In conclusion, it is evident that the poor indeed save to negotiate their complex livelihood 
strategies. It is also clear that savings is an important financial tool for the poor and they even 
pay others to take their savings. Traditional forms of savings have limitations which 
institutional savings schemes can mitigate. Institutional savings schemes enjoy immense 
patronage leading to a debatable conclusion that the poor have greater affinity for savings 
schemes than microloans. The poor have demonstrated that they require savings facilities that 
are accessible, convenient, secure and debatably, yield high interest rates. Most microfinance 
institutions who are NGOs provide only compulsory savings schemes because they are 
constrained by financial regulations. It is evident that the poor require diversity of 
institutional savings schemes that are in tune with the diversity of their needs: products that 
can satisfy short, medium, and long-term needs, in addition to schemes that are adapted to 
meet their cash flow patterns. The effect of savings on poverty is has not been researched 
much but the few studies point to a positive relationship between savings and reduction in 
vulnerability. 
 
2.10 The Interest Rate Question in Microfinance   
The issue of interest rates for microfinance loans seems to be over-discussed yet empirically 
under-explored, especially with regard to rural microfinance (Buchenau, 2003). Microfinance 
institutions have to determine the interest rate to charge on loans and the decisions they make 
are usually contingent on observations and assumptions about their clients, past occurrences 
and on their objectives, both explicit and implicit (Wright and Alamgir, 2004; Armendariz de 
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Aghion and Morduch, 2005). The interest rate question is encapsulated by the subsidy/market 
interest rate debate and the focus of this section is on the relationship between the 
microfinance institution and the service user. This section seeks a deeper understanding of 
interest rate debate because it constitutes an important subject in microfinance especially 
relating to its potential effect on poverty.  
 
2.10.1 Subsidies Disaggregated   
Subsidies are provided to microfinance institutions and/or service users. For microfinance 
institutions, subsidies are financial support offered through direct payment or through indirect 
means in the form of grants, concessionary loans and technical assistance to the microfinance 
institutions themselves. To microfinance service users, subsidy usually refers to the receipt of 
support for non-financial services or credit at below-market interest rates. Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005: 245) argue that the adage that says ‗subsidise the institution and 
not the borrower‘ does not make sense because any subsidy to the institution entails fewer 
costs being passed on to the borrowers. On the contrary, it can be argued that under certain 
circumstances such as under a monopolistic condition, microfinance institutions can absorb 
subsidies without passing any down to service users. As stated in the introduction, the interest 
of this study primarily lies in subsidies that flow from microfinance interventions to service 
users. Subsidies have acquired a rather negative image in the microfinance industry. What 
has informed the generally negative perception of subsidies?    
 
2.10.2 Subsidies: An Anathema? 
The negative image of subsidies in the microfinance literature can mainly be found in its 
historical antecedents. In the past decades governments and other financial institutions 
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established what were known as Agricultural Development Banks (ADBs) based on the 
assumption that subsidised credit was crucial for agricultural and rural development and that 
the poor could not afford to repay loans on market-based interest rates. The main features that 
characterised these microcredit institutions included the following: they were state-sponsored 
and entailed considerable government involvement; they provided subsidised loans; and 
targeted agriculture. Almost all the Agricultural Development Banks failed abysmally and 
their disaster stories are well documented (Robinson, 1995; Morduch, 2000; Owens and 
Agabin, 2006). It should however be noted that subsidised credit was not the only culprit for 
the collapse of Agricultural Development Banks. The ADBs had weak dysfunctional 
governance structures and internal control mechanisms and excessive political intrusion. 
People who accessed these loans considered them as political largesse and refused to repay. 
Most governments almost always forgave these debts for political expediency (Armendariz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). In spite of the above observation subsidies have been vilified 
and much of microfinance discourse emphasises a movement away from subsidies. It has also 
been argued that subsidies in microfinance go against the principles of the neo-liberalist 
agenda that abhors anything that is believed to distort the market, crowd out capital and only 
have short-term effects.     
 
On the micro-level, it seems intuitive that subsidies would lower the cost of credit for service 
users and increase the impact of microcredit on poverty. However, some studies (Robinson, 
1995; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005) contend that subsidies tend to undermine 
poverty reduction because only a small number of poor usually benefit because such loans 
tend to be captured by the non-poor. Microfinance interventions that offer subsidised credit 
generally face low repayment and limited growth because service users often perceive such 
loans as gifts that need not be repaid (CGAP, 2002). It is argued that loans may not be 
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employed for productive purposes if they are perceived as gifts. Robinson (2001) argues that 
because of capital constraints, subsidised credits are effectively rationed. The non-poor then 
allocate the loans to themselves knowing they may not have to repay them. Robinson gives 
many examples of the use of loans to buy political support (see Blair, 1984; Malhotra and 
Fiddler, 1995), and the poor repayment rates of subsidised credit (see Yaron, Benjamin and 
Piprek, 1997).  
  
Robinson (2001) claims poor borrowers incur high transaction costs due the high demand for 
subsidised credit. Poor people usually spend long periods of time waiting in queues and 
return visits. In addition bank staff often demand bribes for the rationed subsidised loans. 
Subsidised loans also deprive service users of an essential financial service—savings. 
Microfinance interventions are unwilling to mobilise savings because subsidised loans imply 
that revenues are too low to cover the operating costs of effective savings mobilisation. 
 
2.10.3 Persistence of Subsidies   
Subsidies have been vilified because they are seen as part of a package of mutually self-
destroying factors: namely political interference, supply-driven and weak institutional 
structures. However, subsidies continue to be a direct and indirect part of the financial 
schemes of many microfinance institutions (Schreiner, 2003; Hardy et al, 2003; Khalily, 
2004; Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, 2005). For instance, the Microbanking Bulletin 
(July, 2003) reveals that 58 microfinance institutions out of 124 surveyed took some form of 
subsidy. Some of the subsidised microfinance institutions were highly efficient and even 
profit-making. Morduch (2005: 3) cites an example of ASA in Bangladesh which ‗has 
implemented innovative cost-cutting management practices… during a period in which it was 
also receiving soft loans from Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PSKF), a local apex 
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organisation. ASA was modestly subsidized but highly efficient.‘ Robinson (2001), a staunch 
advocate of commercial microfinance, concedes that the Grameen Bank, which pursues that 
poverty lending approach, has successfully reached the poor with government- and donor-
subsidised credit services. There is no doubt that Grameen Bank, with good financial 
practices, has become a microfinance model and is replicated all over the world.  
 
Another important reason why the issue of subsidies still persist is the emergence of social 
investors, people who are willing to trade profit for demonstrable poverty impact (Morduch, 
2005). According to Morduch (2005), subsidies are neither intrinsically flawed nor inherently 
useful. Their effectiveness is contingent on how they are designed and implemented. 
Morduch (2005: 1) advocates for subsidies if they can be used to increase the ‗scale of 
microfinance outreach, access to commercial finance, and depth of outreach to the poor.‘ To 
accomplish these he calls for the use of what he terms as smart subsidies which recognise 
hard budget constraints, clear bottom lines and competitive pressure: the same forces that 
drive efficient outcomes in markets. In an attempt to show the positive side of subsidies, 
Morduch (2005) cites an example of how subsidies can be used as a means of attracting 
additional resources (crowding in) into microfinance industry as opposed to the entrenched 
notion of subsidies crowding out capital. Grameen Foundation offered subordinated debt 
(form of subsidy) as guarantee for a loan contracted by SHARE (a microfinance institution) 
from ICICI, a bank in India. In this situation a subsidy enabled the attraction of commercial 
capital into microfinance. This signifies that subsidies and commercial capital are not always 
inconsistent with each other: they can be complementary  
 
Subsidised credit can be used to improve the livelihoods of very poor people. As Yaron 
(1992) raises the ‗infant industry‘ argument in support of the subsidisation of microfinance 
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institutions in the initial stages of their establishment, likewise subsidies can also be used to 
develop the capacity of the very poor to enable them eventually make use of loans at market 
interest rates. As some microfinance institutions need assistance in their start-up so do 
borrowers who in the initial stages cannot reduce their level of poverty with commercial 
loans and need time to graduate from protectional to promotional poverty reduction strategies 
(Hulme and Mosley,1996). Morduch (2005) cites an example of BRAC‘s Income Generation 
for Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD) which achieved impressive results by using 
subsidies to develop the capacity of the very poor to graduate to BRAC‘s regular 
microfinance programmes. Interestingly, there was very little evidence of corruption, elite 
capture and rent seeking in the programme (for more on IGVGD see Hashemi, 2001; Matin 
and Hulme, 2003).    
 
2.10.4 Market Interest Rates  
The failure of many microfinance schemes based on subsidised credit programmes spurred 
the need to ensure sustainability of microfinance institutions. It is argued that one important 
means of sustaining microfinance institutions was to charge market interest rates on loans 
(Morduch, 1999a; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). It has also been argued that 
the ideological shift from state-led development approach to liberalisation or market-driven 
approaches, including neo-liberalists abhorrence for subsidies, catalysed the movement from 
subsidised credit to commercial interest rates in the microfinance industry. Charging market 
interest rates as part of commercialising
22
 microfinance was perceived as a means making 
microfinance institutions profitable and thereby attracts private and corporate capital into the 
industry. Profitability was expected to engender greater competition and permit the expansion 
                                                 
22
 Commercialisation implies microfinance institutions acting in a more business-like manner, covering the full 
cost of delivering of services, following sound financial practice, being efficient and exhibiting financial 
discipline (Sandertine, 2002; Clark, 2004).  
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of products and services, innovation in methodologies and lower costs (Alindogan, 2002). In 
addition to ensuring the sustainability of microfinance institutions, being profitable was 
expected to wean microfinance institutions off donor support and dictates and increase 
outreach through increased investment. Morduch (2005) argues that profitability does not 
guarantee access to commercial capital, especially if profitability was deemed a transient 
situation.     
 
At the micro-level, it is argued that commercial interest rates may engender judicious and 
profitable use of loans if borrowers recognise that their continued access to financial services 
is dependent on their rates of repayment. Loans at market interest rates are likely to be less 
attractive to the better-off and prevent elite capture. This advantage is only likely to hold if 
there is no excessive demand of microfinance loans over supply. There is a concern that very 
high interest rates can erode gains that might accrue to service users.  
 
2.10.5 Competition and Interest Rates 
Buchenau (2003) argues that the idea of recouping cost through interest rates is laudable, 
especially if it stimulates the poor to employ microloans more productively, and does not 
significantly reduce the incomes of the poor. This practice accrues benefits to service users 
and microfinance institutions when it takes place in a free and competitive environment. 
Microfinance institutions in competitive markets are compelled to improve the quality of 
their services to protect or expand their market share. Resultant innovations which reduce 
overall costs can directly improve profitability and increase competitiveness and 
subsequently result in reduction in poverty if the benefits are passed on to service users in the 
form of lower interest rates and fees (ibid).  
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In a study of three countries (Uganda, Bangladesh and Bolivia) which have three of the most 
competitive microfinance environments, Porteous (2006) reached a conclusion that 
competition does not necessarily result in lower interest rates. For interest rates to fall there 
must be sufficiently large microfinance institutions with sufficient incentive and ability to 
reduce their rates (ibid). Wright and Alamgir, (2006) reached the same conclusion in 
Bangladesh: the large microfinance institutions usually reduced their interest rates and the 
other institutions just followed suit. Lapenu and Zeller, (2001) observed that in rural areas in 
most developing countries in Africa, however, the number of microfinance institutions is too 
few to engender competition. This is because Africa‘s has lagged behind in microfinance 
development and outreach compared with Latin America and South East Asia  
 
2.10.6 How Sensitive are Service Users to Changes in Interest Rates?  
There is a general perception that service users‘ demand for loans do not change much when 
interest rates increase and that microfinance institutions can raise interest rates without losing 
clients or suffer mission drift (CGAP, 2003; Dehejia, Montgomery and Morduch, 2005; 
DFID, 2006). Dehejia et al., (2005) argue that service users are not sensitive to increases in 
interest rates because they have ample surpluses to mitigate the effect of higher interest rates. 
The forgoing argument is countered by the position that demand does not change much with 
increases in interest rates due to the overwhelming demand over supply for credit, especially 
in most rural communities in developing countries.  
 
There is a general impression among sustainability advocates that poor entrepreneurs earn 
enough to afford interest at market rates and does not significantly erode the gains of the 
poor. Morduch (2008) claims the microfinance movement is driven by the singular 
assumption that poor households have high economic returns to capital. Consequently poor 
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households are capable of paying the high interest rates that microfinance institutions charge 
in order to survive without donor assistance. Several studies support Morduch‘s argument. 
CGAP (2002) cites studies in India, Kenya and the Philippines that found average return on 
investments by micro-businesses ranged from 117 to 847%. Morduch (2008: 3) reports some 
recent findings that confirm that poor entrepreneurs earn high returns. Returns on male-
owned retail businesses in Mexico ranged from 20% to 33% per month. Returns were even 
higher for businesses identified as financially constrained—70% to 75%. Morduch (2008: 4) 
next cites a study by Del Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Sri Lanka. This 
randomized study confirmed findings of the Mexican study: real returns to capital were about 
60% per year. Using such findings as basis of charging high interest rates is flawed because 
the studies have obvious limitations, which Morduch himself concedes. For instance, the 
studies do not show how they impute costs for own labour. In countries characterized by high 
unemployment and considerable under-employment, one can easily impute zero price for 
own labour. Returns to capital will be drastically reduced if own labour is taken into account. 
Morduch says the studies focus on average returns to capital and conceal the heterogeneity 
within the population and the fluctuations in returns on capital as a result of seasonality and 
other factors. Perhaps most surprising of all is the finding that for female-owned businesses 
average marginal returns to capital was almost zero (Del Mel et al., 2008). Considering that 
most microfinance service users are women, this finding casts doubt on the validity of the 
argument on charging high interest rates. 
 
Interest rate sensitivity does vary according to the socio-economic status of service users. 
Dehejia et al. (2005) conducted a study in the slums of Dhaka in Bangladesh to assess 
borrowers‘ sensitivity to increases on interest on loans. Using data from SafeSave (a credit 
cooperative) the study found that poorer service users were more sensitive to changes in 
90 
 
interest rates than the less poor borrowers. This meant that when interest rates increased the 
bank‘s portfolio shifted away from the poorest borrowers (ibid). Further analysis suggested 
that poorer service users reacted to increases in interest rates by borrowing smaller loans 
more frequently and repaying loans more quickly than before. This finding contradicts the 
findings of the CGAP (2002) study. The study does not give much information of the context 
in which the SafeSave operates. For instance, were there any microfinance interventions 
available to the poorer categories of people? In other words did poorer service users have 
alternative financial services? This could explain why they borrowed smaller amounts.  Not 
much contextual information is available to throw light on the findings of the study.    
 
Other studies have contradicted the findings of Dehejia et al (2005). Karlan, Kutsoati and 
Oliver (2007) conducted a randomised field experiment in urban Accra, Ghana, to assess 
people‘s sensitivity to interest rate changes. Entrepreneurs were more likely to apply for loans 
at lower interest rates than at higher interest rates. When the sample was disaggregated along 
socio-economic lines, poorer service users did not appear to be sensitive to interest rates. 
Karlan et al (2007) surmised it was probable that the poorer entrepreneurs could not tell the 
difference between high and low interest rates due to illiteracy. On the other hand, it could be 
that their profit margins were high enough for high interest rates to significantly affect their 
demand for loans.   
 
The above studies clearly indicate that poor people‘s responsiveness to interest rate increases 
is mixed: it varies in the various contexts. The studies suffer from an important defect; they 
do not give much explanation with regard to how contextual factors influence service users‘ 
observed decisions. In addition, are there other occurrences within the interventions that that 
affect service users‘ ability to make informed choices? Do service users themselves have the 
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ability to react to increases in interest rates? The next section attempts to address these 
questions.   
 
2.10.7 Negotiating the Interest Rate Labyrinth  
The postulations and arguments about the responsiveness of poor people to interest rates will 
be incomplete without reference to the complicated nature of microfinance interest rate 
regimes and poor people‘s perception of interest rates. Interest rate strategies of most 
microfinance institutions are notoriously noted for their lack of transparency (CGAP, 2004). 
First, most microfinance institutions charge flat interest rates such that the interest paid on the 
loan does not decline as the loan is being repaid. Flat interest rates are usually almost doubled 
when expressed as annual percentage rates (APR) (Wright and Alamgir, 2004; Harford, 
2008). The use of flat interest rates is so common that in an assessment of 640 microfinance 
institutions that provided information for a study, the CDF Microfinance Statistics (2002) 
found that over 522 institutions charged the flat rate. The most prominent among these were 
BRAC, ASA and Buro-Tangail. Microfinance institutions are able to maintain the use of flat 
rates because microfinance service users are often illiterate and financially ignorant to tell 
between flat rates and the standard declining interest rates (Wright and Alamgir 2004). 
Related to flat interest rates and one of the least commented-upon issues is the use of 
repayment schedules to change effective interest rates. Microfinance loans are repaid daily, 
weekly, fortnightly, monthly, et cetera. According to Rosenberg et al. (2009), a tweak of the 
repayment schedule changes the effective interest rates. The tighter the repayment schedule, 
the higher the effective interest rate.     
 
The second factor that clouds service users‘ ability to assess the cost of credit is the various 
charges, fees and deductions demanded by microfinance institutions. Johnson and Rogaly 
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(1997:52) observed that service users are ‗...charged loan fees, have to organise ‗gifts‘ for 
bank staff, and incur transport costs to get there.‘ These are referred to as the hidden costs of 
microcredit. Most service users usually do not consider these fees and charges are part of the 
cost of credit (CGAP 2004). Other charges include compulsory deposits that service users 
have to make before they receive loans. If they are paid any interest on these deposits at all 
the interest is usually far below rates service users would have earned if their money were in 
a conventional savings account. These deposit requirements thus reduce the net cash service 
users receive as loans and this increases the effective cost of the loans to service users 
(Rosenberg et al., 2009)  
 
How does the non-transparent interest rate regime affect service users‘ perception and their 
choices? An empirical study by Wright and Rippey (2003) provides useful insights to the 
above question. Wright and Rippey conducted a four-year demand-side analysis of the 
Ugandan microfinance market, focusing on areas of the market where it was particularly 
competitive. They found that although service users claimed to take interest rates on loans 
into account in selecting a microfinance intervention and that interest rates were important to 
them, in reality it was not so. Qualitative data showed that they did not know the differences 
in the interest rates charged by the different microfinance service providers. The lack of 
transparency in pricing services, and lack of clear documentation and communication of 
effective rates of interest hampered informed choices. Further probing revealed that word of 
mouth from family and friends was the main factor influencing the selection of a particular 
microfinance intervention.       
 
Another important explanation of the mixed result of poor service users‘ sensitivity to interest 
rates is related to the idea that the concept of interest rates is poorly understood particularly 
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by the non-literate rural poor. Buckley (1997) and Shipton (1992) observed that the concept 
of interest rates is understood differently in the West African context. West Africans tend to 
ignore the amount of time elapsed and emphasise the ratio between the amount of interest and 
principal.   
 
2.10.8 Interest Rates and Poverty Reduction 
What is the effect of interest rates on poverty? There is surprisingly very little work done in 
this area. The major hindrance to such assessment is that interest rates rarely vary within an 
institution. Even if interest rates vary in a microfinance institution across branches such 
variation might be a result of observed characteristics of service users or context. 
 
Some studies (CGAP, 2004; Fernando, 2006) argue that if interest rates increase but 
repayment rates and demand for microfinance services do not decline, then that is an 
indication that poverty is being reduced. In other words, repayment rates and demand for 
microfinance services can be used gauge the affordability of interest rates. The concern with 
the use of such proxies is that in rural areas in Africa, for example, which have witnessed 
little competition among microfinance institutions and where demand for microcredit 
overwhelmingly outstrips supply, microfinance institutions can increase interest rates without 
any noticeable reduction in the number of service users. Increasing interest rates may lead to 
the erosion of the profits of service users (if loans were invested in business) thereby 
undermining microfinance‘s the objective of reducing poverty (Dehejia, et al., 2005). 
Johnson and Rogaly (1997) confirm this line of argument with the observation that when 
microfinance institutions enjoy monopoly, high commercial interest rates can be a source of 
exploitation of service users.  
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The issue of donor support in the microfinance industry needs to be vigorously pursued if it 
will culminate in the reduction of poverty. It is puzzling why many microfinance institutions 
are desirous of weaning themselves off donor support when such funds are available and 
urgently required to fight poverty. Chowdhury (2009: 5) refers to the July 16
th
 edition of the 
Economist which says:   
 
Despite growing interest from private investors, 53% of the $11.7 billion that was 
committed to the microfinance industry in 2008 still came at below-market rates from 
aid agencies, multilateral banks and other donors. 
 
While the rhetoric of repudiating subsidies continues, many large microfinance institutions 
such as the Grameen Bank continue to receive subsidy in the form of subsidised credit from 
government, concessional loans and technical support from other donors. According to 
Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch‘s (2005) estimation, between 1985 and 1996 Grameen 
Bank received total subsidies of $175 million, both direct and in kind. 
 
To conclude, it can be argued that the subsidy/market interest rate dichotomy is simplistic 
and does not effectively capture the complexity of the interest rate regime. It will be more 
productive to conceptualise this dichotomy as a continuum that ranges from highly subsidised 
to high interest rates. Sandertine (2002) urges microfinance professionals to mull over the 
idea that borrowers have different needs and requirements in different economic and social 
contexts and that a more diversified approach to the provision of microfinance is required  
than what the proponents of commercial or subsidised credit have generally been prepared to 
accommodate. Instead of arguing about how much interest rate to charge on microfinance 
loans, it is suggested that the focus should be on the borrower with the question ‗what level of 
interest will bring about optimum poverty reduction sustainably?‘ Making the borrower the 
core of microfinance interventions will compel lenders to take into account the economic and 
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social circumstances of borrowers in the fixing of interest rates in addition to the 
consideration of issues of institutional sustainability.   
 
The studies reviewed show a lack of consensus on whether the poor are sensitive to changes 
in interest rates. These differences reflect the lack of transparency in interest rate pricing 
procedures, poor people‘s perception of interest and other contextual factors. Not much is 
known about how interest rates affect poverty but inferring from studies that show interest 
rates as a minute proportion of returns on capital, then high interest is not likely to adversely 
affect poverty much. However with the realisation that interest rate terrain is more complex 
and that understandings on the concept of interest rates vary, then the relationship between 
interest rates and poverty becomes complicated, contested and difficult to unravel.    
 
2.11 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed the relevant state of knowledge on microfinance interventions. The 
chapter began by disaggregating and explaining the concept of microfinance because in 
recent periods microfinance has come to mean any type of financial service provided to the 
poor. In trying to ascertain why conceptualisations and perceptions of microfinance change 
over time it was found that changes in development ideology, especially economic drivers 
strongly influenced microfinance. The chapter reviewed the theories that underlie the use of 
microfinance as a development tool. It was found that although increase in income through 
investment in income-generating activities was the primary aim of microfinance service 
delivery, other objectives such as empowerment and employment creation were considered 
important. It was realised that impact assessments failed to incorporate the perception of 
service users and mainly observed microfinance from the institutions‘ viewpoint. The various 
components of microfinance interventions were reviewed. 
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However from the critical review of the literature the following issues can be raised: there are 
no comprehensive studies on implementation process and the poverty reduction effect of 
these processes from the perspective of service users; effects of contextual factors on 
microfinance implementation have not been emphasised much in most studies; most studies 
have emphasised the perspective of the microfinance institutions; the issue of context has not 
played any significant role in most studies on microfinance interventions. The review of the 
literature suggests that there is indeed a dearth of knowledge on microfinance in rural 
communities from the viewpoint of service users and the environment in which they operate.  
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter II reviewed the relevant state of knowledge on microfinance and confirmed that there 
was indeed a lacuna as identified as the research problem in Chapter I. Chapter II identified 
changing development ideologies as responsible for the current state of microfinance which 
does not emphasises the viewpoint of service users in microfinance research. The analytic 
framework of the study is presented in this chapter. The chapter identifies the theoretical 
approaches that will enable the tackling of the research problem. The aim of the chapter is to 
construct a framework that will inform and guide the rest of the thesis: selection of area of 
study, construction of data collection instruments, data collection and data analysis. DeLong 
et al. (2003: 9) define an analytic framework as ‗...an intellectual tool designed and employed 
for the purposes of generating and systematizing interpretations of complex situations.‘ Thus, 
the chapter constitutes the blueprint for the remainder of the thesis. 
 
The chapter begins with the identification and discussion of the theoretical approaches for the 
investigation of microfinance in rural areas. The theoretical approaches guide the formulation 
of the research questions and sub-questions of the study which are presented next. The 
methodological approach of the thesis is presented and analysed next. Finally, a model 
representing a summary of the research logic is presented and discussed.  
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3.2 Theoretical Basis of Research Approach: The Sustainable 
Livelihood Approach and Interpretive Approach   
Research on microfinance has mainly used quantitative methods including econometric 
analysis which have been criticised as being acontextual. In other words findings based on 
econometric analysis and other quantitative data do not usually incorporate contextual 
information. When qualitative research methods have been employed they have tended to 
study only segments or components of microfinance interventions (see Besley and Coate, 
1995; Aghion 1999; Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000; Al-Azzam and Sarangi 2007; 
Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2009). The task for this study is identifying methodological and 
analytical approaches that will guide the answering of the research question. The Sustainable 
Livelihood Approach (SLA) and the Interpretive Approach (IA) were identified as 
appropriate for addressing the research question.  
 
3.2.1 Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA): A View from Below  
In assessing microfinance interventions from the perspective of service users, it is argued that 
understanding the context in which the intervention takes place is paramount. However, very 
little attention is paid to the issue of context in microfinance. Giving reasons for this lack of 
attention to an aspect of context, livelihood, in microfinance studies, Johnson and Rogaly 
(1997: 74) suggest that cross-sectional studies often do not have time or see the necessity of 
‗understanding the complexity of their livelihood strategies and the details of how the rural 
poor deal with their finances.‘ Realising the importance of livelihoods to microfinance 
interventions, participants of the North-South Dialogue on microfinance (June 2000) 
criticised microfinance institutions for being so preoccupied with their own sustainability that 
they give scant attention to the livelihood of their clients (Verhagen, 2001). Given the 
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forgoing problems in microfinance research, the study employed the philosophical ideas of   
the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) to address the research problem. What is the 
SLA and why are its theoretical underpinnings appropriate as an analytical approach for the 
study? 
 
According to Conroy and Litvinoff (cited in Scoones, 2009:4) the term ‗sustainable 
livelihood‘ first came into prominence as a development concept during a conference 
organised by the International Institute of Environment and Development in 1987. 
Sustainable livelihood also has its roots from increased understanding of famine and food 
insecurity which occurred during the 1980s (Eldis, 2009). Chambers and Conway (1991: 6) 
proposed this often-cited definition of sustainable livelihood quoted below: 
  
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it 
can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base. 
 
In disaggregating the concept of sustainable livelihood approach, FSAU (2009) describes 
livelihood as the way of life of a people which is made up of capabilities, activities and 
strategies needed and used by households and individuals for making a living. The term 
‗sustainability‘ has multiple meanings and Chambers and Conway (1991) discuss its use in 
development discourse. Ordinarily, sustainability denotes self-sufficiency and ‗an implicit 
ideology of long-term self-constraints and self-reliance‘ (ibid: 5). Sustainability in a social 
livelihood context refers to the ‗ability to maintain and improve livelihood while maintaining 
or enhancing the local and global assets and capabilities on which livelihood depends‘ 
(Chambers and Conway, 1991: 4). It is worthy to note that this study is not interested in the 
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environmental
23
 perspective of sustainability. Sustainability in this study denotes the ability 
to improve and maintain a livelihood.  
 
In analysing the concept of livelihood strategies, it is important not only to recognise 
resources (in this case income-generating activities) for their instrumental (assisting to make 
a living) and emancipatory values (challenging the structures under which one makes a 
living) but also for its hermeneutic value (making life meaningful). According to Bebbington 
(1999), this holistic perception ensures that well-being and poverty are linked to livelihood 
choices and strategies. It also enhances the understanding of how people‘s capacities both add 
to their quality of life and also enhance their capabilities to confront the social conditions that 
reduce poverty (ibid). Microfinance literature has traditionally tended to neglect the 
hermeneutic value of economic activities of the poor while emphasising their instrumental 
and emancipatory attributes.    
 
SLA can be interpreted in at least three ways: in a normative sense, specifying how 
development interventions should be; as a principle for action or a development objective; 
and as an analytical framework (Farrington, 2001). This thesis employs the SLA as an 
analytical tool but in a limited sense. It does not use any of the SLA frameworks but employs 
the philosophical ideas that underlie the SLA. As an analytical tool, the SLA informs the 
study by guiding the formulation of the research questions to incorporate user perspectives 
and in analysis it offers the opportunity to assess the complexities involved in rural 
livelihoods as a useful tool for understanding microfinance interventions (Kaboski and 
                                                 
23
 The environmental meaning of sustainability is concerned with pollution, destruction of forests and vegetation 
and overexploitation of non-renewable resources. Environmental sustainability implies that poor using 
environmental resources in such as manner that it does not preclude their use by future generations. The 
environmental aspects of microfinance falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
101 
 
Townsend, 2005).The philosophical underpinnings of the SLA that guide the study are 
discussed next. 
 
The SLA places the poor in the centre of analysis and ascertains the extent to which 
interventions recognise people‘s livelihood as a basis for action and whether priorities of the 
target group are linked to the design and scope of the intervention (Toner et al., 2004). SLA 
emphasises people, assets and activities rather than resources or institutions and their 
performance (Ellis, 1998, Toner et al., 2004). In doing so it encourages researchers to assess 
the extent to which the poor are involved in the design and implementation of development 
programmes. The livelihoods approach encourages researchers to consider existing livelihood 
patterns as a basis for the assessment of development interventions (Scoones and Wolmer, 
2003). In general terms, SLA aims at a multidimensional understanding of people‘s complex 
and integrated nature of livelihoods and acknowledges the different entitlements and assets 
that people hold in relation to the wider context of institutions, regulations and cultural 
norms. Additionally, since the SLA emphasises the importance of listening, and learning 
about the experiences of the poor based on the how they negotiate their livelihood, it could 
result in interventions that are attuned to livelihood strategies pursued by the poor (Carney, 
1998; Ellis, 1998).  
 
The sustainable livelihood approach recognises that that the poor face highly complex and 
vulnerable livelihoods which are subject to a myriad of uncertainties. Scoones and Woolmer 
(2003) state that livelihood approaches highlight the complementarities and trade-offs 
between different aspects of livelihood activities. For example, regarding microfinance, a 
poor person might be a part-time farmer, part-time entrepreneur and might not require the 
whole package for a farmer or an entrepreneur, but may want financial resources for 
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‗livelihood‘ where such resources are deployed across an array of activities which make up 
the current livelihood portfolio.  
 
3.2.2 Major Livelihood Strategies/Factors 
Although this study does not intend to study the livelihoods of service users, it briefly 
discusses significant factors that affect or can potentially influence microfinance activities. 
The study therefore briefly highlights some important factors prevalent in the settings and 
livelihoods of rural people that can potentially influence or are influenced by microfinance 
interventions.    
 
3.2.2.1 The Primacy of Agriculture in Rural Communities 
Although, Bebbington (1999) advises against equating agrarian livelihoods with rural 
livelihoods, the fact still remains that much of rural livelihood in developing countries 
revolves around agriculture. One defining characteristic of rurality is the preponderance and 
primacy of agriculture to the local economy. Agriculture indeed drives rural economies and 
determines the demand for non-farm commodities. Ellis (1998) adds that no matter how 
diverse the livelihoods of the rural poor are, agriculture continues to constitute a predominant 
component or an important determinant of rural incomes. Additionally, Okidegbe (2001) has 
observed that for most low-income countries agricultural growth is essential to economic 
growth. Very few countries have experienced rapid economic growth without first achieving 
rapid agricultural growth. Agricultural growth stimulates economic growth in non-
agricultural sectors, and vice-versa.   
Agricultural occupations in Ghana, especially among subsistence farmers, are essentially 
considered as a way of life rather than a business or an economic activity. When farmers 
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were asked whether they were engaged in any employment or economic activity they are apt 
to reply ‗no we are not engaged in any economic activity we are just farmers.‘ This 
perspective of agriculture has permeated the rural society to the extent that microfinance 
interventions typically ignore farmers when they state they only give loans for income-
generating activities. Farming especially food crop farming is generally regarded as the 
occupation of the unschooled and the poor. However, almost all rural residents engage in 
farming. Farming as a supplementary activity is not considered demeaning. Almost all 
microfinance service users interviewed in this study claimed to be part-time farmers.  
  
In Ghana agricultural production and markets have significant influence on non-farm 
economic activities in rural areas. During harvest periods demand for goods and services is 
usually high. Markets are at their lowest at the period of the farming season when farmers 
prepare and tend their farms. In Ghana agricultural production is almost exclusively based on 
rainfall and therefore the issue of seasonality is pivotal to the community.  
  
3.2.2.2 Seasonality 
Closely allied to the issue of agriculture is seasonality.  In the tropics temperatures vary little 
throughout the year so that the distinguishing feature of the seasons is the variability in 
rainfall. In most tropical areas the year is described in terms of wet and dry seasons. The 
issue of seasonality is closely tied to that of agriculture and it is a strong determinant of rural 
livelihood strategies. The effect of seasonality on rural livelihood strategies, however, tends 
to be under-perceived (Walsh, 1981).  
 
The poor are most vulnerable during the raining season due to a combination of scarcity of 
food, prevalence of disease and a lot of labour requirements on farms. Food is scarce at that 
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time of the year because food barns will be almost empty and crops would not have been 
harvested yet. Malaria, the most prevalent disease in the tropics is at its zenith during the 
rainy season. As well, moist conditions encourage the rapid growth of pathogenic organisms 
and surface run-off water during the rainy seasons result in bacteria pollution. It is at this 
period of the year that a lot of labour is required to clear farms of quick-growing tropical 
weeds as well as other arduous tasks. Thus the weakened state of the rural poor as a result of 
malnutrition and demanding labour requirements make them susceptible to the myriad of 
diseases prevalent during the season. The dry season, on the other hand is the period of 
harvest and plenty. It is also the time where demand is high for goods and services. In Ghana 
it is during the dry season when cocoa, the major national cash crop, is harvested and sold.    
 
3.2.2.3 Diversification 
Although rural livelihoods are primarily based on farming, rural households depend on a 
diverse portfolio of activities and income sources. Brown et al. (2006) argue that rural 
households earn income from diverse allocation of their natural, physical and social capital 
among a myriad of income generating activities. This phenomenon is seen as a means of 
reducing vulnerability and increasing incomes in low income countries where farming does 
not provide a guarantee of survival (Ellis, 1998).  
 
Livelihood diversification is not a transient occurrence but it is permanent and persistent in 
many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Bryceson, 1996). Livelihood 
diversification cuts across the various socioeconomic groupings but the poor are more likely 
have more diversified income sources. Income diversification is thought to be pervasive in 
Africa. It is estimated that 30% to 50% of rural incomes in Africa are derived from non-farm 
sources (Sahn, 1993; Reardon, 1997).  
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Some reasons why the rural poor will diversify are rapid population growth which 
subsequently results in fragmentation and over-cultivation of arable land. Subsequent soil 
degradation causes agricultural yields to fall. Increasing irregular weather patterns has now 
rendered farming activities dependent on rainfall a very risky venture. Incomes fluctuations 
become the norm. The above are the reactive reasons for diversification. For other poor 
people diversification is for proactive reasons. They diversify to improve their economic 
situation of their households.  
 
Rural people in Ghana usually diversify into non-agricultural income-generating activities 
such as business which are supported by microfinance interventions. Livelihood 
diversification strategies in rural areas include households pooling resources to sponsor a 
relative to a developed country; cultivating perennial cash crops such as cocoa, oil-palm, 
citrus; migrating to urban centres; and engaging in a non-farm enterprise.  
 
In sum it is reiterated that this study does not intend to employ the sustainable livelihood 
approach as a tool for studying the livelihood of poor rural people but to use the principles 
underlying the livelihood approach to understand the implementation process of microfinance 
interventions and its effect on service users. In other words this study intends to understand 
microfinance processes and its effect on service users using the SLA‘s principles on the 
objectives, scope and priorities of development projects. Regarding the relevance of the term 
‗sustainable‘ in SLA to this study, the researcher‘s interest lies in ascertaining the extent to 
which microfinance affects poverty amongst service users.    
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3.2.3 Interpretive Approach 
The study employs the interpretive approach as the underlying theory of the research 
methodology. Interpretivism or the interpretive approach is a trend in social science that 
focuses on human beings and their way interpreting and making sense of social reality. 
According to Bevin and Rhodes (2004: 130), ‗Interpretive approaches start with the insight 
that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, 
beliefs and preferences of the people involved.‘ Interpretivists argue that human experience is 
a process of interpretation rather than sensory perception of the external phenomena (Winch, 
1994).  The rationale for the inclusion of this approach is based on the idea that to accurately 
convey someone‘s perception, extensive knowledge, understanding and interpretation of the 
world view of the person is essential. A brief overview of the interpretive approach is 
presented next.    
 
The interpretive approach developed out of hermeneutics, which historically had focussed 
almost exclusively on interpreting literary and religious texts (Howard, 1982; Palmer, 1969). 
In recent times, hermeneutics has been applied to the social sciences and is referred to as 
interpretive social science (Rainbow and Sullivan, 1979). The interpretive approach is 
increasingly being applied to a myriad of studies such as psychology, political science, 
anthropology and consumer studies (Holloway, 1997). While there are a number of sources 
that explain the theoretical underpinnings of the interpretive approach, the study borrows 
extensively from Tappan‘s (2001) detailed account of Wilhelm Dilthey, who is considered 
the father of the modern hermeneutic project in the social science, to explain the approach. 
Dilthey argued that unlike the natural sciences, human beings cannot be studied without 
taking the process and self-interpretation into account. However, this introduces the problems 
of bias and prejudice due to the diversity of human perspectives. Dilthey therefore proposed 
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the use of hermeneutics, the systematic methodology of interpretation, to address these 
problems. He employs the term ‗lived experience‘ to encapsulate the individual‘s human 
existence which is represented in the three psychological dimensions; thinking, feeling and 
acting. Lived experience is private, subjective and cannot be described from the ‗outside‘. 
Subsequently, if lived experience has to be understood and interpreted, it should be 
expressed. Expression of lived experience can be manifested in the form of poetry, art, film, 
dance or an interview narrative.  
 
Dilthey‘s major goal was to discover objectively valid interpretations of unique expressions 
of human lived experience. In other words, he endeavoured to find ways of interpreting such 
experience in order to understand other people. Dilthey suggests that in order to interpret 
lived experience, historical and psychological context must be taken into consideration. There 
is no such issue as non-positional understanding. Researchers understand by constant 
reference to their own perspectives, which shape their understanding based on their 
expectations, preconceptions, and assumptions. These in turn are based on the researchers‘ 
life-experience, culture, tradition and worldview. The problem can be ameliorated by 
researchers interacting with expressions of people‘s lived experience (such as text) in ways 
that will enhance their understanding of the subjects‘ experience based partly on their own 
experience. This implies that understanding and interpretation can be enhanced when the 
lived experience of the researcher and researched coincide. 
 
The interpretive approach emphasises interpretation within a context; human beings do not 
exist in a vacuum and their experiences should be understood within a certain context. 
Researchers are therefore urged to understand the socially constructed nature of the social 
world and realise that values and interests become part of the research process. The 
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interpretive approach therefore basically employs qualitative methods in the collection and 
analysis of data (Holloway, 1997).   
 
To conclude, the interpretive approach will serve as a guide to selection of an area of study. 
Interpretation of data is enhanced when the lived experience of the researcher and the 
researched coincide. The researcher will be looking for a rural community where the he has 
sufficient knowledge about the language, culture and social and economic characteristics. In 
other words, the researcher should be conversant with the lived experience of the research 
subjects and that should enable the collection of data that closely reflect what interviewees 
want to convey. This will mean the researcher conducting all interviews, translations and 
transcriptions by himself to ensure that data collected is valid. It is expected that by adopting 
the interpretive approach that emphasises careful consideration of context and interpretation, 
the study of microfinance in rural communities from the perspective of the users will yield 
useful insights. 
 
3.3 Formulation of Research Question and Sub-questions 
It is important to note that although the questions are reproduced in section 1.3 they were 
formulated at this stage after the research problem identified in chapter one was made clear 
after the review of the relevant state of knowledge on microfinance. It was evident that there 
was no comprehensive study of microfinance components and implementation processes and 
their effect on service users from the perspective of service users. The following research 
question was proposed:    
How do implementation processes affect poverty reduction by microfinance in rural 
Ghana?  
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The research question is answered through a series of sub-questions whose construction was 
informed by the analytical approach adopted by the thesis: the Sustainable Livelihood 
Analysis (SLA) and the thesis‘ emphasis on context. The research question is broken down 
into two main questions with their corresponding sub-questions. The first main question 
sought to assess and analyse the implementation process of microfinance interventions while 
the second main question examines the effect of the intervention process on households and 
businesses of service users. 
  
I.   How are microfinance interventions implemented and how do they affect activities 
within the intervention? 
1. To what extent are contextual factors and perceptions of service users taken into 
account in the design of microfinance interventions and what are the implications? 
2. Are there any differences between microfinance institutions‘ intended and actual 
implementation practices and what are its ramifications? 
3. What are the roles and implications of microfinance interventions in group formation 
and dynamics?  
4. How do microfinance institutions‘ loan activities affect service users‘ loan 
management?  
5. To what extent are non-financial services relevant to service users? 
6. How do service users perceive costs of microfinance and why? 
 
II. How do microfinance implementation processes affect poverty reduction?   
 
1. Do characteristics of service users and their businesses influence poverty reduction 
and why? 
2. What are the effects of microfinance interventions on businesses and households?  
3. Do group formation and subsequent activities influence poverty reduction? 
4. How do loan matters affect poverty reduction?  
5. Do savings facilities of microfinance institutions enable service users to reduce 
poverty?  
6. What is the relationship between costs of microfinance and poverty reduction?    
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At this point it is impossible to specify exactly how each of the research questions will be 
answered because the objective was to construct the questionnaire in the field on the basis of 
information collected in interviews. For the rationale for this strategy see section 3.4.3. In 
general terms, the first set of questions regarding the implementation process will be 
answered with interview data, questionnaire data, and secondary information on the 
microfinance institutions. The second set of questions on the effect of the implementation 
processes on household and businesses will include all of the above sources of data used to 
answer questions on the implementation process but much more emphasis will be given to the 
quantitative data. After formulating the research questions the next task confronting the 
researcher is how the questions will be answered. The next section proposes the methods for 
analysing the questions posed.  
 
3.4 Methodological Approach  
There seems to be no single acceptable method of conducting research. Many factors 
contribute to the choice of methodology and these include: researchers‘ perception about the 
nature of the social world and what can be known about it (ontology); the type of knowledge 
and how it can be acquired (epistemology); the purposes and goals of the study; the 
characteristics and other contexts of the study area; resources available for the study; and the 
academic background of the researcher (Snape and Spencer, 2003; Creswell, 2003). Research 
methodology tends to be polarised along the quantitative/qualitative divide because 
researchers are usually recruited, trained, socialised and rewarded along single methods of 
social enquiry. Additionally peers and supervisors of researchers show clear preference for 
one tradition over another. This practice, according to Rao and Woolcock (2003), ensures 
intellectual coherence and quality control. 
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The methodological orientation of this study emanates from the pragmatic perspective in 
social research. According to Creswell (2003), methodological pragmatists use all methods 
applicable to understand various aspects of a research problem. The pragmatist perspective to 
research tends to be problem-centred, consequence-oriented and pluralistic. The appeal of 
this approach stems from its choice of methods that best addresses the problem and not the 
other way round (Patton 1990; Creswell, 2003). Arguing in favour of the pragmatists 
approach, Patton (1990; 39) advocates for a ‗paradigm of choices‘ that applies 
‗methodological appropriateness‘ as the primary criterion for selecting a methodological 
approach. By implication, pragmatists are likely to employ methodological pluralism or the 
mixed methods approach to understand social reality if required (Robson, 2002). Reichardt 
and Rallis (1994; 85) advocate combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies due to 
the following issues in research: 
 the theory-ladenness of facts 
 the value-ladenness of enquiry 
 that reality is multiple, complex, constructed, stratified 
 the under-determination of theory by fact (i.e. that any particular set of data is 
explicable by more than one theory). 
 
In addition, Creswell (2003) makes a knowledge claim for methodological pragmatism and 
succinctly summarises it as follows: it is not confined to any one system of philosophy of 
reality and does not see the world as an absolute unity; believes that research takes place in 
social, economic, political and other contexts; and freedom of choice of method that best suits 
the problem at hand is important. In sum, the pragmatic methodology usually implies, 
‗multiple methods, different worldviews, and different assumptions, as well as different 
forms of data collection and analysis in the mixed method study‘ (ibid; 2003; 12). 
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In keeping to the pragmatist perspective and with regard to the main objectives of this study, 
which are, to understand microfinance intervention processes and assess their effect on 
service users, the mixed methods approach was deemed the most appropriate (Hentschel, 
1999; Rao and Woolcock, 2003). Understanding process— mechanism by which a particular 
intervention initiates a series of events that eventually leads to an observed impact—is 
usually achieved through a qualitative method of enquiry. The qualitative research method 
will enhance the understanding of the cultural, social, economic, political and institutional 
context within which development interventions occur (Bamberger, 2000). Understanding 
process issues are crucial in understanding impact as opposed to just measuring it (Rao and 
Woolcock, 2003). Madey (1982) observed that employing the mixed methods approach in a 
study has synergistic effects on the three major stages of design, data collection and analysis. 
Quantitative research methods will be most appropriate in measuring levels and changes in 
impact and to make inferences from the observed statistical relations between those impacts 
and covariates (ibid, 2003). The increasing popularity of the mixed methods approach in 
development research is due to the recognition that no data collection or analytical method is 
free from limitation and that biases inherent in any one method could potentially be checked 
by other methods (Creswell, 2003).  
 
3.4.1 The Mixed Methods Approach  
While the mixed methods approach is necessary to understand social reality, it is relatively 
new and still developing in form and content and its practical integration in research remains 
quite elusive (Hentschel, 1999; Bamberger, 2000; Creswell, 2003). It is important to 
understand more about the mixed methods approach, especially when and how qualitative 
and quantitative methods can be integrated. For instance, does integration mean conducting 
qualitative and quantitative research separately and comparing results?  Creswell (2003) 
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identified three general procedures for mixing methods: the sequential, concurrent and the 
transformative. The sequential refers to the researcher using one method to develop and 
elaborate another. The situation where the researcher integrates quantitative and qualitative 
data to provide a comprehensive analysis is known as the concurrent procedure. This simply 
implies that both methods are applied simultaneously. With regard to the transformative 
procedure, the researcher employs a theoretical perspective whose design contains both 
quantitative and qualitative data and the research design can involve either the sequential or 
concurrent or both. The transformative procedure, which involves an a priori decision as to 
what research design to use, seems to be at variance with the pragmatic approach which 
advocates the choice of methodological design informed by the research problem. Rao and 
Woolcock (2003) also suggest three ways of integrating quantitative and qualitative data: 
parallel, sequential and iterative. In the parallel approach research teams work separately but 
compare results during the analysis phase. As the name implies and quite similar to 
Creswell‘s explanation, sequential approach implies that one methodological approach 
precedes and elaborates or informs the other. The iterative approach is much like the 
sequential, but it involves returning to the field to clarify questions and resolve apparent 
disparities using alternative methodological approaches. Creswell (2003) and Rao and 
Woolcock‘s (2003) mixed method strategies give a general idea of integrating methods, but 
they do not explain how the methodological approaches are integrated at the various stages of 
the research process. According to Bamberger (2000), research designs can integrate 
quantitative and qualitative methods at different stages of the research process, however, 
designs that fully integrates both qualitative and quantitative methods at all stages of the 
research process have often proved a difficult endeavour. Bamberger says research can be 
mixed at the exploratory, sample selection, data collection, data analysis and the presentation 
of findings‘ stages of the research process. Bamberger‘s detailed account of how quantitative 
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and qualitative methods are integrated in all stages of the research process is not discussed 
here except where it is of relevance to this thesis. How the mixed methods approach is 
applied in three stages in relation to the study is presented next.   
 
3.4.2 Integrating Sampling Methods 
Qualitative and quantitative methods can be effectively integrated at the sampling stage. The 
use of statistical sampling procedures can ensure that the findings of qualitative studies such 
as a case study can be generalised (Bamberger, 2000; Creswell, 2003). This will increase the 
likelihood that the findings will be accepted and used by quantitatively oriented policy 
makers, researchers and practitioners. Additionally, purposive sampling methods can be 
employed to determine a criterion for the design of cluster sampling and stratified sampling 
strategies by helping to identify some of the important social and cultural characteristics of 
different groups which could not be obtained from the kinds of statistical sources normally 
used in sample selection in quantitative research.  
 
Qualitative and quantitative sampling will be done separately in the study. The purposive and 
probability sampling techniques will used for qualitative and quantitative sampling 
respectively. However since respondents for the qualitative interviews will be selected first, 
the subsequent interviews could provide some information about how to conduct sampling 
for the quantitative analysis.   
  
3.4.3 Integrating Data Collection Methods 
The integration of methods at the data collection stage is proving important with the growing 
recognition of the limitations of the survey method for collecting data that is accurate, fully 
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textured and nuanced at multiple levels of social reality (Kertzer and Fricke, 1997). The 
mixed methods approach is feasible at the data collection stage if contextual data collected 
through qualitative data collection techniques is incorporated into the design of appropriate 
quantitative data collection methodology (Hentschel, 1999; Bamberger, 2000). Rao and 
Woolcock, (2003) call the process where qualitative work informs the design of quantitative 
questionnaires as an interactive process. It is also worth noting that in development research 
and programme evaluation studies, quantitative methods can be employed to collect 
qualitative data and vice versa. The inclusion of open-ended or subjective response questions 
in a questionnaire can be used to generate data for qualitative analysis. On the other hand, 
quantitative data can be derived from qualitative methods of data collection if it employed 
probability sampling techniques and used a fairly large number of respondents (Rao and 
Woolcock, 2003). Mixed methods approach at the data collection stage ensures that the two 
methods are complementary and provides reliability checks on each other (triangulation).       
 
The ability to identify the right questions and comprehensively understand, especially, 
complex social phenomena are hampered through the use of quantitative data collection 
methods. Thus, in the study where the issue of context is central, contextual data collection 
methods (interviews) will be used to design appropriate quantitative data collection 
instruments. The construction of the questionnaire for collection of quantitative data will be 
informed by data collected through qualitative interviews. Using this strategy, quantitative 
data collected will include contextual information which quantitative data collection methods 
have usually been criticised of ignoring. 
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3.4.4 Analysis and Interpretation  
The ability to conduct integrated data analysis depends on how the data was collected. For 
example if qualitative data was collected based on some element of random sampling, then 
that data can be analysed qualitatively and also quantitatively by creating dichotomous 
nominal or ordinal variables. On the other hand, using the sequential approach where 
hypotheses derived from qualitative analysis are tested with survey data is a new technique 
being increasingly used in the mixed methods approach (Hentschel, 1999). Bamberger (2000) 
suggests using statistical analysis to test findings of focus groups, interviews and key 
informants. For instance, focus group interviews might reveal a low level of access of the 
girl-child to educational resources, which might then be interpreted to mean gender bias. 
Before making this interpretation, however, it might be useful to compare the findings of the 
proportion the boy-child‘s access to educational resources to ascertain the girl-child is really 
being discriminated against with respect to access to educational resources through 
quantitative analysis. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important stages in the mixed methods approach is the interpretation 
of findings. Quantitative findings, interpreted in conjunction with qualitative findings, will 
enhance the understanding of the magnitude and extent to which phenomena are embedded in 
a certain context. For instance, in a primarily quantitative study the interpretation of the 
statistical analysis can be enhanced by a qualitative narrative account. In a mainly qualitative 
research, on the other hand, quantitative evidence can be used to clarify or buttress the study 
(Robson, 2002). Another frequently mentioned benefit of the mixed methods approach at the 
interpretation stage is the use of qualitative methods to conduct follow-up fieldwork to obtain 
feedback on unexplained and unanticipated outcomes (Bamberger, 2000).   
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In assessing the implementation of microfinance processes, this thesis will organise the 
qualitative data according to themes based on the various components
24
 of the microfinance 
interventions. Interviews on the effect of the processes on household and business outcomes 
will be analysed and compared to the quantitative results. It is expected that such information 
will enable a deeper understanding of the observed effects. The quantitative data on the 
processes will constitute of cross-tabulations and chi-square tests. In assessing the effect of 
the implementation process on household and business outcomes, ordinal or binary logistic 
regression will be employed. Logistic regression will enable the control of the intervening 
variables as shown in Figure 3.1. In sum, this thesis will analyse quantitative and qualitative 
data separately but the interpretation leading to the answering of the research questions will 
be done together. This should enable a seamless depiction of a valid account of microfinance 
in a rural community from the users‘ viewpoint.   
 
To conclude it is worthy to note that the mixed methods approach comes with a cost; it is 
technically complex and in the case of large studies, individuals with skills of both 
approaches have to be recruited. This makes such research projects expensive in terms of 
time, talent and resources. Additionally, the lack of a comprehensive body of knowledge on 
how different methods can be mixed and circumstances under which it can be employed 
constrain the use of the mixed methods approach (Rao and Woolcock, 2003). In keeping with 
the mixed methods approach, where feasible, this study integrates qualitative and quantitative 
research methods at various stages of the research process. 
 
                                                 
24
 Components of microfinance interventions denote the various segments of microfinance interventions such as 
loan, group formation, savings and insurance. See Figure 3.1 for the various components of the interventions. 
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3.5 Summary of Research Logic 
Figure 3.1 presents a summary of the variables and their relationships as used in this study. It 
is important to note that Figure 3.1 is illustrative rather than operational. The outer box 
represents the rural setting and it indicates the importance of context to this study: 
microfinance implementation and its effects are examined and understood within the rural 
context. The set of five boxes in the left side of the rural setting box numbered 1 represent the 
main components of the microfinance interventions whose implementation processes will be 
assessed as the first part of the analysis. The first set of six sub-questions in section 3.3 
investigates the implementation processes of the two interventions. How the relevant 
variables are measured and information about them can be found in Appendix 2. Next the 
study assesses the effect of the implementation of the microfinance intervention components 
numbered 1 on poverty outcomes numbered 3 in Figure 3.1. The effect of the implementation 
of the components on poverty outcomes are assessed by the question ‗How do microfinance 
implementation processes affect poverty reduction?‘ This question is broken down into six 
sub-questions as shown in section 3.3. In answering these questions it is envisaged that some 
characteristics of service users and their businesses (labelled as intervening variables (2) in 
Figure 3.1) can potentially influence the relationship between the component and the poverty 
outcomes. The intervening variables are analysed and discussed in Appendix 1. These are 
then controlled for in the ordinal logistic regression analysis in Appendix 3.  
 
 
119 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Service 
Users and their Businesses 
Age  
Educational Level 
Marital Status 
Time Spent in Business 
Borrow from other sources? 
Indigeneity 
Poverty Outcomes(3)   
Business and  
Household                  
 Savings 
Types 
Interest Rates 
Availability 
 
Transaction Costs 
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Meetings 
Interest Rates 
Charges & Deduct. 
 
Non-Financial 
Services 
Types 
Knowledge 
 
Loans 
Disbursement 
Application  
Quantum 
Repayment 
 
Group Scheme 
Formation 
Monitoring 
Pressure  
Support 
Autonomy 
 
Microfinance Intervention Components (1) 
        Rural Context 
Figure 3.1 Summary of Research Logic 
 
   Intervening Variables (2) 
 120 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter constitutes the blueprint of the thesis that will inform and direct the rest 
of the study. The Sustainable Livelihood Approach was found to be the most 
appropriate analytical theory to guide the study, given that the purpose of the study is 
to understand microfinance from the perspective of its users. The study is also 
informed by interpretive theory, which emphasises the primacy of individuals‘ own 
perceptions. The study will employ a pragmatist and mixed methodological approach 
to data collection and analysis. The data collection process is expected to be fluid 
enough to collect contextual information, which is central to the study. Finally the 
analytic model is encapsulated in a model (Figure 3.1). It depicts the various variables 
that will be controlled for and assessed and the relationships amongst them.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GHANAIAN, COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the background of the country, the area of study and the 
microfinance institutions and interventions studied. This information is essential for 
understanding activities and outcomes of the interventions in order to answer the 
research question. The rationale for the selection of the area of study is also provided 
in this chapter. This chapter was especially influenced by the interpretive approach 
presented in the previous chapter. In selecting an area of study, there was heightened 
awareness of the importance of ensuring that the researcher shares a similar lived 
experience with the people being studied in order to come up with more valid 
information. In other words, knowledge of the respondents and their environment is 
important for a study that emphasises context. Many development-oriented studies 
have emphasised the importance of context in the implementation of interventions 
(Verhagen, 2001; Johnson, et al. 2003; Littlefield, 2003). Legderwood (1999) has 
argued that a country‘s political and economic environment, especially development 
in the financial sector has immense influence on microfinance institutions in their 
delivery of financial services to the poor.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: after the introduction, the chapter presents and 
justifies the selection of the country and community of study, and the microfinance 
institutions and interventions investigated. The section that follows presents the 
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country context describing some economic indicators relevant to microfinance, the 
financial regulatory framework, financial and microfinance institutions in the country. 
The next section introduces the area of study Nsoatre, giving brief social, economic 
and financial information. Finally, the backgrounds of the two related microfinance 
interventions are presented and discussed.  
 
4.2. Selection of Case Study Area and Microfinance 
Institutions 
Decisions regarding where to conduct a piece of research lie at the very heart of every 
research activity. This decision-making process has more to do with imagination and 
ingenuity rather than the simple application of the scientific principle (Bechhofer and 
Patterson, 2000). The choice of Ghana for the study was no accident: it was the 
researcher‘s country of birth and he had resided in the country for more than 30 years. 
The choice of Ghana was in consonance with the aim of this thesis which is to ensure 
that the researcher shared a lived experience with respondents.  
 
With a strong emphasis on context and with the intention of studying microfinance 
from the perspective of microfinance service users, this study did not just select a 
microfinance institution and assess its impact on the poor. The researcher decided to 
first of all select a community, identify and assess all microfinance institutions in the 
community and select the appropriate institutions for the study. The criteria for 
selecting a community for the study were: existence of more than one vibrant 
microfinance institution; diversity in terms of type of microfinance services, 
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organisation, and orientation; microfinance being in existence for three or more years; 
and the assurance of permission to undertake the study.  
 
Nsoatre, a rural community in the Brong Ahafo Region, which was identified during 
the preliminary field trip, satisfied the above criteria and was therefore selected for 
study. Although selection of area of study was purposive, the researcher bore in mind 
that the selected community possessed characteristics similar to others in the forest 
belt of the country so that findings could be applicable to other such communities. In 
other words, it was important to avoid rural communities that possessed unique 
characteristics. Given the prominence of the issue of contextuality to this study, 
another factor that influenced the choice of the rural community was the researcher‘s 
intimate knowledge of the linguistic, social, cultural, economic and political 
characteristics of the area. Hershfield et al. (1983) argue that with regard to rural 
fieldwork, interviewers should be knowledgeable about behavioural patterns, social 
organisation, mores and economic issues of village life before undertaking data 
collection. This intimate knowledge of the area of study, especially the language was 
important considering that there was a high level of illiteracy in the area of study and 
among respondents. This meant that the interview questionnaire had to be employed 
and questions translated into the local language from English during the interview 
process. Another important advantage of the researcher understanding the local 
language was that he could conduct and translate the interviews by himself. This will 
enable the researcher to maintain a high degree of control over the fieldwork process. 
In support of the importance of knowing the language of the area of study, Devereux, 
(1992) acknowledges that it enables richer and more textured information to be 
collected. Fieldwork literature is replete with problems of using translators and 
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understanding social phenomena through others (see Ellen, 1984; Devereux and 
Hoddinott, 1992; Robson, 1997).  
 
The number of years that a microfinance intervention has been operating in the area of 
study was an important selection criterion for inclusion in the study. The study 
selected microfinance institutions which had been operating in the study area for three 
or more years. It is argued that a microfinance institution that has been in existence 
for three years
25
 or more is more likely to have experienced many different economic 
and seasonal conditions that can potentially influence the impact of microfinance 
interventions. Microfinance institutions that have been in existence for over three 
years are likely to have gone through between 6 and 9 cycles
26
 so that the mode of 
implementing services would have more or less assumed regular patterns. Such 
patterns can then be studied in addition to the impact it should yield after that period 
of time. After the identification and selection of the area of study, all formal 
microfinance institutions which existed in the community were subjected to the above 
criteria and the ones that met the criteria were selected for study. Employing these 
criteria, two institutional microfinance institutions were identified during the 
researcher‘s preliminary field trip: the Sinapi Aba Trust and the Nsoatreman Rural 
Bank.  
 
The main rationale for the decision to study more than one microfinance institution 
was to ensure access to diverse information for in-depth understanding rather than for 
comparison. The choice of the two institutions was quite appropriate due to the 
                                                 
25
 In a study to assess the effect of microfinance on the health conditions of children of participants, 
Freedom from Hunger (FFH), as well, chose a three year period (1993-1996) to assess impact. 
26
 Most cycles seem to last for a period of four months, the reason for this is unclear. Depending on 
issues of repayments and disbursement of fresh loans, there may be differences in the number of cycles 
per year. 
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dissimilarities in their mode of operations, services, orientation and composition. It 
should be noted that the emphasis was on interventions rather than on institutions that 
had been in existence for that period of three years (see Appendix 4 for the difference 
between institution and intervention). For instance, NRB was established as a banking 
institution in Nsoatre since 1982 but NWEP intervention began in 1996.  
 
Nsoatreman Rural Bank and Sinapi Aba Trust presented the diversity that promised to 
make an interesting study. SAT, is a financial NGO with restrictions on the type of 
services it could offer and had a poverty-reduction orientation. NRB is a formal 
banking institution with both commercial and welfare objectives and offering a wide 
range of services to service users.  
 
4.3 Ghana: Poverty and Economic Context 
Ghana
27
 is a west African country with a land size of about 240, 000 km
2
 and it is 
situated on the Gulf of Guinea, an arm of the Atlantic Ocean (IFAD, 2007). Ghana 
has an estimated population of 23 million, which has been growing at about 2.7% per 
year (Gallardo, 2002; NDPC, 2005). GDP per capita (PPP) in 2006 was estimated at 
$2700 (CIA, 2008). The population living in rural areas has reduced from 63% in 
1999/2000 to 53% in 2005 and there are indications that the rate of rural-urban 
migration will increase (Gallardo, 2002).  
 
Since she gained independence from the British in March 1957, Ghana has 
experienced a series of political upheavals. The country has had four violent 
overthrows of governments. The most frequently cited reason for military takeovers is 
                                                 
27
 See the map of Ghana at Appendix 5 
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pervasiveness of corruption among the ruling elite. Ghana returned to multi-party 
democracy in 1992 and since then that form of governance seems to have taken root.  
 
4.3.1 Poverty in Ghana  
Poverty in Ghana has witnessed dramatic declines since the late 1980s. For instance, 
the population of Ghanaians defined as poor (per the national poverty line) declined 
from almost 52% in 1991/1992 to a little under 40% in 1998/1999 (Ashong and 
Smith, 2001). According to the Ghana Living Standards Survey by 2005 this had 
reduced further to 28% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2006). Nevertheless, this positive 
trend tends to hide the geographical and occupational (see Figure 4.1 for poverty 
levels based on occupations) heterogeneity in levels of poverty. For instance, the rural 
savannah areas in the northern part of the country experienced an increase in poverty 
while overall food crop farmers experienced the least decline in poverty (Gallardo, 
2002). Reductions in poverty were concentrated in the Accra area and the rural forest 
regions of the country (ibid). Poverty in Ghana, like in most other sub-Saharan 
African countries, is a predominantly rural phenomenon. Out of 35% of Ghanaians 
classified as poor, 75% lived in the rural areas and rural poverty is estimated to 
contribute approximately 90% to national poverty (Oduro, 2001). More than one-half 
of the population living in the rural Savannah regions of Ghana continues to be 
extremely poor.  
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Figure 4.1: Poverty Status by Occupation, 1999   
 
 
4.3.2 Economic Background  
At independence, Ghana emerged as one of the biggest owners of reserves in the 
Sterling Area system due to the boom in the market for cocoa. Accumulated national 
savings led to a spate of infrastructure construction, including the Tema harbour, the 
industrial city of Tema and the Volta River power system. Overall, economic growth 
was relatively robust after independence till the mid 1960s. The Ghanaian economy 
became sluggish from 1964 when the exhaustion of financial reserves coincided with 
the collapse of market for cocoa in the 1960s. Danquah (2006) observed that during 
much of the period between 1966 and 1983 the economic growth rates were negative. 
Economic growth was uneven and poor after the mid-1960s and only began to 
stabilize after 1984. The economic improvement was due to the fact that in 1983 
Ghana adopted the World Bank‘s prescription for development in Third World 
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countries: the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Known in Ghana as the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), SAP involved policies that were meant to 
improve resource allocation, increase economic efficiency and improve the country‘s 
ability to withstand domestic and global economic shocks.  
 
Interest rates which are important determinants of the lending decisions of 
microfinance institutions have been mostly negative until the implementation of a 
Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) in 1986. With the liberalization of 
interest rates under FINSAP, interest rates soared. Lending rates averaged about 36% 
between 1998 and 2000 resulting in the cost of borrowed capital becoming very 
expensive. From 2000 Ghana experienced a spectacular reduction in inflation rates 
and interest rates have somewhat dropped. Due to the important role played by 
inflation rates in financial decisions especially lending, the rates of inflation from 
1980-2008 are presented in Figure 4.2 below. Regarding GDP, since 2000 real GDP 
rates have witnessed consistent growth, culminating in a 7.5% growth in 2008.  
 
In sum, the economic outcomes of the country have shown a highly unstable pattern 
of cyclical fluctuation based on the variability in the markets for the primary products 
namely, cocoa, and timber and gold-upon which, even now, the economy entirely 
depends (NDPC, 2005). Figure 4.2 shows the dramatic declines in inflation rates 
between 1980 and 2008. The spikes coincide with years of poor agricultural yields 
and this indicates how reliant the economy is on agriculture.  
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Figure 4.2 Annual Inflation Rates: Ghana (1980-2008)
 
Source: 2008 World Economic Outlook IMF (2008) 
 
4.4 Financial Institutions and the Financial Regulatory 
Framework of Ghana 
This section discusses the various categories of financial institutions and the financial 
regulatory framework of Ghana. Table 4.1 below depicts the financial institutions that 
are directly involved in microfinance. They consist of a tiered range of formal, semi-
formal and informal institutions and arrangements. The table also shows a summary 
of the legal and regulatory environment under which financial entities in the country 
operate. Financial intermediation and credit activities fall under the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the central bank, Bank of Ghana (BoG) (Gallardo, 2002). The 
regulatory framework under the Banking Law (1989) and the Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI) Law (1993) accommodate a tiered structure of licensed financial 
intermediaries and financial regulation (Gallardo, 2002; 9). This section draws heavily 
from works of Steel and Andah (2003) and Gallardo (2002) who have written 
extensively on the regulatory framework related to rural microfinance.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Financial Institutions Providing Microfinance Services & 
Regulatory Framework of Ghana  
Institution Ownership Legal Basis Organised 
As     
Fund Source Authorised 
Activities 
Agency 
Supervising 
Target 
Market 
Commerci
al Banks in 
MF 
Private/State Companies Act; 
Banking Law 
LLC Equity capital; 
commercial 
loans; 
deposits 
Equity Cap: 
Comm. Loans: 
Deposits 
BOG Individuals/ 
Commercial 
Enterprise 
ARB Apex 
Bank 
Rural Banks; 
BoG 
Companies Act; 
Banking Law 
LLC Government; 
international 
grants and 
loans 
Apex Bank 
functions under 
NBFI licence 
BoG; RFID Rural 
Banks 
Rural 
Banks 
Community-
Owned/BOG 
Companies Act; 
Banking Law 
LLC: Unit 
Bank 
Gov’t loans; 
deposits; 
equity capital 
Savings; 
Deposits; micro-
loans; hire-
purchase 
financing 
BOG; RFID 
ARB 
Individuals/
Bus. in 
Area 
Savings 
and Loans 
Co. 
Private Parties Companies Act 
NBFI Law 
LLC Equity Cap: 
Grants: 
Loans: 
Deposits 
Savings; 
Deposits; micro-
loans; hire-
purchase 
financing 
BOG; NBFI Ind./ Small 
Bus./ Susu 
Collectors 
Ghana 
Credit  
Union 
Assoc. 
Primary-Level 
Credit Unions 
Law on 
Cooperatives 
(CU) 
NBFI Law 
Coop.  
Society 
Member CU’s 
capital; grants; 
contributions, 
loans; 
deposits  
Wholesale loans; 
CFF; CU Pearls; 
training, 
monitoring ; 
assessment  
Registrar of 
Coop.; 
NBFI/BoG 
Credit 
Unions 
Credit 
Unions  
Individuals 
and 
Organisations. 
Law on Coop 
NBFI Law 
Coop. 
Society  
Members’ 
share capital; 
deposits 
Members-only 
savings 
deposits; 
microloans 
BOG: NBFI: 
Ghana CUA 
Registrar of 
Cooperative 
Individual 
Members 
NGOs Private Parties Law on Trust 
and Charitable 
Inst. 
Co Ltd by  
Guarante
e  
(Not for 
Profit) 
Grants and 
Donations 
 
 
Grants: 
Donations 
None Individuals/ 
Groups 
National 
Associatio
n  of Susu 
Collectors 
Individual 
susu 
collectors  
Law on Coop. Coop. 
Society 
Members’ 
share capital; 
contributions 
Taking deposits ; 
making loans to 
members 
None  Susu 
collectors 
Individual 
susu 
collectors 
Individual 
susu 
collectors 
None None  Clients’ fees Collecting & 
safekeeping of 
clients’ savings 
None  Market 
vendors; 
others 
ROSCAs   Members None  Group Members’ 
contributions 
Members-only 
savings deposits 
None  Market 
vendors; 
employees  
ASCAs Members  None  Group  Members’ 
contributions 
Members-only 
savings 
deposits; 
microloans 
None  Market 
vendors; 
employees 
Trade- 
Creditors 
Trade creditor None  None  Personal  Deposits; 
microloans 
None  Farmers; 
Fishermen; 
artisans  
Money 
Lenders 
Money lender None  None  Personal  Loans None  Individual; 
groups; 
families   
Social 
networks 
 None  None  Personal ; 
group 
All forms of 
financial 
assistance 
None  Family, kin 
members 
and friends 
Adapted from A Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions: The experience in Ghana and the Philippines (Gallardo, 
2002)  
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The Bank of Ghana
28
 (BoG) is not classified under any of the above three categories 
because being the central bank it regulates and supervises the commercial and Non-
Bank Financial Institutions and additionally advises government in financial policy 
formulation. The BoG has ceded some of its functions to the Association of Rural 
Banks (ARB), the apex bank of the rural banks (Al-Bagdadi, 2002). In 2002 
parliament passed the Bank of Ghana Act (2002) Act 212 to amend and consolidate 
the law relating to the Bank of Ghana (BoG) which remained fragmented in the 
statute books.  
 
4.4.1 Formal Institutions 
Formal financial institutions are incorporated under the Companies Code 1963 which 
makes them limited liability companies and are subsequently licensed by the BoG 
under either the current Banking Act 2004 (Act 673) or Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions Law 1993 (PNDCL 328) to provide financial services (Steel and Andah, 
2004). These are subject to prudential regulation in order to protect public savings that 
are mobilised and lent out (intermediated).  
 
4.4.1.1 Universal Banks 
Since 2003, Universal Banks have replaced the three-pillar banking model: 
commercial, development and merchant banking. In addition to financial 
intermediation, this banking category is permitted to undertake a myriad of other 
                                                 
28
 For more on the functions of the Band of Ghana (BoG) see 
http://www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/File/Secretarys/bog-act.pdf 
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financial and advisory services
29
. There were 26 universal banks in Ghana as at June 
2009 and most of these have been in existence less than 7 years (BoG, 2008). 
 
Universal banks had previously been involved in state-sponsored subsidised 
microfinance schemes which were noted for their spectacular failures. The Ghana 
Commercial Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, Ghana Co-operative Bank and 
the National Investment Bank are some of the few financial institutions that were 
involved in state-sponsored microfinance schemes. The proliferation of universal 
banks in the recent period is increasingly leading to saturation so some of them have 
turned their attention to the poor unbanked population in rural communities and the 
urban slums. Perhaps the impressive success of Barclays Bank in reaching the poor 
has fuelled this recent development. In 2005 Barclays Bank of Ghana through its 
microbanking scheme mobilised about 47 million Ghana cedis in about 18 months of 
operation. It had also granted 1.03 million Ghana cedis to about 1480 individuals 
made up of market women, hawkers, hairdressers and other artisans (Kunzeman, 
2007; Steel and Andah, 2004). The success of the Barclays Bank in the microfinance 
sector has spurred other universal banks‘ interest in microfinance. Although these 
banks profess to have altruistic motives for engaging in microfinance, being profit-
making institutions it is argued that their major objective investing in microfinance 
has more to do with profitability. However, since almost all of the universal banks are 
situated in urban areas, their microfinance activities in rural areas are limited.  
  
                                                 
29
  For more on the authorised activities of universal banks visit 
http://www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/File/BankingSupervision/Guidelines%20for%20banking%20lice
nces.pdf 
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4.4.1.2 Rural and Community Banks (RCBs)  
RCBs operate as commercial banks under the banking law. However, they cannot 
undertake foreign exchange transactions and their operations are limited to specific 
geographical areas. RCBs were first established in 1976 to mobilise savings in rural 
areas not served by commercial and development banks. RCBs, which operate as unit 
banks, are owned by members of the community through purchase of shares 
(Gallardo, 2001; BoG, 2008).   
 
In 2007, there were 129 RCBs in Ghana and they had a total of about 1.2 million 
depositors and about 150000 borrowers (BoG, 2008). RCBs constitute the largest 
player in Ghana with regard to geographical coverage, depth of outreach and number 
of products. Due to their unique structure and position, RCBs will continue to be the 
major provider of financial services to the rural poor (Andah, 2005). Most RCBs 
routinely run microfinance interventions, usually with assistance from donors. In 
recent times many RCBs have established susu schemes which have been quite 
successful. 
 
In spite of the fact that RCBs operate throughout the country, the three northern 
savannah regions, which are considered the poorest regions, are the least served. 
There were a total of 14 RCBs in that part of the country compared to 115 in the rest 
of the country, consisting of seven regions (ibid). RCBs are increasingly moving into 
urban areas where they make more profits. For example, the head office of the 
Nsoatreman Rural Bank (NRB) is now located in Sunyani, the regional capital, 
instead of Nsoatre where the bank was originally established. The urbanisation of 
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rural banks was so widespread that in 1998 the Bank of Ghana reviewed and enforced 
the rule of limiting operations to specific locations. 
 
Rural Banks in Ghana operate under an apex institution known as the Association 
Rural Bank (ARB). It was established in 1998 to provide a technical and advocacy 
role for rural banks. Some of the functions of the BoG have been delegated to the 
ARB apex bank. The specific functions of the ARB are: cheque clearing; organising 
training programmes, supervision and regulation, rural deposit insurance and research 
and innovation. 
 
4.4.1.3 Savings and Loans Companies (S&Ls)  
The S&L companies licensed under the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Law 1993 
are restricted to a limited range of financial services. They are most active in micro 
and small-scale intermediation employing microfinance methodologies (Steel and 
Andah, 2004). It has been suggested that the S&Ls were created after the banning of 
susu companies that operated illegally in Ghana in the 1980s. In 2004 there were 9 
licensed S&Ls with more than 160000 depositors and 10000 borrowers (ibid). By 
2008 the BOG had registered 15 S&L companies (BOG 2008). It is important to note 
that all 15 S&L companies are located in the two largest cities in the country—
Kumasi and Accra. Jean et al (2005) confirm that S&L companies mostly serve the 
urban populace and that only one S&L institution has a rural branch. Their lending 
practice includes both group and individual savings with credit schemes with existing 
occupation-based groups (ibid).  
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4.4.2 Semi-Formal Institutions  
These institutions are required to register as legal entities but are not licensed by the 
Bank of Ghana. Credit Unions (CUs) and Financial Non-Governmental Organisations 
(FNGOs) are classified as semi-formal financial institutions. Below is a brief 
introduction and discussion of the existing classification of the semi-formal financial 
institutions existing in Ghana.  
 
4.4.2.1 Credit Unions (CUs) 
Credit unions are registered by the Department of Cooperatives as thrift societies that 
can accept deposits from and give credit to their members (Jean et al., 2005; 5). Credit 
Unions were initially established as institution-based organisations or aimed towards 
people on regular incomes. In recent times however, CUs have opened up to a wider 
variety of clients in the community where they are based. The apex body of the CUs, 
the Ghana Cooperative Credit Union Association (CUA) regulates the interest rates 
that CUs have to pay on members‘ savings and charge on loans, perhaps reflecting the 
initial welfare nature of credit unions (Andah, 2005). MASLOC
30
 is experimenting 
with the CUs as avenues for reaching the poor using microfinance methodologies.  
 
CUs were initially licensed under the NBFI Law 1993. Currently, a Credit Union bill 
that reflects the dual nature of Credit Unions as cooperatives and financial institutions 
is currently before parliament. At the end of 2005 there were about 273 credit unions 
in Ghana (Jean et al., 2005). CUA runs a Central Finance Facility into which member 
Credit Unions contribute and source funds to lend to their members. Some NGOs are 
                                                 
30
 Microfinance and small loans centre (MASLOC) is a government organization responsible for 
regulating the microfinance industry in Ghana. For more see pg 11  
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assisting in the formation of credit unions in villages and poor areas (ibid). The 
Department of Cooperatives has a supervisory role over the activities of the credit 
unions.   
 
4.4.2.2 Financial Non-Governmental Organisations (FNGOs) 
NGOs are incorporated as companies limited by guarantee (not for profit) under the 
Companies code. Jean et al (2004) estimates that there are 29 financial NGOs in the 
country. Two types of NGOs that provide finance services can be distinguished; those 
whose core activity is finance are known as financial NGOs (FNGOs) and those 
NGOs who include financial services as a component of their activities. Financial 
NGOs could potentially transform into Savings and Loans companies in order to 
strengthen their operations by mobilising savings from the public, as evidenced by 
Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) converting their most productive branches into the 
Opportunity International Savings and Loans Company.  
    
As long as NGOs do not mobilise savings from the public, the BoG has limited 
interest their activities (Andah, 2005). Any deposits they take from borrowers are 
assumed to be non-voluntary security deposits or security against further loans which 
the NGOs return to borrowers after successful completion of a loan cycle or upon 
withdrawal (Gallardo et al., 2005). The poverty reduction orientation of NGOs means 
that they penetrate deep into the poor clients‘ base using microfinance methodologies 
(Steel and Andah, 2003). In this regard, NGOs have played an important part in 
getting financial services to the northern part of the country where commercial and 
rural banks are relatively scarce (ibid). 
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4.4.3 Informal Financial Systems 
The informal financial sector is made up of organisations or persons engaged in 
financial services beyond the scope of banking and formal financial institutions 
(Aryeetey, 1994).   They are neither licensed nor regulated by the financial regulators 
and their transactions hardly ever involve any legal documentation, Transactions are 
usually based on verbal and oral agreements (Ashley, 1986; Steel et al., 1997). 
Consequently, informal financial systems are usually physical proximity- and 
relationship-based. This helps to reduce information asymmetry, default and 
enforcement costs which are applied through social sanctions, peer pressure and 
interlinked transactions (Onumah, 1998). Informal financial systems encompass a 
wide range of financial activities; itinerant deposit (susu) collectors, moneylenders, 
trade creditors, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), savings and credit 
clubs. The informal system also includes self-help groups, personal loans from friends 
and relatives (Steel and Andah, 2003). As informal individual agents and institutions 
without corporate identity and business license, informal financial systems appear to 
remain outside the law, and BOG officials have repeatedly indicated no interest in 
attempting to supervise them, but rather the need to observe their activities for 
possible infringement of the laws (Steel and Andah, 2003). 
 
4.4.3.1 The Susu Scheme and the Itinerant Deposit (susu) Collector 
Popularly referred to as susu collectors, the itinerant deposit collectors organise what 
are known as mobile mini-banks, collecting deposits from clients from their homes 
and place of work (Onumah, 1998). Susu collectors, who are mostly males, collect an 
agreed-upon amount from clients at regular intervals, usually daily. Deposits are 
mostly collected from women petty traders and others with regular streams of 
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incomes from off-farm businesses. The money is meant to be securely deposited for a 
specific period of time, usually one month. At the end of the agreed period, the 
deposit, less a small commission (usually equivalent to one day‘s contribution), is 
returned to the depositor (IFAD, 2000). Susu collectors usually deposit these funds 
with a bank or invest funds in their own businesses or lend it to other people including 
depositors. 
 
According to Onumah (1998), like all informal financial systems, no formal 
agreements are involved in the transactions and record-keeping are kept to the 
minimum to reduce administrative costs. Additionally, susu collection is based 
entirely on personal trust with no regulation or supervision. Susu collectors are 
notorious for making away with funds of depositors (Aryeetey, 1994). In spite of their 
proven ability to mobilize funds from micro-entrepreneurs, susu collectors are 
severely constrained as effective rural intermediaries because of their limited capacity 
to engage in lending (Onumah, 1998).  
 
In recent periods, there is increasing linkage between susu collectors and formal 
financial institutions. For instance, the Barclays Bank, working with individual susu 
collectors in a scheme called micro-banking,  had collected about £23 million and had 
granted loans to the tune of about £500000 in their first 18 months of operation They 
further estimated that an amount of about £151million could potentially be mobilised 
in the informal sector (Ghana Business and Finance, 2007). 
 
The susu scheme has become an important source of fund mobilisation in Ghana in 
rural areas. Most of the Rural and Community Banks (RCBs) now routinely employ 
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the susu methodology to mobilise savings from small and medium scale enterprises. 
An association called the Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors Association (GSCCA) 
made up of individual susu collectors has been set up and it is gradually spreading its 
influence nationwide.   
 
4.4.3.2 Money Lenders 
Moneylenders in Ghana provide loans usually as a part-time activity and often using 
surplus funds from their main occupational activities. In spite of the Moneylenders 
Ordinance of 1940 and 1957 that provides a legal framework for their operations, 
most of them, especially those in the rural areas tend to be unregistered (Onumah, 
1998). Moneylenders in Ghana are usually wealthy cocoa farmers, traders and 
increasingly government employees who have access to funds from the banks.      
 
Like other informal finance schemes, moneylenders‘ activities are relationship-based. 
Detailed knowledge of the locality and borrowers ensures that moneylenders have an 
accurate estimate of borrowers‘ capacity to repay, thereby ensuring low rates of 
default. This implies that screening, appraisal and monitoring costs are low. Amounts 
of money lent out by moneylenders are usually of a short period and can vary from a 
few pounds to hundreds of pounds. Loans may be granted with or without collateral, 
depending on the relationship, knowledge about the borrower or amount involved. 
Loans are usually taken for emergency or other purposes such as urgent medical 
expenses, funerals, weddings, and school fees. Due to the high interest rates, loans 
from money lenders are seldom used for farming activities or other income-generating 
activities. Interest rates on loans tend to be relatively high and can range from 10% to 
100% per month.  
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According to Steel and Andah (2003), if collateral is required, physical assets such as 
buildings, farmlands, undeveloped lands are the most preferred. In some situations, 
verbal guarantees from family heads, friends and relatives may also be accepted as 
security. Compared to commercial banks, moneylenders incur few transaction costs in 
enforcing pledges of such collateral, as the moneylender can simply make use of the 
property until the debt is repaid. 
 
Moneylenders are often vilified for charging such usurious rates but are 
acknowledged in the literature as being effective in their lending activities, especially 
in keeping their transaction costs very low. In spite of the rather high interest rates 
they charge, they are much sought after in Ghana because of their swiftness in 
providing loans and the flexibility in their transactions.  
 
4.4.3.3 Trade Creditors 
Trade creditors, like moneylenders, provide credit but mostly for specific purposes. In 
Ghana trade creditors include traders, shopkeepers and fishmongers. Trade creditors 
usually provide what are known as interlinked loans. Interlinked transactions 
represents a form of lending where materials, equipment and cash loans are made 
available to mostly farmers, fishermen and other tradesmen in return for the 
prerogative to purchase the outputs of the borrower (Steel et al., 1997). The most 
common trade credit transactions in Ghana are between middlemen and farmers. 
Interest rates are much lower compared to the moneylender‘s. Ashley (1986) notes 
that providing credit is usually supplementary to the trading activities of trade 
creditors and that providing credit as a strategy to secure the produce of borrowers is 
more important than interest earned on loans. However unlike moneylenders, trade 
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creditors are known to offer safekeeping of funds for farmers and other people to 
whom they lend money.  
 
4.4.3.4 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), also known as susu groups, are 
founds most parts of the country. Members contribute fixed amounts into a common 
pool at regular intervals (daily, weekly or monthly, depending on patterns of income 
flows). The joint fund is handed over to each member in turn until everyone is served. 
In Ghana membership of ROSCAs tends to be found among petty traders and 
employees.  Preliminary screening, cohesive and small (averaging about 12 members) 
group sizes ensure that default rates are kept to the minimum. Steel et al. (1997) have 
noted that ROSCA funds are spent on consumer goods (in the case of employees) and 
as working capital for traders. While ROSCAs in principle ends after a full rotation, 
some continue for long periods (ibid). 
 
4.4.3.5 Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs)  
Another variant of susu is the accumulating savings and credit association (ASCAs). 
Like ROSCAs, ASCAs in Ghana are mostly found among traders and employees. 
With ASCAs in Ghana, members, averaging 37 persons jointly make regular savings 
with the objective of raising lump sums for various purposes such as paying fees and 
acquiring consumer items (Steel et al., 1997). ASCAs permit borrowing by members 
and non-members at high interest rates to increase the accumulated savings. At the 
end of an agreed period, amounts accumulated including any interest earned are 
shared among members. ASCAs are slightly more complex than ROSCAs because 
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some amount of record-keeping is required to keep track of payments and borrowing 
transactions. 
 
4.4.3.6 Social Networks 
Social networks in this context refer to family, kindred organizations and friends who 
constitute a form of financial reservoir which people draw on. Ghana has no public 
social welfare system and it is these social networks which perform that role. The 
influence of social networks as a financial resource is usually understated, especially 
in rural areas of Ghana. Traditionally, the extended family is the first port of call 
when a member requires financial resources for any venture or in an emergency 
situation. Members of the extended family are required to offer financial assistance 
during times of emergencies and crises such bereavement, illness, drought, and 
floods. In most parts of Ghana children are obliged to take care of aged members of 
their extended family. In recent times, remittances from people abroad to their 
extended family members in Ghana has become a very important source of financial 
assistance in Ghana. According to Addison (2004), remittances (private unrequited 
transfers) increased from around US$200 million in 1990 to about US$1 billion in 
2003. The Bank of Ghana estimates that informal transfers are at least as high as 
recorded flows.  
 
4.4.4 Role of Government31 and Development Partners32 
The government of Ghana, through its agencies, plays an influential role in the 
development of the microfinance industry. The overall development policy which is 
                                                 
31
 The government includes the activities of the Bank of Ghana, Ministries, Departments and Agencies 
(MDAs). 
32
 Development partners include bilateral and multinational donors and their associated institutions. 
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encapsulated by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers make microfinance integral to the poverty alleviation 
efforts of the government (Gallardo 2002; Mahama, 2005; Atafori, 2006). The main 
agencies and organisations influential in the microfinance industry include the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana and until recently the MASLOC.  
   
The government of Ghana over the years has played both roles of a provider of 
microfinance services (directly and indirectly) and as a regulator of the microfinance 
industry. These include:  
1. Provision of subsidised credit through  the commercial and development 
banks, and through its ministries, departments and agencies 
2. Establishment of rural and community banks and the promulgation of the 
PNDC Law 328 of 1991 that permitted different categories of non-bank 
financial institutions to operate. 
3. Policy-oriented projects and microfinance programmes such as Financial 
Sector Improvement Project, Financial Sector Strategic Plan, Rural Financial 
Services Project, Social Investment Fund, Community-Based Rural 
Development Programme, Rural Enterprises Project, Agricultural Services 
Investment Project, Non-bank Financial Institutions Project, Poverty 
Alleviation Fund, and the Microfinance and Small Loans Centre. 
4. Formulation of the of the Ghana Microfinance Policy (GHAMP).    
 
The Microfinance and Small Scale Loans Centre (MASLOC) deserves special 
mention because it is supposed to be the government umbrella body that oversees 
microfinance activities in Ghana. MASLOC was established in 2004 to serve as an 
apex institution of microfinance sub-sector and to undertake reforms and development 
to strengthen microfinance as an effective and viable strategy for poverty reduction. 
In addition to being responsible for disbursing government funds for microfinance 
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activities, MASLOC is to ensure the judicious management of government and 
development partners‘ funds for microfinance. The organisation is also responsible 
for facilitating the emergence, development and growth of sustainable and 
decentralised microfinance services (Mahama, 2005). However, MASLOC is 
presently preoccupied with the provision of financial services than its regulatory 
functions. Reflecting on how badly many government-sponsored microfinance 
schemes have fared in the past, it is surprising that government still directly engages 
in microfinance activities. It is hardly surprising that after three years of disbursing 
microfinance funds, repayment rates have been very poor. In addition to MASLOC is 
the Ghana Micro-Finance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN), an association of 
microfinance institutions which endeavours to coordinate and support activities of 
microfinance institutions with the aim to develop an efficient and sustainable 
microfinance industry in Ghana.  
 
Ghana‘s development partners have been involved in microfinance activities. The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Microfinance Project, the British 
DFID and CIDA are examples of some institutions involved in the provision and 
development of microfinance in Ghana. Most of these institutions have assisting in 
building sustainable microfinance institutions.  
 
4.4.5 The Financial Regulatory Framework and Microfinance 
How does the financial regulatory framework of Ghana affect microfinance? Gallardo 
(2002) notes that firstly, the national financial regulatory framework is structured to 
enable FNGOs to establish linkages with the formal financial sector and to develop 
into licensed and regulated financial institutions. Secondly, close collaboration among 
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some microfinance advocacy institutions like GHAMFIN, and the BoG and the 
Ministry of Finance have resulted in better understanding of microfinance 
methodologies such as the use of group guarantees as acceptable collateral in 
microfinance loans. Thirdly, government continues to grant concessions such as tax 
exemptions to rural banks and credit unions as an incentive for pursuing microfinance 
programmes. In addition to these, rural banks, credit unions and other financial 
institutions serve as conduits for channelling government funds in the form of 
microfinance services to the poor.  
 
In setting prudential standards, the BoG made adjustments for Rural and Community 
Banks (RCBs) and Savings and Loans companies (S&Ls) in recognition of their 
unique position as microfinance institutions.  In effect the RCBs and S&Ls have 
significantly less minimum capitalisation requirements compared to the universal 
banks. It is important to note that while the government endeavours to provide an 
enabling atmosphere for the development of microfinance, certain microfinance 
institutions lose out. Institutions that can lobby the government for subsidised credit 
will have an advantage over others who are on their way to achieving financial 
sustainability. According to Gallardo (2002), in Ghana experience has proved that 
government-promoted apex organisations pose a significant risk of distorting the 
allocation of scarce financial resources and competing unfairly against private 
microfinance institutions because of their access to subsidised resources, thereby 
stymieing the growth of other institutions.   
 
Among other challenges to the development of microfinance in Ghana, the significant 
issue is the grey area between formal and informal microfinance institutions. For 
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instance, currently there is a debate on what constitutes an informal susu collection 
scheme and an institutionalised susu collection scheme. The institutionalised susu 
collection scheme is illegal under the financial laws. There are increasingly many 
susu schemes being established and so are instances of misappropriation of the 
savings of the poor.   
 
In general, Ghana‘s microfinance institutions continue to offer services to only a 
narrow range of clients and few of them have direct linkage with each other. This has 
resulted in a large chunk of the poor without access to convenient credit and secure 
savings options. In addition there are very few vertical linkages between the various 
financial institutions. Apart from susu, there has been very little effort expended in 
developing the informal financial schemes into viable formal institutions.  
 
In conclusion, Ghana‘s political and economic environment looks conducive for 
microfinance activities. However, there is no clear definition of informal institutions 
and which is increasingly being exploited by organised susu collection schemes often 
to the detriment of the poor. The financial regulatory framework of the country 
induces NGO microfinance institutions to upgrade and offer financial intermediation. 
NGOs that are unable to upgrade are faced with constraints in providing essential 
savings facilities to the poor because they cannot legally provide savings facilities to 
the public. Overall the government and their development partners have demonstrated 
the will to make microfinance a tool for alleviating poverty in Ghana.  
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4.5 Nsoatre: Economic, Financial and Socio-Cultural Setting 
The study area, Nsoatre, is located in the Sunyani District of the Brong Ahafo Region 
of Ghana. It is the main settlement which lies on the main road between Sunyani, the 
regional capital and Berekum, the second largest town in the region. Its geographical 
coordinates are 7° 24' 0"
 
North and 2° 28‘ 0" West (see Appendix 6 for the map of 
Nsoatre in the Sunyani District). The people of Nsoatre are Bonos, which is a subset 
of the Akan ethnic group, the largest ethnic group in the country. The results of the 
2000 census put Nsoatre‘s population at 16,614 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2001).  
 
4.5.1 Economic and Geographical Characteristics  
In Nsoatre about 87% of the economically active group of the population are engaged 
in the agricultural sector (Yeboah, 2001). They consist of subsistence farmers who 
cultivate food crops such as maize, yam, plantain, cassava, cocoyam and vegetables. 
Few farmers are able to cultivate lucrative cash crops like cocoa and oil palm because 
of irregular rainfall patterns and increasing soil infertility. About 5% are employed by 
the government and private individuals. Such employees are likely to be teachers, 
sanitary workers, drivers and health workers. Market traders, artisans, shopkeepers, 
and subsistence trading activities make up the rest. It is to be noted that these 
occupational categories are not mutually exclusive. Almost all persons primarily 
engaged in non-farm occupations are likely to be engaged in some form of farming 
activity as well. Nsoatre is located between the two largest towns in the region, 
Berekum and the regional capital Sunyani. The location of the town, which is between 
the two largest towns in the region, has adversely affected its markets. Larger 
businesses and producers are attracted to the bigger towns nearby where they 
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experience greater demand. Nsoatre therefore has very few large private businesses 
that require employees. In rural areas, an important determinant of the demand for 
goods and services in a community is the availability of satellite settlements. 
Availability of settlements implies bigger weekly markets and increased demand for 
goods and services. Nsoatre has very few satellite settlements and this has contributed 
to the low demand for goods and services. Like most food crop-producing rural 
communities in Ghana, Nsoatre has a limited economic capacity and is relatively 
poor. Ocran and Adjasi (2009) have noted that although food crop farmers constitute 
about 39% of the economically active population, they account for almost 60% of the 
poverty in Ghana between 1998 and 1999.  
 
4.5.2 Financial Facilities in Nsoatre 
Financial facilities in Nsoatre are made up of a formal banking institution, two semi-
formal institutions and many informal financial arrangements. Informal financial 
systems seem to play a more important role compared to semi-formal or formal. 
 
4.5.2.1. Social Networks 
Borrowing and lending among family members constitute an important source of 
financial facility in rural areas. Nsoatre is composed of clans
33
, with each clan 
responsible for financing and performing funeral activities and assisting members of 
the clan in need of help. Extended families
34
 within the clan are usually the first to be 
                                                 
33
The clan is a collection of extended families who trace their ancestry to one common progenitor.  
Relationships among clan members are not as strong as the extended family.   
 
In the case of Nsoatre, which observes the matrilineal system, family usually implies relatives from 
one‘s mother‘s lineage.   34  
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consulted when a member requires financial assistance. The function of social 
networks as discussed in section 4.4.3.6 applies in the case of Nsoatre.   
 
4.5.2.2 Moneylenders 
These ubiquitous members of society were not easily identifiable in Nsoatre. Their 
business, according to Steel and Andah (2004) is shrouded in secrecy because they are 
required to register with the police under the Money Lenders Ordinance 1957, which 
apparently no moneylender does. Moneylenders do not advertise themselves and the 
researcher had to expend much effort in getting information about them. The number 
of moneylenders was quite difficult to assess few would admit being moneylenders. 
Moneylenders in Nsoatre were relatively wealthy cocoa farmers, traders and 
government employees. For many of them money-lending was a part-time business.  
Interest rates varied from 0% to 1200% percent per annum, depending on the 
relationship with the borrower. For instance, when the researcher contacted a 
moneylender for an amount of about £50 for a period of a month, the interest rate 
quoted for the period was 40% (480% per annum). The moneylender, in this instance 
required a guarantor. Most moneylenders do not require collateral but others do 
demand some collateral in the form of jewellery, cocoa farms, land, unharvested food 
crops or a guarantor. Members of the community usually borrow for emergencies 
such as funerals, illness and other crisis situations. Monies can also be borrowed for 
school fees and more recently for sponsoring family members to travel abroad. In 
spite of the presence of formal microfinance institutions, investigation proved that 
demand was high for services of moneylenders in Nsoatre. This is perhaps due to the 
swiftness of obtaining a loan and the flexibility in payment: one could request for loan 
and receive it that very day     
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4.5.2.3 The Individual Itinerant Deposit (Susu) Collector  
Individual susu collectors provide collection and safekeeping of monies for mostly 
market traders, artisans and other micro-entrepreneurs in Nsoatre. Investigations 
revealed that before that advent of the NRB Susu Scheme, there were about four susu 
collectors in Nsoatre. The NRB Susu Scheme had displaced the susu collectors so that 
there was only one operating during the fieldwork period. The NRB Susu Scheme, in 
addition to not taking commission, offered customers loans after they had saved for a 
period of time.  
 
4.5.2.4 Formal and Semi-Formal Financial Institutions 
Four formal and semi-formal financial institutions provide microfinance services to 
the community of Nsoatre; Microfinance and Small Scale Loans Centre (MASLOC), 
Nsoatre Cooperative Credit Union, Sinapi Aba Trust and the Nsoatreman Rural Bank. 
At the time of the fieldwork MASLOC had just began business in Nsoatre, giving 
loans to individual entrepreneurs. Nsoatreman Rural Bank operated two microfinance 
interventions: NWEP and a Susu Scheme. Nsoatre Cooperative Credit Union (NCCU) 
had begun a microfinance scheme with funds from MASLOC. Lastly Sinapi Aba 
Trust was in Nsoatre and operating a group-based microfinance scheme. The NCCU, 
MASLOC and Susu Scheme are briefly described next, while that of SAT and NRB 
are comprehensively discussed later. 
 
The NCCU was established in 2002 and up to 2007, membership of NCCU was 
restricted to people with regular incomes such as government workers and traders. In 
2007 NCCU expanded their clientele to include farmers and other people in the 
informal sector who do not have regular incomes. NCCU has experienced rapid 
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growth since then. The NCCU also operated a group lending methodology with funds 
from MASLOC. Interestingly loans were given out at a subsidised rate of 10% 
(market interest rate between 25 and 30%). According to the NCCU manager there 
had been no defaults in repayment since the scheme begun.  
 
MASLOC‘s activities in Nsoatre began close to the end of in 2007 and apart from 
providing funds to the NCCU, it had provided individual uncollaterised loans for non-
farm enterprises. Investigations revealed that initial repayment rates were not very 
impressive compared to NCCU. This is perhaps a result of the perception of 
MASLOC‘s loans as government gifts which were not meant to be repaid. As 
happened in the past, microcredit with the connotation ‗government‘ is a recipe for 
repayment problems and subsequent collapse.  
 
The NRB established the Susu Scheme begun in 2007 and offers both savings and 
loan facilities to service users who are mostly engaged in income-generating 
activities. Loans to service users are offered through the group lending method. NRB 
is currently experiencing liquidity problems and interviews indicate that the Susu 
Scheme savings mobilisation drive plays an important role in the sustenance of the 
bank. The Susu Scheme is in its nascent stages but has been described as very 
successful by the NRB. 
 
4.5.2.5 Previous Microfinance Activities in Nsoatre 
Microfinance literature suggests that people‘s previous experience of unpaid loans 
and rural financial schemes that have failed can potentially influence subsequent 
microfinance interventions negatively. In the past Nsoatre benefited from government 
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subsidised agricultural loans from the Agricultural Development Bank and the Ghana 
Commercial Bank. Like what happened in other parts of the country, repayment rates 
were very poor. The government then established the Poverty Alleviation Fund
35
 
(PAF). This scheme failed due to heavy political interference in loan allocation and 
the people‘s perception that the funds were a reward for voting certain political parties 
into power. In sum, any microfinance scheme qualified by the word ‗government‘ has 
or will have a high probability of failure in Nsoatre as in other parts of the country. 
On the other hand, Nsoatreman Rural Bank had successfully administered other 
financial schemes such as IFAD‘s SCIMP36 among others.  
 
4.5.3 Salient Socio-cultural and Poverty Characteristics of Nsoatre 
Nsoatre is a matrilineal society with relatively moderate patriarchal tendencies. 
Women can own property such as land and buildings. However, ownership of most 
farmland is usually vested in the clan or extended family. Individual ownership of 
farm land, on the other hand, is not uncommon.  
 
The state and type of housing has been employed as an indicator of the level of 
poverty. For example, Credit and Savings for the Hardcore Poor (CASHPOR) an 
Indian microfinance institution, identifies the very poor using the aforementioned 
criterion. Nsoatre does not exhibit any significant spatial patterns with regard to 
incidence of poverty. Several nuclear families belonging to the same extended family 
and of varying socio-economic status might live in what is referred to as a ‗compound 
house‘, which consists of several rooms built in square or rectangular shape with an 
                                                 
35
 This facility was administered through the District Assemblies (DAs) as a revolving fund for income 
generation. The DAs were expected to set aside 10% of their transfers from the central government for 
this facility 
36
 SCIMP stands for Smallholder Crop Improvement and Marketing Project 
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open space or courtyard in the middle. Sometimes families in a compound house will 
be lucky to have a wealthy member who will renovate the entire building. By 
observation it is quite difficult to tell differences in poverty using type of 
accommodation as an indicator. However, summary of interviews on poverty 
collected during the main data gathering period showed three significant physical 
manifestations of poverty: not having enough or acceptable food to eat therefore 
looking emaciated; not able to afford decent clothing indicating inability to attend 
social gatherings; and inability to enrol one‘s children in school.  
 
To sum up the area of study, Nsoatre, is a typical rural community largely unaffected 
by activities of the surrounding urban communities. Food crop farming is the main 
occupation of the people. Nsoatre has poor markets because of its lack of satellite 
settlements. The society is patriarchal but this is tempered by the matrilineal system of 
descent. Women can own property such as land and buildings. Five microfinance 
interventions were identified in the community with all of them targeting people 
already engaged in some form of income-generating activity. Informal financial 
services do exist but investigations by the researcher indicate that their activities were 
on the wane with the advent of formal microfinance institutions such as Sinapi Aba 
Trust (SAT) below.   
 
 4.6 Background of Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT)  
Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT), a Non-Government Organisation (NGO) was established in 
1994 under the laws of Ghana as a company limited by guarantee to support the 
economically active poor through microfinance and basic business training (SAT, 
2007). SAT‘s major objective of providing microfinance was towards poverty 
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reduction. SAT is a member of the Opportunity International Network (OIN), an 
international Christian NGO engaged in the development of micro-enterprise in over 
40 countries and headquartered in Chicago, USA (ibid). The name ‗Sinapi Aba‘ refers 
to the biblical tiny ‗mustard seed‘ which grew into a mighty tree. In the same token, 
SAT, by providing the poor with relatively small amounts of money, intends to give 
the economically poor the opportunity to expand their income-generating activities. 
Although SAT is a Christian organisation, it caters to people of all religious 
persuasions. However, their activities are heavily influenced by Christian values. 
SAT‘s major source of funding for its activities continues to be equity (53%) (Planet 
Rating, 2007). In addition to financial resources from  Opportunity International, SAT 
receives funding from many other sources including Agence Française de 
Développement, DFID, Hilden Charitable Fund (UK), Microstart (UNDP), USAID 
and currently MicroVest and Calvert Foundation (Steel and Andah, 2003; SAT, 
2007).  
 
Currently, SAT, with its headquarters in Kumasi, is the second largest non-bank 
microfinance institution in the country with regard to client outreach and the third 
largest in loan portfolio (Steel and Andah, 2003). SAT operates in all the 10 
administrative regions of the country with 18 branches and 2 agencies with over 50, 
000 members (SAT, 2007). At the time of the fieldwork
37
, SAT in Nsoatre had 8 
groups with membership ranging from 8 to 20 members.  
 
                                                 
37
 The fieldwork took place between August 2007 and January 2008. 
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4.6.1 Organisational Structure 
This section borrows heavily from the Planet Rating (2007) report; this is a Global 
market Rating Agency
38‘s assessment of SAT. As an NGO, SAT has no owners. It is 
governed by an eleven-member Board of Directors (BOD) including an Executive 
Director (ED). The BOD appoints the ED who carries out supervisory control over 
management through various committees (Executive, Finance and Audit, Human 
Resource Development, Legal/Non Finance).  
 
SAT‘s management is composed of a core and a general management. The core 
management consists of the ED and four heads of departments (F&A, IT/MIS, Chief 
Operations Officer and the Non-Finance Manager). The general management 
comprises of the Area Manager (AM) who supervises the various branches within the 
region, HR, Administration, Marketing, Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E), Micro 
Save, Transformation, Research and Development (R & D), and Branch Managers 
(BM). The branches are headed by a Branch Manager (BM). Under the BM are the 
Finance Services Supervisor (FSS is equal to a senior loan officer), one Finance 
Services Officer (FSO is the equivalent of a loan officer), an Account Officer and a 
Branch Operation Assistant (BOA).  
 
The headquarters is responsible for planning, strategic decision-making, preparation 
of consolidated financial statements, elaboration of procedures, recruitment, search 
for additional funds and external relationship with stakeholders and regulatory bodies. 
                                                 
38
See more information see: 
http://www.mixmarket.org/en//medias/media.player.asp?MediaID={073D3A79-663D-4960-8059-
E713BB9E32E3}&EntityID={9FA4C8C1-56E6-426F-951F-04287B8F5D12}&pxy=1397519625 
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Branches are responsible for loan disbursements, repayments, promotion of products 
and training of clients. Disbursements are approved by BM or FSS based on FSO 
analysis. FSOs, under the supervision of FSS/BM disburse loans to each group 
member. Repayments are supervised and collected by FSO‘s, who then give them to 
the BOA to deposit the money at the bank.  
 
4.6.2 Activities of SAT 
SAT has microfinance delivery as their core activity. They provide small loans to 
individuals and groups already established or the productive poor in the following 
sectors: 
 Artisans- tailors/designers, shoe makers, plastic/leather bags makers, furniture 
makers, handicraft producers etc. 
 Food industry- chopbars/food sellers, bakers/confectionary, restaurants etc 
 Agriculture- poultry farmers, vegetable and food crop farmers among others. 
 Trading- traders in agricultural produce such as beans, maize, yams, various 
types of vegetables, shopkeepers, other retailers etc. 
 Services- hairdressers, communication centres etc. 
 
Sinapi Aba Trust integrates training programmes into the provision of microfinance 
services. Non-financial services provided include entrepreneurial skills development, 
credit management, and records-keeping. SAT also offers services in the form of 
technical advice, institutional capacity-building, supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation to support the development of microfinance and other development-based 
institutions. The NGO also provides consultancy services to other institutions (SAT, 
2007). SAT also offers the awareness creation and counselling services on HIV/AIDS 
and Youth Apprenticeship Programme (YAP) that provides the youth with 
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employable skills. SAT employs three main methodologies to deliver financial 
services to the service users: individual lending, trust bank lending and solidarity 
lending.   
 
4.6.2.1 Individual Lending Method  
The individual service user is permitted to apply for credit from SAT. This is similar 
to the orthodox lending method employed by the commercial banks. The applicant 
has to undergo through some training before the loan is granted. Loan applicants are 
required to present some form of collateral in the form of a guarantor or immovable 
property. The amount of loans offered under this lending method is usually larger than 
that given to the poor. Individual loans are between 200 and 10,000 USD and payable 
within a maximum period of 10 months. Individual lending occurs mainly in the 
urban areas. 
 
4.6.2.2 Trust Bank Lending Method  
This refers to the group-based lending scheme. Groups of poor and economically 
active persons apply for credit under the joint liability method. Between 20 and 30 
members form a group referred to as a trust bank. The group was further divided into 
smaller groups of between 5 and 7 members. The group is then given training on 
credit management, leadership and health training. Other training services are offered 
periodically. Individuals in the group are offered variable microloans depending on 
their individual circumstances. Loans are repaid weekly or fortnightly depending on 
the mutual decision reached with loan officers. 
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4.6.2.3 Solidarity Group Lending 
This is the progressive step after the trust lending method. The solidarity and trust 
bank methods are essentially the same with the difference being that the solidarity 
groups are smaller (average 5 members), have much larger loans and more flexible 
terms. To graduate to the solidarity group a member from the trust bank should have 
successfully gone through four cycles and demonstrated business growth. Both the 
Trust Bank and Solidarity Groups take loans from 100 to 2000 USD for a maximum 
period of 32 weeks. 10% of this is deducted as compulsory savings, 2% for a welfare 
scheme (explained below) and 3% as processing fee. The nominal interest rate is 35% 
(flat) which translates into an APR of about 95%.   
 
4.6.2.4 Asset-based Loans 
Sinapi also offers individual asset loans that enable their service users to buy various 
types of business assets. Items normally purchased are sewing machines, hair dryers, 
cooking utensils, gas stoves and ovens. These loans can be taken alongside other 
various schemes enumerated above 
 
4.6.2.5 Client Welfare Scheme (Insurance) 
SAT operates an insurance product known as the client welfare scheme. It covers the 
risk of death or debilitating illness while the service user is servicing a loan facility. 
The product was developed to remove the burden of repaying the loan of a member of 
a group who is deceased or severely ill. For instance, HIV/AIDS patients who are too 
ill to engage in productive activity and unable to service a loan qualify under the 
client welfare scheme. For client welfare scheme contributions, SAT levies 2% on any 
amount borrowed by a member which is added to the interest charged. 
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4.6.3 Performance  
SAT achieved a gross loan portfolio of USD 8.5 million with less than 2.0% portfolio 
at risk as of march 2007. By 2005, the NGO reached out to close to 35, 000 clients 
(92% women) and had increased profitability with growth rates of 150%
39
. In 
collaboration with Opportunity Transformation Investment (OTI) of Opportunity 
International, SAT established a non-bank financial institution (Opportunity 
International Sinapi Aba Savings and Loans Limited) that required the transfer of 
about half of SAT‘s portfolio to this new organisation, resulting in a reduction of 
clients and portfolio in 2004 and 2005. By managing to sustain growth after the final 
transfer is a clear manifestation of the robustness and resilience of the organisation. 
Table 4.2 shows a summary of performance of SAT between 2002 and 2006.   
 
     Table 4.2: Selected Performance Indicators: SAT (2002-2006) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Value of Loans 
Disbursed (GH¢) 
3, 872, 356 6, 025, 512 9, 270, 170 11, 
120,600 
16, 947, 150 
Value of Loans (GH¢) 1, 579, 954 2, 793, 963 3, 758, 161 2, 829, 844 6, 730, 626 
Operational 
Sustainability  
140% 126% 94% 145% 117% 
No. of Loans 34, 695 50, 333 66, 125 62, 565 69, 266 
Financial 
Sustainability  
104% 94% 82% 127% 103% 
Arrears rate >30 days 3.90% 3.00% 0.93% 1.22% 0.97% 
Portfolio at risk >30 
days 
8.61% 5.24% 1.31% 1.80% 1.49% 
Cost per cedi lent  0.18 0.17 0.30 0.13 0.15 
Number of Clients 26, 615 41, 803 51, 393 34, 632 51, 686 
Percentage of women  93.50% 92.02% 85.00% 95.00% 92.00% 
     Source: Sinapi Aba Trust (2007) 
 
 
In sum, SAT is an FNGO with the main motive of reducing poverty through 
microfinance. It employs the credit-plus and uses the group lending methodology in 
rural areas. The institution seems to have a strong organisational structure with well-
                                                 
39
 This information was retrieved from the Calvert Foundation & MicroVest website: 
http://www.microvestfund.com/news/MicroVest%20Invests%20in%20Sinapi%20Aba%20Trust.pdf 
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defined goals. Although SAT has witnessed strong growth, the background 
information does not show how much the intervention really performs with regard to 
poverty reduction. The service users are hardly mentioned or described in information 
used. 
 
4.7 Nsoatreman Rural Bank and Nsoatreman Women 
Empowerment Programme 
Nsoatreman Rural Bank Limited (NRB) was established in Nsoatre under the 
Companies Code of 1963 (Act 173) in October 1984 (Owusu Ansah, 1999). In that 
same year the bank was licensed to operate as a formal banking institution by the 
Bank of Ghana (BOG). The capital base of the NRB was obtained through the 
purchase of shares by members of the communities of the catchment area. NRB was 
established at a period when commercial banks in the country were downsizing 
through closing down their least performing branches which were usually those in the 
rural areas. Thus NRB, in addition to providing financial service to the unbanked 
poor, filled the gap created by the withdrawal of commercial banks from the 
catchment area of the bank. Currently, NRB has six branches all located in the Brong 
Ahafo Region of Ghana. Apart from the profit motive, NRB aims to improve the 
catchment area‘s standard of living by mobilising resources to support economic 
activities and assisting to develop infrastructure such as education and water (Owusu 
Ansah, 1999). Over 50% of the bank‘s clients are engaged in agricultural activities, 
30% in commerce and trading activities and 20% in cottage and other industries 
(ibid).  
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Although RCBs in Ghana (which includes NRB) have been categorised as 
microfinance institutions, they are strictly not microfinance institutions because their 
prime objective is not to cater for the poor. They engage in all banking functions 
except foreign transactions and also cater for all sorts of clients: the poor to the very 
wealthy. NRB has been involved in many microfinance schemes such as the Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PAF), a local government facility, Smallholder Crop Improvement 
and Marketing Project (SCIMP) project under the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the Rural Finance Project under the International 
Development Association (IDA). NRB also benefits from financial and technical 
support from some of the international agencies such as IDA and IFAD.  Currently 
NRB operates two microfinance interventions: NWEP and the Susu Scheme.  
 
4.7.1 Organisational Structure 
Since Nsoatreman Rural Bank (NRB) overall organisational structure has little 
relevance to NWEP‘s activities and therefore it is not included in this thesis. The 
NRB has a microfinance section within the bank and it is headed by the general 
project manager (coordinator) and his assistant. There are four community promoters 
who manage the various groups and collect repayments on behalf of the bank.  
 
4.7.2 Nsoatreman Women Empowerment Programme (NWEP) 
The Nsoatreman Women Empowerment Programme (NWEP) is a Credit with 
Education (CwE) scheme and was introduced in 1996 by the NRB in partnership with 
Freedom from Hunger (FFH), an NGO headquartered in the United States. The FFH 
methodology, CwE, recognises that increasing incomes is only the start of the self-
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help process. It posits a synergistic effect between credit and education. As women 
congregate to repay their loans, they learn about health, nutrition, family planning and 
business practices. Armed with this knowledge, women use the additional income 
more productively to break the cycle of hunger and poverty
40
.   
 
The FFH‘s role in the partnership was to provide technical training and seed fund for 
the programme. NRB‘s part of the bargain was to contribute to the funds for the 
programme in addition to implementing the programme. Specifically, FFH 
contributed GH¢ 20,000 while NRB contributed GH¢ 250,000 to the programme. It 
was expected that the NWEP will achieve operational sustainability when the 
partnership ended in June 1999. It was not clear whether NWEP achieved operational 
sustainability after the departure of FFH. What was however evident was that the 
membership of NWEP had dwindled as discussed next.  
 
From the records of the Bank, NRB started NWEP in four of the branches in the 
catchment area of Nsoatreman Rural Bank in June 1996 with eight community 
promoters and a coordinator. By December 1996 the number of Credit and Savings 
Associations (CSAs) were 46 with a total membership of 1054.  By December 1999, 
the peak of the scheme, the number of CSAs had risen to 106 with a total membership 
of 3000. At the time of fieldwork the number of CSAs had reduced to 34mainly 
because of the bank liquidity problems. At the time of the fieldwork NWEP in 
Nsoatre had 53 active members in 3 CSAs.  
                                                 
40
 Retrieved from Credit with Education: www.freedomfromhunger.org on 21st April 2008. 
. 
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4.7.3 Methodology 
The NWEP principally employs the group lending methodology. The schemes 
organises five or six women into what are known as solidarity groups. Members of 
each solidarity group are jointly liable for loan repayment within the group. Five or 
six solidarity groups within the community then come together to form a Credit and 
Savings Association (CSA). A newly constituted CSA elects their executive members 
to conduct the affairs of the group.  The CSA then undergoes a four-week training 
session on the following topics: 
 
Group Dynamics 
 Conflict management  
 Credit association management  
 Enforcing group by-laws 
 
Business Skills  
 Selling/Marketing 
 Assessing business feasibility 
 Increasing profitability 
 
Health and Nutrition  
 Infant breastfeeding and child feeding 
 Family planning  
 AIDS and STDs 
 
After the initial training CSA members could access loans which were repayable with 
interest in 16 weekly equal instalments. Loans are increased after each cycle. Like 
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SAT, NWEP targets the productive poor who are already engaged in a business 
activity other than farming. 
 
Rural Banks are profit-oriented financial institutions but they incorporate some 
development-oriented objectives. Rural banks, by virtue of being situated in rural 
areas and being legally permitted to mobilise funds from the public, can potentially 
play an important role in rural finance development. NRB through its two 
microfinance interventions aims at improving the lives of the poor. NWEP uses a 
revised version of the Grameen model and incorporates substantial amounts of non-
financial services.   
 
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter, based on theoretical perspectives identified in chapter three, selected 
Nsoatre, a rural community in Ghana, as the area of study. The researcher had 
intimate knowledge of the customs, socio-economic characteristics, language and 
physical environment. Since the issue of context constitutes an important perspective 
of this thesis, the background of the country, area of study and microfinance 
institutions identified for study are examined with reference to their relationship with 
microfinance.  
 
The Ghanaian political, economic and financial landscape seems conducive for 
microfinance interventions: a stable democratic state, relatively low inflation and low 
interest rates. The financial regulatory framework is tiered and encourages the 
formalisation of financial non-governmental organisation. The Government shows 
interest in using microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction. Nsoatre, although with a 
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large population exhibits many other characteristics of rurality, and is ideal for the 
study. This was because of the existence of some microfinance interventions in the 
community which exhibited some similarities yet differed in orientation and 
objectives and employed different service delivery strategies. The microfinance 
interventions therefore offered a rich diversity of material for this study.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166 
CHAPTER V 
FIELDWORK AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES 
5.1 Introduction 
After identifying the area of study and the microfinance interventions to be studied, 
the logical step is to collect data to answer the research questions. This chapter applies 
the theoretical and methodological approaches presented and discussed in Chapter III. 
If Chapter III is conceptualised as the blueprint of the thesis then this chapter 
constitutes the implementation of part of that blueprint. The focus here is on ensuring 
that strategies employed in the extraction of information from the field and its 
organisation and analysis is in conformity with the theoretical underpinnings in 
Chapter III.  
 
The chapter begins with the fieldwork approach regarding the selection of area of 
study, negotiating entry and the opportunities and risks encountered by the researcher. 
The data collection method and how the data are analysed are presented. In the data 
collection exercise the most salient issue was ensuring the validity and reliability of 
the data collected.  
 
5.2 Why fieldwork? 
For most researchers, it seems that the next logical stage after literature review is to 
head off into the field for data collection. Some social scientists become so attached to 
fieldwork in almost an ideological way that they lose sight of the strengths and 
weaknesses and imagine it is appropriate for all research. Bechhofer and Patterson 
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(2001), argue that underlying the fieldwork approach is the notion that social order is 
best understood through interpretation. Social order is perceived as interactive and 
negotiated and it is this negotiated reality that researchers aspire to study. In other 
words, ‗fieldwork provides the researcher with unparalleled opportunities to access 
these processes and the meanings associated with them‘ (ibid: 97). Fieldwork is 
especially important for gaining intimate knowledge of people and in situations where 
the issue of context is crucial. Another advantage of fieldwork is that the researcher is 
in control of the data-collection process (Oliver, 1007). However, the quality of data 
obtained from the field is contingent on the researcher‘s knowledge and capability.  
 
It is advisable, before one thinks about going to the field, to conduct a thorough 
search for data that enables the research question to be answered. This will prevent 
unnecessary expenditure and interview fatigue resulting from people being subject to 
very frequent studies. It should be borne in mind that fieldwork constitutes an 
intrusion into the private lives of respondents. However, recognising the dearth of 
quality data, most countries, especially developed ones, have increased their data 
collection activities for use by researchers. The downside is that most of such data are 
only quantitative or may be inadequate for particular studies.  
 
Fieldwork requires much tact, patience, endurance and preparation, especially when it 
involves research in developing countries. Leslie and Storey (2003) have observed 
that fieldwork in developing countries, especially rural areas, involves negotiating 
complex situations. Expectations and well-designed plans during fieldwork in 
developing countries may go haywire precisely because everyday life in such 
countries is characterised by uncertainties and flexibility with time.   
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Regarding this study, a thorough search revealed that there was no adequate body of 
already-collected data that could enable the researcher answer the research questions 
satisfactorily. For example the Ghana Livelihood Survey (GLS), data on a national 
sample of people‘s livelihood collected by the Ghana Statistical Service is 
quantitative and does not contain variables suitable for understanding how 
microfinance interventions are implemented. With the issue of context playing a 
crucial role in the study, it was imperative that data be collected from microfinance 
service users. 
 
5.2.1 Negotiating Entry into the Field  
The researcher had to apply for permission to gain access to the microfinance 
institutions and their users from the headquarters of the two institutions. It took about 
six weeks to be granted authorisation to contact the selected local microfinance 
institutions and service users in the area of study. The head-office of Sinapi Aba Trust 
(SAT) is located in Kumasi, the second largest city in the country. In the case of 
Nsoatreman Rural Bank (NRB), the researcher had to travel to the nation‘s capital, 
Accra, to seek permission from the Association of Rural Banks (ARB) also referred to 
as the Apex Bank. It took several trips and personal appeals to some key persons to 
facilitate such ‗early‘ acquisition of the permits. The fieldwork began in August 2007 
and ended in January 2008.  
   
The researcher found that once in possession of the permits, the members of staff of 
the two institutions were helpful especially with enabling access to service users. 
However, very little information was obtained from the institutions themselves with 
regard to loans disbursed, repayment performance, and information on groups and so 
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on. However, the two institutions readily gave out training manuals. The researcher 
surmised that either some of such data was not available or was considered very 
sensitive to reveal. NRB were more forthcoming with information than SAT. For 
example while NRB gave the researcher a list of groups with pictures of members 
with currents loans they had taken, SAT officials asked the researcher to collect such 
information from the groups. After providing information staff of the two institutions 
promised to provide assistance to the researcher when required.  
 
Regarding gaining access to service users, it was important that the researcher‘s first 
meeting with them be carefully orchestrated so as to facilitate a smooth and voluntary 
data collection process. The first contact process constitutes an important act of 
negotiating access to service users. Robson (2002) urges researchers to regard 
negotiation of access as continuing process rather than a single event. The researcher 
initially attended meetings of both the SAT and the NRB (NWEP) members with 
managers of the microfinance institutions. Attending these meetings with the 
managers was to draw attention to the fact that the researcher had approval from the 
leadership for the impending exercise. The brief discussion of the study with the 
service users sought to establish the credibility and authority of the researcher on the 
impending exercise, explain what the project entailed and also to emphasise that the 
researcher knew much about the community. The intention was to exhibit some 
semblance of close relationship with the community and to build a bond of trust with 
the service users. This strategy satisfies Lofland and Lofland‘s (1984) suggestion that 
researchers need to demonstrate that they have enough knowledge about the 
community or respondents to appear competent to undertake a study. After 
negotiating access to the field, data collection constituted the next objective.  
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5.2.2 Preliminary Interviews 
Preliminary interviews were conducted to understand women‘s perception of what 
constituted poverty in Nsoatre. Gender, especially, women‘s perception of poverty 
was particularly important since they constituted more than 98% of microfinance 
services users in SAT and NWEP. It has been argued that there are gender differences 
in perception of poverty. For instance, Kozel and Parker (2000), in an assessment of 
poverty in rural India, found that women placed greater emphasis on the concept of 
vulnerability, which frequently concerned a lack of access to social support networks, 
than they do on current income or consumption. Respondents were selected based on 
their age, type of business, socio-economic and marital status. Respondents were 
asked about their perceptions of poverty. They were asked whether poverty was 
spatially distributed, whether the poverty levels could be ascertained from the type 
and nature of houses in which people dwell. In all ten people were interviewed. 
Findings from the exploratory investigation were then incorporated into the design of 
the questionnaire.  
 
5.2.3 Main In-depth Interviews  
Qualitative interviews were employed as part of the data collection. Qualitative 
interviews involved an interaction between the interviewer and interviewee and it is 
considered a situational and generative technique of collecting information. The 
interview has ‗its roots in a range of theoretical and epistemological traditions, all of 
which give some privilege to the account of social actors, agents, individuals, or 
subjects, such as data sources, and which assume or emphasise the centrality of talk 
and text in our ways of knowing about the social world‘ (Mason, 2002: 225). 
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Interviews are useful ways of getting behind participants‘ experiences and 
understanding the meaning of what interviewees say (Kvale, 1996; McNamara, 1996). 
 
Semi-structured interviews were employed in this study. Such interviews require a 
reasonably open framework which permits for focussed, conversational two-way 
communication (FAO, 1990). Semi-structured interviews were based on an interview 
guide (see Appendix 7 for a copy of the interview guide). However, additional 
questions could be asked during the interview to enable the interviewer to probe for 
details and discuss issues (ibid, 1990). The semi-structured interview format is 
deemed to be more appropriate in situations where the researcher requires in-depth 
knowledge about the social phenomena but wants a certain level of control over the 
interview process. From the researcher‘s previous experience, some level of control 
over the interview process in rural communities is necessary to prevent interviewees 
straying from the research topic. The strategy was to initially ask as few questions as 
possible and use active follow-up strategy questions, probes, prompts, and other 
interventions whose flexibility will be dictated by the interview process. The 
researcher made use of interpreting questions during the interview to ascertain that his 
understanding of the respondents‘ information were what they intended to convey. 
This is an important way of ascertaining that the researcher obtains accurate in-depth 
information.  
 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with service users in the SAT 
and NRB interventions. Selection of respondents for interview was purposive. The 
criteria for choice of respondents and the number interviewed was as follows  
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Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) 
1. leaders of group (2)  
2. successful entrepreneurs (2) 
3. struggling entrepreneurs (3) 
4. dropouts (2) 
5. varying periods with intervention (3) 
6. staff of microfinance institution (2)  
 
Nsoatreman Women’s Empowerment Programme (NWEP) 
1. leaders of group (2)  
2. successful entrepreneurs (2) 
3. struggling entrepreneurs (2) 
4. dropouts (1) 
5. varying periods with intervention (3) 
6. staff of microfinance institution (2)  
 
The motive of the researcher was to engage in what is known as heterogeneity 
sampling or sampling for diversity, which aimed at collecting as much information as 
possible on the interventions using key informants. The researcher was aware of the 
importance of understanding microfinance from perspectives based on variables such 
as age, education and socio-economic status among others. However, these variables 
were not included in the above list because such information was collected using the 
interview questionnaire and analysed quantitatively. Again, to reiterate the objective 
of the study, the qualitative part was to deepen the researcher‘s understanding of the 
implementation process of the intervention and the quantitative to examine the effect 
of the implementation process on poverty outcomes.  
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Snowball sampling approach was used to identify potential respondents for interview. 
Some leaders of the NWEP and SAT schemes were first interviewed and they were 
then asked to identify active leaders who were responsible for the collection of 
repayments. The active leaders interviewed were then asked to identify successful and 
struggling members and those who had dropped out. In all cases the choice of 
respondents was purposive; respondents were selected based on information gained 
about them from informants. Where applicable, there was the tendency to select from 
the extremes for each of the above factors.  
 
Struggling members, according to the leaders, refer to members who encounter 
repayment problems and have not been able to meet at least one repayment schedule, 
while successful ones are those who make prompt repayment. Interviewing successful 
and struggling members is expected to throw more light on what accounts for the 
difference. Specifically, interviews are expected to reveal the opportunities and 
constraints of intervention within the context of the community, enterprises and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Dropouts refer to previous service users who had left the intervention and had 
collected their accumulated compulsory savings. If a service user had taken his or her 
accumulated savings then it was evident that they did not intend to continue 
participating in the intervention. Some women temporarily drop out for reasons such 
as childbirth, taking care of a sick relative, leaving the area temporarily, being 
expelled from an intervention among others. If such people have an intention of 
coming back to the intervention they did not take their savings.   
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Hulme and Mosley (1998) discovered a positive relationship between length of time a 
service user has been with an intervention and reduction in poverty. Can the same be 
said for interventions in rural areas in the forest regions of Ghana? Services users 
were interviewed depending on the length of time they have been with the 
intervention. 
 
Staff members of the microfinance institutions were interviewed to learn about their 
relationship with service users and also about the implementation process of the 
interventions. Officers who were directly in charge of supervising and interacting with 
service users were interviewed. Aside the interviews, the staff were consulted when 
there were any issues that required clarification. In addition the managers in charge of 
the two interventions were interviewed as well. 
 
All interviews were held in the homes of respondents. The idea was that the natural 
setting or familiar environment will make the respondent relaxed and confident 
enough to answer the interview questions. Interviews were conducted during the 
evenings when respondents were less likely to be busy. Most respondents were quite 
enthusiastic about being interviewed. The researcher had a hard time explaining why 
he could not interview everyone. Interviews lasted for an average of about 50 
minutes. During the interview the researcher assumed nothing; a lot of follow-up 
questions and probes were used to unearth and understand issues which emerged. In 
line with the interpretive approach, follow-up questioning was employed to ascertain 
that the idea that the respondent intended to convey had been understood.  
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5.2.4 Questionnaire Construction and Administration   
The questionnaire was constructed in the field and it was informed by the preliminary 
analysis of the interview data. The same questionnaire was used for SAT and NWEP 
service users. The importance of a well-designed questionnaire that elicits valid and 
reliable information from respondents and additionally facilitates analysis and 
interpretation cannot be overemphasised (Creswell, 1999; Bell, 1999). Validity in this 
context means the ability of the measuring instrument (questionnaire) to actually 
measure the concepts that the researcher intends to measure while reliability concerns 
the capacity of the measuring instrument to yield the same result over time if the same 
cases were measured under the same conditions. In sum, while validity is concerned 
with accuracy of the questionnaire, reliability has to do with consistency and stability 
over time.   
 
For the study, a researcher-administered questionnaire was considered the most 
appropriate instrument for collecting data for assessing the effect of the 
implementation process on poverty outcomes of microfinance interventions. In a rural 
area characterised by high illiteracy, with no reliable telecommunication or postal 
infrastructure, the interview-administered questionnaire was deemed the most 
appropriate. Since most of the service uses could neither read nor write, the questions 
(which were in English) had to translated and read out to respondents. The researcher-
administered questionnaire enables questions to be explained to respondents and also 
result in higher response rates. Given the nature of rural contexts in developing 
countries, researcher-administered questionnaires ‗are a good way of collecting 
certain types of information quickly and relatively cheaply…‘(Bell, 1999: 118-9).  
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After the construction of the questionnaire it was pretested and what is discussed 
hereafter represents the pretested and revised questionnaire. The essence and 
pretesting process is discussed in the next section. The interview questionnaire had 52 
open- and closed-ended questions in total (see appendix 8). The first 12 questions 
were about the background and personal information of respondents. Knowledge 
obtained from the in-depth interviews and the literature indicated that the occupation 
of spouse, indigenous status and being engaged in multiple businesses were important 
predictors of the poverty outcomes of microfinance interventions. As explained in 
Appendix I, these were intervening variables which needed to be statistically 
controlled in order to nullify their effect when assessing the effect of microfinance 
processes on poverty outcomes. The next 26 questions assessed the components of the 
intervention: group activities and dynamics, minimalist/credit plus, loans, interest 
rates and savings among others. The final part of the questionnaire consisted of 2 
groups of questions, 14 in total, which sought to determine the impact of the 
intervention on business and on the household. Although the questionnaire seems 
lengthy, it took not more than 30 minutes to complete.   
 
5.2.5 Pretesting 
Pretesting a data collection instrument is essential for a good research process. 
Oppenheim (1992; 47) has noted that; ‗Questionnaires do not emerge fully fledged; 
they have to be created or adapted, fashioned and developed to maturity after many 
abortive test flights.‘ Pretesting helps to unearth some of the inevitable problems 
related to converting of designed data collection instrument into reality (Creswell, 
1994; Robson, 2002).  
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Pretesting the questionnaire was particularly essential because the questions were in 
English and had to be translated into the local language and read out to the 
respondents. The interviewer-administered questionnaire was pretested in Dumasua, a 
small community close to Nsoatre. Dumasua was deemed appropriate for the 
pretesting the interview questionnaire because the people‘s livelihood and economy 
was similar to that of the study area and also had a microfinance intervention 
operating in the town. More importantly, the same language is spoken in both towns.  
 
Deficiencies of the questionnaire became evident during pretesting and considerable 
changes made. For instance, the researcher discovered that some of the questions were 
superfluous and others were difficult to translate into the local language. Pretesting 
also enabled the researcher to become more conversant with the questions and achieve 
consistency in their translation into the local language during interview.  
 
The dependent variables were changed from dichotomous to a three-category ordinal 
variable as a result of the pretest (see questionnaire in appendix 8). It was found that 
for example regarding expansion of business, there were considerable fluctuations in 
tandem with seasonal economic fluctuations. The researcher decided to create a three-
category ordinal variable with ‗somewhat‘ representing this fluctuating pattern.  
 
5.2.6 Sample Size Estimation for Quantitative Analysis  
It is ideally more useful to study a whole population in a research but usually due to 
resource constraints researchers select part of the population. The statistical process 
concerned with the selection of individual observations for study with the intention of 
obtaining knowledge about the population is known as sampling. Statistical sampling 
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ensures every element of the population has an equal or known
41
 probability of being 
included in the sample (Loether and Tarvish, 1993; Abrami, Cholmsky and Gordon, 
2001). There are many types of statistical sampling techniques and these include 
cluster, multi-stage, proportional, and simple random sampling. However, the 
common factor that underlies all these techniques is the use of random sampling 
during sample selection process.  
 
The researcher decided to combine service users of NWEP and SAT into one 
population because of unanticipated smallness of the number (population) of service 
users in the two interventions. SAT had 82 active service users while NWEP had 53, 
totalling 135.  This tactic did not did not cause much problems because respondents in 
the two interventions responded to the same questionnaire.  
 
In selecting a sample it is essential to ensure that the sample size is representative of 
the population being studied. This would ensure that the findings of the study are 
generalisable to the population. A poignant and simple illustration of sampling is 
compared to an act ascertaining the degree of saltiness of a bowl of soup: from one 
spoonful of soup we can draw some inference as to the degree of saltiness of the 
whole bowl of soup. How should a representative sample be selected? 
 
The sampling literature suggests 30 cases as the minimum size for any meaningful 
statistical analysis (Tabacnick, and Fidell, 2001; Overton and van Diermen, 2003). In 
addition to purpose and size of the population, the appropriate sample size is 
dependent on three factors: level of precision or margin of error; the confidence or 
                                                 
41
 Sampling without replacement does not give sampling units an equal chance of being included in the 
sample. However, the problem is negligible when sampling from a very large population. 
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alpha level; and the degree of variability of the variables of interest (Miaoulis and 
Michener, 1976). The alpha level used in determining sample size in most social 
science research is .05 or .01, with .05 being more commonly used. According to 
Bartlett et al. (2001), for categorical
42
 data 5% margin of error is acceptable. Israel 
(2009) proposes the formula below for determining the sample size for a study given 
the population  
 
 
                                 n = N/ [1+N(e)
2
] 
  
where 
 n = the sample size 
N = population  
e = alpha level 
 
Israel (2009) then adjusts the resultant sample size given the margin of error the 
researcher is willing to accept.  
 
Using Israel‘s formula the sample size is calculated as follows 
 
  n= 135/[1+135(.05)
2
] 
  n= 100 
 
From the above the required sample size is calculated as 100. The sample size of 100 
is corroborated by a sample size estimation formula used by Lohr (2010: 40).  
 
The sample size for the study was selected based on proportion. SAT service users 
constituted approximately 60% of the population while NWEP constituted the 
remaining 40%. The sample size of 100 was apportioned in the same percentage for 
the two interventions: 60% and 40% for SAT and NWEP respectively. The study 
ensured that members of each group in SAT and NWEP were represented in the 
sample. The study therefore employed the proportional sampling method. For 
example in selecting 40 service users from NWEP this formula was used: 
                                                 
42
 This study intend to use categorical data.  
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(40/53)* (number of service users in a group)  
  40 = the sample size required 
 53 = population of NWEP 
 
Using the above method 7 service users were selected in a group with 10 service 
users. Service users were selected from each group using simple random sampling.   
 
5.2.7 Administering the Questionnaire 
Due to the length of the questionnaire and the anticipated difficulty in locating 
respondents, the researcher employed three research assistants living in the 
community to assist in the administration of the questionnaire: two male university 
graduates and a female undergraduate. Initial interviews revealed that they had some 
knowledge of data collection. The initial inclination was to employ only female 
research assistants considering the difficulties the researcher encountered interviewing 
female respondents (this is explained later in this chapter). However, it became clear 
that unlike the recorded interviews, the interview questionnaire could take place in the 
open without much hindrance. Male researchers were therefore suitable for the data 
collection exercise. One advantage of using personnel who lived in the locality was 
that they knew almost all the potential respondents and could easily locate them. The 
researcher trained them on how the questionnaires were to be administered. Special 
attention was paid to the translation of the questionnaire from English to the local 
language. As part of the training simulation interviews were employed till the 
assistants were adept with the process.  In addition the researcher accompanied the 
assistants during the initial interviews, observed and provided guidance till it was 
evident that they could work independently. Response rates were quite high, out of 
the number interviewed, only two respondents declined to be interviewed. The 
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response to the interviews was so overwhelming that some service users not included 
in the sample requested to be interviewed as well. Of the 100 respondents selected for 
interview, three could not be traced. Altogether five respondents could not be 
interviewed. Another selection process based on proportional sampling was therefore 
conducted to make up the required sample size. 
 
5.2.8 Verification of Data 
Since the results and conclusions of the study depended on the data it was important 
to ensure that the data collected were valid and reliable. This included ensuring that 
the research assistants collected data exactly as they were trained to do. The potential 
problems associated with using others to participate in data collection are many. 
Among these are the ever-present problems of research assistants going wrong or 
deliberately ‗cooking‘ data during questionnaire administration (Leslie and Storey, 
2003). The qualitative data collected by the researcher himself using probes, cross-
checking and interpreting questions ensured that data was valid. For the quantitative 
data collection process, the researcher accompanied each of the three assistants on 
their first two or three interviews to ascertain that the questionnaires were accurately 
administered. The assistants were allowed to go out by themselves only after they had 
become quite conversant in administering the data collection instrument accurately. 
Additionally, the research assistants‘ attention was drawn to the need to wary of 
inconsistent/conflicting responses. If they found any such irregularities, the 
interviewers were required to draw the attention of the respondents to the anomalies, 
and rectify them by probing further. An advantage of using research assistants for 
quantitative rather than qualitative data collection was that the interview questionnaire 
was quite straight forward and very little was left to the discretion of the research 
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assistants and therefore the problem of misinterpretation and mistranslation were 
minimised.  
 
In addition to these checks, the researcher visited some respondents randomly to 
ascertain whether they had actually been interviewed. At the end of each day, the 
research assistants were required to review completed questionnaires, looking out for 
any unanswered questions, inconsistencies or mistakes they might have committed. 
The researcher, at the end of each day, collected the completed questionnaire and 
double-checked for any indications that questionnaires were incorrectly completed or 
for signs of interviewers completing questionnaires themselves. The researcher 
decided that during the data entry stage, the data will be further checked for errors and 
inconsistencies and if any were found the most experienced of the research assistants 
will be contacted to deal with the problem. 
 
5.2.9 Secondary Data 
Secondary data was sourced to complement primary data collected. Overton and van 
Diermen (2003) claim that whether the researcher undertakes a qualitative or 
quantitative study, collecting secondary data is standard practice during fieldwork in 
developing countries. Sources of secondary information are quite vast, they include 
published government statistics, previous studies, newspapers, organisational reports 
and data and brochures. Secondary data is important not only in its own right but also 
to supplement or triangulate the researcher‘s own data (ibid, 2003).   
 
Secondary data obtained for the study included Bank of Ghana legal instruments, 
document and reports from the NRB, brochures from the SAT and reports and studies 
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from the Sunyani District Assembly. Informal conversations were another important 
source of information. The researcher mingled with the service users informally and 
was able to gain valuable insights into the perception of the service users of the 
microfinance interventions.  
 
5.2.10 Risks and Opportunities  
Risks in research refer to the possibility of harm, hazard or exposure to danger of the 
researcher or the researched. It is ever-present when conducting fieldwork (Lee-
Treweek and Linkogle, 2000). Being a scholar from a university in a developed 
country (and therefore considered wealthy), the researcher was faced with general 
risks such as being robbed, having to part with bribes and being perceived as being 
insensitive to the plight of the poor. The specific risks faced by the researcher during 
the data collection period are discussed here.  
 
Opportunities with reference to fieldwork process constitute positive factors that 
facilitated the smooth running of the data collection process. Some opportunities for 
the researcher included visiting the area of study at the post-harvest period there was 
not much farm work to do and therefore most people were available for interview. In 
addition people are usually in good spirits at this time of the year when they have 
money and food from the harvests. Specifically being an insider was a big opportunity 
for the data collection task. 
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5.2.10.1 Interviewing Women 
Women constituted about 98% of the service users of the two microfinance 
interventions examined. Culturally, it is inappropriate for the researcher, a man, to be 
alone in a room with married women (most service users were married) even for an 
interview. When convenient and appropriate, interviews were held in the open unless 
the service users insisted that it was alright to conduct the interview indoors. It was 
always with an uneasy heart when the researcher interviewed women in enclosed 
places. In one instance, during an interview in the evening, the lights suddenly went 
out (a very common occurrence in Ghana) but the interview continued because the 
interview guide was being read from a laptop. The researcher thought he was going to 
be lynched when the respondent‘s husband angrily burst into the room but apparently 
the researcher was not the cause of his anger. Interviewing in the open meant that the 
researcher had to contend with many distractions which interrupted and affected the 
pace of the interviews. To minimise such risks, as far as possible, the researcher tried 
to avoid interviewing at night and in a setting that could create the impression of an 
amorous meeting.  
 
5.2.10.2 Rumour-Mongering 
The community was always rife with rumours about the true motive for interviewing 
service users. Initially, the service users believed that the researcher worked for SAT 
and that he had come from their headquarters to talk to them. Later rumours went out 
that the researcher had come to talk to them in order to offer them a new microfinance 
intervention. Finally, NWEP service users were of the opinion that they had to be 
interviewed in order to be granted a loan. These rumours had the potential to 
influence and distort responses from the service users. In all these situations, the 
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researcher got to know fairly early because of his insider status. The researcher talked 
to their leaders who the service users respected and trusted. They in turn talked to 
their members to dispel such rumours. Before each interview, it was essential that the 
reason for the study be reiterated.  
 
5.2.10.3 Being an Insider 
The researcher refers to himself as an insider because he spent about 10 years of his 
life in the community and often visited as well. An insider in the context of this study 
refers to a researcher who has ‗natural access‘ to the setting as an active participant. 
Being an insider implies that the researcher lives or has lived in the setting and then 
employs the experiences, knowledge and access to empirical material for the research 
purpose (Alvesson, 2003). Insider researchers, by virtue of their insights from lived 
experience possess knowledge of the setting that can be both rich and complex. 
Knowledge of the local culture and customs and having established a prior 
relationship with respondents enables researchers to have unfettered access to 
participants. 
 
Being an insider in the area of study was a deliberate action influenced by the 
interpretive approach: the deliberately researcher chose such a community for the 
study. The researcher status as an insider more than satisfies Twumasi‘s (2001) 
requirements of conducting a study in a rural area: the researcher must understand the 
language, at least to the rudimentary level and be acquainted with aspirations and 
worldview of the people. Being an insider living in the community made the 
researcher privy to important information about the microfinance schemes that would 
otherwise have escaped an outsider. For instance, it was through informal discussions 
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that the researcher came to know that some service users who could not make use of 
all the loans gave out part of it to their relatives.  
 
As an insider, the researcher was cognisant of the potential problems of being 
embedded in a setting. It is frequently perceived that insider research lacks intellectual 
rigour because of the researcher‘s personal stake and emotional investment in the 
setting (Anderson and Herr, 1999; Alvesson, 2003). Such research is considered as 
too close and therefore lacks distance and objectivity necessary for credible study. To 
mitigate this problem, Brannick and Coghlan (2007) recommend that researchers 
possess a reflexive awareness of the relationship between them and the object of the 
research. Methodological reflexivity that demands that researchers follow research 
procedure and protocols required by the various research traditions is one means of 
reducing the problems associated with insider research.  
 
Insider researchers have been accused of being so embedded in the setting that they 
are unaware of issues that an outsider would notice. An anecdote that illustrates the 
insider‘s problem is the story of a farmer who had not realised the tropical forest was 
so noisy till it was brought to his attention by a friend who was in the forest for the 
first time. The farmer had apparently become accustomed to the cries of the birds, 
crickets and other animals in the forest.  
 
Consequently, the researcher tried to observe respondents and the community through 
the eyes of an outsider. The researcher had the advantage of having lived outside of 
the community for long period of time and therefore could also observe the 
community through the viewpoint of an outsider as well. The ability to observe 
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phenomena from two different perspectives, which comes with intellectual self-
training, enabled the researcher to assuage the problem of closely associated with the 
social phenomena being studied.  
 
On the balance, however, the advantages that accrued to the researcher for being an 
insider outweighed that of being an outsider, especially considering that the issue of 
context was pivotal to the study. Knowledge of the language of the area of study 
meant that the researcher prepared and translated the interview guide and 
questionnaire by himself.  Thus the researcher was able to ensure much control over 
the data collection process by reducing the involvement of assistants in the crucial 
stages of the data collection process. 
 
5.2.11 Ethical Issues  
Ethical considerations are important because social research, especially when it 
involves fieldwork, almost always intrudes into respondents‘ private lives when they 
disclose to researchers private and personal information that they will want to keep 
confidential. The act of researching people‘s lives and putting such information in the 
public domain also raises ethical issues. Ethics concerns the moral deliberation, 
choice and accountability on the part of researchers throughout the research process 
(Edwards and Mauthner, 2002). Researchers are enjoined to protect participants from 
harm or risk and work according to ethical guidelines and rules (Holloway, 1997). 
Ethics also means the researcher‘s own responsibility to protect himself by 
conducting the research safely and sensibly (Oliver, 1997). Ethical considerations are 
however determined by the discipline, the phenomena under study and the context of 
the study.  
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Before collection of data it is important to ensure that respondents give information 
willingly. Informed and voluntary consent implies that respondents are aware not only 
of the benefits of the research but also of the risks that they face. Asking for informed 
consent should not be accompanied by threats or inducements. Holloway (1997) 
acknowledges that qualitative researchers have an inherent problem with informed 
consent. In an interview, for example, surprising issues arise which might lead the 
process to unanticipated directions. Informed consent must be observed throughout 
the interaction process, particularly in the face of unexpected happenings. Researchers 
need to stress the fact that respondents can withdraw at any stage.  
 
During interviews and questionnaire administration in Nsoatre special efforts were 
made to ensure that respondents willingly gave out information. The high level of 
illiteracy among service users meant that verbal approval was the appropriate means 
of seeking informed consent. It was emphasised that they could quit the interviews 
anytime they wanted and that they had the right to refuse to answer any question. 
However, cultural factors can influence this interaction process. For example in the 
area of study it is considered rude to refuse to answer a question, especially when 
there is unequal power relation between the interviewer and the interviewee. The 
researcher therefore relied on cues from the respondent to assess when service users 
felt uncomfortable in responding to some questions. If respondents hesitated in 
answering any question it alerted the interviewer who will then further probe if the 
respondent did not really mind answering the question. Since it is quite difficult to 
ascertain what information will be derived from a qualitative interview, the 
researcher, after the interview ascertained whether the respondent was willing to 
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permit the information collected to be used in the study. Respondents were generally 
willing and enthusiastic to have contributed to the study.  
 
Confidentiality and anonymity of respondents is essential to ethical research practice 
(Crow and Wiles, 2009). Researchers need to inform respondents regarding who the 
information will be disclosed to and how it will be stored to prevent unauthorised 
access. It also involves how much of the data is disclosed to the public. The 
respondent must be informed about all these and consent obtained before data is 
collected. Sometimes this is not feasible or possible so researchers promise 
respondents anonymity. This implies that respondents cannot be identified in the 
publication and dissemination of research work. Holloway (1997) suggests measures 
for ensuring anonymity: use of pseudonyms that have no resemblance to the real 
name; names are not linked to data (names are kept separate); specific locations 
should not be mentioned and; researchers cannot be identified by age, gender, ethnic 
group to mention a few. Issues of anonymity depend on the type of study and the 
respondents involved. 
 
This study was assessed to be high risk with regard to the potential harm it could 
cause respondents because service users could be victimised by the microfinance 
institutions if they revealed they had contravened the regulations of the interventions. 
For example, the microfinance institution could identify service users who used their 
loans for non-business purposes and punish them. The researcher found that in the 
rural area it was easy to identify a service user even by her occupation alone. Every 
effort was therefore expended to ensure the anonymity of service users. Pseudonyms 
were used throughout the thesis and any variable, set of variables or description that 
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could potentially lead to the identification of a service user were avoided. 
Respondents were informed that only the researcher would have access to the raw 
data they provided. This issue limited the analysis because it was difficult to present 
rich descriptive information.  
 
 5.3 Data Preparation and Analytical Techniques 
Data preparation for analysis is a crucial stage in the research process. Errors 
committed during this stage are difficult to detect and can potentially render results of 
analysis inaccurate. With quantitative data, the stage where data is transferred into a 
statistical package is where things are likely to go wrong. The analytical techniques 
employed on the qualitative and quantitative data are described and justified in this 
section. Here emphasis was on the analytical technique that best fits the data.   
 
5.3.1 Preparation of Data 
Qualitative and quantitative data had to be prepared for analysis. Qualitative data 
which was collected first was analysed first. The data was translated and transcribed 
at the same time. This was a particularly slow and tedious task but it was important to 
pay painstaking attention to ensure that the transcripts reflected what the interviewees 
intended to convey. After this process the researcher listened to the interviews and 
compared them to the transcripts to ascertain that any mistakes and omissions had 
occurred were identified and rectified.  
 
Concerning the quantitative data the first task was to check the data for inconsistent 
responses and also examine questionnaire for mistakes, omissions and multiple 
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choices. As a result of the meticulous scrutiny some anomalies were found and the 
questionnaire sent back to the most experienced of the research assistants who sought 
out the respondents and the necessary corrections were done. The sample size was 
small so every effort was made to ensure partial non-response was avoided. If some 
questions were found to have been unanswered, all efforts were expended to have 
them completed. After this exercise the questionnaires was fully complete without any 
unanswered questions.   
 
The questionnaire was then entered into an SPSS spreadsheet. Before that open-ended 
questions were coded and categorised. The variables entered were double-checked to 
ensure that all data had been correctly entered. Preliminary cross-tabular and multiple 
regression analyses were carried out to determine the appropriateness of the variables 
and its categories for analysis. Variables and categories that were found unsuitable for 
analysis were readjusted. For instance, where the cells in the cross-tabular analysis 
showed very few
43
 or no cases, categories of such variables were carefully combined 
to make them suitable for analysis. For example, the variable ‗marital status‘, as a six-
category variable, (single, divorced, married etc) was collapsed into two categories 
(married and single) for ordinal logistic regression analysis.  
 
5.3.2 Data Analysis 
This section discusses and justifies the analytical techniques used to organise the 
qualitative data and analyse the quantitative information put into SPSS. The analytic 
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 The rule of thumb is that the minimum expected cell frequency should be at least five for any 
meaningful analysis (Pallant, 2001) 
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strategies used in this study were primarily informed by what best fit the data rather 
than a technique chosen beforehand. 
 
The analysis of the qualitative data was guided by three stages of Connolly‘s (2003) 
qualitative data analysis. The three stages employed in the study were: the generative 
phase; interpretive phase; and the theorising phase. At the generative stage the 
qualitative data was coded into themes and sub-themes based on the sub-questions 
under the main research questions. At this stage the information that was insignificant 
or irrelevant was discarded. The researcher was however alert to any new themes that 
emerged and did not fall under any of the sub-research questions. It was at the 
interpretive stage that the data was reduced. The patterns between the themes and the 
sub-themes were determined and brought together. The theorising stage was 
conducted in conjunction with the quantitative data.   
 
The quantitative data was first analysed using descriptive statistics, specifically 
frequencies and cross-tabulations. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Appendix 1 and 2. In this section the socio-demographic and business characteristics 
of service users were discussed. Cross-tabulations were employed to assess the effect 
of all variables in the study on households and businesses of service users. Cross-
tabular analysis was carried out between the socio-demographic and predictor 
variables on one hand and the two composite indicators: business and household 
outcomes (see section 5.3.3 for more composite dependent variables). The results and 
accompanying discussions are presented in Appendix 2. The study used chi-square 
tests in assessing the relationships between the variables and those that were found to 
be statistically significant were flagged. As previously stated, cross-tabulations were 
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useful because they enabled separate analysis to be performed for each of the two 
interventions. It also served as a guide on which variables to include in the ordinal 
logistic regression. 
 
Third, ordinal logistic regression was employed to assess the effect of the 
microfinance components on households and businesses of service users. Ordinal 
logistic regression was selected for this study because the composite dependent 
variables were ordinal (see questionnaire sample in Appendix 8). Even though other 
statistical methods, such as multinomial logistic regression could have been used, the 
inherent order or ranking of the dependent variable will have been lost (Borooah. 
2002; Norusis, 2010). Ordinal logistic regression results in more accurate and valid 
results because it employs procedures designed to fit the inherent ordered 
characteristic of the data. Other reasons in favour of employing multiple regression 
approach were that it has been argued that in the social world seldom does a single 
variable adequately explain a social phenomenon. Logistic regression enables a 
researcher to predict relationships between a dependent variable and multiple 
predictor variables to provide greater insights and improved understanding of 
complex social reality. Multiple regression analytical techniques such as ordinal 
logistic regression permits the control of the effects of variables that the researcher is 
not interested in but confounds the study. This enables the researcher to assess the 
unique effect of the predictor variables on the dependent variable.  
 
Ordinal logistic regression also known as PLUM
44
 is an extension of the binary 
logistic model to handle ordinal response variables. In explaining the specifications of 
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 PLUM stands for PoLytomous Universal Model 
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the ordinal model much of what is presented here is borrowed from Norusis (2010). 
While binary logistic regression model estimates a set of regression coefficient that 
predict the probability of an outcome of interest such as the parameters set below  
 
     In[prob(event)/(1 – prob(event))] = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + .... βkXk 
 
The left side of the equation before the equal sign is called the logit and it is the log of 
the odds of an event occurring. In other words, the odds of an event occurring is, for 
example, the ratio of the number of people subject to an event to the number of people 
who are not subject to an event. The ordinal logistic modifies the binary logistic to 
include the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. With PLUM, instead of assessing 
the probability of an individual event occurring models, it considers the probability of 
that event occurring and all events that are ordered before it. This is known as 
cumulative probability. In the case of a three-category ordinal variable this how the 
ordinal logistic models the odds (θ): 
 
            θ1=  prob(score of 1) /  prob(score greater than 1)  
                      θ2 =  prob(score of 1 or 2) /  prob(score greater than 2)  
                      θ3 =  prob(score of 1, 2, or 3) /  prob(score greater than 3)   
 
 
The last category has no odds because the probability of scoring up to and including 
the last score is 1. 
All odds of the response category j are in the form:  
  P(y ≤ j) 
  P(y> j) 
 
Where y denotes the ordinal response variable.  
 
For a single independent variable the ordinal logistic regression is modelled thus: 
 
  Ln(θj) = αj - βx 
 
Where categories j goes from 1 to the number of categories less 1 
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Norusis (2010) says the negative sign in the above equation is not a mistake. It is used 
so that the larger coefficients show an association with larger scores.  
 
Logistic regression has some other important advantages. It permits the prediction of 
discrete outcomes from a set of variables, whether they are continuous, discrete, 
dichotomous, or a mix (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2001). An additional advantage of 
logistic regression is that it makes no assumptions about the predictor variables. The 
independent variables do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related or of 
equal variance within each group. In logistic regression the dependent variable has to 
be discrete but a continuous variable can be converted into a discrete one if necessary. 
Although continuous predictor variables are permitted, they can cause the cell 
probabilities tables to have a large number of cells. This can generate many cells with 
zero frequencies, especially when the sample size is small (Garson, 2008). It is also 
possible to add explicit interaction and power terms as predictor variables. Logistic 
regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the variables 
into logit (the natural log of the odds of the dependent category occurring). This 
statistical procedure estimates the probability of a certain event occurring. The data 
had to be first prepared for the quantitative analysis.  
 
Ordinal logistic regression requires some data preparation before analysis could be 
conducted. The researcher had to assess the independent variables for 
multicollinearity. Logistic regression models are affected as multicollinearity 
increases among the independent variables. Multicollinearity is a statistical situation 
where there is high correlation among the independent variables. Tabachnick and 
Fidell, (2007) suggest that variables that are multicollinear contain redundant 
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information and are therefore not all required in the same analysis. According to 
Menard (2001), the coefficients will be unbiased but the standard errors for the 
coefficients will tend to be large and present non-significant results. Beta coefficients 
tend to be unusually high as multicollinearity increased and as a rule unstandardised 
coefficients greater than two should be examined for collinearity (ibid). First, for each 
model, the researcher carried out a correlation matrix to determine the degree of 
correlation among the independent variables. For any two variables with correlation 
value of 0.8
45
 and above, one variable was dropped out of the model after careful 
consideration of the theoretical implication of such action. 
 
Preliminary analysis indicated that ordinal logistic precluded the separate analysis for 
each intervention because of the smallness of the sample sizes. The samples of the 
two interventions were combined for the ordinal logistic regression analysis. It was 
necessary to ensure that in combining the two sample sizes from the two interventions 
they were equally represented (SAT and NWEP had sample sizes of 40 and 60 
respectively). The study therefore employed weights
46
 to correct for the unequal 
sample sizes. Each respondent of NWEP was adjusted with a weight of 1.5 to bring 
the sample equal to that of SAT. The rationale for this procedure was to prevent the 
bigger proportion of cases of SAT from swamping that of NWEP in the regression 
analysis and thereby ensure that the results reflected an equal representation of the 
two interventions in the analysis.   
 
                                                 
45
 For further information on dealing with multicollinearity, see 
web.as.uky.edu/statistics/users/viele/sta671u08/multicol.ppt 
46
 For more on weighting visit http://www.spsstools.net/Tutorials/WEIGHTING.pdf 
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5.3.3 Dependent Variables and their Aggregation  
The dependent variables that measured the effect of the intervention on businesses 
and household were 14 in total (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3 in section 7.3 and 7.4). The 
dependent variables were selected based on interviews, observations, microfinance 
literature and on a SEEP manual
47
. The objective was to construct composite 
variables. A composite variable refers to a quantitative indicator created from a series 
of observed facts. Composite indicators summarise complex multi-dimensional 
realities and reduce the size of variables. They can however lead to problems if they 
are poorly constructed or misunderstood (OECD, 2008). In this study composite 
variables are appropriate because they were constructed with variables that measured 
various aspects of household and businesses of service users.  
 
The dependent variables had the same number and description of categories and that 
facilitated their conversion into composite variables. Factors analysis should have 
been the most appropriate technique to construct the composite indicators but this did 
not prove feasible
48
.  In constructing the composite indicators, the three categories of 
each of the dependent variables were assigned numbers and added up for respondent. 
Numbers attained by respondents formed a range and the range carefully divided into 
three categories which corresponded with the initial three categories of the individual 
dependent variables. After this exercise every respondent now had two variables that 
measured effect of interventions on households and businesses instead of 14 variables. 
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 See Nelson, C. Et al. (2004). Learniing from Clients: Assessment Tools for Microfinance 
Practitioners. Washington D.C.: SEEP Network.  
48
 Factors analysis did not work because some of the dependent variables were included as a measure 
of the outcomes based on the literature and not based on what the service users said were indications of 
successful poverty outcomes. For example ‗business expansion‘ was added as a variable because the 
literature says microfinance should enable micro-enterprises to expand. With the initial trial with factor 
analysis some indicators will not load on the underlying indicators but the researcher wanted the 
variables as indicators.   
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However, one variable ‗contributed or increased contribution to education of children‘ 
was not amenable to this procedure because this variable had one more category (‗not 
applicable‘, which denote service users without children) than the other variables used 
in the construction of the composite variables. This variable was included in the cross-
tabular analysis.  
 
A model-building approach was employed in the multiple regression analysis. Models 
were constructed for each of the dependent composite indicators (business and 
household outcomes). First, a pair of models was built for each indicator with only the 
control variables. The control variables and the rationale for their inclusion are 
discussed in Appendix 3. The second pair of models was made up of the first model 
plus variables concerned with group matters. The third pair were constructed with 
model one and variables related to loans. The smallness of the sample size did not 
permit the splitting of the data file according to interventions. Results of the analysis 
are presented in six tables: Tables 3.1A to 3.6A in Appendix 3.  
 
All the models satisfied the criteria for ordinal logistic regression; the models fitted 
well and test of parallel lines indicated that the proportional odds assumption, which 
the validity of the analysis depend on, was not violated. The results of the ordinal 
logistic analysis are discussed in Appendix 3. All variables in the models are 
discussed, both the statistically significant ones and otherwise. However for variables 
which were not significant only the direction of the relationship was discussed. In 
addition if non-significant relationships showed a trend or pattern this was explicated 
and discussed.  
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5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter justified the need to undertake fieldwork and described the process. It 
was evident that data collection process required more than academic knowledge: it 
involved being able to ‗pull strings‘; assess and anticipate situations; and being 
attuned with the culture and perspective of the people involved in the process. Being 
an insider made a very positive contribution to the data collection process. It is worth 
mentioning that some data collections strategies which the researcher intended to use 
had to change when faced with the realities in the field. 
 
The study conducted some preliminary interviews which dwelt on understanding 
poverty in the context of the community. The preliminary interviews and the 
substantive interviews both informed the construction of the questionnaire in the field. 
This ensured that the questionnaire was sensitive to the context of the study. The 
study interviewed 26 people, including 3 dropouts and 4 staff of the intervention. For 
the quantitative aspect of the study, 100 service users were interviewed consisting of 
60 and 40 service users of SAT and NWEP respectively. Throughout the process of 
fieldwork and data analysis, ensuring collection of valid and reliable data was a 
paramount concern. Efforts at ensuring the validity and reliability of data included; 
pretest of data collection instruments; the researcher conducting all qualitative 
interviews; training and supervising research assistants; cross-checking data in the 
field; and checking for inconsistencies in the data. The qualitative interviews were 
interpreted, transcribed, organised and incorporated into the analysis. For the 
quantitative data, frequencies distributions, cross-tabulations and ordinal logistic 
regression were employed in its analysis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MICROFINANCE PROCESSES: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INTERVENTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
SERVICE USERS 
 
6.1: Introduction  
What is the nature of intervention designs and how are they implemented?‘ The 
chapter describes and analyses the salient features of intervention components as they 
have been implemented from the perspective of the service users. Contextual 
influences on the implementation process are also assessed. In all aspects of the 
implementation process, the chapter looks out for implementation gaps. This is the 
difference between what was to be done (implementation design) and what was 
actually done. What was supposed to be implemented comes from intervention 
manuals, documents and staff, and what was actually done came from service users 
and observation. The study assesses the interventions from the perspective of service 
users and pays particular attention to the livelihood of service users and the 
environmental and cultural context of the area of study. Lastly the chapter assesses the 
implications of the empirical findings for the existing literature on microfinance.  
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6.2 To What Extent are Contextual Factors and Perceptions of 
Service Users taken into Account in the Design of 
Microfinance Interventions and what are the Implications? 
The involvement of service users in the context of this study implies the extraction of 
local knowledge for the creation of an intervention intended to change their lives 
(Jennings, 2000). The rationale for assessing the involvement of service users in 
microfinance interventions is based on the argument that in developing countries 
microfinance is primarily perceived as a development intervention. It has been argued 
that microfinance institutions were established in developing countries with the 
objective of reducing poverty rather than for profit-making (Harper, 1998; ADB, 
2000; McKernan, 2002; Muhumuza, 2007). Ledgerwood (1999; 1) adds that 
‗microfinance is not simply banking, it is a development tool‘. Indeed both 
interventions stated poverty reduction as their major objective. As a development 
intervention therefore, there is the need for the involvement of all stakeholders, 
especially users of development interventions, in all stages in of the process (Oakley 
et. al., 1991; Pretty, 1995; Chambers, 1997; McLeod, MacDonell and Doolin, 2007). 
Involving service users increases the likelihood that interventions will be context–
specific and meet the requirements of the service users.  
 
The study recounts the introduction of the interventions to the area of study to 
ascertain whether the inputs of service users were sought in the design of the 
interventions. The pioneer service users claimed SAT staff came to Nsoatre from 
Sunyani on a membership drive in 1995. Service users did not recall any questions or 
interviews concerning what they preferred in the intervention. When asked whether 
service users were represented in the design and implementation of the intervention, a 
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staff of SAT replied ‗No, when we have designed it and we explained it to them and 
they accept it we give them the loans‘. The staff however indicated that the 
intervention in Nsoatre was different from that of the nearby villages in that 
repayments were made every two weeks while it was weekly for all the other villages. 
The staff were however unable to explain the rational for the variation.  
 
Regarding NWEP, the parent financial institution, Nsoatre Rural Bank, is located in 
the area of study, Nsoatre. According to a staff member of the NWEP, they got the 
leaders of the community to introduce the intervention to the people. To the question 
whether there were any variations in NWEP to reflect the characteristics of the people 
and the conditions in the area where the intervention was being introduced, a NWEP 
member of staff replied ‗No please, it is uniform everywhere‘.   
 
This is what some service users had to say regarding whether they were involved in 
the formulation and implementation of the interventions: 
 
No, they (SAT) did not ask our views about how the programme should be 
done. All they did was to inform us that anyone who wanted to join to write 
down their names with Teacher Boakye. We did not know anything about 
how they operated. They told us we will get loans for our business (Yaa 
Tawiah, SAT). 
 
The people came and asked us to form groups. We did not know how much 
money or how we will repay the loans. It was during the training period that 
we got to know about how the programme operates (Naomi Twum, NWEP) 
 
 
In sum both interventions were introduced into the community already designed and 
ready to be implemented. Microfinance institutions are noted for their exclusion of 
users from the design and implementation of their interventions (Pitamber, 2003). 
 203 
Staff members of the two interventions were unable to explain the rationale for the 
design and implementation of the intervention when asked. For example, the reason 
for the choice of weekly or fortnightly repayment interval with a total payment period 
of 16 weeks could not be explained. The uncritical replication of microfinance 
interventions models developed elsewhere has been observed in many developing 
countries (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Burkett, 2007).  
 
Why are service users‘ inputs missing in microfinance interventions? Perhaps the lack 
of user input into microfinance interventions is due to the perception that 
microfinance (perhaps as a banking institution?) is too complex to involve its users 
who are usually poor and non-literate. Cornwall and Gaventa (2000), opine that 
increasing emphasis on neo-liberalism and institutional sustainability implies that if 
there is any participation of the people in the microfinance intervention at all it is to 
ensure the efficient delivery of services rather than permitting the people to have 
power and influence over the intervention. Two responses from staff of the 
interventions buttress the above assertion. A staff member of NWEP interviewed 
stated that uniformity in the intervention across different localities ensured efficiency. 
As to why interventions did not reflect the characteristics of an area, a SAT manger in 
an interview said that their activities had to be structured to conform to the financial 
management software programme instead of the other way round. From the field and 
the literature, it is clear that institutional microfinance as a development intervention 
generally reflects a top-down approach.  
 
What were the implications of the non-involvement of service users or the context of 
the area of study? The lack of consultation with service users probably resulted in 
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assumptions that did not reflect reality. For example it was assumed that loans would 
be routinely used for business purposes only and repayment will be made from 
proceeds from profits from businesses. The modes of operation of the two 
interventions as analysed later in the chapter suggest that there was some mismatch 
between the intervention activities and economic opportunities and conditions in the 
area of study. For instance, loan disbursement and repayment patterns did not reflect 
seasonal economic fluctuations and market conditions of the area of study and 
therefore service users were unable to take optimum advantage of economic 
opportunities. Kaplan and Mullainathan (2000) have documented how mismatch 
between loan repayment and incomes can result in grave consequences for the ability 
of microfinance service users to alleviate their level of poverty.    
 
In sum results of this study suggest that non-participation of the service users in the 
design of the microfinance interventions resulted in the inability of microfinance 
practitioners to tailor interventions to the environment and requirements of service 
users. This ultimately detracts from the effectiveness of microfinance interventions as 
an important poverty reduction tool. Strong theoretical and practical arguments have 
been made in many studies for the involvement of the users of interventions. 
Schneider (1997), states that for microfinance interventions to be sensitive to the 
priorities, constraints and potentials of service users, they should be based on the 
understanding of the local people and their environment. Microfinance in rural areas 
seems to call for flexibility in design and implementation of the intervention.  Hickson 
(2000) has highlighted the importance that service users attach to flexibility in 
microfinance services and rightly observed that microfinance institutions usually fail 
to appreciate the extent to which service users seek flexibility.  
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6.3 How are Group Activities Organised in NWEP and SAT? 
Groups and group liability constitute the backbone of microfinance. Although other 
non-group schemes exist, the overwhelming majority of microfinance interventions 
are group-based. This section analyses how the group activities are organised in the 
two interventions including service users‘ participation and perception of these 
activities. 
 
6.3.1 Group Formation  
Asked about how they formed their Trust Banks, SAT service users stated that anyone 
who was interested and met the selection criteria of the intervention wrote down their 
names on a list which became a group once the required group size was attained. In 
spite of widespread insistence in self-formation of groups (Ghatak, 1999, 2000; 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005) such methods of constituting 
microfinance groups are not unknown. For instance, Karlan (2003) found a similar 
method of group formation being employed by FINCA
49
 in Ayacucho in Peru. Staff 
of SAT corroborated the above information and added that such a group-formation 
strategy was to ensure that each Trust Bank consisted of members of different 
occupations and socio-economic status. SAT staff further explained that the idea was 
to prevent covariate risk and ensure that the less poor assisted the poorer ones during 
periods of repayment difficulties. The idea received confirmation in a study in Bolivia 
where Mosley (1996) found that there was much higher likelihood that group 
members assisted their peers when the socio-economic profile of the group was more 
heterogeneous. It was obvious that the non-self-formation of groups was to achieve 
                                                 
49
 FINCA means Foundation for International Community Assistance 
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the financial sustainability objective of the microfinance scheme. Regarding the issue 
of implementation gap, even though SAT‘s documents (see section 4.6.2.2) said Trust 
Banks were organised into sub-groups of between 5 and 7 members, interviews with 
service users and the researcher‘s investigations showed that there were no such sub-
groups in any of the Trust Banks.  
  
Staff interviews revealed that SAT did not specifically target the poor. However, the 
smallness of the initial loans, the relatively high interest rates and the idea of 
attending regular compulsory meetings in public places with poorer members 
precluded wealthier entrepreneurs from joining the intervention. This indirect way of 
excluding the non-poor has been documented by Hulme and Mosley (1996) and 
Johnson and Rogaly, (1997).  
 
SAT‘s status as a Christian organisation influenced its member selection process. 
SAT endorses the biblical notion of patriarchy and therefore required married women 
to seek permission from their spouses before they could join the scheme. During the 
initial membership drive many people dropped out of the intervention as a result of 
not being granted permission by their husbands. This is what an interviewee said 
concerning the requirement that women asked permission before they joined the 
scheme:  
 
When we filled the form they asked us if we were married. Those who were 
married were asked to tell their husbands before they took the loans. Some 
people reported that their husbands wouldn‘t allow them to take the loans, so 
they were dropped. Adwoa Benewaah, SAT. 
 
In NWEP the solidarity groups were formed through self-selection. NWEP‘s 
emphasis on self-selection is exemplified by these statements: 
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What happens is that those of us who are close and know ourselves 
come together. This was done so that those of us who are in a group 
should understand ourselves. Adwoa Yeboaa, NWEP. 
 
We heard that there was such a scheme (NWEP) and we were made to 
understand that if we come together we were going to have access to loans. So 
if I knew someone who is serious and trustworthy, and can help work out such 
a group I could call her. So that was what we did and formed the group. Yaa 
Mansa, NWEP.  
 
Interviewees stated that NWEP organised people into solidarity groups of between 4 
to 6 women. NWEP staff combined five or six of the solidarity groups to form a 
Credit and Savings Association (CSA). Solidarity groups were formed on the basis of 
proximity and/or occupational homogeneity. For instance an interviewee
50
 remarked 
―the four of us who formed the group are ‗banku51‘ sellers.‖ These solidarity groups 
within the CSA were primarily responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance 
with repayment schedules. NWEP had a two-tier joint liability structure. The 
solidarity group were the first group to make good any loan defaults. If the solidarity 
group failed to repay the problem fell on the CSA. Interviewees had observed that the 
CSAs were gradually taking over the functions of the solidarity groups especially the 
risk of default. An interviewee complained about increasing ineffectiveness of the 
solidarity groups; 
 
A situation we have is that the smaller group [solidarity group] is supposed to 
share and pay for its members in the case of loan default. This arrangement is 
not working because none of the members of the solidarity members are willing 
to pay in case of default. The debt then goes to the larger group [CSA]. The 
solidarity group is not effective as it should be. Yaa Aso, NWEP. 
 
Just like SAT, NWEP did not screen service users to ensure that non-poor 
entrepreneurs did not participate in the intervention. Again as in the case of SAT, 
investigations revealed that the smallness of the initial loans and the unwillingness of 
the non-poor to associate with the poorer people helped to ensure that loans generally 
went to the targeted population- the entrepreneurial poor. 
 
                                                 
50
 Adwoa Yeboaa 
51
 A popular Ghanaian meal prepared with maize flour 
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Although Ghatak (2000) argues that the issue of joint liability induces group members 
to self-select, empirical evidence from the field indicates potential service users may 
not have any influence in how their groups are formed. In the case of SAT, the group 
formation strategy was part of an already-packaged intervention over which service 
users had no influence. It can be argued that in NWEP the practice of combining 
solidarity groups together to form a CSA defeats the idea of constituting groups on the 
basis of self-selection, especially when the choice of which solidarity groups to put 
together to constitute a CSA was taken solely by the microfinance staff. This is 
significant given that CSAs were increasingly taking over the functions of the 
solidarity groups.  
 
6.3.2 Peer Monitoring and Pressure 
After groups are formed they are then provided with financial services, the most 
notable being loans using the joint liability strategy. How do groups ensure that loans 
are repaid so that they enjoy continued access to microfinance services? The study 
assessed the extent to which peer monitoring is used as a strategy to ensure loan 
repayment.  Peer monitoring refers to the ways through which that group members 
observe their peers to ensure that loans will be repaid. Peer monitoring is supposed to 
mitigate the problems of ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard
52
. In NWEP the solidarity 
groups were supposed to undertake the peer monitoring task, while in SAT in the 
absence of the sub-groups, members of the Trust Banks were to be responsible for 
monitoring their peers. During interviews staff field staff of SAT and NWEP stated 
                                                 
52
 Ex-ante moral hazard denotes the risk of not using loans for designated purpose that compromises 
the ability to repay loan. Ex-post refers to the risk that service users after investing loans and making 
profit will refuse to repay the loan.  
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that the intervention expected members to perform the peer monitoring task and even 
claimed they performed the task of monitoring loan use as well.  
 
Effective peer monitoring presupposes that members are knowledgeable of how their 
peers use their loans. Quantitative analysis indicates that the majority of service users 
did not know how their peers used their loans. From Table 6.1 below, 55% and 60% 
of SAT and NWEP service users respectively indicated they could not tell how other 
group members used their credit. It is difficult to ascertain how effective monitoring 
could be if the majority in both SAT and NWEP reported they did not know how their 
colleagues used their loans. Few interviewees claimed to have intimate knowledge of 
how their peers used their loans. What accounts for the low level of knowledge of 
how members used their loans in a rural area characterised by a high level of 
interaction among people? 
 
Table 6.1: Knowledge of other Members’ Use of Funds 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid yes 27 45.0 45.0 45.0 
No 33 55.0 55.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid yes 16 40.0 40.0 40.0 
No 24 60.0 60.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
How service users employed their loans could explain why there was a low level of 
knowledge on loan use by peers. From Table 6.2, the study found that 51.7% and 
67.5% of SAT and NWEP service users respectively claimed they consistently used 
part or all of their loans for other purposes in spite of the fact that the microfinance 
institutions forbade the use of loans for any other purpose except for income-
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generating activities. There is some suspicion that percentages of service users who 
claimed to use their loans for other purposes could be higher because stating that 
loans were not used for income-generating activities meant admitting to having 
contravened the regulations of the interventions.  
 
Table 6.2: Did You Use Loan for Other Purposes? 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid yes 31 51.7 51.7 51.7 
no 29 48.3 48.3 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid yes 27 67.5 67.5 67.5 
no 13 32.5 32.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
It was therefore obvious that peer monitoring was of very little value in an 
environment where most service users declared they used loans for non-business 
purposes. Reasons for the difficulty of using loans for only business purposes are 
expatiated in section 6.4.3. Additionally, although field staff of the microfinance 
institutions claimed they also monitored loan use, the fact that none of the service 
users had been penalised for doing that by the staff of the institutions meant staff 
monitoring was quite ineffective or they were not interested in how loans were used 
as long as they were repaid.  Microfinance field officers did not monitor or were not 
interested in monitoring loan use because the performance assessment of field officers 
did not include monitoring loan use among service users. The activities of field 
officers did not seem to be supervised
53
.   
 
Studies that have examined the issue of peer monitoring (Stiglitz, 1990; Ghatak and 
Guinnane, 1999; Amendariz de Aghion, 2005) have emphasised its role in reducing 
                                                 
53
 During the five-month fieldwork period the researcher did not observe any supervisory activities of 
the activities of field staff of the two interventions.  
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the problem of moral hazard. However these studies were not based on empirical 
observations and also premised on the assumption that loans had to be invested in 
income-generating activities in order to ensure that the loan can be repayable. In a 
study in Peru, Marr (2002) found that more than half of service users had not 
undertaken any peer monitoring and of those who had none had undertaken 
monitoring not more than 50%. Marr (2002) attributed the low level of peer 
monitoring to the high cost of monitoring; the fact that close relatives formed groups 
and had the least interest to undertake monitoring; and the intimidation, abuse and 
even threats faced by those who divulged information acquired through peer 
monitoring. While Marr argued that peer monitoring was important for maintaining 
high repayment rates, this study found that peer monitoring had little influence on 
repayment rates because the majority of service users used their loans for non-
business purposes.     
 
How did groups ensure that loans were repaid? In forming a group through self-
selection, such as done in NWEP, the most important criteria for selection into a 
group to ensure loan repayment was the virtue of being trustworthy and noted for 
being reliable in honouring one‘s debts, not where or how loans were likely to be 
invested. This is what a service user said on group formation: 
 
We look for someone who is not difficult when it comes to debt repayment. 
Someone who is will not give us problems when the time comes for repaying 
the loans. We seek for someone with a good character. Mary Adu, NWEP.   
 
The strategy of selecting members for their trustworthiness and tenacity to repay debts 
backed by intense peer pressure was quite an effective strategy to induce repayment 
especially in a rural area. The same was true for service users of SAT; emphasis was 
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placed on one‘s tenacity to ensure that loans were repaid rather on how loans were 
employed. Good repayment character was important because service users did not 
only rely on proceeds from their businesses to repay their loans: they sometimes 
borrowed; sought assistance from relatives and friends; from other group members; or 
even mortgaged or sold their assets (for more on loan repayment see section 6.4.4).   
 
Marr (2002) found that where peer monitoring was weak peer pressure was very 
strong. Similar findings were observed in SAT and NWEP.  In the absence of peer 
monitoring, peer pressure and threat of sanctions became very important additional 
strategies to ensure loan repayment. Indeed interviewees in the two interventions 
talked about how they dreaded the extent of peer pressure and sanctions brought to 
bear on them in case of repayment difficulties. It included ostracization, verbal abuse, 
and even threats of violence. This was particularly effective in a rural community 
where people usually have close interaction with each other. This finding also reflects 
Besley and Coates‘ (1995) assertion that in a rural setting with high level of social 
cohesion, peer pressure constitutes a strong instrument for enforcing repayment. It is 
noteworthy that through observation and interviews, peer pressure was at its zenith if 
loan defaults impeded the commencement of a new cycle. This is an indication that 
peer pressure was applied not just to repay loans but more importantly to enable 
continued access to microfinance loans.  
 
6.3.3 Peer Support  
Peer support refers to how group members assist each other with loan repayments and 
in other issues such as their welfare. With regard to the issue of joint liability, service 
users in both interventions continually used this statement in interviews: ‗obi case ye 
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me case‘ literally meaning, ‗someone‘s problem is my problem‘. There was high 
awareness of the concept of joint liability including its ramifications. There were 
many informal arrangements that groups members employed to ensure loan 
repayment. It was not uncommon to see members asking for money from members of 
their groups to make up the repayment sum. With SAT, some interviewees mentioned 
the invaluable assistance of some members with regard to helping them to meet 
repayment schedules. This is what a member of a group in SAT said: 
 
When we are unable to make enough money within the two weeks to make 
the repayment Yaa Benewaah (a leader of a group) makes up the difference 
which we later pay back to her. Victoria Ntim, SAT.  
 
Many of the interviewees of SAT confirmed that leaders of the Trust Banks, 
especially those in charge of collecting repayments, usually topped up the groups‘ 
total amount due and later retrieved monies from defaulting members. The researcher 
observed that those in charge of collecting repayments (usually the secretaries) were 
literate and relatively better-off than the other members. They were therefore in a 
position to assist their peers in loan repayment. Thus the essence of SAT forming 
groups in a manner that ensured that the better-off will support the poorer service 
users seems quite effective.  
 
As already discussed, NWEP had two tiers of peer support: at the solidarity level and 
Credit and Savings Association (CSA) level. If a member had any repayment 
problems, the solidarity group was the first to attempt to resolve the issue. If the 
solidarity group was unable to make up the required repayment sum then the CSA 
took up the issue. Some service users observed the CSAs were in recent times 
increasingly taking over the duties of solidarity groups which were failing to carry out 
their functions. The two tier peer support system did not seem sustainable because 
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once a solidarity group brought its problem of loan default to the CSA then the 
burden of joint liability becomes lighter for that solidarity group. This was because 
the loan in default was now shared by a larger number of service users (all members 
of the CSA) and therefore members of the solidarity group in question pay less. Once 
that happens every other solidarity group is likely to do the same, thus shifting the 
issue of joint liability from the solidarity group to the CSAs.  
 
In both NWEP and SAT some interviewees expressed disquiet for being jointly liable 
for bigger loans taken by their peers. They objected to the arrangement whereby they 
had taken smaller loans but were jointly for larger loans taken by their peers. Service 
users in SAT were more vociferous on this issue than NWEP. The probable cause of 
this was the greater heterogeneity with regard to loan size in groups as a result of 
SAT‘s disregard for self-selection during group formation (see Table 6.7 for loan 
distribution). The microfinance literature is generally silent on this issue and its 
possible effect on group solidarity and performance.  
 
Peer support within both interventions was not limited to issues of loan repayment. 
The study found that financial relationships among group members were embedded in 
social relationships. When group members encountered calamities such as death of 
spouse, other group members contributed to pay off the loan of the affected person 
and even provided further financial support. Group members attended funeral 
celebrations and other social ceremonies of their peers. A SAT member recounted 
how other members of her group paid the remainder of the loan of their peer whose 
husband had died and further supported her financially. SAT and NWEP members 
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agreed that social interaction such as participation in funerals of bereaved members 
and naming ceremonies seem to increase solidarity within the groups. 
 
SAT and NWEP encouraged these social interactions among members. According to 
SAT service users, the constitution for members included a clause that called on 
members to offer support to each other during social events, disasters and 
emergencies. What seem to differentiate this support from the normal rural social 
support system was that these groups ensured that they were identified as a 
microfinance group. To support users, NWEP had created a group account for the 
CSAs from which members, with the consent of other members of the group and staff 
of the intervention, could borrow from if they were faced with an emergency or crisis 
situation. The impression from interviews suggests that access to the fund was quite 
difficult and that few service users had ever benefited from it. The difficulty with 
accessing these funds was because staff of the intervention rarely permitted service 
users to withdraw the funds. A few interviewees of SAT and NWEP suggested that 
groups needed to get involved in other joint commercial projects in order to generate 
income and by so doing increase solidarity and cohesion among group members.  
 
In sum, interviews and observations suggest that the joint liability concept was well 
accepted by service users of the two interventions, except for the problem of being 
jointly liable for loans of different sizes. Many studies have criticised microfinance 
groups for being formed solely for accessing microfinance services. It is argued that 
groups generate social capital and become more cohesive if they engage in collective 
activities beyond microfinance (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). With 
some measure of success, the two institutions had been able to extend group activities 
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beyond involvement in microfinance activities. Observations and interactions with 
some service users during meetings showed some degree of friendship and intimacy 
among service users. However, it was not clear whether these relationships were a 
manifestation of normal rural interaction or relationships that flowered after the 
establishment of the interventions.  
 
6.3.4 Group Independence and Relationship with Staff 
The ability of groups to make independent and informed decisions without undue 
interference from intervention staff is paramount for the sustainability of the groups. 
The study assessed groups‘ ability to make their own decisions in their group and 
their relationship with staff of the interventions.  
 
Service users of the two interventions enjoyed a high degree of autonomy with regard 
to the running of activities of their groups. Asked whether staff of the interventions 
could take decisions concerning management of groups without consulting members 
of the group, service users unanimously answered in the negative. Interviewees of 
both interventions stated that, for instance, the loans officers had to consult group 
members if, for example, they wanted someone included in group. To the question 
whether the loan officer could unilaterally expel someone from a group, Adwoa 
Yeboaa of NWEP answered ‗it could never happen‘. It is only the group members 
themselves who can do that.‘ Service users possessed awareness of their rights and 
generally exercised them without fear or favour.  
  
Even though groups were found to enjoy autonomy, there were certain situations 
where field officers of the intervention intervened albeit surreptitiously. This was 
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especially evident when field officers believed there was a potential situation for loan 
default. It became apparent during interviews of service users and staff of the 
interventions in SAT that field officers could unilaterally expel or reduce loans of 
service users who were deemed risky borrowers when the group was reluctant to take 
action. Staff of the microfinance institution would act surreptitiously to avert loss to 
the institution. This was done in order not to be seen as usurping the autonomy of the 
groups. During interviews there were some complaints of this nature. Some service 
users complained concerning how the ‗computer54‘ had reduced or deleted their 
names from the list of loan recipients. Gloria Owusu (SAT) commented: ‗when the 
list (loan recipients) comes from the Head Office and the computer has deleted one‘s 
name, there is nothing anyone can do about it in that case.‘ Another interviewer (a 
dropout) claimed she was informed by the loans officer that the computer had deleted 
her name and there was nothing anyone could do about it. Apparently she had 
encountered repayment problems with the last loan she took and that might have been 
the reason why the ‗computer‘ deleted her name. Service users usually accepted 
without question when told about what the ‗computer‘ had done. Staff of SAT 
intervention‘s surreptitious activities to deal with potential and actual repayment 
problems speaks volumes of the high regard for service users in a society 
characterised by officialdom‘s disregard for the rights of the poor.  
  
While groups in the interventions enjoyed some level of independence, it can be 
argued that the level of supervision was important for the functioning of groups. For 
instance with regard to the meeting day for SAT groups (for more on group meeting 
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 Apparently staff attributed their surreptitious actions to the computer in the office of the 
microfinance institution. This was to prevent friction and animosity among group members and 
between the affected person and the microfinance institution.    
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see section 6.7.3), the choice of Friday by service users was clearly not a prudent 
decision and the situation would have been different if the staff of the intervention had 
been involved. A problem that occurred in one of the groups of SAT highlights the 
need for some level of staff supervision in group activities. A SAT staff claimed that a 
male teacher in a small settlement about nine miles from Nsoatre reported that he had 
organised a group and therefore requested for loans for this group. Staff of SAT 
neither visited the settlement nor tried to ascertain the businesses of the members of 
the group. Members of the group travelled to Nsoatre to participate in all training 
activities and collected their first loans. However, after a month when the first 
repayment was due the leader of the group had not showed up to make payment. 
Upon visiting the settlement and interviewing the women, staff of SAT learnt that the 
women had no businesses but they had collected the loans on behalf of the leader!  
 
Concerning the relationship with intervention staff, interviewees claimed they had 
good working relationships with loan officers and other staff of the two interventions.  
They don‘t disrespect us just because we come from a rural area, but 
rather they warmly welcome us when we go to the office in Sunyani. 
Whatever your problem they are always ready to listen to you and 
help. Gloria Owusu, SAT. 
 
Our relationship is very cordial. We cooperate with her and she 
cooperates with us. We share our problems with her and she does the 
same. Personally I don‘t have any problem with her. Victoria Ntim, 
SAT. 
 
We get on quite well with him. He is not bossy and listens to us. 
He treats us with respect. We don‘t want him to be transferred. 
Juliana Osei, NWEP. 
 
Perhaps this section will not be complete without the discussion of the issue of 
corruption and abuse in the interventions. Instances of people having to pay money to 
staff of financial institutions before they could be granted loans are not uncommon in 
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Ghana. The study assessed whether service users had to give bribes in order to access 
financial services from the microfinance interventions. No interviewee reported any 
incident of corruption against staff of the two interventions. Service users of the two 
interventions stated that they voluntarily offered gifts to staff of the institution 
periodically.  
 
In sum, the forgoing analysis showed that groups were formed based on the 
microfinance institutions‘ policy. None of the two interventions groups (CSAs and 
Trust Banks) were truly self-formed. Peer monitoring was found to be hardly used as 
a strategy of ensuring loan repayment because loans were routinely used for non-
business purposes. Group formation, peer pressure and sanctions proved to be more 
effective methods of ensuring that loans were repaid. Although groups tended to be 
independent, the microfinance institutions apparently dictated the extent of 
independence groups enjoyed. However, staff members of the two interventions seem 
to have some respect for group autonomy within the limits permitted by the 
interventions. Such situations do not often prevail in relationships between two actors 
of unequal power relation in rural areas in Ghana. Service users in the two 
interventions had high awareness of the issue of joint liability but this was dampened 
to some extent by unequal loan sizes.  
 
6.4 How are Loans Provided by Microfinance Interventions 
and in what Ways do Service Users Manage Them?  
Although microfinance is concerned with the provision of a variety of financial and 
non-financial service to the poor, the provision of loans constitute the core function of 
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most microfinance interventions. Indeed the name ‗microcredit‘ which denotes the 
provision of credit is used interchangeably with the term ‗microfinance‘. This section 
assesses the disbursement, quantum, use and repayment of microfinance loans in the 
two microfinance interventions.  
 
6.4.1 Loan Disbursement 
In the two interventions new loans were supposed to be disbursed when the previous 
cycle has been completed successfully completed. However, NWEP had perennial 
problems with loan disbursement because its parent institution, NRB, had been 
experiencing liquidity problems for the past five years. NWEP service users 
interviewed indicated that instead of giving loans to all members at the same time, 
loans were granted to group members in turns. Below is a comment on the 
disbursement of loans by an interviewee: 
 
The problem has been the mode of payment. There is a situation whereby 
the money is disbursed in days and weeks to one member after another. So 
it takes time before we are all covered. Joyce Konadu, NWEP.  
 
There seemed to be no particular period for disbursement of loans or funds: funds 
were disbursed when they became available. Table 6.3 shows information on 
responses to a question on the timeliness of loan disbursal. In the survey conducted 
80% of NWEP members stated they did not receive their loans on schedule.  
Table 6.3: Did You Receive Loan on Schedule? 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid yes 36 60.0 60.0 60.0 
no 24 40.0 40.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid yes 8 20.0 20.0 20.0 
no 32 80.0 80.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Compared to NWEP service users, members of SAT were at an advantage with regard 
to promptness of loan disbursement. Some interviewees commented on how in 
previous times they received new loans the same day that they completed the previous 
cycle. However, loans could be delayed mainly because of the inability of other 
members of the group to complete their repayments on schedule. Likewise loans were 
delayed if the disbursement period fell between the 15
th
 and the end of the month, a 
period SAT staff indicated was dedicated to office duties. In addition, loan 
disbursements had to be coordinated with eMerge
55
. With regard to receipt of loans on 
schedule 60% of SAT indicated that they received loans on schedule, while 40% said 
they did not (see Table 6.3). 
 
As stated previously, loans could be disbursed at any time of the year in the two 
interventions. The study assessed on the average whether these loans were received at 
a convenient time (see Table 6.4). The rationale was to establish whether receipt of 
loans on schedule coincided with receipt of loans at a convenient time. In NWEP, 
however, service users were equally divided (50% each) as to whether they received 
loans at a convenient period. In SAT, 75% responded they received their loans at 
convenient periods while the remaining 25% answered in the negative. The forgoing 
discussion indicates that higher percentages of service users stated they received loans 
at a convenient (75%) time than on schedule (60%). This implies that although some 
loans were not received on schedule, they could still be at a period convenient for 
service users. This makes sense in a situation where service users could use loans for 
any purpose: it might not be convenient for business but it might for paying fees or 
any other non-business purpose. In a rural area receipt of loans at a convenient period 
                                                 
55
 The eMerge is an integrated software used for accounting, portfolio tracking, HR and payroll, and 
fixed assets management.  
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is important if service users are to take advantage of market opportunities. Below are 
excerpts of comments of those who did not receive loans at a convenient period: 
 
As for the time it (loans) comes, I am not happy about it because most 
of the time it comes at the lean season when people do not have money. 
They disburse it any time they want and it happens to be at the wrong 
time. Times like Christmas where you need the money most to trade it 
does not come. Yaa Owusuaa, SAT  
 
Since the second loan since was disbursed during the lean season, it 
affected our business negatively. The first one helped us since that one 
was disbursed at a good period. Afia Twumasiwaa, SAT dropout.  
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Did You Receive Loan at a Convenient Time? 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid yes 45 75.0 75.0 75.0 
no 15 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid yes 20 50.0 50.0 50.0 
no 20 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
6.4.2 Quantum of Loan 
The study received conflicting information on the initial amount of loan service users 
received in NWEP. Staff of NWEP stated that the initial loan amount a service user 
received depended on the amount of initial savings prior to the commencement of the 
first cycle. However, service users indicated that they were initially given the same 
amount with subsequent loans based on repayment performance. This is what a 
service user said: 
 
We were all given one million cedis (GHC 100) for the start. The 
explanation is because they do not know much about our finances they 
start with an amount we can all conveniently pay so they gave us the same 
amount. Joyce Konadu, NWEP.  
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SAT staff and service users agreed that initial loan sizes varied with circumstances of 
service user and were based on interviews and type of business. Like in NWEP, loan 
sizes in subsequent cycles depended on repayment performance. 
 
For subsequent loans, both institutions employed the dynamic incentive strategy: 
increasing the amount of loan after each cycle. Loan increment after each cycle is 
usually used as a repayment incentive and perhaps to match the increasing financial 
requirements of service users over time (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Staff of the two 
institutions claimed they used the dynamic incentive strategy to enable service users 
expand their business and eventually graduate to mainstream banking. Service users 
of NWEP claimed their loans had not witnessed much increase due to the liquidity 
constraints encountered by Nsoatreman Rural Bank. Most service users of SAT, on 
the other hand, had experienced continuous loan increments.  
  
Nevertheless, loan increment for service users was not a routine procedure.  Group 
leaders and members in the two institutions could object to any loan increment if they 
thought it could result in repayment problems. Objections to increments were usually 
made against members who had previously experienced repayment problems. To 
avoid confrontation within the group, members/leaders will surreptitiously inform the 
loan officer of their concerns. Below is typical of what happened in both interventions 
before the start of a new cycle: 
  
In Sinapi Aba, as you pay you get the chance to increase the amount you 
borrow, but the group members can decide not to let you peg the amount any 
higher because you struggled to pay the last amount you borrowed. If we 
inform Sinapi office, they act on our behalf. Adwoa Benewaah, SAT.  
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Interviews with SAT service users showed that objection to loan increment occurred 
often. It was less much so in NWEP.  Although objections were usually surreptitious, 
it caused disaffection amongst members of both SAT and NWEP. Being a close-knit 
community with a strong communal spirit, affected members were annoyed that they 
did not receive loan increments while other group members did. A NWEP member, 
Yaa Mansa, declared she was so peeved for being treated that way that she had 
considered dropping out of the intervention. As stated previously, field officers could 
also influence the amount of loan service users could receive if they had reason to 
suspect that repayment difficulties could occur.  
 
Some critics, for example, have argued that microfinance loans in rural communities 
in developing countries are so paltry that they can only be used for household 
consumption. In the study service users were generally satisfied with the size of their 
loans as far as their businesses were concerned
56
. However, service users indicated 
that their loan requirements fluctuated within the year. Given the seasonal nature of 
economic activities in the area of study this was expected. Table 6.5 below shows the 
most recent loans received by NWEP and SAT service users. On the average, loan 
sizes of SAT members were bigger than that of NWEP. Compared to 86.7% of SAT 
members who received over GH¢ 200, only 45% of NWEP members received above 
the same amount. The reasons for the differences in loan amounts between SAT and 
NWEP had to do with the financial crisis encountered by the Nsoatreman Rural Bank 
and the fact that NWEP had a substantial number of service users (17) in their first 
cycles compared to only one member for SAT. New members usually received 
smaller loans which increased with time with the dynamic incentive strategy.  
                                                 
56
 SAT service users expressed more satisfaction with loan size than NWEP.  
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Table 6.5: Amount of Last Loan (in GH¢)  
Name of  
Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid up to 100 1 1.7 1.7 1.7 
    101-200 7 11.7 11.7 13.3 
    201-300 18 30.0 30.0 43.3 
    301 and above 34 56.7 56.7 100.0 
    Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid up to 100 19 47.5 47.5 47.5 
    101-200 3 7.5 7.5 55.0 
    201-300 14 35.0 35.0 90.0 
    301 and above 4 10.0 10.0 100.0 
    Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
6.4.3 Loan Use 
Microfinance loans are typically intended to be invested in income-generating 
activities (Ledgerwood, 1999, Amendariz de Aghion, 2005). Empirical evidence 
indicates microfinance loans are used for a myriad of purposes other than income-
generating activities. SAT and NWEP staff claimed loans were designed expressly for 
income-generating activities and had therefore warned their members against using 
their loans for any other purpose. Again loan officers of the two interventions claimed 
to have the ability to monitor the use of loans but service users‘ interviews have 
shown this was quite impossible. The study asked service users if they consistently 
used part or all of their loans for purposes other than for business. Table 6.2 in section 
6.3.2 demonstrates that the majority of service users in both SAT and NWEP 
indicated that they used their loans for purposes other than business. The percentage 
of SAT members who used their loans for other purposes was 51.7% while that of 
NWEP was 67.5%.  
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It is surprising that such a high percentage chose to ignore the injunctions of the 
microfinance interventions and indeed part of members‘ training was geared towards 
the successful application and management of money for business. It is worthy to note 
that the percentages cited above do not include service users who used their loans for 
non-business purposes on a one-time-off basis. In total the figures for non-business 
use of funds could be greater than that cited above. 
 
From SAT and NWEP interviews most service users who used their loans for other 
purposes said they used the funds to pay school fees of their children and for 
housekeeping. Other interviewees stated that the loan was the only bulk amount they 
had access to and could use for projects that required large amounts of money such as  
building projects. A few service users of NWEP stated that they gave part of their 
loans to other family members for investment in income-generating activities. 
Interviews and informal interaction with service users pointed to the fact that 
microfinance loans were used for many other purposes than can be recounted here.  
 
Information in the training manuals of the two microfinance institutions required 
service users to keep business finances separate from general household finance. The 
study assessed the extent to which service users heeded the advice of separating 
income-generating finances from general household finances. Table 6.6 below reveals 
that in the two institutions over half (SAT: 51.7% and NWEP: 72.5%) did not keep 
their finances from income-generating activities separate from personal or household 
finances. Thus it is clear that for a majority of service users and contrary to the 
instructions of the microfinance institution, loans and business finances go into one 
financial portfolio (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  
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Table 6.6: Do You Keep Business Money Separate from Personal/Household Finances? 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid yes 29 48.3 48.3 48.3 
no 31 51.7 51.7 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid yes 11 27.5 27.5 27.5 
no 29 72.5 72.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
The study has established that loans were used for both business and non-business 
purposes and discussed how loans were used for non-business purposes. How were 
loans employed in business?  The most salient point that service users mentioned was 
that loans enabled them to buy business inputs in bulk. With access to loans service 
users could now buy in bulk at a discount; bypass the middleman whose prices were 
relatively higher; and buy at cheaper prices because they could now buy with cash 
instead of buying on credit. Given the low demand for goods and services in the study 
area expanding businesses was not a much viable option. Loans enabled service users 
to buy in bulk and thereby increase business profitability by reducing input costs. This 
finding highlights the importance of receiving loans at appropriate times if service 
users are to take advantage of market opportunities such as buying inputs on the cheap 
during the harvest season. A few other service users said that they used loans to 
acquire business assets, upgrade and expand their businesses. How loans were 
employed in business is analysed in detail in section 7.3.  
 
The study assessed whether how loans were managed had implications for loan 
repayment. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the results of the cross-tabular analysis of the 
relationship aforementioned. There were no statistically significant differences in 
repayment difficulties for both NWEP and SAT service users who used their loans for 
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other purposes and those who did otherwise. Likewise, no significant difference was 
found with respect to repayment difficulties for service users who kept monies from 
their income-generating activities separate from household finances and those who 
did not. However NWEP service users who used loans for other purposes were 
slightly more likely to encounter repayment problems but this relationship was not 
significant. Perhaps the relatively small size of NWEP loans meant that after using 
loans for other purposes there was not enough left to invest in business to generate 
profits for loan repayment. 
 
 
Table 6.7: Do You Use Loan for Other Purposes by Do You Encounter Difficulty in Loan 
Repayment? 
 
  
  
  
 Name of  Intervention 
 
Do you 
encounter 
difficulty in loan 
repayment Total 
yes no  
SAT Do you use loan 
for other 
purposes 
yes Count 
3 28 31 
      %  
9.7% 90.3% 100.0% 
    no Count 4 25 29 
      %  
13.8% 86.2% 100.0% 
  Total Count 7 53 60 
    % within did you use 
loan for other purposes 11.7% 88.3% 100.0% 
NWEP Do you use loan 
for other 
purposes 
yes Count 
6 21 27 
      %  
22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 
    no Count 1 12 13 
      %  7.7% 92.3% 100.0% 
  Total Count 7 33 40 
    % within did you use 
loan for other purposes 17.5% 82.5% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 6.8: Do You Keep Business Money Separate from Personal or Household Finances by Did 
You Encounter Difficulty in Loan Repayment? 
Name of  Intervention 
did you encounter difficulty 
in loan payment 
Total yes no 
SAT do you keep business money 
separate from pers./hhld 
yes Count 1 28 29 
%  3.4% 96.6% 100.0% 
no Count 6 25 31 
%  19.4% 80.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 7 53 60 
%  11.7% 88.3% 100.0% 
NWEP do you keep business money 
separate from pers./hhld 
yes Count 1 10 11 
%  9.1% 90.9% 100.0% 
no Count 6 23 29 
%  20.7% 79.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 7 33 40 
%  17.5% 82.5% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
6.4.4 Loan Repayment 
While NWEP required weekly repayments, SAT service users made fortnightly 
repayments. Both organisations required loans be repaid in instalments over a period 
of 16 weeks. Staff of SAT and NWEP when interviewed could not offer any 
satisfactory explanation for the choice of the repayment period of 16 weeks. Service 
users were expected to bring their monies for loan repayment to meetings which 
incidentally coincided with the repayment period. SAT service users expressed their 
appreciation for a two-week repayment grace period after receipt of loans. NWEP too 
had a grace period of one month for their members.  
 
Loan repayment issues provoked passionate protests amongst service users during the 
interviews. With regard to the issue of repayment interval, unanimous comments from 
SAT service users indicated that the repayment interval was too short. These 
comments on loan repayment are typical of SAT members: 
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The only problem I have with them (SAT) is the programme of 
repayment of the loan. The kind of pressure that comes on you when you 
don‘t have money is intense. That one goes against us a lot. We pray and 
we keep pleading with them to allow us more time like a month before 
we pay. Gloria Owusu, SAT. 
 
 
If they can change our two-weekly payment to one month it will help us. 
This is because our businesses are not doing very well and so the time 
for the demand of the money is not very good for us. Yaa Owusuaa, 
SAT.  
 
NWEP interviewees also complained that the repayment period was too tight and that 
they wanted the two-weekly repayment interval instead of a weekly one. According to 
Mknelly and Kevane (2002) service users are generally known to complain about 
repayment instalments but practitioners consider them essential for sustaining high 
repayment rates. No study was found that had conducted any systematic investigation 
into the reasons for the incessant complaints on repayment from service users. The 
reason for the intense repayment pressure could be attributed to a myriad findings 
unearthed by this study. First, the problem of repayment difficulties can be found in 
the main assumption behind microfinance: to provide financial services to the 
entrepreneurial poor so that they can expand their businesses and earn more income. 
Mohammed Yunus referred to this as the virtuous cycle. In reality and as found in this 
study (see section 6.4.3), loans are not only used for income-generating activities. The 
aforementioned, poor markets and fluctuations in economic activities in the area of 
study constricted the expansion of businesses. Second, repayment pressure was bound 
to increase because the two microfinance interventions applied the dynamic incentive 
without corresponding extension of the repayment period. 
 
Regarding the sources from which service users repaid loans, proceeds from income-
generating activities was stated as the main source. When proceeds from income-
generation activities were insufficient to repay loans, service users relied on members 
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of their family, other service users, friends, and infrequently on moneylenders. When 
service users are unable to raise funds to make good their debt to the microfinance 
intervention then the service user is considered by other members of the group to have 
defaulted.  
 
Respondents were asked about how they handled problems of loan defaults. 
According to SAT interviewees, the secretaries
57
 of the various groups in SAT were 
usually responsible for the collection of the repayments and if there was a shortfall 
they made up the difference and later demanded payment from the defaulting 
member. If the defaulting member was unable to make payment after persistent 
demands and it was clear the loan could not be paid then the entire group will share 
the debt equally amongst themselves and as a last resort, pursue the debt through the 
courts with the assistance of SAT staff.   
 
With regard to loan repayments within NWEP, the solidarity group was the primary 
and first tier responsible for ensuring that their members paid up. If the repayment 
problems could not be handled in the solidarity group, then the Credit and Savings 
Associations (CSAs) dealt with the matter. At the time of fieldwork many NWEP 
members had observed that the CSAs were increasingly taking up all repayments 
problems. NWEP service users reported relatively fewer problems with loan 
repayment. This was perhaps because NWEP service users received relatively smaller 
loans.  
 
                                                 
57
 Careful observation by the researcher showed that the secretaries were incidentally relatively less 
poor and more educated than most other members of the group. 
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How were recalcitrant members compelled to honour loan repayment schedules? In 
Table 6.9 below, peer pressure
58
 including threat of sanctions was found to be the 
most commonly used method of ensuring repayment. Over 93% of SAT members and 
72.5% of NWEP members agreed that peer pressure was the dominant form of 
enforcing repayment. The next line of action for enforcing repayment in the two 
interventions was the use of court action — 6.7% and 12.5% for SAT and NWEP 
respectively. Interviews indicated that SAT members used court action as the last 
resort. 
If a member defaults and refuses to pay and the other members are forced 
to pay, we are allowed to take the offender to court to reclaim the money 
with the percentage of interest that Sinapi Aba demands. We the members 
of the group also have a percentage (20%) that we add because we had to 
pay the debt. Adwoa Benewaah, SAT.  
 
Two NWEP members
59
 mentioned using the police as the last resort. According to 
Yaa Mansa of NWEP:  
 
When persuasion fails we call on the assistance of the police to handle it… 
Because people are afraid of the police the moment they see the police, they 
quickly pay the money. 
 
Members socially ostracised peers and even sometimes verbally assaulted defaulters. 
Members threatened to let the public know about defaulters. It was admitted public 
disclosure of debt brought shame on defaulters. Such was the potency of peer pressure 
that most interviewees claimed they would look for means of repaying the debt rather 
than to incur the wrath of their peers. In a rural community characterised by strong 
communal relationships, peer pressure of was quite effective.  
 
 
                                                 
58
 For more on peer pressure see Section 6.3.2. 
59
 Akua Manu and Yaa Mansa (NWEP members) 
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Table 6.9: How Does your Group Enforce Repayment? 
Name of  
Intervention   Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid peer pressure 56 93.3 93.3 93.3 
    court action 4 6.7 6.7 100.0 
    Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid peer pressure 29 72.5 72.5 72.5 
    court action 5 12.5 12.5 85.0 
    police action 1 2.5 2.5 87.5 
    not done 5 12.5 12.5 100.0 
    Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
The study examined the groups for any particular problems that exposed groups to 
repayment problems. Some SAT members recounted how they began to experience 
problems when remnants of another group were added to theirs. Here is an instance of 
what one member said: 
 
They brought some people from another group and added them to our group. This 
trend of events has not helped us since then the love amongst us has gone down. 
So the way we used to conduct our activities has changed, Abena Musuo, SAT.  
 
At the time of fieldwork the group to which Abena Musuo belonged was in crisis. 
Some members had threatened to leave the group because of the repayment 
difficulties. Adding to members of a group seems to dilute group solidarity built over 
time and thus weaken members‘ adherence to the joint liability for loan default. 
Abena, however, claimed that members of the group consented to the merger but they 
did not anticipate the consequences.  
 
In spite of the widespread use of loans for non-business purposes, some interviewees 
of NWEP and SAT argued that loan defaults were dependent on what loans were used 
for. A NWEP service user cited an example of another service user who had 
encountered repayment problems. Apparently a member had used her loan to cater for 
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her sick sister while another had used her loan to perform her father‘s funeral. Further 
probing showed that both service users had been unable to carry on with their income-
generating activities during those times thus causing them to experience financial 
difficulties and not as a result of how they used their loans. It was quite evident that 
the inability of service users to repay loans triggered an enquiry into what the loan 
was used for. Marr (2002) refers to the enquiry into the inability of members to repay 
loans as peer audit. 
 
In summary, service users complained they came under intense pressure during loan 
repayment. Evidently, repayment difficulties that service users experienced reflect a 
combination of factors: limited economic absorptive capacity of the community (poor 
markets), increasing loan sizes with no commensurate extensions in repayment 
periods; and loan disbursal at any time of the year without regard to seasonal 
economic fluctuations. Peer pressure was seen as the dominant means of ensuring 
loan repayment and it acted both as a deterrent against default and for enforcing 
repayment.  
 
6.5 How are Institutional Savings Schemes Implemented and 
How do Service Users’ Perceive Them? 
Institutional savings refer to both voluntary and compulsory deposits that members 
make to their respective microfinance institutions. None of the two microfinance 
interventions had a truly voluntary savings scheme. Although SAT professed to 
operate a voluntary savings scheme known as progressive savings scheme, a 
minimum amount had been fixed for service users and was compulsory. Nevertheless, 
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members could save more than the minimum amount but very few service users saved 
above the stipulated minimum. With respect to NWEP, staff said service users did not 
have a voluntary savings scheme created for them under the microfinance 
intervention. Service users were encouraged to use the regular savings facilities of the 
bank. In addition, members could join the bank‘s susu scheme if they wished to save. 
It is paradoxical that SAT operated a voluntary savings scheme which they were not 
permitted to do so by law, while NWEP had no voluntary savings scheme even 
though they had the legal mandate to take voluntary savings from service users but 
did not.  
 
Both SAT and NWEP had compulsory savings schemes. NWEP had a savings 
scheme which consisted of 1% of the amount service users borrowed. This amount 
was paid as part of their weekly loans repayment. Compulsory savings in addition to 
initial deposits made before joining the intervention were deposited into the accounts 
of the Credit and Savings Associations. Members, with the approval of the group, 
could borrow from the fund. Service users could borrow from the group fund for 
emergencies or crises situations and such loans had a short-term repayment period. 
Very few service users claimed to have benefited from this scheme. SAT, on the other 
hand, deducted 10% of every loan provided as compulsory savings on behalf of 
members. Neither the progressive savings nor the 10% deductions were available to 
service users: they were accessible only after service users had left the intervention.  
 
Regarding service users‘ satisfaction of savings schemes, NWEP members were on 
the average more satisfied compared to SAT‘s. Over half (57.5%) of NWEP service 
users compared to 46.7% of SAT members claimed they were satisfied with their 
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savings arrangements (see Table 6.10). Service users who claimed the savings scheme 
was moderately satisfactory constituted 46.7% in SAT and 42.5% in NWEP. While 
none of NWEP members said savings facilities were not satisfactory, 6.7% of SAT 
service users said their savings products were unsatisfactory. NWEP service users 
were relatively more satisfied with their savings scheme perhaps because of three 
factors. First, the savings was built into the repayment instalments unlike in SAT 
where the amount was taken off the loan. NWEP service users were not likely to feel 
the bite like SAT users who commented that their loan was much depleted after the 
deductions. Second, the savings amount was not as big as that of SAT, 1% compared 
to 10% for NWEP and SAT respectively. Third, NWEP service users had access to 
their savings, albeit quite limited, and they also knew how much they had 
accumulated over time.  
 
Table 6.10: How Do You Assess the Savings Scheme of the MF Intervention? 
Name of  
Intervention   Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid satisfactory 28 46.7 46.7 46.7 
    moderately satisfactory 28 46.7 46.7 93.3 
    not satisfactory 4 6.7 6.7 100.0 
    Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid satisfactory 23 57.5 57.5 57.5 
    moderately satisfactory 17 42.5 42.5 100.0 
    Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
Service users‘ knowledge about the amount of money they had saved differed in the 
two interventions. Staff of NWEP stated that the Credit and Savings Associations 
(CSAs) had passbooks in which all monies belonging to the group were recorded and 
in addition to that each service user had a passbook that showed the amount of money 
they had accumulated. This information was confirmed by service users of NWEP. 
The field staff of SAT also indicated that their service users had been issued with 
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passbooks which showed the amount of money they had saved. However, all service 
users of SAT interviewed vehemently denied that claim. They stated they had not 
been provided with passbooks and they could only guess how much money they had 
saved. For example, Afia Kusi stated: 
 
What I want to say is that they (SAT) should let us know about the 
monies they make us deduct and put aside as security so that each of us 
can know how much we would get individually from the contributions 
if we are to get out (of SAT) today.  
 
Asked whether SAT informed service users knew how much money had accrued to 
them, a service user replied; 
 
No! They don‘t do anything if that sort. They will only tell you the 
percentage deducted say 10% or 5% to which you had to calculate how 
much money you have. If I decide to leave the intervention right now I 
surmise the minimum amount I will receive will be about GH¢75 or 
GH¢80. Gloria Owusu, SAT.  
 
The researcher saw firsthand, a situation that confirmed the service users‘ claims. 
During the fieldwork period the researcher talked to a service user who was leaving 
the intervention and had discovered her total savings was far less than what she 
envisaged she would receive. Many SAT service users expressed apprehension of 
being of being kept in the dark concerning the amount of money they had with SAT. 
Many service users were of the opinion they could be cheated. The researcher pursued 
this issue further but was offered no evidence of documented savings from SAT.  
 
Another important area which most service users were not knowledgeable about was 
the issue of whether the interventions paid any interest on their savings. In Table 6.11 
below, 96.6% and 82.5% of SAT and NWEP service users respectively stated that 
their savings did not attract interest or they had no idea whether it did. Staff of both 
interventions categorically stated that they indeed paid interest on savings. The 
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researcher had no independent means of assessing the veracity of the intervention 
staff‘s assertion.   
 
Table 6.11: Does Your Savings Attract Any Interest? 
Name of  Intervention Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid  yes 2 3.3 3.3 3.3 
 no 44 73.3 73.3 76.7 
 no idea 14 23.3 23.3 100.0 
 Total 60 100.0 100.0  
NWEP Valid  yes 7 17.5 17.5 17.5 
 no 10 25.0 25.0 42.5 
 no idea 23 57.5 57.5 100.0 
 Total 40 100.0 100.0  
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
To conclude, the discussion on savings has portrayed the disparity between what the 
interventions claim to do and what service users claim to experience. As in all aspects 
of the microfinance intervention, the savings facilities were imposed on service users 
without their input. Interviews suggested that service users lacked knowledge about 
various aspects of the savings scheme and that savings was perceived as a cost to be 
borne in order to gain access to loans. Although service users generally exhibited lack 
of knowledge on the savings schemes, their general satisfaction of the savings scheme 
as shown in Table 6.10 probably reflected the fact that it enabled them to accumulate 
some sums of money.   
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6.6 What are the Non-Financial Services Components of the 
Microfinance Interventions and to What Extent are they 
Relevant to Service Users? 
Both SAT and NWEP had comprehensive programmes regarding the provision of 
non-financial services as part of their interventions. In fact the strategy underlying 
NWEP was known as ‗credit with education‘ (CwE) scheme. The Freedom from 
Hunger (FFH) organisation that helped establish NWEP made educational training the 
cornerstone of the intervention (see section 4.7). SAT and NWEP provided training 
for service users before providing financial services and also periodically provided 
education and other training to their users.  
 
Interviews with NWEP staff indicated that newly constituted groups were taken 
through a four-week training session on group dynamics, business skills, health and 
nutrition. NWEP service users stated that apart from the initial training they were 
offered periodic education on breastfeeding, nutrition and on the judicious use of the 
additional income from business that the interventions enable service users to 
generate. Service users were also educated on how to deal with some diseases such as 
diarrhoea and malaria in emergency situations. However, after the withdrawal of 
Freedom from Hunger from the programme in 1999, the credit with education 
component of the microfinance intervention had practically ceased.    
 
SAT officials claimed their intervention advocated the holistic transformation of 
service users and therefore included social, spiritual and political issues as well as 
business and group management training. SAT offered two types of training 
programmes: training provided by loan officers; and participatory training by service 
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users themselves and external resource persons. Apart from the initial training and 
education provided to all members, SAT interviewees said that subsequent education 
and training programmes were given only to the leaders of the various groups who 
were in turn to pass it down to their members. The leaders met on the last Tuesday of 
every month for such educational and training programmes in the SAT district office 
in Sunyani. Resource persons educated them on subjects like menopause, HIV/AIDS 
and treatment of diarrhoeal cases in children.  Interviewees mentioned that in crisis 
situations such as disease outbreaks SAT would sometimes offer them education on 
how to avoid contracting the disease. For instance, when there was a cerebrospinal 
meningitis (CSM) outbreak in the northern part of the country that threatened to 
spread to other parts of the country, SAT brought in resource persons to educate 
service users on the disease in Nsoatre. 
 
Many members of SAT and NWEP thought the non-financial educational and training 
provided them were appropriate and beneficial. Interviewees had this to say:    
 
The educational aspect helps us a lot. Especially to be educated 
about a deadly disease like HIV/AIDS is very good since we are the 
vulnerable people when it comes to sex. This education about 
HIV/AIDS will help us abstain from it (casual sex) and concentrate 
on our work. I wish they will not stop giving us the education but 
instead make it more regular. Gloria Owusu SAT. 
 
They teach us many things. What I really like is education on how 
to budget our money so that we don‘t use it frivolously. Teaching 
us on how to maintain a healthy relationship with other members in 
our groups has helped us a lot. Joyce Konadu, NWEP.  
 
However, in the questionnaire, when pressed to mention three specific types of non-
financial services that the intervention had provided them, surprisingly most service 
users of both SAT and NWEP were unable to do so. Service users stated that after the 
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initial training
60
 not much training and educational activities took place thereafter in 
both interventions. In SAT, although field officers were expected to give business 
training at meetings and on loan disbursement days, there were hardly any time for 
anything other than loan repayment and allied matters. Holding meetings on Friday, 
the market day and the fact that staff members of the intervention were perennially 
late for the meetings meant meetings were poorly attended and no meaningful 
educational or training could be effectively delivered. Regarding NWEP and as stated 
earlier, with the withdrawal of the Freedom from Hunger from NWEP, the Bank 
seemed more interested in the financial issues and had, to a large extent, neglected to 
continue the educational aspect of the intervention.  
 
It can be argued that, for instance, if the interventions‘ instructions and training on 
loan use does not reflect how service users actually apply their loans then such 
training will not be relevant to service users and will easily be forgotten. It is 
noteworthy that during interviews service users mostly mentioned education on 
diseases control but not business management and the other issues related to loan 
management. Probably, service users only discussed non-financial services that were 
of relevance to them.  
 
6.7 What Constitute the Costs of Microfinance and what are 
Service Users’ Perceptions of these Costs and Why?   
Cost of microfinance is generally perceived in terms of interest rates. In reality costs 
go beyond interest rates to include charges and deductions, attending meetings and the 
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issue of joint liability. The cost of microfinance to service users is generally higher 
because the problems that orthodox financial institutions have to grapple with such as 
adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement are passed onto microfinance service 
users (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
 
6.7.1 Interest Rates 
As discussed in the background chapter, SAT charged an interest rate of 35% (flat). 
According to staff of SAT, the flat interest rate of 35% is applied to the loan amount 
and the total divided by the number of repayment instalments. This interest rate 
translates into about 95% APR. According to staff, NWEP, on the other hand, charged 
interest of 51% (flat) on loans. This converts to over 150% APR. NWEP staff 
attributed the rather high interest rate to huge cost incurred in managing the 
intervention. The interest rates charged by the two interventions compare with that of 
between 25% APR and 32% APR charged by orthodox banking institutions (BOG, 
2008) and between 100% and 1200% charged by moneylenders (Buckley, 1997). The 
researcher was unable to obtain independent confirmation of the level of interest that 
service users actually paid.  
 
Knowledge of the level of interest rates charged on loans was very limited among 
service users in both interventions. When asked about the level of interest charged on 
loans, most of the interviewees responded they did not know. However, some service 
users knew the total amount of interest they paid. For example, a service user of 
NWEP claimed that for every GH¢100 they took as loan, they paid interest of GH¢20 
in a repayment period of 16 weeks. A member of SAT claimed she paid almost 
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GH¢40 interest on a loan of GH¢300. Two service users
61
 of SAT quoted interest 
rates that did not tally with that stated by staff of the intervention. Other reasons for 
service users‘ limited knowledge could be the lack of transparency in interest rates, 
especially the common practice of charging flat interest instead of using the reducing 
balance method (APR). This strategy almost doubles the effective interest rate 
(Harford, 2008). The high level of illiteracy among microfinance users implied that 
they were unable to comprehend how much interest rate they actually paid.  
 
In spite of the limited knowledge on amount of interest charged on loans, most SAT 
and NWEP service users stated that the interest rates were satisfactory. Further 
probing indicated that they reached that conclusion by comparing the interest rate 
charged by the interventions with that charged by moneylenders. However, it has been 
established that the poor hardly ever borrowed from moneylenders for business 
purposes. An important reason for service users being satisfied with the evidently 
high interest rates can be found in the rural poor people‘s conception of interest rates. 
Many studies (CGAP, 2003; Dehejia, Montgomery, Morduch, 2005; DFID, 2006) 
have observed that users of microfinance users were not bothered by high interest 
rates without investigating the reason for this observation. Interviews revealed that 
service users were interested in the total amount of interest and not in the rate. Indeed 
there was no direct translation for the term ‗interest rate‘ in the local language. It took 
some explanation to convey the meaning of the term. What the service users knew 
well was ‗nsiho‘ which means the total amount of interest. For instance when asked 
how much interest was charged on a loan, a service user would mention the total 
amount of interest she paid on the loan but did not know or remember the interest 
                                                 
61
 Kwame Manu and Adwoa Benewaah 
 244 
rate. Going back to the first interviews, a service user could recall that she paid total 
interest of GH¢20 on a loan of GH¢100 and yet could not recall the interest rate. The 
issue of time in interest rates had little meaning for the service users
62
. This 
observation has been documented in a study by Shipton (1992), as cited in Buckley 
(1997:1088) who found similar perceptions of interest rates in some African societies. 
The service users of the two interventions can be described as financially illiterate as 
far as interest rates were concerned. 
 
6.7.2 Other Charges and Deductions  
Charges and deductions are payments made by service users to microfinance 
institutions through actual cash payments or deductions from the loans. NWEP 
required that members save for a period of time before they were granted loans. Staff 
of NWEP claimed that the frequency and quantum of the savings was a determinant 
of the amount of money granted as loan. Some service users commented that there 
was pressure to increase the amount and frequency of savings in order to create the 
impression of being more creditworthy and attract bigger loans. In reality, however, 
some service users said they received the same amount of loan during the first cycle. 
Service users as a result could sometimes have large amounts of money locked up in 
that sort of compulsory savings.  
 
Although SAT members did not have to make any savings before they began their 
first cycle, the intervention had a myriad of charges and deductions: loan application 
fee; processing fee; training fee; insurance; and compulsory savings. Staff stated that 
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to be paid.  
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a loan application fee (GH¢1) and training fee (GH¢0.5) were required at the 
commencement of each cycle. Staff of SAT again indicated that an amount of 2% was 
added to the interest rates as insurance. A processing fee of 3% was also deducted 
from loans. Some service users complained about having to pay training fees every 
time they began a new cycle when they had undergone the same training on numerous 
occasions during previous cycles. SAT interviewees protested that too much money 
was being deducted from their loans.  
 
In addition to deductions and charges mentioned above, staff of SAT said that from 
every loan granted, SAT made a 10% compulsory deduction as loan guarantee. Many 
of the SAT members grumbled that this deduction severely reduced the amount 
available to them. Total deductions amounted to about 20% of loans they were given 
and yet they had to pay interest on the total loan amount. Members thought the fact 
that they were jointly liable for loans should have been precluded any compulsory 
savings or loan guarantee. Lastly, SAT had implemented a voluntary savings scheme 
known as progressive savings. However, according to interviewees, an amount of 
GH¢1.00 had been fixed for all members, which they paid anytime they made loan 
repayments. In effect this savings scheme had become compulsory and members who 
were unable to pay were considered defaulters and had to make up the payment later. 
On top of it all SAT members could access the compulsory and ‗voluntary‘ savings 
only when they quit the intervention. 
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6.7.3 Meetings  
As discussed earlier, SAT members held their meetings every two weeks on Fridays, 
while NWEP had weekly meetings organised on Wednesdays. Meetings were 
compulsory and a member could be expelled from a group for not attending meetings.  
Meetings were not popular among service users in the two institutions. NWEP 
interviewees commented that on meeting days they could hardly engage in any other 
economic activity like visiting the farm. Some suggested holding meetings 
fortnightly. In spite of its unpopularity interviewees conceded that meetings broke the 
monotony of everyday life and presented them the opportunity to meet friends. 
 
SAT meetings were held fortnightly on Fridays, the ‗market day‘ of the community. 
As already discussed, meetings on Friday put severe constraints on trading activities 
of service users. On two occasions that the researcher was present at meetings of 
SAT, the field staff of SAT chairing the meeting was late and this caused much 
concern. Service users were clearly anxious to attend to their businesses and were 
obviously reluctant to attend the scheduled meeting. Evidently attending meetings on 
Fridays came at a high cost to SAT members. Meetings were poorly attended and 
although SAT regulations stipulated that members were liable to dismissal for failing 
to attend meetings on three occasions, apparently no one had suffered dismissal 
because of the problems associated with meetings on Friday. 
 
6.7.4 Joint Liability  
Joint liability essentially implies microfinance institutions shifting much of the burden 
of monitoring, enforcement and loan default onto groups. In other words, it meant 
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groups members had to shoulder the liability of loan repayment of their peers on 
behalf of the intervention. Both interventions applied joint liability as a form of social 
collateral. Interviewees who were in groups with high default rates expressed concern 
about having to pay the debts of others. When asked about what they thought about 
the issue of joint liability, some service users bitterly asked why they should be made 
accountable for loans taken by others. Another issue that most interviewees 
complained about had to do with being liable for relatively bigger loans others 
members had taken. For instance, some NWEP and SAT service users complained 
about the fact that they had to co-guarantee loans of other members who had taken 
about twice the size they had received.  There were suggestions that if the strategy of 
joint liability was to be equitable, then members of each group should be offered 
similar loan sizes.  
 
SAT interviewees mentioned how they had to spend much time taking recalcitrant 
members to the law courts to recover monies they had paid on their behalf. NWEP 
service users said they sometimes resorted to using the police to help them retrieve 
monies from defaulting members. NWEP service users stated that the use of the 
police (an illegal activity
63
) had caused a lot of disaffections amongst group members 
and had increased tension among relatives and kinsmen in such as close-knit rural 
community.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter described and analysed the relevant processes of the two interventions in 
the area of study primarily from the perspective of the service users. The chapter 
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answered questions on group activity, loans, savings, non-financial services and costs 
of microfinance. Self-selection was found to be important for subsequent activities of 
the groups. Service users‘ knowledge and participation in the processes were 
reviewed. It was discovered that in spite of the acclamation of microfinance 
interventions as a bottom-up approach (Dowla and Barua, 2006; Agrawala and 
Carraro, 2010) service users were not involved in the design and implementation of 
interventions. Apart from the solidarity groups in NWEP, service users did not have 
control over the formation of Trust Banks or the CSAs, which incidentally bore the 
ultimate liability for loan defaults. Indeed service users had no voice in how and when 
loans were disbursed and repaid. Savings schemes and the provision of non-financial 
services were all managed by the interventions without any inputs from service users. 
Another recurring issue in the chapter was service users‘ lack of knowledge on many 
of the components of the intervention. Service users of the two interventions showed a 
consistent lack of knowledge (or interest?) on interest rates and non-financial services. 
Most service users, however, knew the total amount of interest charged on the loans. 
The observed patterns suggest that service users were more concerned and more 
knowledgeable on issues that were related to the survival of the groups and 
consequently their continued access to microfinance services. All other components 
were considered as costs that had to be borne in order to access financial services, 
particularly loans from the intervention. The chapter identified disparities between 
what is publicly known about the two interventions and what actually occurred in the 
field (implementation gap). The implementation gap was more evident in SAT than 
NWEP. The study tested some theories on some components of microfinance. For 
instance, the study assessed the effect on peer monitoring loan repayment. It was 
found that peer monitoring was not necessary in ensuring loan repayment in an 
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environment where loans could be used for purposes other than income-generating 
activities. It was found that groups enjoyed some level of autonomy but within the 
boundaries set by the interventions. In sum, although the interventions were 
essentially established as development interventions, the interventions‘ processes 
suggests there were not much explicit strategies to ensure that the poverty reduction 
objectives were achieved.  
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CHAPTER VII 
MICROFINANCE PROGRAMMES AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
So we find out that such and such a percent of people have such 
and such a percent increase in income. So what. It doesn't tell us 
what to do about it.' (Participant at Micro credit summit meeting 
New Delhi 2001). 
 
 
7.1: Introduction 
Most microfinance processes primarily enable financial institutions to sustainably 
provide financial services to the poor. These processes cannot be said to have a 
neutral effect on poverty levels of their users. This chapter endeavours to assess the 
poverty outcomes of the intervention components and characteristics of service users. 
Characteristics of service users include the socio-demographic and business attributes. 
Poverty outcomes are operationalised in terms of business and household outcomes. 
Cross-tabulations, ordinal logistic regression and qualitative data are used in this 
analysis. It is important to note that some of the intervention components such as 
interest rates do not vary with respondents and therefore was not amenable to 
quantitative analysis. In such situations the poverty implications of the components 
were assessed based on the extant microfinance literature. In this study poverty 
reduction implications of the interventions also include an assessment of the 
microfinance interventions capability to retain poorer service users. Analyses and 
discussions of the microfinance interventions in the previous chapter constitute the 
basis for the assessment of poverty reduction implications of the microfinance 
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interventions in this chapter. The analytical techniques employed in this chapter are 
comprehensively discussed in section 5.3. 
  
The chapter is organised into seven main sections. After the introduction, the first 
section assesses the poverty implications of the socio-demographic and business 
characteristics of service users. Sections two and three assess the effect of the 
interventions on businesses and households respectively. This is followed by the 
fourth section which investigates the poverty outcomes of the group lending strategy. 
In the fifth section, the effect of the various aspects of loan matters is assessed for 
their effects on poverty. Finally, sections six and seven explore the effect of savings 
and the costs of microfinance on poverty.  
 
7.2 Do Socio-Demographic and Business Characteristics have 
any Implications for Poverty Reduction and Why? 
Although characteristics of service users and their businesses are not part of the 
implementation process and are considered as control variables in the study, their 
effect on businesses and households are assessed as part of understanding effects of 
microfinance. The above question intends to shed light on how socio-demographic 
and business characteristics affect poverty reduction from the perspective of the 
service users. Analyses in Appendices 1 to 3 and qualitative data are employed to 
answer this question. 
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7.2.1 Women and Poverty Reduction  
Most microfinance institutions have targeted women. The general perception of 
microfinance is banking for women (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005). This observation characterises the microfinance sector 
in Ghana because the informal non-farm sector that microfinance institutions serves 
constitute mainly women (Ashong and Smith, 2001). Staff of NWEP were emphatic 
that their intervention was geared towards reducing poverty among women. During 
interviews service users constantly mentioned that their major reason for joining the 
interventions was to help cater for their households. From Table 7.2 in section 7.3, it 
was evident that the interventions generally had beneficial effects on household 
consumption. This finding is supported by the literature. For example Khandker 
(2003), in a study in Bangladesh, estimated that microfinance contributes to 
household consumption at the rate of 18% for lending to females and 11% in the case 
of male borrowing. Women were also found to spend more of their incomes on 
households compared to men (Chester and Kuhn, 2002). Additionally, in targeting 
women in a community such as Nsoatre which is a matrilineal society, microfinance 
assumes another important poverty reduction function. In such societies children 
belong to the woman‘s maternal family and as a result the welfare of children is the 
primary responsibility of women (Oppong and Abu, 1987). Targeting women in 
Nsoatre therefore ensured that the financial resources that accrue to women are used 
to cater for the household, especially children.  
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7.2.2 Enterprising Poor  
The major criterion for eligibility for membership into the two microfinance 
interventions was that potential service users should already be engaged in a non-farm 
micro-enterprise or income generating activity. Hulme and Mosley (1996) also 
observed that many microfinance institutions give loans to people with already-
established income-generating enterprises rather than for business start-ups. 
 
The category of people that microfinance institutions targeted has important 
implications for poverty reduction. Those targeted by the interventions were not 
considered among the poorest or most vulnerable in the community. The poorest in 
most rural areas in Ghana are the subsistence farmers, especially food crop farmers 
(Canagarajah et al., 2001; Nkum, 1998). Adjei and Arun (2009) argue that the pursuit 
of financial sustainability prompted SAT to target the less poor instead of the poorest.  
Microfinance institutions in general are usually reluctant to do business with food 
crop farmers because they are considered high risk and therefore unattractive 
microfinance clients (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005). However, Hulme and Mosley 
(1997), Zaman (2000) and Robinson (2001) argue that there is little evidence to 
support the fact that the entrepreneurial poor are the only people who can benefit from 
microfinance. It can be argued that, by excluding food crop farmers the intervention 
failed to reach the poorest in the rural area. 
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7.2.3 Socioeconomic Status of Service Users and Poverty 
Reduction  
Variables that measure the extent of poverty and vulnerability (such as marital status 
and occupation of spouse) of service users generally suggested that the microfinance 
interventions benefited poorer service users
64
 (i.e., single service users and those 
whose spouses were farmers) compared to the less poor (see Tables 2.1A, 2.2A and 
3.1A-3.6A in Appendix 2 and 3). In SAT all variables that estimated levels of poverty 
supported the above observation while in NWEP, however, this trend was not so 
obvious in the cross-tabulations with the exception of the cross-tabulation between 
household outcomes and ‗occupation of spouse‘ (see Table 2.1A in Appendix 2). 
However after controlling for other variables in the ordinal logistic regression analysis 
(see Tables 3.1A to 3.6A in Appendix 3), the trend was clear: the socio-economic 
status of service users measured by the variable ‗occupation of spouse‘ consistently 
indicated that poorer service users who were single and spouses of farmers were more 
likely than the less poor (spouses of service users in non-farming occupations) to 
experience positive business and household outcomes. Additionally, Table 2.3A in 
Appendix 2 shows that in the two interventions service users who were poorer 
(single) were more likely to have increased or increased their contribution to the 
education of their children than the less poor (married). This relationship was 
significant. For more on the poverty levels among the different occupations see 
Canagarajah et al. (2001) and Ghana Statistical Service (2000).  
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positive household and business outcomes  
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The above finding seems to run counter to other studies that have generally found that 
microfinance benefits the less poor (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Buckley, 1997; 
Remenyi and Quinones, 2000; Coleman, 2002, Copestake, 2002; Shaw, 2004; 
Johnson, 2005). For example, Hulme and Mosley (1996) hypothesised that less poor 
service users were more likely reap more benefits from microfinance by investing in 
more risky but profitable income-generating activities than the poor who are risk-
averse. The authors also found empirical evidence of larger positive impacts on 
income for better-off borrowers. 
 
What accounts for the contrary finding of this study?  It is probable that the effects of 
the microfinance interventions might have had proportionately greater effect on 
businesses and households of poorer service users than those who were relatively 
better-off. Such results might not be evident in conventional surveys that employ 
objective indicators because they seek to measure absolute effects. In addition, the 
indicators used (see Table 7.2 and 7.3 in sections 7.3 and 7.4) could also explain why 
findings of this study differ from that found in the literature. It is well known that the 
poor spend a greater proportion of their income on household consumption (Hazell 
and Roell, 1983) and with the household indicator mostly made up of household 
consumption variables, it is likely the poor will score higher points on the composite 
indicator ‗household outcomes‘ than the less poor. 
 
7.2.4 Borrowing from Other Sources65for Business 
As observed in the cross-tabulations and logistic regression analysis
66
 service users 
who borrowed from other sources for business were more likely to experience 
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beneficial business outcomes. Service users who borrowed from other sources (from 
other microfinance interventions) were over 15 times more likely to state that their 
businesses improved ‗somewhat‘ or ‗very much‘ compared to service users who 
borrowed from one intervention. However, only 4 service users from each 
intervention claimed to have borrowed from another microfinance intervention (see 
Table 1.13A in Appendix 1). This relationship is very strong and statistically 
significant. What were the characteristics of those who borrowed from multiple 
microfinance institutions? From a cross-tabular investigation as shown in Table 7.1 
below, all the service users who borrowed from other sources were likely to be poor 
(4 were single and the remaining 4 were spouses of farmers). This observation lends 
more credence to the finding that poorer service users were more likely to experience 
more positive outcomes. 
 
Table 7.1 Occupation of Spouse by Do you Borrow from Other Sources for Business? 
   Occupation of spouse 
Total 
   
N/A 
non-
farming Farming 
do you borrow from other 
sources 
Yes Count 4 0 4 8 
%  50.0% .0% 50.0% 100.0% 
No Count 29 26 37 92 
%  31.5% 28.3% 40.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 33 26 41 100 
%  33.0% 26.0% 41.0% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
Why will borrowing from multiple microfinance interventions result in positive 
business outcomes? Two explanations could be adduced for the above observation. 
First, service users who took loans from multiple interventions were the more 
entrepreneurial than their peers and therefore made better use of the loans. Second, 
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service users took loans from other microfinance institutions after their businesses 
showed improvement. From the two explanations above, it is difficult to tell which 
occurred first, improvement in business outcomes or borrowing from multiple 
microfinance interventions. This finding needs to be investigated further in 
subsequent studies.  
 
7.3 How do Microfinance Interventions Affect Service Users’ 
Businesses? 
Seven variables were selected to assess the effect of the interventions on the various 
dimensions of businesses of service users which were termed as businesses outcomes 
in this study (see Table 7.2). The variables
67
 were selected primarily based on 
interviews, observations and a SEEP manual
68
. The study assessed changes in 
business outcomes since service users joined the intervention using the three-category 
ordinal response shown in Table 7.2 below. 
 
Table 7.2 Business Outcomes of Microfinance Interventions  
Variables Not at all (%) Somewhat (%) Very much (%) 
Expanded size of business 8.3     (2.5)* 41.7   (65.0) 50.0   (32.5) 
Added new products 43.3   (30.0) 31.7   (42.5) 25.0   (27.5) 
Hired more workers 81.7   (87.5) 11.7   (7.5) 6.7     (5.0) 
Reduced cost by buying in greater 
quantities 15.0   (17.5) 43.3   (37.5) 41.7   (45.0) 
Improved quality of business products 23.3   (22.5) 35.0   (47.5) 41.7   (30.0) 
Developed new business  46.7   (45.0) 35.0   (37.5) 18.3   (17.5) 
Increased business assets 21.7   (27.5) 41.7   (45.0) 36.7   (27.5) 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*NWEP figures in brackets  
 
                                                 
67
 For further information on the rationale for the choice of business and household outcomes see 
section 4.4A in Appendix 4.  
68
 See Nelson, C. et al. (2004). Learning from Clients: Assessment Tools for Microfinance 
Practitioners. Washington D.C: SEEP Network.  
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Regarding whether service users had been able to expand their businesses as a result 
of being with the intervention, 50% and 32.5% of service users of SAT and NWEP 
respectively said they had expanded their businesses ‗very much‘. Data from the 
interviews revealed that most of the consistent expansion in business occurred at the 
initial stages of joining the intervention. This finding supports Hulme and Mosley‘s 
(1996) assertion that informal businesses were unlikely to experience continuous 
growth. They claim businesses were more likely to reach a peak in growth after one or 
two cycles and thereafter remain in a steady state. Service users who responded 
‗somewhat‘ (SAT, 41.7% and NWEP, 65%) reflects the norm: businesses expansion 
fluctuated with seasonal changes in demand for goods and services in the community. 
In total, the quantum of expansion in business was rather small due to the perennial 
low demand for goods and services in the area of study, as the other variables will 
indicate.  
 
The addition of new products refers to adding other products similar to that of the 
existing income-generating activity. For instance, a seamstress claimed to have started 
selling tailoring products (buttons, sewing thread, sewing machine parts, etc.) in 
addition to her normal sewing work.   Adding new products was an important 
livelihood strategy for the poor; it essentially enabled them to reduce risk. When 
asked whether they had been able to add new products to their business, about a 
quarter of service users of both interventions responded ‗very much‘. In Table 7.2, 
about 40% and 30% of service users of NWEP and SAT respectively said they had 
not added any new products to their businesses. The addition of new products to an 
existing business was usually a sporadic activity dictated by seasonal ebb and flow of 
economic activity.  
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Does access to microfinance services help to create employment opportunities? The 
question in Table 7.2 is aimed at determining the extent to which microfinance 
resulted in the increase in direct paid non-family labour (part- and full-time) in the 
income-generating activity of service users. The study did not assess indirect 
employment creation in the community. Did the expansion of service users‘ 
businesses result in the creation of employment opportunities? Business expansion 
was not very substantial and was limited to the initial stages or tended to fluctuate 
with seasonal fluctuations in demand and therefore as shown in Table 7.2, most 
service users (NWEP 87.5%; SAT 81.7%) were unlikely to have hired workers for 
their businesses. On the other hand when there was the need to employ some workers, 
interviews showed that wages were so low that very few people were willing to work 
for the micro-entrepreneurs. Some service users complained of the lack of labourers 
because few people were willing to work for the very low wages they paid. Interviews 
and observations indicated that if there was any need for labour service users mostly 
relied on members of their households, a finding confirmed by Hulme and Mosley 
(1996). It is evident in Table 7.2 that rural microfinance hardly resulted in 
employment openings in informal micro-enterprises. Buckley (1997) explains that in 
rural areas few informal businesses actually employ people on a consistent full-time 
basis. Other findings that support the reason why employment generation capability of 
microfinance interventions was modest were the limited rural markets which inhibited 
continuous business growth and the widespread use of loans for purposes other than 
income-generating activities.  
 
Buying in greater quantities in order to reduce cost was an often-used business 
strategy by interviewees. A SAT service user who traded in venison, for instance, 
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claimed that as a result of the loan she no longer had to buy on credit at high prices 
from the middlemen: she could now afford to buy directly from the hunters at 
relatively low prices. Severe fluctuations in prices of agricultural products in Nsoatre 
meant that food vendors and other service users who used agricultural products in 
their income-generating activities or traded in them could reduce cost by buying 
cheaply in bulk during the harvest season
69
. While it is difficult to increase revenue 
due to poor markets, by buying in bulk service users were able to reduce their input 
costs thereby increasing their profit margins. Over 80% of service users had employed 
this strategy intermittently (somewhat) or consistently (very much) in their income-
generating activities.   
 
The two microfinance interventions gave their service users lessons on business 
improvement and management. Quality of business products was concerned with 
making products and services more hygienic, safe and presentable. Some service 
users in the two interventions reported that initial training they received enabled them 
to improve the quality of their business products. Food vendors, for example, were 
schooled on how to make their food hygienic, safe and presentable. The majority of 
members said the quality of their business products had improved ‗very much‘ or 
‗somewhat‘ (see Table 7.2).  
 
Although business or occupational diversification is considered an important 
livelihood strategy for the poor, close to half of service users had not developed a new 
business. Over 30% of service users had developed new businesses but intermittently. 
An average of 18% of service users in both interventions answered ‗very much‘ to 
                                                 
69
 Buying in bulk during harvest time underscores the importance of receiving loan at the appropriate 
time. 
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development of new businesses. Service users were more likely to add new products 
to existing businesses than establish new businesses altogether because of the 
smallness of the loans and the poor markets in Nsoatre. Some service users claimed 
they were reluctant to establish new income-generating enterprises because they could 
not find reliable people to assist them to manage their businesses. 
 
The final variable examined how microfinance had enabled service users to increase 
their business assets. About 37% and 28% of service users in SAT and NWEP 
respectively claimed to have consistently increased their business assets as a result of 
being with the interventions. Close to half of service users in both interventions said 
they increased business assets intermittently. Like expansion in size of business, 
consistent increase in business assets were mostly limited to the initial stages of 
joining the intervention.  Mknelly and Kevane (2002), observed a similar pattern in 
Burkina Faso where women made a one-time investment in productive capacity 
(buying larger cooking pots, improving market stall etc) in their first years with the 
intervention and thereafter invested very little in asset accumulation.  
 
Some salient conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of the effect of 
microfinance interventions on businesses of service users. Seasonal economic 
fluctuations seem to significantly influence income-generating activities of service 
users. Microfinance services did not engender much businesses expansion nor did it 
culminate in significant increase in business assets. Income-generating activities of 
service users had a negligible effect on employment generation. This including other 
factors discussed suggests that it is not a very good strategy to use microfinance as a 
means of generating direct employment opportunities in rural areas. Finally, service 
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users‘ businesses seem to benefit from microfinance primarily through being able to 
buy in bulk at lower prices including buying agricultural products at cheaper prices 
during the harvest period.  
 
7.4 How do Microfinance Interventions affect Household 
Consumption & Asset accumulation? 
Household outcomes are made of variables that mainly measure changes in 
consumption and asset accumulation in the household. The rationale was to ascertain 
how the interventions had contributed to mainly changes in consumption and asset 
accumulation in the household. The seven variables measuring the effect of 
interventions on households are shown in Table 7.3 below.  
 
Table 7.3: Household Outcomes of Microfinance Interventions  
Variables Not at all (%) 
Somewhat 
(%) 
Very much 
(%) 
N/A 
(%) 
Contributed/increased contribution  to 
household finances  20.0   (10.0)* 38.3   (40.0) 41.7   (50.0)  
Contributed/increased contribution  to 
children's education 30.0   (17.5) 31.7   (37.5) 28.3   (45.0) 10.0 
Enabled household to cope during lean 
season 6.7     (7.5) 58.3   (82.5) 35.0   (10.0)   
Acquired long-term assets 65.0   (87.5) 16.7   (2.5) 18.3   (10.0)   
Contributed  to the acquisition of household 
assets  63.3   (82.5) 20.0   (5.0) 16.7   (12.5)   
Increased ability to cope with household 
emergencies 13.3   (15.0) 33.3   (42.5) 53.3   (42.5)   
Make/increased household savings 25.0   (22.5) 53.3   (72.5) 21.7   (5.0)   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*NWEP figures in brackets and SAT‘s without brackets 
 
Regarding whether the intervention had contributed or increased their contribution to 
household finances, the largest proportion of service users in both interventions (SAT; 
41.7%: NWEP; 50.0%) affirmed the intervention had done so consistently. Household 
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finance refers mainly to the local traditional money required for daily food 
consumption. Respondents refer to this as ‗chop money‘. Only 10% and 20% of 
members of NWEP and SAT respectively acknowledged that the microfinance 
intervention had not contributed or increased their contribution to household finances. 
The fact that 80% and 90% of service users in SAT and NWEP respectively claimed 
that microfinance had enabled them t o consistently and intermittently contribute or 
increased their contribution to household finance was expected because interviewees 
claimed their major reason for joining the intervention was to assist their spouses to 
take care of their households.  
 
Service users were asked whether the intervention had enabled them contribute or 
increase their contribution to the education of their children because during interviews 
service users frequently mentioned using proceeds from the intervention to cater for 
their children‘s education, especially paying their school fees. NWEP service users 
were more likely than SAT members to say they had contributed or increased their 
contribution to their children‘s education. Only 17.5% of NWEP service users 
compared to 30% of SAT members said that the interventions had not contributed or 
increased their contribution to the education of their children. In the case of SAT there 
were some respondents (10%) who did not have children and this is represented as 
N/A (not applicable) in the table.  
 
For people living in a rural area characterised by economic fluctuations, ability to 
cope during the lean season when there was low demand for goods and services as 
well as food scarcity was important. The majority of service users (SAT, 93.3; NWEP 
92.5%) said the intervention had enabled them to cope consistently (very much) and 
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intermittently (somewhat) during the lean season
70
. Less than 8% of service users of 
both interventions said the microfinance interventions played a no role (not at all) in 
enabling them to cope during the lean season. Thus the interventions played an 
important role in enabling service users overcome a major problem inherent in most 
rural areas in Ghana.  
 
With regard to the acquisition of long-term and household assets, the interventions 
seem to have played a minor role. Long-term assets refer to items like building plots, 
farmlands, and houses, while household items denote items such as televisions, 
mattresses and cooking stoves.  Increase in assets in the household is regarded as an 
important indicator of the effect of microfinance interventions and indeed a measure 
of household wealth (Morris and Barnes, 2005).  An average of about 64% and 85% 
of SAT and NWEP service users stated that the interventions did not culminate in the 
acquisition of long-term and household assets (see Table 7.3). However between the 
two interventions, SAT contributed more to the acquisition of household and long-
term assets than NWEP. Poorer rural people are likely to spend more of their incomes 
on consumption (especially for reducing vulnerability) rather than on investment 
(acquiring assets). NWEP service users were found to be poorer than SAT‘s and this 
perhaps explains the differences in asset accumulation.  
 
The ability to cope with household emergencies was perceived as an indicator of the 
rural poor‘s resilience to vulnerability and an important poverty reduction 
determinant. Only 13.3% and 15% of SAT and NWEP service users respectively 
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 The lean season in the area of study begins around March and ends in July. This is the farming 
season where lack of food coincides with the peak labour period and high morbidity due to prevalence 
of the mosquito (malaria).  
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stated that the interventions had not enabled them to cope with household 
emergencies. This shows the extent of the interventions contribution to enabling 
service users cope with household emergencies.  
 
Regarding the issue of the interventions enabling service users to make or increase 
household savings, a majority of service users (SAT; 53.3%: NWEP; 72.5%) replied 
‗somewhat‘. This implies that savings amongst service users was usually intermittent 
depending on time of the season. Service users would perhaps make more profit and 
save during the harvest period and make use of the savings during the lean season. 
Only 5% of NWEP service users compared with 21.7% of SAT service users claimed 
they saved consistently. Once again there is a suggestion here that the less poor (SAT 
service users) were able to save more consistently than poorer people (NWEP service 
users). The poorer service users were perhaps affected by seasonal fluctuations in 
economic activity than the less poor.  
 
The major conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis and discussion of the 
effect of the interventions on service users‘ household is that microfinance 
interventions have limited effect on asset accumulation but increase household 
consumption.  On a comparative basis, however, SAT had a slight advantage with 
respect to accumulating assets and savings than NWEP. NWEP service users‘ 
preoccupation with reducing vulnerability perhaps reflects the fact that they were 
poorer than SAT service users.  
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7.5 How and Why does the Group Lending Strategy Influence 
Poverty Reduction? 
Group lending is the cornerstone of most microfinance institutions (Huppi and Feder, 
1990; Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, 2005). It is 
usually perceived as an important means of getting microfinance services to the poor. 
Marr (2001) encapsulates the objectives of groups into two: to achieve financial and 
organisational sustainability. Financial sustainability is achieved by performing duties 
of screening, monitoring and enforcing loan repayments and organisational 
sustainability through self-management of the group as a social network. Most studies 
(Bratton, 1986; Jahangir and Zeller, 1995; Sharma and Zeller, 1997) have assessed 
how group liability contributes to sustainability of microfinance interventions. There 
is very little on how the group lending strategy directly affects poverty reduction. In 
spite of this, Marr (2001) states that the process through which groups are formed, 
their structures and how they interact cannot be assumed to have a neutral effect on 
poverty reduction. This study attempts to answer the above question by examining the 
formation, structure and dynamics of groups.  
 
7.5.1: Group Formation and Structure 
How groups are formed and structured mainly influences selection and retention of 
poor people. Studies have noted that the poor tend to be left out during group 
formation because they tend not to be peer-selected or because of their fear of not 
being able to keep up with repayments (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). NWEP group 
formation was based on self-selection (see Section 6.3.1) which meant that members 
chose people who they desired to join their groups. This gave rise to the possibility 
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that the poorer people, who in the opinion of other group members were likely to 
default, will not be admitted into any groups. For SAT the problem of excluding the 
poorer service users during group formation was mitigated because anyone who 
satisfied the minimum criteria irrespective of socio-economic status could be a 
member of a group. In other words, potential service users did not require another 
member‘s approval to join a group. An assessment of the membership of the two 
interventions with respect to socio-economic status, Tables 1.3A, 1.7A and 1.10A in 
Appendix 1 and its accompanying discussions suggest that NWEP service users were 
generally of a lower socio-economic status than those of SAT. This perhaps suggests 
that the use of self-selection did not preclude poorer service users from joining 
NWEP.  
 
With regard to retention of poorer service users SAT seemed to perform poorly. The 
institution was unable to retain poorer service users because of the mode of group 
formation. In forming groups without the use of peer selection, SAT service users 
claimed they had little knowledge of each other and were therefore unable to assess 
each other‘s level of risk. In order to ensure the survival of the groups and therefore 
continued access to loans, members said they had to purge their groups of service 
users who struggled with loan repayment. It can be argued that while NWEP groups 
screened their members during group formation, SAT group members screened their 
members after groups had been formed. In other words, while strict adherence to rules 
of expelling recalcitrant members enabled groups in SAT to get rid of people who 
could afford make repayments but wilfully refused to repay loans, it was also likely to 
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result in the expulsion of poorer members who faced nascent repayment problems
71
. 
Interviews confirmed that there were high attrition rates among SAT groups, 
especially in the initial stages after the groups had been formed. For instance, 
members in one of the first groups of SAT were reduced from 75 to 30 in its first year 
of commencement. The idea that poorer service users were likely to be excluded from 
microfinance interventions is confirmed by Montgomery (1996), who found in a study 
in Bangladesh that it was usually poorer service users who were likely to encounter 
repayment problems and face possible expulsion from the group and ultimately from 
the intervention. Marr (2002) and Johnson and Copestake (2002) have observed that it 
was poorer service users who were likely to be expelled from microfinance 
interventions. Yunus‘ (1998) application of Gresham‘s law72 to groups in 
microfinance interventions supports this argument: if the poor and the non-poor are 
put in one group or program the non-poor will always drive out the poor. This implies 
that if there are any expulsions from the groups in the two interventions it is the poor 
who are likely to be affected. 
   
Thus the evidence of this study indicates that how groups were formed in 
microfinance interventions has significant implications for poverty reduction through 
the exclusion of poorer service users. The evidence from NWEP shows that enabling 
the self-formation of groups did not lead to the exclusion of poorer service users nor 
did it subsequently result in their expulsions from the groups
73
. Findings demonstrated 
that although non-self-selection of groups as found in SAT did not preclude the 
inclusion of the poorer service users, it later resulted in their expulsion from the 
                                                 
71
 Although it was not possible to obtain any official figures on dropout rates from the two 
interventions, interviews confirmed that dropout rates were far higher in SAT than NWEP. 
72
 Gresham‘s law is commonly stated ‗bad money drives out good‘. Here Yunus refers to the tendency 
for one class in a group to ‗crowd out‘ another‘s ability to gain from the intervention.  
73
 For more on self-selection and member retention see Osmani, 1991; Rutherford, 1994. 
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groups. By expelling poorer service users interventions are hindered from achieving 
their goal of getting microfinance services to the entrepreneurial poor. The importance 
of interventions attracting and retaining poorer service users assumes added 
importance given that this study found that poorer service users experienced more 
benefits from the intervention than less poor ones (see section 7.2.3).  
 
The study found that the structure of groups in the two interventions also had 
implications for retention of poorer service users. NWEP groups were composed of 
solidarity groups (sub-groups) within the Credit and Savings Associations (CSA) 
while SAT‘s consisted of only one large group known as the Trust Bank, just like the 
CSA (for more the structure of the groups see section 6.3.1). In NWEP, the solidarity 
groups were jointly liable for loan repayment among other functions. However, with 
regard to expulsions from the intervention the CSAs bore that responsibility. As per 
interviews, as long as the issues of joint liability regarding loan defaults were 
successfully dealt with within the solidarity group, members had low likelihood of 
being expelled from the CSA (and from the intervention). This is because the 
executive and other members of the CSAs will not get to know about the difficulties 
faced by service users in the solidarity groups. The implication was that in keeping 
any repayment infractions that could lead to expulsion within the sub-groups, the 
solidarity groups acted as a buffer against expulsion of their members. SAT had no 
such solidarity group and expulsions therefore occurred at the Trust Bank level. It was 
perhaps the absence of solidarity groups in SAT groups that account for its high 
attrition rates.  
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As argued previously in this section it was the poorer members of the groups who had 
the greatest likelihood of being kicked out of the intervention and therefore the ability 
of the intervention to retain service users through solidarity groups implied that the 
poor were more likely to be retained in the groups and thereby benefit from the 
interventions.  
 
7.5.2 Group Decision-Making  
During the interviews many service users complained about decision-making within 
the groups especially with regard to expulsions of members from the groups. During 
the interview period the researcher also noticed that attrition rates were high in groups 
where only the leaders took decisions regarding who to expel from groups. The 
researcher decided to investigate whether decision-making within groups had any 
effect on household and business outcomes. ‗Decision-making‘ was constructed as a 
two-category variable: decision-making by the group as a whole (consensus) and by 
executives (leaders). How decisions were made in the various groups were found to 
influence household outcomes. Ordinal logistic regression results (see Table 3.5A in 
Appendix 3) showed that service users who stated that decision-making within groups 
was based on consensus were about 4.4 times more likely to state that the intervention 
had a positive effect on their households than in groups in which leaders primarily 
made decisions. There is no theoretical explanation for the above finding but it is 
probable that when leaders were in charge of decision-making, members of the group 
would be reluctant to apply loans to households
74
. Additionally, interviews revealed 
that when leaders were the major decision-makers in groups (especially in SAT) 
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 It should be borne in mind that the microfinance interventions forbade the use of loans for non-
business purposes. Leaders could expel members if they found them using loans for unintended 
purposes.  
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expulsions tended to be relatively high. For instance, in one SAT group which had 
been reduced from 30 to 5 members, the leader claimed she alone took decisions 
concerning the group. As stated previously it was the poor who were likely to 
encounter repayment problems and therefore likely to be expelled than the less poor.  
 
7.5.3 Joint Liability and Poverty Reduction  
How was service users‘ perception of joint liability related to poverty outcomes? This 
was an important question because joint liability is the pivot of microfinance. Joint 
liability could not be measured as a variable because it applied to all groups. Service 
users‘ perception of joint liability was therefore used to assess its implications for 
poverty reduction. From Tables 3.5A and 3.6A in Appendix 3, service users of the 
two programmes who ‗strongly agreed‘ or ‗agreed‘ to the statement that ‗group 
liability is the optimum way of doing microfinance‘ experienced less positive 
business outcomes compared to those who claimed group liability was not an 
optimum method of doing microfinance. The researcher did not have any literature to 
explain this relationship but it was probable that service users who had experienced 
relatively positive business outcomes were no longer enthused by the use of group 
liability to obtain access to microfinance services. 
 
It has been argued that the use of group liability inhibits entrepreneurial growth. Some 
service users‘ income-generating activities expand to the extent that they outgrow the 
size of loans offered by the microfinance interventions. Such service users are 
unlikely to be supportive of the strategy of using joint liability as a condition for 
access to loans. Joint liability is premised on loans to group members being more or 
less equal. There is usually not a great disparity in loan sizes otherwise the joint 
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liability function breaks down. The assumption behind microfinance is that poor 
people of similar socio-economic status come together to access financial services and 
therefore loans sizes do not usually vary greatly.  The concept of being one‘s 
brother‘s keeper did not resonate well with some of the interviewees.  
 
In sum, group formation methods and structure of groups affected poverty reduction 
mainly through their influence on the inclusion and retention of poorer service users.  
How decision-making was carried out in the groups affected household outcomes. 
Service users who stated that decision-making was through group consensus 
experienced more positive household outcomes than those who said leaders of the 
groups were in charge of decision-making. Service users who thought joint liability 
was not an optimum means of doing microfinance were more likely to experience 
more positive business outcomes.  
 
7.6 Do loan matters have any implications for poverty 
reduction and why? 
Most microfinance interventions are organised around the provision of microloans 
and the two interventions studied in Nsoatre were no exception. The pivotal role of 
loans in most microfinance interventions suggests that among the various 
microfinance components, loans are likely to have the most significant implications 
for poverty reduction. Loan matters in this study refer to receipt, quantum, use and 
repayment of loans.    
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7.6.1 Timing of Loan Disbursals 
From the previous chapter it was observed that the two interventions disbursed fresh 
loans after each group had fully repaid the previous one
75
. Loan disbursals followed 
that rigid pattern. This implies service users had to take loans when they became 
available rather than when they required them, a phenomenon also noted by Johnson 
and Rogaly (1997). The following statement by Johnson and Rogaly (1997:51) 
epitomises the characteristics of area of study: ‗in some areas where seasonality is a 
highly significant factor, cash is virtually unavailable during certain times of the 
year‘. At that time of the year economic activity is at its lowest level and patronage of 
goods and services is virtually at a standstill. In such context, if service users did not 
need loans but were not willing to miss a cycle, they had to adopt complex strategies 
to manage loans till they require them. It was perhaps one of the reasons why service 
users employ loans for other purposes other than for income-generating activities. 
Comments from Section 6.4.1 shows the extent of complaints from service users 
regarding how they were affected by the mode of disbursement of loans. Most of the 
service users interviewed stated that receiving loans at the ‗wrong‘ time affected their 
business negatively. 
 
In spite of the above problems, service users experienced significant and positive 
household and business outcomes when they were received on schedule compared to 
those who did not (see Tables 3.3A and 3.4A in Appendix 3). The positive business 
and household outcomes as a result of receiving loans on schedule suggests that 
service users were capable of making profitable use of loans when they were received 
at the anticipated time no matter what time of the season or year it was. Receipt of 
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 With NWEP loans disbursements were further delayed because the Rural Bank had run into liquidity 
problems. 
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loans on schedule probably enables service users to make plans of how they will use 
the money.  
 
7.6.2 Quantum of Loan 
Loan sizes in NWEP were relatively smaller than those of SAT (see Table 6.5 in 
section 6.4.2). NWEP service users rarely got what they requested for because 
Nsoatreman Rural Bank was in financial distress. Both microfinance institutions used 
the dynamic incentive strategy
76
. This strategy had implications for the poverty 
reduction efforts of the interventions. Loan increments did not take into account the 
capability of service users to repay the now bigger loans in the unchanged 16-week 
repayment period. The extreme repayment difficulties most service users most 
claimed they faced was probably due to this situation especially when it coincided 
with receipt of loans during the lean season.  
 
Interviews with SAT dropouts revealed that they taken much larger loans than they 
could repay from their income-generating activities leading to their inability to cope 
with repayment schedules. This was one of the most often cited reasons for expulsions 
and dropout of service users from SAT. This problem was more prevalent in SAT 
than NWEP because SAT service users received relatively bigger loans. By all 
likelihood it was the poorer service users who are more likely to drop out or get 
expelled from microfinance interventions as a result of taking bigger loans than they 
could handle.  
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 Disbursing repeated and bigger loans  
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Although loan size (the most recent loan amount) was not significantly correlated 
with business and household outcomes, a consistent pattern emerged from the analysis 
(see Tables 2.1A and 2.2A in Appendix 2, and Tables 3.3A, and 3.4A in Appendix 3). 
Service users most likely to say they had the most positive business and household 
outcomes were those who received between GH¢ 101 and GH¢ 300. This was 
followed by service users who received above GH¢ 300 and with those who had 
received loans up to GH¢ 100 bringing up the rear. What could account for this 
relationship? The study examined the relationship between last loan amount and 
length of time service users had been with the intervention. There was a positive and 
significant relationship between the most recent amount of loan received and the 
length of time service users had been with the interventions (see Table 2.5A in 
Appendix 2). It was probable that service users who received up to GH¢ 100 had not 
yet experienced any substantial positive effect on their households and businesses 
because they had not been in the intervention long enough or the amount was too 
small to have any meaningful effect on poverty. On the other hand, given the state of 
the local economy
77
 and the fixed period for repayment of all loans irrespective of 
size, loans of over GH¢ 300 might have been larger than the service users required 
profitably invest in businesses. This is supported by the finding that not a single 
service user from SAT and NWEP had graduated from microfinance to the 
conventional banking system. Buckley (1997), in a study on micro-enterprises in rural 
areas in Africa came up with a similar finding: in some microfinance interventions the 
demand for credit had remained constant and there was no evidence of service users 
moving towards self-sufficiency or graduating from microfinance to the conventional 
financial institutions.  
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 Poor markets including a fluctuating economy. 
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7.6.3 Loan Use  
As discussed in section 6.4.3 in the previous chapter, the majority of service users 
admitted using loans for other purposes when they had been expressly instructed by 
the microfinance institutions to apply loans only to their income-generating activities. 
During interviews service users did not hide information about using loans for other 
purposes. Information from the interviews suggests that a greater percentage than 
captured by the questionnaire routinely used their funds for other purposes (see Table 
6.3 in section 6.3.2). Although microfinance institutions perceive fungibility as a 
problem in microfinance, under the livelihoods strategies approach it is viewed as a 
crucial strategy for the poor. Johnson and Rogaly (1997) point to the futility of 
microfinance institutions attempting to direct loans to a particular purpose and trying 
to monitor the exact use to which loans are put.  
 
From Table 7.3, it was evident that loans were mostly used for consumption (coping 
with crises and seasonal fluctuations) than for accumulating assets. Indeed, the ordinal 
logistic regression analysis (see Tables 3.4A in Appendix 3) affirms the poverty-
reducing advantages of using loans for purposes other than income-generating 
activities. Compared to those who used their loans for business only, service users 
who indicated that they used part or all of their loans for non-businesses purposes 
were 2.5 times more likely to experience positive household outcomes.  This finding 
implies that using loans for non-business purposes had a significant and positive 
effect on households of service users. In an environment characterised by seasonal 
fluctuations in demand for goods and services, exercising the option of how to invest 
loans made more sense than automatically investing loans in business without regard 
to the prevailing economic conditions. Additionally, service users of the two 
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interventions who used loans for other purposes were more likely to have contributed 
or increased contribution to the education of their children than those who applied 
their loans only to their enterprises (see Table 2.4A in Appendix 2). This relationship 
was statistically significant for the two interventions.  
 
7.6.4: Loan Repayment  
The amount and the frequency of loan repayments raised intense comments from 
service users. Service users of both institutions complained that repayment schedules 
put them under great pressure. As already stated, in a rural setting with low economic 
demand, the use of dynamic incentives
78
 without corresponding lengthening of the 
repayment period put service users under intense pressure. It can be argued that it is 
the poorer service users who were more likely to succumb to that intense pressure and 
risk leaving or being kicked out of the interventions. Nteziyaremye et al. (2001) 
conducted a study in rural Mali, where the context (weak local markets) was similar 
to that of Nsoatre. The study found that the poorest members of the microfinance 
programme encountered the most difficulties in meeting repayment schedules. In 
other words they lived on the edge and the slightest mishap such as sickness, death or 
any other crisis in the household could result in repayment difficulties.  
 
Important conclusions can be drawn from analysing the effect of loan matters on 
poverty reduction. The timing of receipt of loans influenced business outcomes. 
Receipt of loans during periods of low demand (lean season) affected businesses 
negatively. Receiving loans on schedule was another significant determinant of 
household and business outcomes. A pattern extricated from the quantitative data 
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 Repeated and increased loans  
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suggested that service users who had received up to GH¢100 and more than GH¢300 
experienced less positive household and business outcomes that service users who lay 
in-between the two groups. Finally loan repayment schedules put immense pressure 
on the majority of service users. Those who dropped out or were expelled from the 
interventions for loan repayment difficulties were likely to be the poorer service users.  
 
7.7 What are the implications of institutional savings for 
poverty reduction and why? 
The reasons why and how the poor save depend on their circumstances and their 
environment (Rutherford, 2000), but the poor do really save and they do so in one 
form or another for a myriad of reasons (Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002; Johnson 
and Rogaly, 2005; Zeller and Sharma, 2000). The literature on savings (see Section 
2.9.2) shows that the poor want savings facilities that are convenient, liquid, safe and 
arguably offer realistic interest rates.  
 
From interviews with staff of the interventions, the rationale for providing savings 
facilities was to inculcate in service users the habit of savings and also ensure that 
service users had a lump sum of money for investment later on. Staff of SAT added 
that compulsory savings was a form of collateral for loans while NWEP workers said 
it enabled service users to cope with emergencies. Payment of savings deposits was 
convenient: savings instalments were paid alongside loan repayment. Deposits can be 
said to be safe: there had been no concerns or reports of anyone losing their 
accumulated savings. The staff of both savings facilities claimed interest was paid on 
savings. Service users had little knowledge about whether their savings attracted 
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interest, but as discussed in section 6.7.1, service users were generally disinterested in 
interest rates or did not understand the concept. Were savings facilities of the two 
interventions accessible to service users? For SAT the answer was no. NWEP service 
users had limited access to their savings (see Section 6.5). The poor prefer savings 
that is easily accessible (liquid) to enable them to overcome shocks. The importance 
of accessibility of loans to the poor is emphasised by Wright (1999b:1) who observed 
that the poor basically save....‗as insurance against emergencies, for social and 
religious obligations, for investment and for future consumption.‘ Therefore savings 
that are liquid is key to local savings mobilisation. Although the poor do not make 
very frequent withdrawals they appreciate the option of being able to withdraw 
whenever they want (ibid).  
  
It is also important to assess the context in which the savings facilities were offered to 
ascertain whether savings offered benefits to service users. With reference to Tables 
7.2 and 7.3 in sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively, it was evident that service users‘ 
businesses witnessed little expansion and they invested much of their loans in 
reducing the vulnerability of their households. A scrutiny of the indicators of 
household outcomes showed that the interventions enabled the majority of service 
users to cope with emergencies, economic fluctuations and daily consumption 
requirements more than for any other purposes (see Table 7.3). The environment on 
the other hand was an agricultural economy characterised by seasonal fluctuations in 
demand and generally poor markets. The above profile of service users and their 
environment suggests making savings available
79
 to service users will enable them to 
further mitigate their vulnerability. 
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 Availability could imply being able to have access to savings and repaying on short-term basis as in 
the regulations of NWEP 
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As already indicated earlier in section 6.7.2 in Chapter 6, all savings in the two 
interventions were effectively compulsory. Savings added to the loan repayments 
burden and contributed to the intense pressure faced by service users to meet 
repayment schedules. For instance, while SAT service users‘ compulsory savings of 
10% effectively reduced the amount of loan available for investment, an additional 
savings of GH¢ 1.5 was required to be paid during each loan repayment period. With 
savings playing no role in enabling service users to reduce their vulnerability and 
instead increasing their repayment burden, it can be argued that savings had a 
dampening effect on the poverty level of service users. Johnson and Copestake (2002) 
observed in Malawi that obligatory savings and frequent loan repayments meant that 
little money remained for household use.   
 
Conversely, institutional savings of the two interventions helped inculcate the habit of 
savings in service users
80
. However, the idea that SAT‘s progressive savings scheme, 
a voluntary scheme, had been made compulsory and a fixed amount determined by 
the field staff of SAT was an indication that service users of SAT were not willing to 
save voluntarily. Although the interventions did not seem to benefit service users 
much while they were in the interventions, many interviewees in SAT and NWEP 
were grateful because they were assured of a lump sum when they left the 
intervention or when the interventions folded up. 
 
In conclusion it is evident that the savings facilities of the two interventions were 
geared towards the long-term objective of enabling service users to adopt a savings 
habit and also obtain a lump sum of money when they left the intervention. However, 
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 In emerged from the interviews that women were fond of profligate spending at the expense of their 
businesses and therefore forcing them to save was a way of reducing that expenditure.  
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the context of the study area and characteristics of service users necessitated savings 
facilities that would enable them to reduce their vulnerability.  Johnson (1999) rightly 
observed that most microfinance savings schemes are not tailored to the specific 
requirements of service users. Vonderlack and Schreiner (2002) also acknowledge 
that saving facilities remain undeveloped and that few interventions have come up 
with concrete ways to satisfy the distinct demands for poor women for savings 
services in ways that will lead to poverty reduction. In sum the savings schemes of the 
two interventions seemed to have very little effect on poverty reduction. 
 
7.8 To What Extent do Costs of Microfinance Affect Poverty 
Reduction? 
Cost of microfinance in the context of this study refers to what service users deemed 
as costs in the interviews. It should seem obvious that costs of microfinance to the 
service user (see section 6.7) will increase the level of poverty of service users. Costs 
of microfinance can also have positive influences on service users and their degree of 
poverty. The aim in this section is to assess the extent to which these costs in the two 
interventions affect poverty.  
 
7.8.1 Interest Rates 
Interviewees in the two interventions agreed that the interest they paid on loans were 
high compared to that charged by the conventional banks. Indeed interest rates on 
loans of the two interventions were found to be high compared to that of the 
conventional banks. It is important to restate that service users were knowledgeable of 
the total interests they paid but had poor knowledge of the concept of interest rates 
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(see section 6.7.1). The lack of variability in interest rates in the interventions 
precluded the use of quantitative analysis in this study. However, considering that 
service users claimed to be under great pressure with regard to loan repayment (with 
interest payment making a substantial percentage of the repayment) it was likely that 
high interest rates exacerbated the already precarious situation of service users, 
especially the poorer ones.  
 
Some researchers have argued that charging market interest rates engenders the 
productive use of loans by erasing the erroneous perception of loans as gifts or grants 
(Buchenau, 2003). It also prevents the hijacking of loans by the non-poor (Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996). From the analysis in section 6.7.1, it is doubtful if interest rates 
charged stimulated the use of loans for productive use since the majority of service 
users in both interventions used their loans for other purposes (see Table 6.2 in 
Section 6.3.2). With regards to excluding the non-poor, the relatively high interest rate 
was a disincentive to loan hijacking because enquiries revealed that most of the non-
poor entrepreneurs could access credit at relatively cheaper rates from the 
conventional banking institutions. Thus the interest rate charged ensured that 
microfinance services reached poor entrepreneurs. 
 
7.8.1 Charges and Deductions  
As discussed in Section 6.7, charges and deductions were more prevalent in SAT than 
NWEP. Service users of SAT particularly complained about charges which were paid 
upfront and deductions that reduced the loans amount available for investment. 
Service users of NWEP also complained of having been misled to believe that the 
quantum of initial savings was related to the amount of the loans they will receive. 
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Much of their finances were locked up in NWEP as a result. These charges reduce the 
amount of loans available for investment and could detract from the capability of 
loans to improve the household and businesses of service users. The difference 
between the two interventions was that while NWEP‘s upfront payment occurred only 
once (before one joined the scheme), SAT‘s upfront payments occurred at the 
beginning of every cycle. An interview with a service user who was with both SAT 
and NWEP suggests what service users prefer in an intervention. This service user 
had decided to quit from one of the interventions and had made up her mind to leave 
SAT. Her explanation for quitting SAT was that they only offered a fraction of what 
was approved as a loan to service users.  
 
7.8.2 Group Meetings  
Microfinance institutions used periodic meetings as a strategy to foster group 
cohesion and stimulate high repayment rates among others. Service users of both 
interventions were unanimous that meetings had enabled them to share ideas and 
enhance solidarity amongst them. Studies have found that service users value these 
meetings for the social networks which are in turn vital for the health of income-
generating activities of service users. Additionally, social networks are important 
instruments for combating poverty (Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch, 2005). 
Meeting attendance is a useful indicator of the level of members‘ commitment to the 
group and to the intervention.  
 
From section 6.7.3 it was evident that SAT service users‘ meetings on Fridays, the 
market day of the community, rendered members unable to take advantage of the high 
patronage of goods and services on that day. As stated in the previous chapter, 
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meetings were usually delayed and further affected businesses activities of the service 
users. NWEP service users claimed meetings limited their ability to engage in 
productive activity on meeting days especially given the length of meeting times. 
Considering that NWEP members attended weekly meetings meant meetings came at 
a substantial cost to service users. Close to the end of the researcher‘s fieldwork 
period, some groups in SAT had began to experience declines in meeting attendance 
with the group leadership reluctant to apply sanctions due to the peculiar problems 
they faced. This had resulted in reduction in repayment performance which threatened 
the survival of the groups.  
 
7.9 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to assess the poverty outcomes of the intervention components, 
including the capability of microfinance interventions to attract and retain poorer 
service users. The study examined the role of socio-demographic and business 
characteristics in poverty outcomes of microfinance interventions. A pattern emerged 
from the data indicating that compared to less poor service users, poorer service users 
were more likely to experience positive household and business outcomes. Poorer 
service users were likely to have significantly contributed or increased contribution to 
the education of their children. Borrowing from multiple microfinance interventions 
had a positive and significant effect on businesses of service users. Concerning the 
effect of the intervention on businesses, not much expansion or increase in business 
assets or direct employment opportunities seems to have occurred. The intervention 
enabled service users to make more profit not by increasing revenue but by reducing 
costs through buying in bulk at a discount, at cheaper prices and not having to buy on 
credit. With regard to household outcomes, the intervention had enabled service users 
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to increase consumption. Service users scored high on measures aimed at mitigating 
vulnerability. The intervention had negligible effect on enabling service users to 
accumulate durable and long-term household assets. 
 
Contrary to the literature, the use of self-selection did not preclude poorer service 
users from joining the intervention. On the other hand, non-self-selected groups had 
fewer poor people due to expulsions. Groups that had sub-groups retained their 
members more than those without them. Regarding decision-making within groups, 
when decision-making was consensual members were likely to experience more 
positive household outcomes compared to when leaders made decisions on behalf of 
the group. In addition service users who stated group liability was not an optimum 
way of doing microfinance were more likely to state they experienced more business 
outcomes. 
 
Concerning loans, service users claimed loans could be disbursed to them at any time 
of the year. Receipt of loans during the leans season negatively affected businesses of 
service users. Service users however experienced more positive household and 
business outcomes if loans were received on schedule. Repeated loans with 
increments without corresponding increases in repayment period put a strain on 
service users‘ ability to honour repayment schedules and it was poorer service users 
who were likely to experience repayment problems and likely to be expelled from the 
intervention as a result. Service users who received between GH¢101 and GH¢300 
experienced more positive household and business outcomes that those received more 
or less than that amount. Predictably service users who used their loans for other 
purposes experienced more positive household outcomes than those who did not.  
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Finally, in examining the savings facilities provided by the intervention, the study 
found that it did not fully satisfy the needs of service users. It was observed that the 
high interest rates seem to have prevented the non-poor from hijacking microfinance 
loans. Although, weekly or fortnightly meetings afforded service users a forum to 
build social networks, it detracted from their time required for other business or 
household activities.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This thesis examined microfinance implementation processes and their implications 
for poverty from the perspective of service users. Drawing on some philosophical 
ideas from the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) and the Interpretive 
Approach, this study set out to tackle an important problem which has hitherto not 
been adequately investigated: How microfinance interventions are implemented and 
the effect of the implementation processes on poverty. To address this problem the 
study reviewed the relevant state of knowledge on microfinance. An analytic 
framework was designed which informed the formulation of the research question and 
sub-questions. In consonance with the interpretive approach and to have adequate 
control the data collection process, two microfinance interventions in Nsoatre, a rural 
community in Ghana whose language, customs and livelihoods the researcher had 
extensive knowledge of , were selected for the study. 
 
This concluding chapter first summarises the thesis by briefly reviewing the research 
problem, the research approach and methods applied in the thesis. The chapter then 
presents and discusses the main and significant findings of the study. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the thesis and presents areas for 
further research. 
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8.2 Restatement of Research Problem and Questions 
Microfinance has been perceived as an important poverty alleviation tool and on the 
basis of that the microfinance industry has phenomenally expanded based on the 
assumption that poor people‘s access to financial services will enable them work their 
way out of poverty. The extent to which microfinance reduces poverty has been 
extensively investigated with most studies relying on impact assessments. Impact 
assessment of microfinance interventions tends to assess microfinance interventions‘ 
outcomes, paying scant attention to type of services provided and the implementation 
processes which brought about these outcomes in the first place. Impact assessments 
of microfinance interventions as a result share an implicit assumption that 
microfinance interventions, the context in which they operate and the people who 
access these services are homogeneous. It is no wonder that the literature abounds 
with conflicting impacts of microfinance interventions. Microfinance institutions 
differ in orientation, services that they provide and modes of service implementation 
and therefore outcomes and impacts may differ. 
 
Many studies have examined microfinance from the perceptive of the microfinance 
institutions, concentrating on institutional sustainability. For instance, in assessing 
repayment performance such studies will ask ‗how do microfinance interventions 
engender high loan repayment?‘ From the viewpoint of service users the above 
question will be rephrased as ‗what strategies do service users employ to ensure loan 
repayment?‘ Microfinance from the perceptive of service users has received little 
attention in the microfinance literature. In researching microfinance we ought to ask 
ourselves the question ‗whose reality counts?‘81 Since the service users are the 
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 A phrase/question borrowed from Robert Chambers 
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consumers of microfinance services, it is imperative that their perspective of 
microfinance is adequately researched and documented.  
 
Based on the perceived limitation of the literature on microfinance, the study 
proposed the following research question in anticipation that its answer will 
contribute to filling a lacuna in the state of knowledge in microfinance research:  
How do implementation processes affect poverty reduction by microfinance in 
Rural Ghana? 
The above question was broken down in to two main questions: (a) How are 
microfinance interventions implemented and how do they affect activities within the 
intervention? (b) How do microfinance implementation processes affect poverty 
reduction? The sub-questions under the two main questions are listed in section 3.3. 
Chapter 6 tackled the first main question regarding the implementation processes 
while chapter 7 answered the second main question concerning the effect of the 
implementation processes on poverty reduction. 
 
8.3 Summary of the Thesis 
The first chapter of the thesis presented the research problem, objectives of the study, 
justification of the study, and scope and limitations of the study. To keep the logical 
flow of the thesis the research questions were reproduced in the introduction even 
though they were formulated after the design of the analytic framework. The chapter 
concluded with an outline of the thesis. 
 
Chapter II reviewed the state of knowledge of microfinance relevant in addressing the 
research problem. It began by disaggregating the microfinance concept and 
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delineating what constituted microfinance. In trying to understand the changes in the 
conceptualisation of microfinance over time, the chapter drew parallels between 
changes in development thinking or paradigms and microfinance. After that some 
classic impact assessment studies were reviewed to ascertain the extent to which they 
incorporated implementation processes and views of service users. Most of the studies 
reviewed hardly captured viewpoints of service users and paid scant attention to 
context or the implementation processes. The chapter then reviewed studies on the 
various components of microfinance interventions such as groups, loans and non-
financial service. Although most of these studies were comprehensive they failed to 
take a contextual perspective of the microfinance interventions. In addition, because 
of the fragmentary nature of these studies, the linkages between the various 
components of microfinance interventions were not explicated. It was evident there 
was a gap in the literature concerning studies on intervention processes and their 
implications for poverty reduction. In effect studies that examine microfinance from 
the perspective of users and investigate the effect of the implementation process on 
poverty are required.  
 
The analytic framework of the study, which can be conceptualised as the blueprint of 
the thesis was presented in Chapter III. The chapter presented and analysed the 
approaches used in the thesis. The Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) was 
introduced and how it was applied justified. It is important to state that none of the 
SLA frameworks was applied in this study. However, the philosophical ideas 
underpinning the SLA informed the formulation of the research questions, the data 
gathering work and analysis of the thesis. The SLA‘s basic tenet as an analytic 
framework is that development interventions need to be understood from the 
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perspective of people rather than projects. In analysis, SLA emphasises the 
conceptualisation of development interventions as contextually embedded projects. 
The SLA also informed the analysis of this study enabling the explanation of findings 
within the context of the study area. The interpretive approach was introduced to 
guide the selection of the study area and also the analysis of data. The research 
questions were raised at this point in the study. In answering the research question, the 
study adopted a pragmatist approach so that no research method was chosen a priori. 
Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, a therefore a mixed methods 
approach, questions were answered based on the method that was deemed most 
appropriate.   
 
A brief background of Ghana, its national financial regulatory framework, especially 
sections relevant to microfinance, was introduced in Chapter IV. Included in Chapter 
IV were backgrounds of the two microfinance institutions and the area of study. The 
regulatory framework of Ghana was presented to enhance the understanding of the 
context in which microfinance institutions operate. The study presented the 
background of Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) and Nsoatreman Women‘s Empowerment 
Programme (NWEP) showing their mode of operations, brief sketch of their 
organisational structures and the services they provide. The study presented the 
background of the area of study in this chapter and this was especially important 
because of the study‘s emphasis on context. The study reviewed the financial 
arrangements existing in Nsoatre, the environment, the economy and a brief 
exposition of the cultural practices especially those relevant to finance and economic 
matters. 
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The fieldwork activities and data analysis strategies are presented in Chapter V. The 
thesis employed interviews and questionnaires to gather data on service users of two 
microfinance interventions, SAT and NWEP. To ensure the quantitative data reflected 
the context in which the service users were embedded, interviews were first 
conducted and a preliminary analysis of the information gathered informed the 
construction of the questionnaire. The researcher also relied on documents and 
personal observation to complement the data. The researcher deliberately chose a 
rural community whose language and customs he was well acquainted with. This 
ensured that the researcher could conduct the all qualitative interviews, translation and 
transcriptions by himself. This ensured that the fidelity of the data was not distorted. 
In total 22 service users and 4 members of staff of the two interventions were 
interviewed while the researcher-administered questionnaire was used to collect data 
from 100 service users. Three research assistants were employed to assist in the 
administration of the questionnaire. Stringent checks were performed to ensure that 
the data collected was valid and reliable. Due to the smallness of the sample size, 
great efforts were expended at ensuring that the data set was without any missing 
cases or data. 
 
The interviews were translated and transcribed in the field by the researcher. 
Preliminary analysis was performed in the field to indentify variables that could be 
included in the questionnaire. The completed questionnaires were rigorously checked 
and rechecked for any errors and inconsistencies. Any problems found were 
investigated and rectified. The quantitative data was entered into SPSS and analysed 
using frequency distributions, cross-tabulations and ordinal logistic regression. For 
the dependent variables used in the multiple regression analysis, two composite 
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indicators were constructed from measures of households and businesses. The 
qualitative data were analysed according to the various themes (components of the 
interventions). The study used the mixed methods approach in the analysis of the data. 
 
A summary of the findings of the study in Chapters VI and VII are presented below. 
The research questions formulated in section 3.3 are individually addressed. The 
significant and insightful findings that add to the microfinance literature are presented 
for each question.  Chapter VIII concludes with a summary of the thesis including its 
methodological and empirical contributions to knowledge. 
 
8.4 Summary of Significant Findings 
The main objective of this thesis was to assess the implementation processes of the 
microfinance interventions and their implications for poverty reduction from the 
perspective of service users. This section presents the significant findings of the 
various questions raised in section 3.3. It also acknowledges any contributions the 
study has made to the state of knowledge on microfinance. Finally the section 
explicates the broader implications of the thesis. 
 
8.4.1 How are microfinance interventions implemented and how do 
they affect activities within the intervention?  
The above question was the first of the two main questions asked. Under the above 
research question six sub-questions were asked. The first sub-question under the 
above question was: To what extent are contextual factors and perceptions of service 
users taken into account in the design of microfinance interventions and what are the 
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implications? For both interventions there were no attempts at involving service users 
in the design of the interventions. The implication was that the interventions were not 
tailored to the circumstances of service users and the environment in which they 
operated (see section 6.2). The mismatch between the intervention and the 
circumstances of the service users is apparent throughout the thesis.  
 
Microfinance literature is silent on how microfinance interventions decide on how and 
which services to provide and the extent to which contextual factors and potential 
service users are involved in the formulation of interventions. Most microfinance 
institutions adopt interventions that have proven successful elsewhere without 
considering the suitability of the context in which it is being introduced.  
 
The second sub-question was: Are there any differences between microfinance 
institutions‘ intended and actual implementation practices and what are their 
ramifications? It is important to note that an implementation gap, the difference 
between the intended and what is actually implemented is not always negative if, for 
instance, the interventions are adapted to suit the circumstances of the service users. 
The formal information of microfinance implementation processes and what 
happened in the reality in the field was quite fascinating and revealing. Concerning 
the formation of groups, SAT‘s documents claimed the Trust Groups were further 
divided into sub-groups but these sub-groups did not exist (see section 6.3.1). NWEP 
also claimed its groups were self-formed but this was not found to be wholly true. It 
was true that the solidarity groups were self-formed but when the staff arbitrarily 
combined groups to form CSAs then that element of allowing groups to self-form was 
diluted. The importance of these sub-groups has been expatiated in sections 6.3.1 and 
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7.5.1. Self-selection into groups is perceived as the cornerstone of group formation. 
The implication of the implementation gap in group formation is that service users of 
differing risk and socio-economic levels might be in one group. Such a situation will 
mean that it is the poorer service users who are likely to be expelled (see section 
7.5.1).  
 
Another implementation gap identified was that SAT field staff claimed service users 
were issued with passbooks that contained records of all savings they had made. 
Service users on the other hand stated they had not been issued with any passbooks. It 
was evident that service users had not been issued with passbooks because no service 
user interviewed knew how much money they had accumulated with the intervention. 
For instance, a service user who had left SAT bitterly complained about being given 
far less money that she envisaged she had accumulated. Such situations seem to erode 
the trust service users had in the intervention because some service users opined that it 
was a deliberate attempt by SAT to cheat them. 
 
In NWEP service users claimed they were informed that the initial amount they 
received would depend on the initial savings that they accumulated. However all 
service users received the same amount of loans irrespective of how much each 
service user saved. In another instance the NWEP manual claimed that service users 
could access emergency loans from a fund controlled by the CSA. In reality the fund 
was ultimately controlled by the members of staff of the intervention who had to give 
consent before a member could access the loan. Such authorisations were seldom 
given which meant that service users had limited access to the emergency loans. 
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SAT charges training fees at the beginning of every cycle. Service users claimed that 
SAT failed to give them any training beyond the first cycle but yet charged them for 
training during every cycle. Service users of SAT complained about having to pay for 
a service they did not receive. However an implementation gap that SAT service users 
talked favourably about was the change in the repayment schedule from weekly to 
fortnightly. Service users who were with SAT during this change explained that it 
reduced the repayment pressure that they encountered. It is also worthy to note that 
service users usually do not know what the design of the intervention was.  
 
The assessment of the implementation gap in the two interventions though not in-
depth is an eye-opener in microfinance research. There is very little literature on 
implementation gaps in microfinance. What makes this knowledge pertinent when 
incorporated into research especially impact assessment is that it could be influential 
in explaining observed findings. 
 
The third sub-question was: what are the roles and implications of microfinance in 
group formation and dynamics? Regarding group formation in SAT it was found that 
the institution did not permit the self-selection of members into groups. Interested 
people just put their names down and when they had enough it became a group. The 
explanation for the observed method of group formation was that it mitigated 
covariant risks and boosted repayment rates. This meant that risky and non-risky 
members could be put together in a group. In the process of ensuring that risky 
members were eliminated from groups, poorer service users who were more likely to 
experience nascent repayment problems were likely to be expelled as well. In NWEP 
solidarity groups were self-formed but not in the CSAs (see section 6.3.1). With joint 
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liability gradually shifting from the solidarity groups to the CSAs, there were 
complaints of unequal loan sizes which constituted a threat to the joint liability 
strategy and hence to the sustainability of the groups. The solidarity groups were also 
found to be buffers against expulsions
82
 (see section 6.3.1). 
 
In section 6.3.2, the study found that peer monitoring was virtually non-existent 
because there was widespread knowledge among service users that loans were 
routinely used for purposes other than income-generating activities. Service users of 
the two interventions therefore did not need to monitor their peers to ensure that loans 
were used for income-generating activities. The finding of this study on peer 
monitoring contrasts with mainstream perceptions of peer monitoring in the literature. 
Peer monitoring occupies a prominent role in microfinance literature as an important 
mechanism to mitigate ex-ante moral hazard, that is, the use of loans in a manner 
which jeopardises chances of loan repayment. Marr (2002) found evidence of limited 
peer monitoring in microfinance interventions in Peru and attributed this to the high 
cost associated with monitoring loan use and the cost of sharing such information due 
to loyalty or the risk in being labelled an informer. The findings of this thesis confirm 
Marr‘s observation that there is a limited amount of peer monitoring in microfinance 
interventions. However, while Marr acknowledges the importance of peer monitoring 
as essential for good repayment performance, the findings of this study suggests 
otherwise: peer monitoring is not essential for loan repayment. In the absence of peer 
monitoring other aspects of group lending such as group formation and peer pressure 
become very important instruments in ensuring high repayment performance. This 
finding constitutes a significant empirical contribution to the body of knowledge on 
                                                 
82
 The solidarity groups were gradually ceding their function of joint liability to the CSAs (see section 
6.3.1)  
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microfinance. In addition this finding emphasises the centrality of group formation 
and group pressure in ensuring loan repayment. 
 
A general observation that emerged was that groups in the two interventions were 
found to enjoy some degree of autonomy but within boundaries defined by the 
microfinance institutions. Staff only interfered albeit surreptitiously when there were 
concerns of repayment problems. In a country where corruption was ubiquitous it was 
surprising that the study found no evidence of corruption in the implementation 
process. This is not to claim there was no corruption but if there was any it was likely 
to be well hidden or minimal. 
 
In conclusion, it has become clear that to explain group behaviour under joint liability 
schemes it is important to be knowledgeable of other components of the interventions 
and the context in which they operate. Group formation emerged as a strong 
determinant of subsequent activities of the group including dropout rates. This study 
has added to the literature on group activities, specifically on peer monitoring and the 
dynamics involved in ensuring the sustainability of groups in a rural area. 
 
The next question was: How do microfinance institutions‘ loan activities affect 
service users‘ loan management? Loan disbursals and repayment schedules followed a 
regimented pattern. This mode of loan disbursal meant that loans could be disbursed 
at any time of the year, implying that service users took loans when they became 
available rather than when they required them (see section 6.4.1). Service users 
complained of the negative consequences of taking loans during unfavourable periods 
such as during the lean season. 
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Regarding loan use, service users used loans as they deemed fit: for income-
generating activities as well as for household consumption. When service users used 
their loans for business purposes it was usually to reduce input costs by mainly buying 
stock in bulk at a discount; buying during periods when stocks were cheaper, for  
example during the harvest season; and buying cheaper with cash instead of on credit. 
 
The majority of service users complained incessantly about the pressure that they 
encountered during loan repayment. It was observed that the microfinance institutions 
adopted the dynamic incentive strategy (see section 6.4.2). The automatic loan 
increments were without reference to business growth and repayment capabilities of 
service users. Loans were increased without corresponding increase in repayment 
periods. Finally, poor markets and seasonal variations in economic activity 
contributed immensely to the repayment pressure and tension experienced by service 
users. Service users routinely accepted loan increments because of social pressure to 
be perceived as doing well in business. It is evident that the repayment pressure 
experienced by service users was genuine and that a combination of factors 
contributed to this situation. In such situations it was the poorer service users who 
were likely to suffer adverse effects and get expelled from the intervention. 
 
The finding on repayment pressure is an example of sensitivity to the concerns of 
service users, an issue usually neglected when microfinance is studied from the 
institutional sustainability perspective. In addition, the stance of this study that 
findings need to be contextually interpreted led to a better understanding and 
appreciation of the problems encountered by the service users. This represents a break 
from the usual research process on microfinance.  
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The penultimate sub-question on implementation processes was: To what extent are 
non-financial services relevant to service users?  Both interventions provided some 
non-financial services to their users. For NWEP non-financial services constituted an 
important part of the intervention (see section 6.6). Like other components of the 
interventions, the design of non-financial services did not include inputs from service 
users.  Interviews showed that SAT and NWEP service users appreciated the 
provision of education on disease prevention more than training on business 
management and the like. However, during the administration of the questionnaire, 
few service users in the two interventions could recall specific non-financial services 
they had benefited from. Considering the context and background of the mostly 
women service users (poor markets, small businesses, economic fluctuations, mostly 
non-literate, taking care of households) it is not difficult to envisage the irrelevance of 
business education that emphasises record-keeping, business growth and general 
business management. 
 
The last question was: How do service users perceive costs of microfinance and why? 
Costs of microfinance to service users include interest rates, charges and deductions, 
and other transaction costs. Interest rates in the two interventions were quoted in flat 
rates (see section 6.7.1) which translates to about 95% and 150% for SAT and NWEP 
respectively. Service users stated the interest rates were satisfactory and their point of 
comparison was with interest rates of money lenders. However moneylenders hardly 
lent for income-generating purposes. Service users‘ satisfaction with interest rates is 
thrown in doubt for two important reasons. First the lack of transparency in interest 
rate charges, that is charging flat interest rates and additional charges (in the case of 
SAT) which increased the effective interest rate made it difficult for service users who 
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are mostly illiterate to make informed decisions on interest rates. Second, the service 
users can be described as financially illiterate because it was found that service users 
did not understand the concept of interest rates (see section 6.7.1). Nevertheless, the 
high level of interest rates is certain to contribute to the repayment pressure service 
users profess to endure. As iterated, it is the poorer service users who were likely to 
suffer and even experience expulsion as a result. The literature shows that perception 
has shifted from service users not being able to afford markets interest rates to the 
entrepreneurial poor making enough profits to afford market interest rates. Although 
this study did not assess how affordable interest rates were, it found that service users 
were financially illiterate and in addition could hardly comprehend the very 
complicated interest rate landscapes of the microfinance interventions. The prevailing 
situation makes it difficult for service users to make informed decisions about the 
effect of interest rates on their businesses. In conclusion considering that service users 
operate in poor markets and also routinely used loans for non-business purposes, the 
high interest rates might have contributed to the immense repayment pressure most 
service users experienced.  
 
Charges and deductions were higher in SAT than NWEP. Perhaps it was to make up 
for SAT‘s lower interest rate compared to NWEP. For details of charges and 
deduction made by SAT see section 6.7.2. There were almost unanimous complaints 
against the various charges and deductions in SAT. Service users were particularly 
unhappy with the reduced amount of loans offered them after the deductions had been 
made. NWEP service users on the other hand received the exact amount of money 
that they had applied for as loan. Whereas service users were described as financially 
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illiterate, they knew how much loan that had been approved for them and the amount 
they received.  
 
Another cost of doing microfinance was service users having to meet periodically to 
make loan repayments and for other activities. Findings from section 6.7.3, there was 
concern for SAT‘s members‘ choice of Friday as a meeting day. Friday was 
coincidentally the community‘s ‗market day‘, an important day for traders. Meetings 
on these days were clearly inappropriate because service users were anxious to trade 
on that day and were reluctant to attend meetings. Observations revealed that service 
users were obviously reluctant to attend meetings and therefore meetings were usually 
poorly attended. Staff of SAT explained that meeting on Friday was the choice of the 
service users. This situation clearly underscored the importance of collaboration 
between the microfinance institution and service users in redressing problems when 
they crop up. 
 
8.4.2 How Do Microfinance Implementation Processes affect 
Poverty Reduction? 
The above was the second main question and under it six sub-questions were 
answered. The first sub-question was: Do characteristics of service users and their 
businesses influence poverty reduction and why? The finding of this study suggests 
that poorer service users were more likely to benefit from the intervention. They were 
also more likely to have contributed or increased their contribution to the education of 
their children. This finding is contrary to the dominant perception in the literature that 
the less poor benefit from microfinance interventions than the poor. The reason for 
such a finding is probably because this study relied on service users own perception of 
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the effects of the intervention. For more explanation on the relationship between 
levels of poverty and poverty outcomes see section 7.4.3.  
 
The study found that service users who borrowed from other microfinance institutions 
were more likely to experience beneficial business outcomes. These service users 
were also likely to experience consistent expansion in business and business assets. It 
is difficult to determine whether their businesses improved after they took other loans 
or they took the loans after their businesses had begun to improve. The latter is more 
plausible because in microfinance literature taking multiple loans is usually perceived 
as a strategy of coping with loan repayment. Poor people take on new loans to enable 
them to pay off previous loans. If these service users in this study took additional 
loans because their businesses showed signs of improvement then other factors such 
as entrepreneurial ability could account for the initial improvement in business.  
 
The second sub-question was: What are the effects of microfinance interventions on 
businesses and households? Microfinance interventions had initially caused business 
sizes to consistently expand. After that initial expansion the usual occurrence was that 
businesses expanded and contracted in tandem with seasonal fluctuations in economic 
activity. Microfinance had negligible effect on direct employment generation. When 
there was the need for additional labour, service users were likely to use household 
members who were usually unpaid. Given the constraints to business expansion 
service users make profits by reducing input cost. Microfinance enabled service users 
to reduce input costs by buying inputs in greater quantities. Service users especially 
food vendors bought large quantities of food items for storage during the harvest 
season when it was relatively cheap. For more on effects of microfinance in 
 304 
businesses see section 7.3. From the above it is clear that seasonal fluctuations in 
economic activity played an important role in the businesses of service users. 
 
Regarding the effect of microfinance intervention on households, the intervention had 
contributed very little in enabling service users to acquire household and long-term 
assets. However the interventions had enabled households to increase their 
consumption but more importantly it seems to have enabled service users to reduce 
their vulnerability. On a comparative basis, SAT service users reduced vulnerability 
and accumulated more assets than NWEP service users. The findings on the effect of 
microfinance on businesses and households were generally consistent with the 
literature on microfinance. In sum, this study provides useful insights into the 
underlying reasons regarding how microfinance interventions influence households 
and businesses of service users. For example, the use of contextual explanations helps 
in understanding why microfinance interventions affected household and businesses 
in the ways that they did. 
 
The third sub-question was: Do group formation and dynamics influence poverty 
reduction? The study found that group formation and structure were important 
determinants of subsequent occurrences within the intervention, dropout rates. 
Incidentally it was poorer service users who were more likely to drop out or be 
expelled from the intervention.  
 
Another significant finding in the study was the effect of decision-making within 
groups on household outcomes and dropout rates. Logistic regression results showed 
(see section 7.5.2) that when decision-making was based on group consensus 
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members were more likely to experience positive household outcomes compared to 
when leaders were responsible for decision-making in the group. In addition there 
were more expulsions in groups where leaders where the decision makers. No reason 
could readily be adduced to explain the effect of decision-making on household 
outcomes and this will therefore require further investigation.  
 
It can be argued that self-formation of groups is likely to reduce the level of 
heterogeneity (socio-economic and risk) within groups and thereby reduce the 
probability of leaders taking decisions for the group. Evidence for the argument 
comes from the data. Unlike NWEP, SAT groups were not formed through self-
selection and from Table 2A in Appendix 2, it is seen that SAT was more leader-
driven in decision-making than NWEP. Groups within NWEP had experienced fewer 
expulsions compared to SAT. 
 
The last significant finding on groups was that service users who claimed group 
liability was not an optimum method of doing microfinance experienced more 
positive business outcomes compared to those who were of the opinion that joint 
liability  was an optimum way of doing microfinance. Does this suggest that group 
liability people who do well in business feel inhibited by joint liability? This seems 
plausible because joint liability has never been the choice of service users but rather a 
mechanism used by microfinance institutions as a form of collateral. The idea that 
service users should be responsible for the failings or debts of their peers did not 
resonate well with the service users. Grameen Bank has now abolished joint liability 
(Reggiani, 2005), while in a study in Bangladesh and Uganda 76% and 87% of 
service users respectively wanted to be independent borrowers (WWB, 2003). It also 
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makes sense that service users who do not perform so well in business will want 
assistance from more successful entrepreneurs when it came to loan repayment.  
 
The effect of groups and joint liability on poverty reduction is an area very little 
studied in microfinance. Again the findings buttress the need to study the entire 
intervention to understand and explain the ensuing relationships and activities. For 
instance, how groups were initially formed explain how leaders come to dominate 
decision-making in groups. The finding on groups also suggests that joint liability is 
inimical to business development. It is important to reiterate that these are initial 
findings of an unexplored area in microfinance and will certainly benefit from further 
research.  
 
The next sub-question asked was: How do loan matters affect poverty reduction? 
Loan disbursals could be delayed for many reasons but service users experienced 
significant and positive household and business outcomes when loans were received 
on schedule. Analysis of the effect of loan use revealed an important result: 
employing loans for non-business purposes was associated with positive and 
significant effects on households (see section 7.6.3). Additionally, service users who 
used their loans for other purposes were more likely to have significantly contributed 
or increased contribution to the education of their children. 
 
Concerning amount of loans, service users whose last loan was between GH¢ 101 and 
GH¢300 saw the most positive household and business outcomes followed by those 
who received over GH¢300, with service users receiving less than GH¢101 bringing 
up the rear (see Tables 2.1A, 2.2A, 3.3A and 3.4A). For explanation about this 
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observation see section 7.6.2. According to Littlefield, Murdoch and Hashemi (2003), 
impact intensifies as service users stay longer in a given programme. This study 
however suggests otherwise: the impacts tend to reduce with time. It is noteworthy 
that there was no evidence of service users having successfully graduated from 
microfinance to a conventional banking institution. Poor markets, tight loan 
repayment schedules and women‘s other competing commitments such as taking care 
of the household constitute impediments to graduation from microfinance 
interventions.  
 
The next sub-question was: Do savings facilities of microfinance institutions enable 
service users to reduce poverty? The savings schemes of the two interventions were 
essentially unidirectional processes. Service users contributed to the scheme but did 
not have access to their savings
83
. It can be concluded that the savings schemes had 
very little direct effect on poverty because the schemes were not tailored to meet the 
specific requirements of service users. For instance, savings schemes did not 
incorporate voluntary savings so that service users could save more or less depending 
on economic fluctuations and also savings made available to service users when they 
were economically hard-up during the lean season. The lack of development of 
savings facilities is well documented in the microfinance literature (Johnson, 1999; 
Vonderlack and Schriener, 2002). Service users‘ lack of knowledge on some aspects 
of the savings schemes was also revealed: SAT members did not know how much 
they had accumulated as savings; and service users in the two interventions did not 
know whether their savings attracted any interest. In spite of the above mentioned 
situation, a majority of service users stated they were satisfied with the savings 
                                                 
83
 NWEP manual says service users could borrow from their group schemes but they hardly ever had 
access to the funds.  
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scheme (see Table 6.11) because it forced
84
 them to accumulate lump sums of money. 
The bottom line is that if savings could only be accessed after service users had left 
the intervention (when they were no longer service users) then technically the savings 
schemes cannot be said to have benefited service users.  
 
The last sub-question was:  What is the relationship between the costs of microfinance 
and poverty reduction? As stated in section 7.8, costs of microfinance refer to costs 
associated with service users‘ access to financial services. Interest rates were high 
compared to that of the orthodox financial institutions. Given the mismatch between 
modes of loan disbursal and repayment,
85
 and the poor and fluctuating markets, high 
interest rates could have played a significant role in the intense pressure service users 
complained about regarding loan repayment. The study also found that the high 
interest rates prevented the hijacking of loans by the non-poor. However, contrary to 
what is espoused by the literature, the high interest rates did not engender the 
productive use (business) of credit. 
 
Group meetings had become a significant cost to service users especially SAT‘s. For 
SAT service users it interfered with business on the most important day of the week in 
Nsoatre: the market day. NWEP service users, on the other hand, complained about 
the frequency of the meetings (weekly).   
  
After addressing the two main question and sub-questions, the study attempted to 
answer, in a brief summary, the overall research question: How do implementation 
                                                 
84
 An interviewee of SAT commented that women were especially noted for profligate spending to the 
detriment of their businesses so forcing them to save was a good way curbing that habit. 
85
 Loans being disbursed at any time of the year; loan increments not being accompanied by 
corresponding increase in repayment period; and the inflexibility in loan repayments.   
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processes affect poverty reduction by microfinance in rural Ghana? Turning to 
how the microfinance interventions were implemented, the overarching finding of 
study was that the interventions were designed without inputs from service users or 
the people and without reference to the environment and conditions of the study area. 
This resulting outcome was a general mismatch between the implementation 
processes and context in which the interventions were introduced. For example, loan 
disbursement and repayment schedules were regimented and did not take into 
consideration the fluctuating economic conditions prevalent in the area of study. The 
effect of the non-participation of service users in the formulation of the designs of the 
interventions resonates throughout the findings of this study. Poverty was measured in 
terms of household and business outcomes, and the capability of the interventions to 
attract and retain poorer people (see sections 5.3.3, 7.3, 7.4 and Appendix 4.4A).   
 
Regarding the implementation of the various components of the interventions, the 
study found that modes of group formation and structure had important effects on the 
retention of poorer service users in groups (see sections 6.3 and 7.5). Groups that 
were self-formed were more capable of retaining poorer service users that those that 
were not. Contrary to literature, self-formation of groups did not exclude poorer 
people from the groups. The presence of sub-groups within groups tended to aid the 
retention of service users but the effect waned over time (see section 7.5.1). Decision-
making within groups had implications for household outcomes and expulsion. When 
decision were made in groups based on consensus rather than by leaders of the group, 
had favourable effect on households and reduced expulsions (see section 7.5.2).  
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How loans schemes were implemented had poverty implications for service users. 
When loans were received on schedule they had positive effects on household and 
business of service users (see section 7.6.1). Findings on the effect of loan size on 
household and businesses indicated that initially positive outcomes that accrued to 
service users increased with increasing loan size and after a certain threshold as the 
loans became larger the gains began to decrease (see section 7.6.2). Using loans for 
non-business purposes was associated with more beneficial household outcomes but 
did not affect service users‘ loan repayment efforts (see section 7.6.3). Service users 
experienced severe pressure associated with loan repayment and it was the poorer 
service users who were likely to suffer expulsion. The study found that dynamic 
incentives strategy was used without corresponding increase in repayment period or 
an assessment of the capability of service users to repay loans. The study argued that 
it was the poorer service users who were likely to face repayment problems and get 
expelled from the intervention.    
 
Finally, given the circumstances of the service users and the savings schemes being 
operated, the study argued that savings schemes were not very beneficial to the users. 
Service users did not have access to savings facilities while they were with the 
intervention and the burden of contribution could have contributed the severe loan 
repayment pressure they experienced (see section 7.7).  
 
The section concludes with a discussion of broad observations extracted from the 
main findings. First, service users‘ lack of knowledge was evident throughout the 
assessment of the implementation process. For instance, service users had very little 
knowledge about interest rates (savings and loans), non-financial services and for 
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SAT service users, how much they had saved. The lack of knowledge could stem 
from three factors: (1) the high level of financial illiteracy among service users, (2) 
certain aspects of the intervention were irrelevant to service users and they therefore 
not worth remembering and (3) staff of the intervention failed to provide information 
to service users at all or failed to deliver information accurately.   
 
The second observation was the importance of group formation to the microfinance 
interventions. How groups were formed was found to have implications for other 
components of the intervention. Group formation had effects on dropout rates, 
decision-making in groups and on household outcomes. The study found that in the 
absence of peer monitoring, group formation became an important determinant of 
loan repayment performance.  
 
The final observation relates to the lack of evidence of corruption in the two 
interventions. This is surprising considering that corrupt practices are very rampant in 
the country and also perceived as normal practice in most workplaces. In Ghana it is 
routine practice that to obtain a loan one has to present a ‗gift‘.  
 
8.5 Methodological Implications of the Study  
The study has made some contributions to understanding implementation processes 
and their effect on poverty in rural areas. The findings of this thesis established that 
understandings of microfinance interventions cannot be divorced from the context in 
which they operate. In examining microfinance interventions from the perspective of 
service users the findings of this thesis suggests a reappraisal of the conceptualisation 
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of microfinance interventions, especially in rural areas. This section presents the 
methodological contributions of the study.  
  
First, in studying microfinance from the perspective of the users, this study focussed 
on understanding what service users appreciate and are concerned about in 
microfinance interventions. For example, the study investigated service users‘ 
complaints about repayment pressure, an issue many studies have glossed over. The 
study is also guided by the interpretive approach to ensure that the findings truly 
reflect what service users intended to convey. In addition, the researcher chose a study 
area in which he had sufficient knowledge of the context.  
 
Second, the study ensured that the quantitative data was contextually embedded by 
constructing the questionnaire based information from interviews. Most microfinance 
studies have used one method of analysis and on the few occasions where a mixed 
methods approach has been used data has been collected independent of each other.  
 
Third, studies that have investigated the components of microfinance interventions 
have been limited to individual components (such as group lending, loans and 
savings) have resulted in incomplete explanation and understanding of the 
interventions (see Stiglitz, 1990; Aghion, 1999; Marr, 2002, Ahlin and Townsend, 
2007; Al-Azzam and Sarangi, 2007). This study has demonstrated that a holistic study 
of interventions enhances understanding of the individual components. For instance, it 
was the findings on the use of loans that shed light on the irrelevance of peer 
monitoring. Loans issues and group activities have typically been studied separately 
(see above citations). 
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8.6 Limitations of the Study 
It should be stated that one of the aims of this study was to ensure that findings could 
be generalised to rural communities in Ghana. However, due to the lack of resources 
only two microfinance interventions were studied in a single locale and therefore 
results can strictly be generalisable only to service users in these interventions. 
However, because most microfinance institutions in Ghana have adopted versions of 
the Grameen model as seen in SAT and NWEP, there is a strong likelihood that the 
findings of this study will be applicable to other interventions in rural communities in 
the forest belt of Ghana.  
 
Another limitation of the study was the smallness of the sample sizes for the two 
interventions. During the preliminary fieldwork the researcher had no independent 
means of checking the number of service users in the interventions and had to rely on 
verbal assurances of the adequacy of the population. After it was evident that 
regression analysis could not be conducted independently on each intervention, the 
two samples were carefully combined by using the same questionnaire and weighting 
the NWEP sample. These strategies mitigated the problem of dealing with a small 
sample size.  
 
Finally the study was limited by the lack of access to data on repayment, expulsion 
and dropout rates on the two microfinance interventions. No concrete figures could be 
obtained on the above. The study relied on information obtained during interviews 
and documents from the leaders of the groups. Record-keeping was however not very 
good.  Information on overall repayment rates would have enabled a clearer picture of 
the interventions to emerge. From the literature there is a tendency for microfinance 
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institutions to closely guard such information especially regarding how such figures 
are computed (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). The study was not overly 
affected by the lack of such data because the main aim of the study was to understand 
microfinance from the perspective of the users for which information was readily 
available. 
 
8.7 Areas for Further Research 
Comprehensive and contextual assessments of the processes of microfinance 
interventions from the perspective of service users seem to be novel method of 
researching microfinance interventions. Further studies that employ larger sample 
sizes and encompass wider and different geographical, cultural and economic aspects 
are required.  
 
Specifically studies into how microfinance interventions are designed are required. 
This study has indicated that there is very little literature on what factors are 
considered in the design of microfinance interventions. Investigations into 
implementation gaps should be incorporated into microfinance research, especially 
impact assessments because these could be explanatory factors for findings.    
 
The effect of group activities on poverty outcomes is an innovation in microfinance 
research and will require further studies. For example, how decision-making 
influences poverty outcomes could not be adequately explained in this study. This 
could form the research problem for other studies. In addition this study demonstrated 
the importance of group formation in microfinance. This constitutes a significant 
discovery in the microfinance literature and requires more rigorous research if it is to 
 315 
inform policy.  Findings of this study suggest that successful service users do not 
appreciate the use of joint liability in microfinance. Further studies are required to 
confirm this finding given its centrality in microfinance.  
 
Another issue that requires further investigation is the changes in significance and 
coefficients of some variables in the different ordinal logistic regression models. As 
observed in Appendix 3, the period of time (in cycles) that service users had spent in 
the microfinance had a significant effect on business in the model with variables 
relating to service users‘ personal and business characteristics, and variables related to 
loans (Table 3.3A in Appendix 3). In another model, however, with variables relating 
to service users personal and business characteristics and variables on group matters, 
the same variable showed a significant effect on household outcomes (see Table 3.5A 
in Appendix 3). Additionally the coefficients indicating the effect of borrowing from 
other microfinance interventions on business outcomes tended to change in the 
different models. Investigation of why these occur might reveal interesting answers. 
 
To conclude, further studies that are sensitive to service users and amplify their 
concerns and appreciations are required. Poor people are usually of the impression 
that interventions are doing them a favour so they seldom complain about the 
interventions and therefore studies that pick up the faintest of murmurings of service 
users are required to make interventions suitable for service users.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Socio-demographic Background and Business 
Characteristics of Service Users 
 
Appendix 1 presents the analysis for a selection of socio-demographic and business 
characteristics of service users. Socio-demographic information of respondents is vital 
in a study that emphasises the issue of context. The variables analysed and discussed 
in this section form an important resource for answering the research questions and 
also employed as control variables in the ordinal logistic regression analysis. 
Frequency distributions of the variables are presented in tables after the discussion.    
 
1.1A Gender  
Most microfinance interventions are mostly of constituted of women and SAT and 
NWEP were no exceptions. NWEP exclusively targeted women, while SAT did not 
discriminate between genders. However, the criteria employed by SAT for inclusion 
into the intervention ensured that the groups were overwhelmingly women. SAT 
targeted the entrepreneurial poor who were already engaged in an economic activity. 
In Nsoatre women constitute the majority of people engaged in micro-enterprises (i.e. 
food vending, agro-processing, trading in agricultural produce, small shops etc). 
According to staff of SAT, most of the education such as that on menopause and 
preventing diseases in children were aimed at women. Given the above reasons and as 
shown in Table 1.1A it is therefore not surprising that out of SAT‘s sample size of 60 
only 3 were male representing about 5%.      
 
1.2A Age 
Age was converted into a four-category ordinal variable (see Table 1.2A). A 
categorical variable rather than a continuous one was more appropriate because 
women were not willing to reveal their ages or did not know their exact ages. 
However, they were willing to give estimates of how old they were, which suited the 
categories well. Service users of SAT service users were on the average older than 
NWEP‘s. Table 1.2A shows that 66.7% of service users of SAT were aged above 40 
years compared to 42.5% for NWEP.  
 
1.3 A Marital Status 
Table 1.3A showed that married service users constituted the majority in both SAT 
(71.7%) and NWEP (62.5%). It is interesting to note that the number of divorcees 
(35%) in NWEP was significantly higher than that of SAT (10%) and perhaps that of 
the general population. The literature highlights the vulnerability of one-parent 
households (especially female-headed households) and the fact that such households 
are more likely to be poorer than two-parent households.  
 
To throw more light the characteristics of the marital status of service users, a cross-
tabular analysis between marital status and age (see Table 1.4A) was conducted. 
Among NWEP service users, divorcees tended to be younger than married women, 
71.4% of divorcees were under 40 years compared to 52% of those married. For SAT 
all six divorced respondents (100%) were aged above 40 years as apposed 64.1% of 
married respondents. 
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In cross-tabulating marital status with number of children, Table 1.5A revealed that in 
the NWEP intervention 78.6% of divorcees had three or more children compared to 
72% for married women. The observation in the SAT intervention was quite similar to 
that of NWEP: 100% of SAT‘s divorcee respondents and 86% of married respondents 
had more than three children. In sum, a picture of young single service users (mostly 
women) with relatively many children emerges (especially from NWEP) from the 
forgoing analysis and indicates the extent of vulnerability of these service users.  
 
1.4A Level of Education 
Level of education was included as a five-category nominal variable in Table 1.6A. 
The study expected that better educated service users would make better use of 
microfinance and thus show more positive household and business outcomes. In 
Ghana, primary education refers to 6 years of education; middle school, 10 years
86
; 
secondary school, between 12 and 17 years of education
87
; and post-secondary refers 
educational qualifications above secondary school (for example teacher training 
college and university education). The three males in SAT‘s sample on the average 
had higher levels of education compared to their female counterparts: one had 
secondary education while the other two possessed post-secondary education. As 
shown in Table 1.6A, NWEP respondents had a slightly higher percentage of people 
who had some level of education 82.5%% compared to 76.7% for SAT. The category 
with the highest frequency in both groups was middle school level of education. 
Again, NWEP respondents had a higher percentage (62.5%) than SAT‘s (48.3%).   
 
1.5A Occupation of Spouse  
The main criterion for selection of service users into the two interventions was that 
they should be engaged in an income generating activity (non-farm enterprise). 
Although the smallness of initial loans and other strategies helped to some extent to 
exclude the non-poor, the members of the intervention were not likely to be 
homogenous in terms of socio-economic status. The questionnaire used the 
occupation of the spouses of service users as a means of gaining more information 
about the socio-economic status of service users. In predominantly patriarchal 
societies such as the study area, the socio-economic status of the household is 
primarily determined by the husband‘s occupation (that is if there is a spouse). The 
occupation of the husband is a robust variable for determining the socio-economic 
status of the household because it is not likely to be influenced by the effect of the 
microfinance intervention. Service users without spouses (husbands) were grouped in 
a ‗not applicable‘ category. 
  
The study hypothesised that households of higher socio-economic status were more 
likely to use microcredit for entrepreneurial activities as opposed to poorer 
households who might have more competing uses for microloans. For instance, 
compared to poorer households, less poor families will be less inclined to use loans 
for payment of children‘s fees because the spouse (usually the husband) will cater for 
such expenses. Ideally, microcredit is thought to yield the most return if invested in 
microenterprises. This study therefore posited that microfinance interventions will 
                                                 
86
 Middle school category includes Junior Secondary School (JSS) students which is 9 years of 
education. The new educational reform was introduced in 1987.  
87
 Secondary school education comprises of Senior Secondary School (SSS), Sixth form and normal 
form five secondary education.  
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have more positive effects on households and businesses of service users from a 
higher socio-economic status than a lower one.  
 
The various categories of this ‗occupation of spouse88‘ variable were constructed (see 
Table 1.7A) based on income sources, quantum and regularity of income flows. 
Government employees were usually considered relatively well paid, their incomes 
were not subject to seasonal fluctuations and they enjoyed greater job security.  
Shopkeepers, traders and artisans come after government employees. Even though 
their incomes were to a certain degree subject to seasonal fluctuations, the effect is 
not as great as the lesser categories. Other employees refer to people who were 
employed by private individuals in occupations such as driving and shop-keeping. 
They are usually not well paid and have no job security because these forms of 
employment are informal contractual arrangements in which such employees are 
subject to dismissal at any given time. Farmers, especially food crop farmers are 
usually considered the poorest. The category ‗not applicable‘ refers to respondents 
(mostly women) who do not have spouses. Only one spouse of a respondent was in 
the unemployed category. It is worth noting that most of the people in the other 
occupational categories could be engaged in part-time farming activities. The 
categorisations emphasise the main occupation of spouses.  
 
In combining three categories that reflected the least poor (government employees, 
other employees and traders/self employed), the spouses of SAT respondents 
constituted 31.6% while NWEP made up 25% (see Table 1.7A). This observation 
adds to the evidence that SAT respondents, compared to NWEP‘s were less poor. 
Characteristic of a rural community, farmers constituted the category with most 
respondents, 40% and 37.5% for SAT and NWEP respectively. The poorer categories 
(farmers, unemployed and not applicable), constituted 75% in NWEP and 68.4% in 
SAT  
 
1.6A Number of Dependent Children 
Most microfinance service users were women and in developing countries the 
responsibility of household chores primarily falls on women. It was expected that 
resources (including time) required to take care of dependent children will detract 
from resources required for business activities. Table 1.8A shows that in the two 
microfinance institutions, majority of service users (about 67%) of both interventions 
had between 3 and 6 children. Only 15% and 7.5% of SAT and NWEP service users 
had 7 or more dependent children.  
 
1.7A Being Indigenous   
The question required that respondents state whether they were indigenous to the area 
of study. Being indigenous implies being affiliated or belonging to a clan in the 
community. Indigenous service users are more likely to benefit from social support 
network that exist within clans. These traditional social support networks are very 
important because there are no public social support systems. Non-indigenous service 
users are unlikely to have access such an extensive support network which may 
translate into financial/business support and higher patronage of business output. In 
                                                 
88
 For more information on the various categories of occupations and incomes see Canagarajah, S., 
Newman, C. and Bhattamishra, R. (2001). Non-farm income, gender, and inequality: evidence from 
rural Ghana and Uganda. Food Policy, 26(4): 405-420. 
 
 344 
total, 81.7% from SAT and 87.5% of NWEP (see Table 1.9A) service users indicated 
that they were indigenous to the area of study.  
 
1.8A Types of Business 
The types of micro-enterprises in which the service users engaged is an indicator of 
the amount of capital required to establish the business, the quantum of revenue, 
profitability and ultimately the degree of impact of the intervention on the household. 
For instance, consider two micro-entrepreneurs: one who retails a basket of oranges 
every evening worth GH¢5 and another who operates a retailing shop and making an 
average of GH¢50 per day. These two are likely to be faced differing capital 
requirements and level of profit. The latter service user is likely to make more profit 
and be better-off.  The categories were therefore constructed to highlight these 
differences. It is important to note that the ‗type of business‘ variable refers to the 
main type of businesses which were supported by the microfinance institution. The 
categorisation of this variable was primarily informed by the researcher‘s extensive 
prior knowledge of the study area and reinforced by field observation.  
  
From Table 1.10A, food vendors who constituted 52.5% and 38.3% in NWEP and 
SAT respectively were those whose businesses usually required the least amount of 
capital to establish. Food vending is usually a part-time job, with business being 
conducted mostly during mornings and evenings. Shopkeepers and other traders
89
 
constituted 58.4% and 40% of SAT and NWEP service users respectively. These two 
categories of service users (shopkeepers and other traders) required relatively larger 
sums of money for their business activities and were likely to be less poor. SAT had 
no artisans but had two service users who mentioned farming as their business 
supported by microcredit. It is baffling why farmers were included in SAT 
programme when during interviews with staff they claim they did not do business 
with farmers. Follow-up effort efforts failed to yield any information on the reason for 
inclusion of farmers in SAT. NWEP, on the other hand had three artisans. 
 
1.9A Number of Business 
Diversification of economic activities is regarded as an important livelihood strategy. 
To reduce vulnerability the poor endeavour to diversify their income sources. It is 
therefore expected that service users with multiple business ventures will have more 
positive business outcomes. The study measured the number of economic activities 
that service users were engaged in. From Table 1.11A, it is clear that there was not 
much difference between the percentage distribution of the number of economic 
activities performed by service users in SAT and NWEP. A little over half of service 
users in both SAT (53.3%) and NWEP (52.5%) were engaged in only one economic 
activity. For service users with two occupations, NWEP registered 45%, while those 
in SAT constituted 41.7%. Very few of the service users were engaged in three 
occupations. Being engaged in farming activities was not considered as an economic 
activity here because almost all service users were engaged in some form of farming 
activity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
89
 The ‗other traders‘ category is made up of traders in agricultural products such as maize, plantain, 
yam and vegetables. 
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1.10A Amount of Time Spent on Business 
The amount of time service users spent on their business was employed as a proxy for 
the size of business. This variable was purposely included to serve as a control 
variable for the importance of the business to the household of the service user. From 
observations and enquiries in the field, service users with small businesses such as 
morning food vendors spent about 4 hours in the evening preparing food to be sold in 
the morning. In the morning they spend the same about the same amount of time 
selling their food. To such people their business was considered part-time. There were 
others who spent most of their time on their business—example shopkeepers and 
dressmakers. From Table 1.12A, majority of the service users in the two interventions 
worked over 8 hours per day: 68.3% and 57.5% for SAT and NWEP service users 
respectively. 
 
1.11A Borrowing from other Sources 
The study asked service users if they borrowed from other microfinance interventions. 
From Table 1.13A only 4 service users each from SAT and NWEP said they 
borrowed from other microfinance interventions. The variable was included as a 
control variable since loans from other interventions could confound the results of 
ordinal logistic regression.   
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1A: Gender 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid female 57 95.0 95.0 95.0 
male 3 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid female 40 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
Table 1.2A: Age of Service User 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid Up to 30 9 15.0 15.0 15.0 
31 - 40 11 18.3 18.3 33.3 
41 - 50 30 50.0 50.0 83.3 
51 and above 10 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid Up to 30 5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
31 - 40 18 45.0 45.0 57.5 
41 - 50 14 35.0 35.0 92.5 
51 and above 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 1.3A: Marital Status 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid single 7 11.7 11.7 11.7 
married 43 71.7 71.7 83.3 
divorced 6 10.0 10.0 93.3 
widow/widower 4 6.7 6.7 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid married 25 62.5 62.5 62.5 
divorced 14 35.0 35.0 97.5 
widow/widower 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4A: Age of Service User by Marital Status  
Name of 
Intervention      Age of service user Total 
      Up to 30 
31 - 
40 
41 - 
50 
51 and 
above Up to 30 
SAT Marital 
status 
single Count 
3 2 2 0 7 
      % within Marital status 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
    married Count 6 9 21 7 43 
      % within Marital status 14.0% 20.9% 48.8% 16.3% 100.0% 
    divorced Count 0 0 5 1 6 
      % within Marital status .0% .0% 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
    widow/ 
widower 
Count 
0 0 2 2 4 
      % within Marital status .0% .0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  Total Count 9 11 30 10 60 
    % within Marital status 15.0% 18.3% 50.0% 16.7% 100.0% 
NWEP Marital 
status 
married Count 
3 10 9 3 25 
      % within Marital status 12.0% 40.0% 36.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
    divorced Count 2 8 4 0 14 
      % within Marital status 14.3% 57.1% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
    widow/ 
widower 
Count 
0 0 1 0 1 
      % within Marital status 
.0% .0% 
100.0
% 
.0% 100.0% 
  Total Count 5 18 14 3 40 
      % within Marital status 12.5% 45.0% 35.0% 7.5% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 1.5A: Number of Children by Marital Status 
Name of  
Intervention 
  
  
  
  
  
Number of children Total 
0 - 2 3-6 
7 and 
above 0 - 2 
SAT Marital 
status 
single Count 
5 2 0 7 
      % within Marital status 71.4% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
    married Count 6 31 6 43 
      % within Marital status 14.0% 72.1% 14.0% 100.0% 
    divorced Count 0 5 1 6 
      % within Marital status .0% 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
    widow/ 
widower 
Count 
0 2 2 4 
      % within Marital status .0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  Total Count 11 40 9 60 
    % within Marital status 18.3% 66.7% 15.0% 100.0% 
NWEP Marital 
status 
married Count 
7 15 3 25 
      % within Marital status 28.0% 60.0% 12.0% 100.0% 
    divorced Count 3 11 0 14 
      % within Marital status 21.4% 78.6% .0% 100.0% 
    widow/ 
widower 
Count 
0 1 0 1 
      % within Marital status .0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
  Total Count 10 27 3 40 
      % within Marital status 25.0% 67.5% 7.5% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.6A: Level of Education 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid none 14 23.3 23.3 23.3 
primary 11 18.3 18.3 41.7 
middle school 29 48.3 48.3 90.0 
secondary 4 6.7 6.7 96.7 
post-secondary 2 3.3 3.3 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid none 7 17.5 17.5 17.5 
primary 6 15.0 15.0 32.5 
middle school 25 62.5 62.5 95.0 
secondary 2 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 1.7A: Occupation of Spouse 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid farmers 24 40.0 40.0 40.0 
    trader/self employed 8 13.3 13.3 53.3 
    other employees 5 8.3 8.3 61.7 
    Gov’t employees 6 10.0 10.0 71.7 
    not applicable 16 26.7 26.7 98.3 
    unemployed 1 1.7 1.7 100.0 
    Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid farmers 15 37.5 37.5 37.5 
    trader/self employed 6 15.0 15.0 52.5 
    other employees 2 5.0 5.0 57.5 
    Gov’t employees 2 5.0 5.0 62.5 
    not applicable 15 37.5 37.5 100.0 
    Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.8A: Number of Children 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid 0 - 2 11 18.3 18.3 18.3 
3-6 40 66.7 66.7 85.0 
7and above 9 15.0 15.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid 0 - 2 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
3-6 27 67.5 67.5 92.5 
7and above 3 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.9A: Being an Indigene 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid yes 49 81.7 81.7 81.7 
no 11 18.3 18.3 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid yes 35 87.5 87.5 87.5 
no 5 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 1.10A: Type of Business 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid food seller 23 38.3 38.3 38.3 
shopkeeper 10 16.7 16.7 55.0 
other traders 25 41.7 41.7 96.7 
farming 2 3.3 3.3 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid food seller 21 52.5 52.5 52.5 
artisan 3 7.5 7.5 60.0 
shopkeeper 7 17.5 17.5 77.5 
other traders 9 22.5 22.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.11A: Number of Businesses 
Name of  Intervention   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid one 32 53.3 53.3 53.3 
two 25 41.7 41.7 95.0 
more than 2 3 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 60 100.0 100.0   
NWEP Valid one 21 52.5 52.5 52.5 
two 18 45.0 45.0 97.5 
more than 2 1 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0   
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.12A: Amount of Time Spent on Business 
Name of  Intervention Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid  up to 8 hrs 19 31.7 31.7 31.7 
 over 8 hrs 41 68.3 68.3 100.0 
 Total 60 100.0 100.0  
NWEP Valid  up to 8 hrs 17 42.5 42.5 42.5 
 over 8 hrs 23 57.5 57.5 100.0 
 Total 40 100.0 100.0  
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 1.13A: Do You Borrow from Other Sources?  
Name of  Intervention Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
SAT Valid  yes 4 6.7 6.7 6.7 
 no 56 93.3 93.3 100.0 
 Total 60 100.0 100.0  
NWEP Valid  yes 4 10.0 10.0 10.0 
 no 36 90.0 90.0 100.0 
 Total 40 100.0 100.0  
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Appendix 2: Business and Household Outcomes:  Cross-
Tabular Analysis 
 
Appendix 2 presents cross-tabular data and its interpretation. The independent 
variables were cross-tabulated with the two dependent variables: household and 
business outcomes. In addition, significant relationships in the cross-tabulations 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable that could not be 
aggregated namely ‗contributed or increased contribution to the education of children‘ 
was presented. The discussion that follows is grouped under: socio-demographic 
characteristics; nature of business; group and loan issues. The relationships that were 
statistically significant were flagged. Appendix 2 ends with a discussion on the effect 
of microfinance interventions on children‘s education. The results of the cross-tabular 
analyses are presented in Tables 2.1A to 2.5A after the interpretation of the data.  
 
 
2.1A Socio-demographic Characteristics 
The study assessed the relationship between the socio-economic characteristics of 
service users and businesses and households outcomes. The variables below were 
employed in the cross-tabular analysis. Preliminary cross-tabular analysis showed that 
some variables had too few cases in a cell to make the analysis meaningful. These 
variables were carefully recategorised.  
  
2.1.1A Age of Service User 
Table 2.1A showed that majority of service users were between 31 and 50 years. 
Service users between the ages of 31 and 50 showed higher likelihood of experiencing 
positive household outcomes compared to the two other categories. There was no 
discernable pattern with respect to business outcomes (see Table 2.2A).  However, the 
age of service users did not significantly influence businesses and households of 
service users.  
 
2.1.2A Marital Status 
Marital status is an example of a variable that was recategorised. Service users of 
SAT who were single reported that the intervention had a more positive effect on their 
businesses compared to those who were married (see Table 2.2A). This relationship 
was statistically significant.  Over 47% of single service users compared to about 16% 
of married service users claimed that microfinance interventions had a very positive 
effect on their businesses. Only about 6% of single service users compared to about 
30% of married service users said the SAT intervention had no effect on their 
businesses. The same trend was evident concerning the effect of marital status on 
households as shown in Table 2.1A. By inspection, SAT service users who were 
single were more likely to experience positive household outcomes, although this 
relationship was not statistically significant. With regard to NWEP, married women 
reported more positive effects on their businesses than single women (see Table 
2.2A). From Table 2.1A, it was evident that there was no relationship between marital 
status and household outcomes. Relationships between marital status and household 
and business outcomes in NWEP were not statistically significant.  
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2.1.3A Occupation of Spouse 
As previously noted in section 2.1.1A, SAT service users who were single reported 
more positive business outcomes. This finding is confirmed by the variable 
‗occupation of spouse‘ in Tables 2.1A and 2.2A. Service users who were single (‗not 
applicable‘ category) were likely to state (41.2%)  that the intervention had a 
consistently positive effect (very much) on their businesses compared to service users 
whose spouses were in non-farming occupations (16.7%) and those whose spouses 
were farmers (20.0%). A similar trend is witnessed with respect to the relationship 
between spouse‘s occupation and household outcomes. All relationships discussed 
above were however not statistically significant. 
 
In NWEP (see Tables 2.1A and 2.2A), compared to service users whose spouses were 
in non-farming occupations, service users who were single (not applicable) and those 
whose spouses were farmers were more likely to state that the intervention had a more 
positive on their households but this effect was not significant. Related to business 
outcomes, service users who were single and those whose spouses were farmers were 
also more likely to report more benefits from the intervention than those whose 
spouses were non-farmers, although this was not statistically significant.  
 
2.1.4A Level of Education 
From Tables 2.1A and 2.2A, service users with higher levels of education were more 
likely to report more positive business and household outcomes. In both NWEP and 
SAT service users who had been educated up to primary and middle school level 
reported that their businesses and households had benefitted from the interventions 
more than those with no education. For NWEP there was a positive and significant 
relationship between level of education and household outcomes. 
 
2.1.5A Number of Children 
Regarding the effect of the number of children on business and household outcomes 
of microfinance interventions, the data indicated that service users who had fewer 
children were more likely to report more positive outcomes. The findings were quite 
similar for both NWEP and SAT. The relationships between number of children, and 
business and household outcomes of interventions were not significant (see Tables 
2.1A and 2.2A).  
 
2.1.6A Being Indigenous 
Being indigenous to the rural area was hypothesised to have a more positive effect on 
business. The explanation for the indigenous variable can be found in section 1.7A in 
Appendix 1. Indigenous people could use their extensive social networks to their 
advantage in business. This was supported by the cross-tabulations albeit non-
significant. SAT‘s indigenous service users were more likely to report positive 
outcomes on the businesses and households compared to non-indigenes (see Table 
2.1A and 2.2A). With regard to NWEP, Tables 2.1A and 2.2A showed that there were 
no discernable relationships between service users‘ indigenous status and business 
and household outcomes.   
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2.2A Business Characteristics   
The study examined the effect of business characteristics of service users on 
household and businesses of service users. This was based on four variables: whether 
service users borrowed from other microfinance institutions apart from the 
microfinance in question; the number of businesses; main business and the amount of 
time the service users spent on their businesses.  
 
2.2.1A Borrowing from other Sources 
The fact that service users borrowed from other sources (other microfinance 
institutions) had a very statistically significant effect on businesses of service users of 
both interventions. From Table 2.2A, service users of the two interventions (75%) 
who borrowed from other sources were more likely to indicate that the intervention 
had a consistently positive effect (very much) on their businesses  compared to those 
who relied on one microfinance intervention only for financial services (average 
20%). There was no discernable relationship between borrowing from other sources 
and household outcomes in the two interventions (see Table 2.1A).   
 
2.2.2A Number of Businesses 
The number of businesses a service user was engaged in was cross-tabulated with 
business and household outcomes of microfinance interventions. From Table 2.2A, 
service users of SAT with two or more businesses had a higher likelihood of 
experiencing positive and significant business outcomes. The same finding was 
observed within NWEP but the relationship was not significant. Household outcomes 
of the number of businesses service users were mixed and not significant (see Table 
2.1A). While for SAT service users with two or more businesses reported more 
favourable effects on the household, those of NWEP pointed to the opposite direction: 
service users with only one business were more likely to report better household 
outcomes compared with those with two or more businesses.    
 
2.2.3A Principal Business 
Service users were classified according to the main type of business they engaged in. 
In both interventions, food sellers and shopkeepers stated that the interventions had 
more positive effect on their businesses compared to the other groups (see Table 
2.2A).  The relationship between main type of business and households outcomes 
showed no discernable pattern (see Table 2.1A). However, the main business of 
service users was not significantly related to household and businesses outcomes.  
 
2.2.4A Time Spent on Business  
As a proxy for the importance of the business to the financial lives to service users, 
time spent on business was cross-tabulated with household and business outcomes.  
The relationship between ‗time spent on business‘ and business outcomes was 
somewhat positive but not statistically significant (Table 2.2A). However, compared 
to those who worked up to 8 hours, NWEP and SAT service users who worked above 
8 hours a day were more likely to state that the interventions had beneficial effect on 
their businesses. With reference to the effect of time spent in business on households, 
the findings were mixed and not significant (see Table 2.1A). NWEP service users 
who worked more than 8 hours on their businesses were more likely to say the 
intervention had a positive effect on their households compared to those who worked 
less than 8 hours per day. In SAT the relationship between time spent on business and 
household outcomes was unclear.   
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2.2.5A Length of Time with Intervention 
The period of time that a service user had been with an intervention was measured in 
terms of the number of cycles members had gone through. The number of cycles that 
service users experienced in NWEP had statistically significant effects on households 
and businesses. NWEP service users who had been with the intervention between 4 to 
9 cycles were more likely to say the intervention had a positive influence on their 
businesses and households compared to the other two categories (see Tables 2.1A and 
2.2A). Members who had been with NWEP for over 9 cycles were the second among 
the three categories to state that the intervention was beneficial to their household and 
businesses. Responses from SAT members showed a statistically significant negative 
relationship between business outcomes and the length of time they had spent with the 
intervention (see Table 2.2A). There was no discernable relationship between time 
spent in an intervention and household outcomes among SAT service users.   
 
 
2.3A Group and Loan Issues  
Variables concerned with group and loan matters were cross-tabulated with the 
dependent variables: household and business outcomes. 
 
 
2.3.1A Group Decision-Making   
Groups have to make many decisions including whether to expel a member, report 
member to intervention staff or make payment on behalf of defaulting member. The 
study assessed whether how these decisions were made in the groups had any effects 
on households and businesses of service users. About 82% and 93% of respondents of 
SAT and NWEP respectively claimed decisions were reached through group 
consensus (see Table 2.1A). Service users of the two interventions who claimed 
decisions were arrived through group consensus were more likely to state that the 
intervention benefited their businesses compared to those who claimed that leaders of 
the groups were mainly responsible for decision-making. In SAT service users who 
stated group decision-making was the norm in their groups experienced better 
household outcomes and the opposite was true in NWEP. None of the relationships 
were however significant. 
 
2.3.2A Amount of Last Loan   
The study assessed whether the size of a loan was related to household and business 
outcomes. The majority of SAT service users (55%) had received over GH¢ 300 in 
the most recent cycle while the largest percentage of NWEP service users (47.5%) 
received GH¢100 or less (see Tables 2.1A and 2.2A). Service users of both 
interventions who received between GH¢101 and GH¢300 in their most recent cycle 
had higher probabilities than the other two groups of experiencing positive business 
outcomes. Members who received over GH¢300 were next category to experience 
positive business outcomes. Regarding household outcomes service users of both 
interventions who received over GH¢100 reported more beneficial outcomes than 
those who received up to GH¢100 in their most recent cycle (see Table 2.1A). None 
of the relationships was however statistically significant.   
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2.3.3A Time of Loan Receipt  
The study differentiated between loans received on schedule and loans received at a 
convenient period. It was hypothesised that the receipt of loans on schedule and at a 
convenient period will positively affect households and businesses of service users. 
Receiving loans on schedule as a variable referred to the timely disbursal of loans, 
while receiving loans at a convenient time meant receiving loans at a period when it 
had a maximum utility to service users. SAT service users were more likely to receive 
loans on schedule (60%) compared to NWEP (20%). Receiving loans on schedule 
was more beneficial to businesses and households for the two interventions but not 
statistically significant.  
 
From Tables 2.1A and 2.2A, SAT members (75%) were more likely to say they 
received their loans at a convenient period than NWEP service users (50%). Service 
users of both interventions who claimed they received their loans at a convenient time 
were more likely to experience less beneficial business outcomes compared to those 
who claimed not to have received loans at a convenient time. Receipt of loans at a 
convenient time was associated with more positive household outcomes in both 
interventions. Receipt of loans at a convenient period was not significantly correlated 
with household and business outcomes.     
 
2.3.4A Loan Management 
The manner in which loans were managed was expected to be important predictors of 
business and household outcomes. First the study determined whether the use of loans 
for non- business purposes influenced businesses and households of service users. 
Majority of service users of SAT (51.7%) and NWEP (67.5%) stated they used part or 
all of their loans for other purposes. With SAT there was no discernable correlation 
between use of loans on one hand and household and business outcomes on the other 
(see Tables 2.1A and 2.2A). NWEP members who used loans for non-business 
purposes had a higher likelihood of experiencing significant positive business 
outcomes. Although NWEP service users who used loans for non-business 
experienced more positive household outcomes, the relationship was not significant 
(see Table 2.1A).  
 
Majority of service users of both interventions (SAT: 51.7; NWEP: 72.5%) stated that 
they did not keep their business finances separate from other household finances. 
There was no clear evidence that keeping all household finances together or otherwise 
had any effect on business outcomes (see Table 2.2A). However, in Table 2.1A SAT 
service users who did not separate their business dealings from other household 
finances experienced more positive and significant household outcomes than those 
who did otherwise. The effect for NWEP service users was similar to that of SAT‘s 
but not statistically significant. 
 
2.3.5A Repayment Difficulties 
Repayment difficulty refers to service users‘ missing at least one repayment schedule. 
Concerning loan repayment, 88.3% of SAT and 82.5% of NWEP service users 
responded they had not experienced any repayment difficulties. As expected, service 
users SAT who stated they did not encounter loan repayment difficulties were also 
likely to report more positive business and household outcomes than those who said 
they experienced repayment difficulties. The effect of repayment difficulties on 
household and business outcomes in SAT was not statistically significant. The 
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opposite effect to the above was witnessed among NWEP service users: those who 
claimed to experience repayment difficulties were more likely to report significantly 
positive business outcomes than service users who did stated that they did not 
encounter repayment difficulties. Similarly NWEP service users who faced repayment 
difficulties were more likely to experience positive household outcomes, although not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
2.5A Microfinance and Children’s Education  
The extent to which the intervention enabled service users to contribute or increase 
contribution to their children‘s education is a dependent variable which could not be 
included in the construction of the composite ‗household outcome‘ variable. This was 
because some of the service users did not have children and therefore the variable had 
one additional category—not applicable—more than the other variables included in 
the constructing the household composite variable. For reasons of parsimony only 
predictor variables that significantly affected ‗contributed or increased contribution to 
children‘s education‘ variable were reported.   
 
Only marital status was significantly related to the ‗contributed or increased 
contribution to the education of children‘ variable. Among service users in SAT and 
NWEP with children, single service users compared to those who were married were 
more likely to state that they contributed or increased contribution to the education of 
their children as a result of being with the intervention (see Table 2.3A below).  
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Table 2.1A: Cross-tabular Analysis of Effect on Household by Socio-Demographic  
Characteristics and Other Variables     
      
Variables  Categories  Sample Size Not At All Somewhat Very Much 
(%)  (%)  (%) (%) 
Age of Service User              Up to 30 15.0 (12.5) 22.2 (60.0) 66.7 (40.0) 11.1 (0.0) 
SAT 31-50 68.3 (80.0) 26.8 (37.5) 51.2 (56.3) 22.0 (6.3) 
(NWEP)
 τ
 
51 & above 16.7 (7.5) 30.0 (33.3) 50.0 (66.7) 20.0 (0.0) 
Marital Status                     
SAT 
Single 28.3 (37.5) 11.8 (40.0) 58.8 (53.3) 29.4 (6.7 ) 
(NWEP) Married  71.7 (62.5) 32.6 (40.0) 51.2 (56.0) 16.3 (4.0) 
Occupation of Spouse         Not Applicable 28.3 (40.0) 17.6 (37.5) 52.9 (56.3) 29.4 (6.3) 
SAT Non-Farming 30.0 (20.0) 33.3 (50.0) 50.0 (50.0) 16.7 (0.0) 
(NWEP) Farming 41.7 (40.0) 28.0 (37.5) 56.0 (56.3) 16.0 (6.3) 
Level of Education             Secondary & above 10.0  (5.0) 33.3 (50.0) 33.3 (0.0) 33.3 (50.0) 
SAT 
Prim. And Middle 66.7 (77.5) 22.5 (32.3) 57.5 (64.5) 20.0 (3.2) 
(NWEP)* None 23.3 (17.5) 35.7 (71.4) 50.0 (28.6) 14.3 (0.0) 
Number of Children            0-2 18.3 (25.0) 18.2 (40.0) 45.5 (50.0) 36.4 (10.0) 
SAT 3 to 6 66.7 (67.5) 25.0 (44.4) 60.0 (51.9) 15.0 (3.7) 
(NWEP) 7 & above 15.0  (7.5) 44.4 (0.0) 33.3 (100) 22.2 (0.0) 
Being an Indigene               
SAT 
Yes 81.7 (87.5) 24.5 (40.0) 53.1 (54.3) 22.4 (5.7) 
(NWEP) No 18.3   (12.5) 36.4 (40.0) 54.5 (60.0) 9.1   (0.0)  
Borrowed from Other        
Sources      SAT 
Yes  6.7   (10.0) 50.0 (50.0) 50.0 (25.0) 0.0 (25.0) 
(NWEP) No 93.3 (90.0) 25.0 (38.9) 53.6 (58.3) 21.4 (2.8) 
No. of Businesses                
SAT 
One  53.3 (52.5) 31.3 (23.8) 46.9 (71.4) 21.9 (4.8) 
(NWEP) Two or more 46.7 (47.5) 21.4 (57.9) 60.7 (36.8)  17.9 (5.3) 
Main Business                     Food Sellers 38.3 (52.5) 17.4 (52.4) 56.5 (47.6) 26.1 (0.0) 
SAT Artisans 0.0 (7.5) 0.0  (0.0) 0.0 (100.0) 0.0  (0.0) 
(NWEP) Shopkeepers 16.7 (17.5) 40.0 (14.3) 30.0 (71.4) 30.0 (14.3) 
  Other Traders 41.7 (22.5) 28.0 (44.4) 60.0 (44.4) 12.0 (11.1) 
  Farming 3.3  (0.0) 50.0 (0.0) 50.0 (0.0) 0.0  (0.0) 
Time Spent on Bus.           
SAT 
Up to 8 hours 31.7 (42.5) 15.8 (58.8) 73.7 (41.2) 10.5 (0.0) 
(NWEP) Above 8 hours 68.3 (57.5) 31.7 (26.1) 43.9 (65.2) 24.4 (8.7) 
No. of Cycles in Scheme      1-3 cycles 15.0 (55.0) 22.2 (59.1) 66.7 (40.9) 11.1 (0.0) 
SAT 4-9 cycles 48.3 (7.5) 20.7 (0.0) 51.7 (66.7) 27.6 (33.3) 
(NWEP)*   Over 9 cycles 36.7 (37.5)  36.4 (20.0) 50.0 (73.3) 13.6 (6.7) 
How Decisions Made         
within group SAT 
Group Consensus 81.7  (92.5) 22.4 (40.5) 55.1 (54.1) 22.4 (5.4) 
(NWEP) Leaders 18.3    (7.5) 45.5 (33.3) 45.5 (66.7) 9.1   (0.0) 
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 Table 2.1A continued            
            
Variables  Categories  Sample Size Not At All Somewhat Very Much 
(%)  (%)  (%) (%) 
Amount of Last Loan       Up to 100 3.3   (47.5) 50.0 (63.2) 50.0 (36.8) 0.0 (0.0) 
SAT 101-300 41.7 (42.5) 24.0 (17.6) 52.0 (76.5) 24.0 (5.9) 
(NWEP) 301 and above 55.0 (10.0) 27.3 (25.0) 54.5 (50.0) 18.2 (25.0) 
Received Loans on 
Schedule 
SAT 
Yes  60.0 (20.0) 
 
25.0 (25.0) 52.8 (62.5) 22.2 (12.5) 
(NWEP) No 40.0 (80.0) 29.2 (43.8) 54.2 (53.1) 16.7 (3.1) 
Received Loan at   
Convenient Time 
SAT               
Yes  75.0 (50.0)  16.7 (40.0) 55.6 (45.0) 27.8 (15.0) 
(NWEP) No 25.0 (50.0) 26.7 (45.0) 46.7 (55.0) 26.7 (0.0) 
Use of Loan for Other      
Purposes 
Yes  51.7 (67.5) 29.0 (29.6) 45.2 (63.0) 25.8 (7.4) 
SAT                      
(NWEP) 
No 48.3 (32.5) 24.1 (61.5) 62.1 (38.5) 13.8 (0.0) 
Keep Funds Separate         
from Household Finance  
Yes 48.3 (27.5) 
 
27.3 (27.3) 69.0 (63.6) 3.4   (9.4) 
SAT*              (NWEP) No 51.7 (72.5) 25.8 (44.8) 38.7 (51.7) 35.5 (3.4) 
Encounter Difficulty in 
Loan Repayment  
Yes  11.7  (17.5) 57.1 (28.6) 14.3 (57.1) 28.6 (14.3) 
SAT                (NWEP) No 88.3  (82.5)  22.6 (42.4) 58.5 (54.5) 18.9 (3.0) 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*Relationships are statistically significant in (p<.05) 
τ
 NWEP figures in brackets 
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  Table 2.2A: Cross-tabular Analysis of Effect on Business by Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
and Other Variables   
Variables  Categories  Sample Size Not At All Somewhat Very Much 
(%) (%)  (%) (%) 
Age of service user              Up to 30 15.0 (12.5) 11.1 (40.0) 66.7 (40.0) 22.2 (20.0) 
SAT                                                                                                                                                                                                          31-50 68.3 (80.0) 26.8 (21.9) 48.8 (53.1) 24.4 (25.0)
(NWEP)
τ
 
51 & above 16.7 (7.5) 20.0 (0.0) 50.0 (66.7) 30.0 (33.3) 
Marital Status                     
SAT* 
Single 28.3 (37.5) 5.9   (33.3) 47.1 (46.7) 47.1 (20.0) 
(NWEP) Married  71.7 (62.5) 30.2 (16.0) 53.5 (56.0) 16.3 (28.1) 
Occupation of Spouse        Not Applicable 28.3 (40.0) 11.8 (31.3) 47.1 (43.8) 41.2 (25.0) 
SAT                                                                                                                                                                                                          Non-Farming 30.0 (20.0) 38.9 (12.5) 44.4 (62.5) 16.7 (25.0)
(NWEP) Farming 41.7 (40.0) 20.0 (18.8) 60.0 (56.3) 20.0 (25.0) 
Level of Education              Sec. & above 10.0  (5.0) 33.3 (0.0) 33.3 (50.0) 33.3 (50.0) 
SAT Prim. And Middle 66.7 (77.5) 22.5 (25.8) 52.5 (51.6) 25.0 (22.6) 
(NWEP) None 23.3 (17.5) 21.4 (14.3) 57.1 (57.1) 21.4 (28.6) 
Number of Children           0-2 18.3 (25.0) 9.1   (50.0) 45.5 (30.0) 45.5 (20.0) 
SAT                    3 to 6 66.7 (67.5) 30.0 (14.8) 52.5 (59.3) 17.5 (25.9) 
(NWEP) 7 & above 15.0  (7.5) 11.1 (0.0) 55.6 (66.7) 33.3 (33.3) 
Being an Indigene               Yes 81.7 (87.5) 20.4 (25.7) 49.0 (51.4) 30.6 (22.9) 
SAT                 (NWEP) No 8.3   (12.5) 36.4 (0.0) 63.6 (60.0) 0.0   (40.0) 
Borrowed from Other 
Sources        SAT* 
Yes  6.7   (10.0) 0.0      (0.0) 25.0 (25.0) 75.0 (75.0) 
(NWEP)* No 93.3 (90.0) 25.0 (25.0) 53.6 (55.6) 21.4 (19.4) 
No. of Businesses                
SAT* 
One  53.3 (52.5) 18.8 (19.0) 68.8 (66.7) 12.5 (14.3) 
(NWEP) Two or more 46.7 (47.5) 28.6 (26.3) 32.1 (36.8) 39.3 (36.8) 
Main Business                     Food Sellers 38.3 (52.5) 13.0 (28.6) 56.5 (47.6) 30.4 (23.8) 
SAT 
Artisans 0.0 (7.5) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (33.3) 0.0 (66.7) 
(NWEP) Shopkeepers 16.7 (17.5) 20.0 (14.3) 40.0 (57.1) 40.0 (28.6) 
  Other Traders 41.7 (22.5) 36.0 (22.2) 48.0 (66.7) 16.0 (11.1) 
  Farming 3.3 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 100.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 
Time Spent on Bus.           
SAT 
Up to 8 hours 31.7 (42.5) 15.8 (35.3) 68.4 (47.1) 15.8 (17.6) 
(NWEP) Above 8 hours 68.3 (57.5) 26.8 (13.0) 43.9 (56.5) 29.3 (30.4) 
No. of Cycles in Scheme  
     
1-3 cycles 
 
15.0 (55.0) 0.0   (27.3) 44.4 (59.1) 55.6 (13.6) 
SAT*                  4-9 cycles 48.3 (7.5) 20.7 (0.0) 51.7 (0.0) 27.6 (100.0) 
(NWEP)*   Over 9 cycles 36.7 (37.5)  36.4 (20.0) 54.5 (33.3) 9.1  (26.7) 
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Table 2.2A continued  
Variables  Categories  Sample Size Not At All Somewhat Very Much 
(%) (%)  (%) (%) 
            
How Decisions Made        
Within Group  
Group Consensus 81.7 (92.5) 20.4 (21.6) 51.0 (54.1) 28.6 (24.3) 
SAT (NWEP) Leaders 8.3   (7.5)) 36.4 (33.3) 54.5 (33.3) 9.1  (33.3) 
Amount of Last Loan  
(GH¢)                                                                                                                   
Up to 100 3.3   (47.5) 0.0   (31.6) 100.0(52.6) 0.0   (15.8) 
SAT 101- 300 41.7 (42.5) 24.0 (11.8) 48.0 (52.9) 28.0 (35.3) 
(NWEP) 301 and above 55.0 (10.0) 24.2 (25.0) 51.5 (50.0) 24.2 (25.0) 
Received Loans on            
Schedule 
Yes  60.0 (20.0) 25.0 (12.5) 47.2 (50.0) 27.8 (37.5) 
SAT                         
(NWEP) 
No 40.0 (80.0) 20.8 (25.0) 58.3 (53.1) 20.8 (21.9) 
Received Loan at                 Yes  75.0 (50.0) 31.1 (25.0) 44.4 (60.0) 24.4 (15.0) 
Convenient Time              
SAT (NWEP) 
No 25.0 (50.0) 0.0   (20.0) 73.3 (45.0) 26.7 (35.0) 
Use of Loan for Other 
Purposes 
Yes  51.7 (67.5) 25.8 (25.9) 48.4 (37.0) 25.8 (37.0) 
SAT                         
(NWEP)* 
No 48.3 (32.5) 20.7 (35.4) 55.2 (64.6) 24.1 (0.0) 
Keep Funds Separate 
from Household Finance  
 
Yes 48.3 (27.5) 20.7 (27.3) 62.1 (45.5) 17.2 (27.3) 
SAT   
(NWEP) 
No 51.7 (72.5) 25.9 (20.7) 41.9 (55.2) 32.3 (24.1) 
Encounter Difficulty in 
Loan Repayment 
Yes  11.7  (17.5) 28.6 (28.6) 57.1 (28.6) 14.3 (42.9) 
SAT                         
(NWEP)* 
No 88.3  (82.5) 22.6 (21.2) 50.9 (57.6) 26.4 (21.2) 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*Relationships are statistically significant (p<.05) 
τ
 NWEP figures in brackets 
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Table 2.3A Contributed/Increased Contribution to Education of Children by Marital Status 
Name of  Intervention  
contributed/increased cont to 
education of children 
Total not at all 
somewha
t very much 
SAT marital status 1  single  Count 1 6 5 12 
% within marital status 1 8.3% 50.0% 41.7% 100.0% 
married  Count 12 18 12 42 
% within marital status 1 28.6% 42.9% 28.6% 100.0% 
Total   Count 18 19 17 54 
% within marital status 1 33.3% 35.2% 31.5% 100.0% 
NWEP marital status 1  single  Count 1 6 8 15 
% within marital status 1 6.7% 40.0% 53.3% 100.0% 
married  Count 6 9 10 25 
% within marital status 1 24.0% 36.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Total   Count 7 15 18 40 
% within marital status 1 17.5% 37.5% 45.0% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*Relationship is statistically significant in NWEP and SAT (p<.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4A: Contributed/Increased Contribution to Education of Children by Use of Loan for Other Purposes  
Name of  Intervention 
contributed/increased cont to 
education of children 
Total not at all Somewhat very much 
SAT did you use loan for other 
purposes 
yes Count 6 10 13 29 
%  20.7% 34.5% 44.8% 100.0% 
no Count 12 9 4 25 
%  48.0% 36.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 18 19 17 54 
%  33.3% 35.2% 31.5% 100.0% 
 NWEP did you use loan for other 
purposes 
yes Count 4 7 16 27 
 14.8% 25.9% 59.3% 100.0% 
no Count 3 8 2 13 
% 23.1% 61.5% 15.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 7 15 18 40 
% 17.5% 37.5% 45.0% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*Relationships are statistically significant in NWEP and SAT (p<.05) 
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Table 2.5A: *Amount of Last Loan by Time Joined Scheme (Number of Cycles) 
Name of  Intervention 
Amount of last loan (GH¢) 
Total up to 100 101-300 
301 and 
above 
SAT Time joined scheme/number 
of cycles 
1-3 cycles Count 2 5 2 9 
%  22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 100.0% 
4-9 cycles Count 0 14 15 29 
%  .0% 48.3% 51.7% 100.0% 
over 9 cycles Count 0 6 16 22 
%  .0% 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 2 25 33 60 
%  3.3% 41.7% 55.0% 100.0% 
NWEP Time joined scheme/number 
of cycles 
1-3 cycles Count 17 5 0 22 
%  77.3% 22.7% .0% 100.0% 
4-9 cycles Count 0 3 0 3 
%  .0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
over 9 cycles Count 2 9 4 15 
%  13.3% 60.0% 26.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 19 17 4 40 
%  47.5% 42.5% 10.0% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
*Relationships are statistically significant in NWEP and SAT (p<.05) 
 
Table 2.6A Did you Encounter Difficulty in Loan Repayment  by Did you Use Loan for Non-business Purposes   
   did you encounter difficulty in loan 
payment 
Total    Yes no 
did you use loan for other 
purposes 
yes Count 9 49 58 
% within did you use loan for 
other purposes 
15.5% 84.5% 100.0% 
no Count 5 37 42 
% within did you use loan for 
other purposes 
11.9% 88.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 14 86 100 
% within did you use loan for 
other purposes 
14.0% 86.0% 100.0% 
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Appendix 3: Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
The results of the ordinal logistic regression were tabulated and interpreted in this 
section. The results of the analysis are reported in Tables 3.1A to 3.6A and are 
presented after the interpretation of the results. The effects of the following were 
assessed on poverty outcomes of the intervention: socio-demographic and business 
characteristics; loan issues; and group activities.  Other components such as interest 
rates were not amenable to the logistic procedure because it had no variability: the 
same rate applied to everyone in an intervention.  The statistically significant results 
were interpreted first showing the direction and magnitude of the relationships. The 
direction of the non-significant relationships was also interpreted with the intention of 
establishing any underlying patterns or trends.  
 
3.1A Control Variables 
Statistical controls were used to minimise the effects of extraneous factors that were 
capable of affecting the outcomes of the regression analysis. Control variables are 
usually not predictor or independent variables but have the potential to affect the 
study and therefore have to be held constant in order not to confound the outcomes of 
the study (Loether and McTavish, 1993). 
  
Based on initial fieldwork experience, observations and the literature, the study 
controlled for the variables below: 
1. Age of service user 
2. Occupation of spouse 
3. Number of Children 
4. Being an indigene 
5. Level of education  
6. Time spent on business 
7. Borrowing from other sources  
 
The rationale for the choice and how they are measured are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2A Socio-demographic and Business Characteristics and Poverty Reduction  
Business and household outcome indicators were regressed on the control variables 
and the results of the analysis presented in Tables 3.1A and 3.2A. Amongst the 
control variables only ‗borrowing from other sources‘ which meant borrowing from 
other microfinance interventions turned out significantly related to business outcomes. 
Service users who borrowed from other microfinance interventions were over 15 
times more likely to state that their businesses improved ‗somewhat‘ or ‗very much‘ 
compared to service users who borrowed from only one intervention.  All other socio-
demographic characteristics did not show any statistically significant relationship to 
business or household outcomes. With reference to age, older service users were more 
likely to say the intervention had a positive effect on their households compared to 
their younger counterparts. The opposite was observed regarding business outcomes, 
younger service users were more likely to indicate more beneficial business outcomes. 
Concerning occupation of spouses, service users who were single (not applicable) 
were more likely to say they experienced positive business and household outcomes 
compared to service users whose spouses were engaged in farming. On the other 
hand, service users whose spouses were non-farmers had a greater likelihood of 
saying their businesses and households did not benefit from the intervention as much 
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as those with farmers as spouses. The benefits of microfinance to business and 
household increased with the number of children. Being an indigene had a positive 
effect on business but showed a slightly negative effect on the household. With regard 
to the level of the service users‘ education, there was a positive relationship between 
educational qualification and household outcomes. The reverse was true for the 
relationship between educational levels and business outcomes. As expected the 
amount of time a service user spent on her/his business was positively correlated to 
business and household outcomes. For service users, borrowing from other sources 
was associated with less beneficial household compared to those who did not.   
 
3.3A Effects of Loan Issues on Business and Household Outcomes  
The next logistic regression models (3.3A and 3.4A) assessed the effect of loans and 
related issues on household and business outcomes. The amount of time service users 
had been in an intervention had a significant effect on businesses of service users. 
Service users who had been in the intervention for between 1 and 3 cycles and those 
between 4 and 9 cycles were about 4.6 and 3.6 times respectively to state that the 
interventions  ‗somewhat‘ or ‗very much‘ affected their  businesses positively, 
compared to service users who had experienced more than 9 cycles in the 
interventions. Time spent in an intervention did not indicate a significant effect on 
households but the results showed that service users who had been with the 
intervention between 4 and 9 cycles were more likely to experience positive effects 
followed by those over 9 cycles and those who have spent between 1and 3 cycles 
bringing up the rear.  
  
As expected, service users who received loans on schedule were about 3.2 times more 
likely to state that the intervention had beneficial effects on their businesses and 
households compared to those who did not receive loans on schedule. Receipt of loans 
at convenient time was not significantly related to household and businesses 
outcomes. Users of microfinance interventions who claimed they received loans at a 
convenient time were less likely to state that the intervention had a positive effect on 
their businesses. Related to household outcomes, service users who said they received 
loans at convenient times were more likely to experience positive outcomes compared 
to service users who did not. These relationships were however not statistically 
significant.  
 
The use of loans for non-business purposes was a statistically significant predictor of 
household outcomes. Service users who claimed they used part or all of their loans for 
other purposes other than business were 2.5 times more likely to experience positive 
household outcomes compared to those who used their loans for business only. 
Service users who claimed they used their loans for other purposes were also likely to 
experience more positive business outcomes than those who did not. The relationship 
was however not statistically significant. In a follow-up enquiry to find out whether 
using loans for other purposes affected repayment rates, the variable ‗did you use 
loans for other purposes?‘ was cross-tabulated with ‗did you encounter difficulty in 
loan repayment?‘ (see Table 2.6A in Appendix 2).  There was no significant 
relationship between the two variables. The two findings just discussed suggests that 
using loans for non-business purposes benefits the household but does not affect the 
capacity for loan repayment.   
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In connection with the current amount of loan received by service users and its effects 
on household and businesses of service users, no significant relationship was found. 
However, service users who received up to GH¢ 100 were less likely to experience 
positive household and business outcomes compared to those who received above 
GH¢ 300. However, service users who received between GH¢ 101 and GH¢ 300 
showed more positive business and household outcomes than those who received over 
GH¢ 300.   
 
Keeping business finances separate from household finances was associated with less 
positive business and household outcomes but these relationships were not significant. 
Finally and as expected, service users who said they experienced difficulties in loan 
repayment were likely to say the interventions had less positive effects on their 
businesses and households. This was also not statistically significant. Difficulty in 
repayment was defined having missed as least one loan repayment schedule.  
 
3.4A Influence of Groups Activities on Business and Household Outcomes 
The third set of models assessed the effect of group activities on household and 
business outcomes (see Tables 3.5A and 3.6A). Few variables turned out statistically 
significant. The first significant relationship was the effect of decision-making in 
groups on household outcomes. The study assessed whether decision-making styles in 
the groups affected households and businesses of service users.  The ordinal logistic 
results showed that service users who claimed decision-making was based on group 
consensus were about 4.4 times more likely to report that the intervention had a 
positive effect on their households compared to groups where leaders were primarily 
in charge of decision-making. This was a statistically significant relationship. The 
effect of decision-making on business outcomes was in the same direction as 
household outcomes but the relationship was not statistically significant.  
 
Service users who ‗strongly agreed‘ or ‗agreed‘ with the statement that group liability 
was an optimum means of doing microfinance were more likely to experience less 
beneficial effects of the intervention on their businesses and households compared to 
service users who disagreed with that statement. Service users who ‗strongly agreed‘ 
or ‗agreed‘ were 31% and 83% respectively less likely to say the intervention had a 
positive effect on their households compared to those who disagreed to the above 
statement. For business outcomes, service users who ‗strongly agreed‘ or ‗agreed‘ 
were 50% and 72% respectively less likely to state that their businesses experienced 
positive effects than service users who ‗disagreed‘ with the statement.  
 
Service users‘ knowledge of how their peers used their loans led to more positive 
household and business outcomes but the relationship was not significant. Other 
predictors that were not significant included how loan repayments were enforced and 
whether groups were able to influence use of funds. Loans repayments enforced 
through peer pressure rather than through the court action or the use of the police was 
associated with more benefits to households and businesses. Service users who 
claimed groups were able to influence service users‘ use of loans experienced positive 
household outcomes and less positive business outcomes compared to service users 
who said the opposite. 
 
It was also noted that the effect of borrowing from other microfinance institutions 
changed in the various models. As previously stated, in Table 3.2A which comprised 
 366 
of variables related to background and business characteristics, service users were 
over 15 times likely to state their businesses experienced positive effects. In the model 
(Table 3.3A) that incorporated the first model (Table 3.2A) and loan issues, the effect 
of borrowing from other microfinance interventions on businesses increased so that 
service users were over 21 times more likely to state they experienced positive 
business outcomes. In Table 3.6A which is made up of variables in Table 3.2A and 
group activities, service users who borrowed from other interventions were 38 times 
more likely to report positive benefits in business outcomes.  
 
In addition to the above, the effect of the number of cycles a service user had spent in 
an intervention changed in the various models. In Table 3.3A (model 1 plus loan 
variables), service users who had been with the intervention for up to 9 cycles were 
over 3.5 times more likely to report positive effects on their businesses. However in 
Tables 3.5A and 3.6A (model1 plus group activities), the variable did not significantly 
affect businesses but rather service users who had been with the interventions for up 
to three cycles were 82% less likely to report positive household outcomes compared 
to those who had been with the intervention for over 9 cycles. Those who had been 
with the intervention between 4 and 6 cycles were 2 times more likely to state that the 
intervention had positive effects on their household.  
 
 
 
Table 3.1A: Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients for Household 
Outcomes by Background and Business Characteristics (Activities)  
Variables  Categories  B Exp B Std. Error Sig. 
      
Age Up to 30 -1.166 0.312 0.936 0.213 
 31-50 -0.178 0.837 0.649 0.784 
 51 and above 0 1 . . 
Occupation of Non applicable 0.591 1.806 0.502 0.239 
Spouse Non-farming -0.099 0.906 0.526 0.851 
 farming 0 1 . . 
Number of  0-2 -0.817 0.441 0.850 0.336 
Children 3-6 -0.209 0.811 0.638 0.743 
 7 and above 0 1 . . 
Being  yes -0.113 0.893 0.615 0.854 
Indigenous no 0 1 . . 
Level of  Sec. & above 1.114 3.047 0.881 0.206 
Education  Prim. & middle 0.623 1.865 0.537 0.246 
 none 0 1 . . 
Time Spent on  Up to 8 hrs -0.455 0.634 0.436 0.296 
Business Above 8 hrs 0 1 . . 
Borrowed from Yes -1.021 0.360 0.769 0.184 
other Sources No 0 1 . . 
     Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 3.2A: Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients for Business  
Outcomes by Background and Business Characteristics (Activities)  
Variables   Categories  B Exp B Std. Error Sig. 
      
Age Up to 30 0.040 1.041 0.926 0.966 
 31-50 0.129 1.138 0.657 0.844 
 51 and above 0 1 . . 
Occupation of Non applicable 0.243 1.275 0.500 0.627 
Spouse Non-farming -0.318 0.728 0.524 0.544 
 farming 0 1 . . 
Number of  0-2 -1.029 0.357 0.870 0.237 
Children 3-6 -0.925 0.397 0.660 0.161 
 7 and above 0 1 . . 
Being  yes 0.792 2.208 0.614 0.197 
Indigenous no 0 1 . . 
Level of  Sec. & above -0.154 0.857 0.881 0.861 
Education  Prim. & middle -0.603 0.547 0.532 0.257 
 none 0 1 . . 
Time Spent on Up to 8 hrs -0.691 0.501 0.440 0.117 
Business Above 8 hrs 0 1 . . 
Borrowed from Yes 2.719 15.165 0.945 0.004 
other Sources No 0 1 . . 
     Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 3.3A: Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients for Business 
Outcomes by Background, Business Characteristics and Loan Issues 
 
Variables Categories B EXP B 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
      
Age Up to 30 0.197 1.218 1.013 0.846 
  31-50 0.325 1.384 0.734 0.658 
  51 and above 0 1 . . 
Occupation of Non applicable 0.686 1.986 0.568 0.227 
Spouse Non-farming -0.356 0.700 0.600 0.553 
  Farming 0 1 . . 
Number of  0-2 -1.246 0.288 0.931 0.181 
Children 3-6 -0.956 0.384 0.726 0.188 
  7 and above 0 1 . . 
Being  Yes 0.520 1.682 0.673 0.439 
Indigenous No 0 1 . . 
Level of  Sec. & above -0.068 0.934 0.933 0.942 
Education  Prim. & middle -0.573 0.564 0.555 0.301 
  none 0 1 . . 
Time Spent on Up to 8 hrs -0.761 0.467 0.476 0.210 
Business Above 8 hrs 0 1 . . 
Number of  1-3 1.523 4.586 0.706 0.031 
Cycles  in 4 to 9 1.272 3.568 0.551 0.021 
Scheme Above 9  0 1 . . 
Borrowed from Yes  3.057 21.264 1.021 0.003 
other Sources No 0 1 . . 
Amount of  Up to 100 -0.566 0.568 0.841 0.501 
Last Loan 101-300 0.292 1.339 0.560 0.602 
 300 & above 0 1 . . 
Received Loan Yes 1.160 3.190 0.532 0.029 
On Schedule? No 0 1 . . 
Rec. Loan at Yes -1.120 0.326 0.576 0.062 
Convenient Time  No 0 1 . . 
Did you Use Loan  Yes 0.516 1.675 0.461 0.263 
for other Purposes No 0 1 . . 
Separate Loan from Yes -0.284 0.753 0.497 0.568 
Household Finances No 0 1 . . 
Difficulty in Loan  Yes -0.755 0.470 0.673 0.262 
Repayment No 0 1 . . 
Link function: Logit.      
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 3.4A: Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients for Household 
Outcomes by Background, Business Characteristics and Loan Issues 
 
Variables Categories B EXP B 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
       
Age Up to 30 -1.190 0.304 1.026 0.246 
  31-50 -0.352 0.703 0.711 0.621 
  51 and above 0 1 . . 
Occupation of Non applicable 0.943 2.568 0.588 0.109 
Spouse Non-farming -0.671 0.511 0.622 0.280 
  Farming 0 1 . . 
Number of  0-2 1.053 2.866 0.900 0.242 
Children 3-6 -0.232 0.793 0.681 0.733 
  7 and above 0 1 . . 
Being  Yes -0.606 0.546 0.715 0.396 
Indigenous No 0 1 . . 
Level of  Sec. & above 0.853 2.347 0.989 0.388 
Education  Prim. & middle 0.783 2.188 0.596 0.188 
  None 0 1 . . 
Time Spent on Up to 8 hrs -0.397 0.672 0.487 0.415 
Business Above 8 hrs 0 1 . . 
Number of  1-3 -0.182 0.834 0.669 0.786 
Cycles Spent 4 to 9 0.741 2.098 0.557 0.183 
  Above 9  0 1 . . 
Borrowed from Yes  -1.019 0.361 0.833 0.221 
other Sources No 0 1 . . 
Amount of  Up to 100 -1.387 0.250 0.870 0.111 
Last Loan 101-300 0.289 1.335 0.557 0.604 
  300 & above 0 1 . . 
Received Loan Yes 1.142 3.133 0.538 0.034 
On Schedule? No 0 1 . . 
Rec. Loan at Yes 0.078 1.081 0.565 0.890 
Convenient Time  No 0 1 . . 
Did you Use Loan  Yes 0.925 2.522 0.483 0.049 
for other Purposes No 0 1 . . 
Separate Loan from Yes -0.453 0.636 0.509 0.373 
Household Finances No 0 1 . . 
Difficulty in Loan  Yes -0.280 0.756 0.698 0.689 
Repayment No 0 1 . . 
Link function: Logit.      
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 370 
Table 3.5A: Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients for Household 
Outcomes by Background, Business Characteristics and Group Issues 
 
Variables  Categories B EXP B 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
      
Age Up to 30 -1.741 0.175 1.070 0.104 
  31-50 -0.576 0.562 0.727 0.428 
  51 and above 0 1 . . 
Occupation of Non applicable 0.475 1.608 0.565 0.400 
Spouse Non-farming -0.300 0.741 0.590 0.611 
  Farming 0 1 . . 
Number of  0-2 1.410 4.096 0.945 0.135 
Children 3-6 0.329 1.390 0.700 0.638 
  7 and above 0 1 . . 
Being  Yes 0.246 1.279 0.708 0.728 
Indigenous No 0 1 . . 
Level of  Sec. & above 0.539 1.714 0.971 0.579 
Education  Prim. & middle 0.645 1.906 0.606 0.287 
  None 0 1.000 . . 
Time Spent on Up to 8 hrs -0.253 0.776 0.489 0.605 
Business Above 8 hrs 0 1 . . 
Number of  1-3 -1.731 0.177 0.628 0.006 
Cycles in Scheme 4 to 9 0.724 2.063 0.586 0.217 
  Above 9  0 1.000 . . 
Borrowed from Yes  -0.166 0.847 0.825 0.841 
other Sources No 0 1 . . 
How are Decisions Consensus 1.486 4.419 0.701 0.034 
Made in Group? Leaders 0 1.000 . . 
Knowledge of Members’  Yes 0.514 1.672 0.475 0.279 
Loan Use No 0 1 . . 
How does your Group  Peer Pressure 0.656 1.927 0.680 0.335 
Enforce Repayment Court Action 0 1 . . 
Group able to   Yes 0.195 1.215 0.554 0.725 
Influence Loan Use No 0 1 . . 
How Do you Rate GL as a V. Effective 1.745 5.726 1.126 0.121 
Method of Enforcing   Somewhat Eff. 0.145 1.156 0.632 0.819 
Repayment? Not Effective 0 1 . . 
Group Liability the    Strongly agree -0.371 0.690 0.877 0.672 
Optimum Way of Doing  Agree -1.764 0.171 0.591 0.003 
Microfinance Disagree 0 1 . . 
Link function: Logit.      
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Table 3.6A: Ordinal Logistic Regression Coefficients for Business 
Outcomes by Background, Business Characteristics and Group Issues 
 
Variables  Categories B EXP B 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
      
Age Up to 30 -0.346 0.708 1.014 0.733 
  31-50 -0.009 0.991 0.718 0.990 
  51 and above 0 1 . . 
Occupation of Non applicable 0.188 1.207 0.548 0.732 
Spouse Non-farming -0.082 0.921 0.566 0.885 
  Farming 0 1 . . 
Number of  0-2 -1.014 0.363 0.942 0.282 
Children 3-6 -0.679 0.507 0.720 0.346 
  7 and above 0 1 . . 
Being  Yes 1.089 2.971 0.685 0.112 
Indigenous No 0 1.000 . . 
Level of  Sec. & above -0.699 0.497 0.942 0.458 
Education  Prim. & middle -0.499 0.607 0.576 0.387 
  None 0 1 . . 
Time Spent on Up to 8 hrs -0.742 0.476 0.479 0.122 
Business Above 8 hrs 0 1 . . 
Number of  1-3 0.198 1.219 0.581 0.733 
Cycles in Scheme 4 to 9 0.940 2.560 0.577 0.103 
  Above 9  0 1 . . 
Borrowed from Yes  3.644 38.245 1.068 0.001 
other Sources No 0 1 . . 
How are Decisions Consensus 1.131 3.099 0.676 0.094 
Made in Group? Leaders 0 1 . . 
Knowledge of Loan  Yes 0.442 1.556 0.470 0.347 
Use No 0 1 . . 
How do You  Peer Pressure 0.176 1.192 0.659 0.789 
Enforce Repayment Court Action 0 1 . . 
Is group able to   Yes -0.277 0.758 0.538 0.606 
Influence Loan Use No 0 1 . . 
How Does Group  V. Effective 0.778 2.177 1.029 0.450 
Enforce Repayment Somewhat Eff. -0.381 0.683 0.626 0.542 
 Not Effective 0 1 . . 
Group Liability the    Strongly agree -0.686 0.504 0.865 0.428 
Optimum Way of Doing  Agree -1.276 0.279 0.549 0.020 
Microfinance Disagree 0 1 . . 
Link function: Logit.      
Source: Fieldwork Data, 2007/08 
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Appendix 4: Definition of Concepts and Operational 
Definitions 
 
 
4.1A Operational Definition of Microfinance 
Throughout the paper, the term ‗microfinance‘ is used to designate the provision of 
financial (and non-financial) services to the poor who have no access to traditional 
financial resources. Microfinance, as used in this study, refers to financial (and non-
financial) services provided by formal establishments
90
 or organisations. Financial 
services include loans, savings, insurance and money transfer services.  Some non-
financial services provided are financial management and education in health and 
nutrition.  For a more comprehensive analysis of microfinance see section 2.2. 
 
4.2A Differentiating between Microfinance Institutions and Microfinance 
Interventions  
This study liberally uses the terms ‗microfinance institutions‘ and ‗microfinance 
interventions‘. It is important to make the distinction between the two to avoid any 
misunderstanding. In this study a microfinance institution denote formal 
establishments or organisations whose primary purpose is to dispense microfinance 
services. For example although the Barclays Bank (Ghana) provides some form of 
microfinance services, it is not a microfinance institution because its primary purpose 
is not to provide microfinance services. On the other hand SAT is a microfinance 
institution because it was set up purposely to provide microfinance services. 
 
Microfinance interventions refer to programmes that provide microfinance services.  
Microfinance interventions can be provided by microfinance institutions, orthodox 
financial institutions or can be a component of a development intervention
91
. For 
example Nsoatreman Rural Bank operates multiple microfinance interventions:  
NWEP, the Susu scheme and other microfinance services on behalf of the government 
and other agencies. In sum microfinance institution refers to an organisation while 
microfinance intervention represents programmes of the organisation. 
 
4.3A Rurality Defined  
There seem to be no consensus of what constitutes a rural area. In the developed 
world such as the United States, population density and degree of isolation (distance 
from an urban area) have been used as defining criteria for rural areas (AMCHP, 
2004; Crandal and Weber, 2005). In developing countries population size, availability 
of basic amenities, main economic activity, and socio-economic characteristics are a 
few of the features that have been used to define rural areas (Owusu, 2005; Muula, 
2007). A community is deemed to be rural if it lacks basic social amenities such as  
pipe-borne water, electricity, motorable roads, educational facilities and healthcare 
facilities. The main occupation of rural communities in developing countries is 
agriculture (crop and livestock production), fishing and forestry (Khan, 2000). 
Markets in rural settlements are usually poor and characterised by fluctuations in 
demand as a result of seasonal influences. Social relations in rural areas are usually 
                                                 
90
 Formal establishment refers to institutions with clearly defined hierarchical structure which is not 
based on personal relationships.   
91
 For example, World Vision International provides microfinance as one of its numerous development 
interventions.  
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based on kinship ties and there is a high degree of familiarity among residents in a 
rural area. Kinship networks may also determine residential patterns. Cohesion and 
integration in the community is a result of homogeneity based on occupation and 
lifestyle.  
 
In Ghana, however, a rural area is officially defined as a settlement with population of 
less than 5000. This official definition has existed since 1957 when the population of 
the country was about 6 million (Adlakha, 1996). Ghana‘s population has almost 
quadrupled to 23.8 million (CIA, 2008) since then. Population increase has led to 
increase in rural populations without much corresponding changes in other indicators 
that characterises rurality. This has created a lot of large rural settlements in Ghana. 
Such settlements have populations over ten thousand but still retain other vestiges of 
rurality.   
 
Muula (2007) has argued that definitions should reflect what motivates the 
classification. Since the interest of this thesis lies in finance, income-generating 
activities, and the socio-cultural context of the rural poor, the basis for classifying a 
settlement as rural will be main occupational activity, socio-cultural patterns and 
markets.  
 
 
4.4A Poverty Outcomes 
Microfinance interventions affect poverty reduction at the individual, household and 
at the enterprise level (Hulme, 2000; Johnson et al., 2002). Studies at the individual 
level of analysis have mostly concentrated on the issue of empowerment, especially 
for women. Individuals as units of analysis are easily defined and identified but 
effects of interventions usually transcend individuals and therefore do not enable the 
researcher to capture much of the effects of interventions (Hulme, 2000). Regarding 
businesses, it is relatively easy to calculate the effects of microfinance on businesses 
especially if factors such as profitability and returns to investment are indices.  
Assessment at the enterprise level is quite problematic in rural areas because it is 
usually difficult to distinguish between an enterprise and other household activities. It 
is also now widely acknowledged that targeting microfinance resources at particular 
occupations or businesses is a futile exercise because of the fungibility of financial 
resources (Zeller et al., 1997). Evidence shows that service users adapt loans to use 
them for a variety of purposes such as medical expenses, funerals and school fees. 
Assessing the impact of access to microfinance services at the household level takes 
care of the issue of fungibility because when financial resources are diverted from 
their original purpose they ultimately end up in the household. Indeed some 
researchers have argued that permitting the allocation of financial resources by 
service users usually implies optimality in allocation and use of microfinance 
resources (Hulme, 2000). Households as units of assessment are not without 
problems. In some rural areas it is difficult to delineate the membership of a 
household. For instance, is the household the nuclear or the extended family? 
Employing the household as a single unit of impact assessment fails to take into 
consideration unequal access to resources in the household.  
 
The study was primarily interested in the effect of microfinance interventions on 
households because of its advantages over other units of assessment when measuring 
poverty reduction. Household is defined to reflect the context of the area of study: a 
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group of people who eat from the same pot. The household in rural Ghana usually 
transcends the nuclear family. The study mainly household outcome variables were 
mostly related to consumption. Interviews to assess people‘s perception of poverty 
were mostly related to consumption such as not having enough food to eat, lack of 
decent clothing and not being able to participate in public ceremonies. Compared to 
income which could be accrue to a household but could be mismanaged, consumption 
had a direct impact on households. Business outcomes were included in the study to 
understand how the effect of microfinance on businesses in a rural area. Another 
important reason for its inclusion was because microfinance discourse places 
emphasis on effects on businesses: microloans are invested in businesses to generate 
extra income. For business outcomes the study included variables that measured 
expansion and improvement in businesses.   
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Appendix 5: Map of Ghana 
 
 
Source: Ghana Geological Survey 
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Appendix 6: Map Showing Nsoatre in the Sunyani District 
 
 
Source: Sunyani District Assembly Planning Department.  
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Appendix 7: Interview Guide   
 
The interview guide was used to collect data especially in the implementation 
processes of the interventions.  The study employed semi-structured interview format.  
The interviews, on the average, lasted for about one hour.  
 
Prior to the use of the interview guide interview guide, interviewees were expected to 
provide bio-demographic information such as age, marital status, occupation, number 
of dependents (if any). This information should give a good picture of service users 
and their households in general.  
 
Interview Guide 
 
I. Group Liability Scheme 
 
1. How did you become a member of your group? 
2. How long have you been together? (Probe: how is group sustained? dropouts?) 
3. How often do you meet? If you do, tell me about such meetings? 
4. What is the relationship between your group and the institution? 
5. What change(s) will you like to see in your group? 
6. What do you particularly like about your group?  
 
II. Targeting Women 
 
1. What is your opinion about targeting women only?  
2. To what extent has access to financial services influenced your relationship 
with spouse, members in the community, etc?  
3. What do you like about being targeted as a woman? (what don‘t you like?) 
4. How can targeting of women be improved? 
 
III. Minimalist/Credit-Plus 
1. Apart from financial services, can you identify other services that the 
institution offers? (Probe: offers training on group activities, setting up 
business, technical advice?). If any, how helpful were they? 
2. Did you have any non-financial services from the institution? (explain) If yes. 
What were they?  
3. In your opinion, do/did you require any non-financial services? (explain 
further)    
4. What non-financial services will you like the institution to provide and why? 
 
 
IV. Interest Rates 
1. What is the interest rate charged/given on loan/savings? What is your opinion 
about that? 
2. Do you borrow money from elsewhere? If yes, how does it (interest rate) 
compare with what is charged elsewhere? 
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V. Implementation 
1. Can you describe your relationship with staff of institution? (probe for any 
irregularities, e.g. bribery, favouritism, high-handedness, etc) 
2. How are loans disbursed? 
3. Can you tell me about the process of accessing savings (compulsory schemes)/ 
what does the process of saving and withdrawal entail? 
4. What is the level of involvement of staff with use of financial services (probe: 
do staff have any influence on how service users apply financial services?) 
 
 
Services  
 
V. Loans 
1. How do you describe access to credit facilities? (probe: easy, competitive, 
complicated, rationed etc). 
2. What features do you require in a loan? (explain: convenience, proximity, size, 
promptness, 
3. How important are loans to you?  
4. What are the repayment requirements of the institution and your repayment 
experience?  
5. What have you primarily used the loan(s) for? (seek clarification for multiple 
use for different cycles). 
6. Is that what you intended to use loan(s) for? If not, what is the reason?  
 
 
VI. Savings  
1. What type of savings services does your institution offer? (explain: 
compulsory, voluntary or both) 
2. How often do you use savings facilities? If not why? 
3. Which one do you prefer, voluntary or compulsory and why?  
4. What do you like about savings facilities offered ? 
5. What will you like to change if you had a chance? 
 
 
V. People’s Conception of Poverty  
1. In your opinion what is poverty? (how does it manifest?) 
2. What are the characteristics of a poor household? 
3. How will you describe status of your household before you joined the 
intervention? 
4. Are there any changes in your household that can be attributed to the 
intervention? 
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Appendix 8: Questionnaire for NRB & SAT Service Users 
 
Background and Personal Information 
 
1. Name………………………………………………………………. 
2. Age:   < 21 ( ) :  21-30 ( ) :  31-40 ( ) :  41-50 ( ):  51-60 ( ):  > 60 ( ) 
3. Marital Status: single ( ): married ( ): divorced ( ): widow/widower ( ): 
common-law ( ): other (specify)…………………………………………….... 
4. Occupation of Spouse (specify):……………………………………………… 
5. Level of Education: none ( ): primary sch. ( ): middle sch. ( ): sec. sch ( ): 
other (specify) …………………………………… 
6. Number of Children (no. of dependent children/wards): 0 ( ): 1-2 ( ): 3-4 ( ): 5-
6( ): 7-8 ( ): > 8 
7. Do you borrow from other sources?: yes ( ): no ( ) 
7a. If yes, from what source(s)? & details:…...…………………………………….  
8. Indigene of town: yes ( ): no ( )  
9. Type(s) of business(es):………………………………………………………...  
9a. If more than one business, what is your main business?..................................... 
10. Amount of time spent on business:…………………………………………….. 
11. Time (year) joined scheme (number of cycles): ……………….……………… 
 
Group Activities and Dynamics 
 
12. What is the name of your group?:………………………………………………  
13. How was your group formed?: 
………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
14. How many members are in your group?: ……………………………………… 
15. How are decisions made in the group?: group consensus ( ): by leaders ( ): by 
MF staff ( ): other (specify) …………………………………………………… 
16. How does your group enforce repayments? ………………….………………... 
17. Do you know how other members use their funds?: no ( ): yes ( ):                   
other 
(specify)……………………………………………………………………… 
18. Is the group able to influence other members in the ―proper‖ use of funds?: yes 
( ) : no ( ): other (specify)………………………………………………………. 
19. How do you rate GL as a method of enforcing payment? : very effective ( ): 
effective ( ): not effective ( ): other (specify): …………………………………. 
20. Using GL is an optimum means of doing MF?: strongly agree ( ): agree ( ): 
disagree ( ): other (specify) ……………………………………………………. 
 
Minimalist\Credit-Plus  
21. Do you know any non-financial services provided by the 
scheme?:………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
21a. If any, how will you describe these non-financial services?:  beneficial ( ): 
not beneficial ( ): other (specify)…………………………………………………… 
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………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………... 
21b. If any, mention two things you like most about these financial services: 
……….. ………………………………….………………………………………... 
22. (if any)mention two things you will like least about the non-financial 
services:………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Lending and Interest Rates  & Perception of MFI 
 
23. Amount of last loan: ………………………………………………………….. 
24. Are loans usually disbursed on schedule?: no ( ): yes ( ): other (specify)…….. 
25. Do you usually receive loans at periods convenient for your business and other 
purposes? yes ( ): no ( ): other (specify)………………………………………. 
26. Do you (sometimes) use loans for other purposes? (such as paying school fees, 
hospital bills etc):  no ( ): yes ( ): other(specify)…..........................…………. 
27. Do you keep your business money separate from money for personal or 
household expenses? 
28. Have you encountered any difficulty in servicing your loans?: no ( ): yes ( ): 
other (specify) ……………………………………………………………… 
29. Does your savings attract any interest?: yes ( ): no ( ): don‘t know ( ): other 
(specify)……………………………....................................................................
..... 
30. How do you assess the savings scheme of the MF scheme overall?: 
satisfactory ( ) : moderately satisfactory ( ): not satisfactory ( ): other 
(specify)……………………………………………………………………… 
31. How do you rate the scheme?: very beneficial ( ): beneficial ( ); not beneficial 
( ): other (specify)……………………………………………………………… 
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     Effect on Business 
As a result of being with 
the scheme, did you 
make any of the 
following changes so 
that your business could 
earn more income or be 
more productive? 
Very much Somewhat Not at all Other  
(specify) 
Expanded size of business     
Added new products 
 
    
Hired more workers 
 
    
Reduced costs by buying 
in greater volume or at 
wholesale prices 
    
Improved quality of 
business products 
    
Developed new 
businesses 
    
Increased business assets     
 
 
     Effect on Household 
How has your 
participation in the 
scheme enabled you to do 
the following 
Very much Somewhat Not at all Other  
(specify) 
/N/A 
Contributed/increased 
contribution to household 
finances/income 
    
Contributed/increased 
contribution to education of 
children 
    
Enabled household cope 
during the lean season 
    
Acquired long-term assets 
(building, building plot, 
farmland etc) 
    
Contributed to the 
acquisition of household 
assets ( TV., tape etc) 
    
Increase the ability to cope 
with household emergencies 
    
Make/increase household 
savings 
    
 
 
